2026:HHC:21796 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA. CMP(M) No. 841 of 2026 & LPA No. 333 of 2026 Date of decision: 03.06.2026 State of H.P. & Ors. …Appellants Versus Saini Ram …Respondent Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice G. S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice. The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bipin C. Negi, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? For the Appellants: Mr. Pranay Pratap Singh, Additional Advocate General. G. S. Sandhawalia , Chief Justice (Oral) The present time barred appeal is sought to be entertained by the State by filing an application for condonation of delay, whereby the office has calculated the delay to be of 2 years 30 days against the judgment passed in CWPOA No. 7629 of 2020, titled as Saini Ram vs. State of H.P. & Ors., dated 04.04.2024, filed by the employee Saini Ram (respondent herein). 2. The learned Single Judge had come to the conclusion that the petitioner was entitled to regularization on completion of 10 years of service as Cook against the said post and his regularization was ordered with all consequential benefits on notional basis upto three years, preceding the date of filing of 2 2026:HHC:21796 the writ petition, after which date the actual monetary benefits were applicable. 3. The learned Single Judge found that the employee had been working in the Boys Hostel, Government Post Graduate College, Dharamshala, H.P. since 2007 and initially he had been appointed on consolidated salary of Rs. 9,000/- per month. The petitioner had put in 17 years of his life in service and no decision had been taken regarding regularization of his service and at the time of filing of the petition he was 48 years old and keeping in view the law laid down by the Apex Court in Mool Raj Upadhayay vs. State of H.P. & Ors., 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 316, he was held entitled to regularization after completion of 10 years of service. 4. Counsel for the State has been fair enough to point out that in similar circumstances two other appeals bearing LPA No. 175 of 2026, titled as State of H.P & Ors. vs. Ramesh Chand and LPA No. 176 of 2026, titled as State of H.P. & Ors. vs. Nasib Singh @ Chuhru Ram, decided on 31.03.2026, have already been dismissed on same ground by us on the ground of delay, wherein after noticing the factum of the inaction of the State as such, the following findings have been recorded:- “5. The above facts would go on to show that the State has been lackadaisical in going ahead in pursuing the 3 2026:HHC:21796 appeal, as it took them over a year to take remedial steps. 6. In Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and another (2010) 5 SCC 459, wherein it has been held that in absence of any plausible and tangible explanation for long delay, there was no valid reason to condone the delay. 7. In Chief Postmaster General and others versus Living Media India Limited and another (2012) 3 SCC 563, it has been held that liberal concession may have to be adopted, but the department cannot take advantage of its own impersonal machinery and they have to perform the duty with diligence and commitment and condonation of delay is an exception. 8. In Esha Bhattacharjee versus Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others (2013) 12 SCC 649, the principles of limitation were culled out as under: “i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice- oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation. iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 4 2026:HHC:21796 iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 5 2026:HHC:21796 xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.” 9. Therefore, for the reasons given above, we dismiss the application for condonation of delay in the absence of sufficient cause. Resultantly, the appeal is also dismissed. 5. In the present case also, the situation is only much worse, since those appeals were barred by 1 years 337 days and 1 year 295 days respectively. Sufficient cause to condone the delay has been sought to be made out in similar matter in Nasib Singh’s case (supra), which arose out of CWPOA No. 7631 of 2020, titled as Nasib Singh vs. State of H.P. & Ors., and was decided on the same date i.e. 04.04.2024. The decision had been examined at various level at Directorate of Higher Education and sent to the Government College Dharamashala, District Kangra, H.P. on 18.09.2024 and detailed facts had been submitted on 30.10.2024. The matter was then examined at Directorate level and only sent to the government for directions on 21.03.2025 6 2026:HHC:21796 and the government conveyed the approval on 23.04.2025 and the same was received in the Legal Cell two days later on 25.04.2025. Thereafter, certified copy of the judgment was received on 21.11.2025 and was sent to College Branch on 25.11.2025, and then referred back by the same to take up the matter with general branch. The LPA was only drafted on 16.02.2026. 6. Apparently, there is no action as such which has been taken after 04.04.2024 on which date at least three similar cases were decided by the learned Single Judge and after five months, the Directorate of Higher Education sent the file to Government Degree College Dharamshala on 18.09.2024. Thereafter, there has been unexplained delay till 21.03.2025, when the matter was sent to Government and even the certified copy was only received on 21.11.2025, which was applied only on 15.11.2025, after 1 ½ years of the order being passed. 7. The State rather than acting in consolidated manner, when the three appeals on same issue have been decided, from the same institute and from the same Directorate, is not able to consolidate its litigation and in spite of the fact that it is not one case but three cases, which shows total apathy at the hands of the litigation branch as from November, 2025, after receiving the certified copy also, the appeal could not be filed till March, 2026. At various levels, the delay has taken place. 7 2026:HHC:21796 8. Resultantly, keeping in view the earlier position in connected two matters reproduced above, we are of the considered opinion that no case is made out to entertain the application for condonation of delay. 9. Therefore, for the reasons given above, we dismiss the application for condonation of delay in the absence of sufficient cause. Resultantly, the appeal is also dismissed. (G. S. Sandhawalia) Chief Justice (Bipin C. Negi) 3rd June, 2026 Judge (sanjeev)