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2026 DAILYLAW 11413 (CHH)

B. L. Gangwani v. Lineshwar Joshi

ACQA/204/2017 · 2026-05-05

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Judgment text

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1 2026:CGHC:21236 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 204 of 2017 B. L. Gangwani S/o Baliram Gangwani Aged About 59 Years R/o Mig 11, Sector 3, Shankar Nagar, P.S. Civil Lines Raipur Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant(s) versus 1 - Lineshwar Joshi S/o Late B.L. Joshi Aged About 35 Years R/o Hosue No. 15, Near Garden, Avanti Vihar Telibandha Raipur Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh 2 - State Of Chhattisgarh, Trhough The District Magistrate Raipur Chhattisgarh,, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Ms. Laxmin Tondey, Advocate. For Respondent No.2/State : Ms. Ritika Verma, Panel Lawyer. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Judgment on Board 06/05/2026 1. The present acquittal appeal is filed being aggrieved by the order dated 16.06.2014 passed by the learned Special/Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur in Criminal Revision No. 308/2013, whereby 2 the criminal revision preferred by the appellant seeking restoration of Complaint Case No. 162/2012 has been dismissed and the order dated 27.04.2013 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur has been affirmed. 2. Prosecution story, in brief, is that the appellant had filed a complaint against the respondent, Lineshwar Joshi, under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act on 16.09.2011. The said complaint was duly registered, and after the appearance of the respondent, notice of offence under Section 138 of the Act was framed on 16.04.2013. Thereafter, the case was fixed for recording of complainant’s evidence on 27.04.2013. On the said date, due to the absence of the complainant, the complaint was dismissed by the trial Court. Subsequently, the appellant moved an application on 05.06.2013 before the trial Court seeking restoration of the complaint, however, the same was rejected on the ground that there exists no legal provision for restoration of a criminal complaint once it has been dismissed in default. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant preferred criminal revision bearing CRR No.308 of 2013 before the Court of Special/Additional Session Judge, Raipur (C.G.) contending that the order of dismissal is erroneous, the said criminal revision was dismissed vide order dated 16.06.2014 giving rise to the present appeal. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned orders passed by the learned trial Court as well as the revisional Court are illegal and liable to be set-aside, as the appellant had sufficient cause for his non-appearance before the trial Court. On all previous 3 dates, the appellant or his counsel had remained present, and it was only on the first date fixed for evidence that the appellant could not appear due to illness. Despite this, the learned trial Court dismissed the complaint for want of prosecution without properly appreciating the circumstances. She further submits that the learned trial Court failed to assign any cogent reason for dismissing the complaint case except noting the absence of the appellant. The Courts below have acted mechanically and without considering the settled legal position governing dismissal of complaint cases in default. She also submits that the learned revisional Court erred in dismissing the revision on the ground that the appellant had not informed the trial Court about his absence, whereas there was no occasion to do so at that stage. The Courts below ought to have considered the sufficient cause shown by the appellant for his absence on 27.04.2013 and allowed the revision accordingly. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the State / respondent supports the impugned judgment and submits that learned trial Court has rightly dismissed the complaint filed by the complainant, which has been affirmed by the learned revisional Court. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 6. It is not in dispute that the complaint filed by the appellant / complainant under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was fixed for recording of complainant’s evidence on 27.04.2013. On 4 the said date, neither the complainant nor his counsel appeared before the trial Court. In such circumstances, the learned Magistrate, invoking the provisions of Section 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, dismissed the complaint. 7. From perusal of the record, it is evident that no application seeking exemption from appearance or adjournment was filed on behalf of the appellant on the said date. The grounds now urged, such as illness of the appellant and absence of counsel due to engagement elsewhere, were not brought to the notice of the trial Court at the relevant point of time. The responsibility to remain present or to duly inform the Court of inability to appear squarely lies upon the complainant. Failure to discharge such duty cannot be lightly condoned. The learned revisional Court has elaborately considered the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant and has recorded a categorical finding that no sufficient cause was demonstrated for non-appearance on the relevant date. It has further been held that once the complaint stood dismissed under Section 256 Cr.P.C., there exists no provision for its restoration. This Court finds no infirmity in the said reasoning. 8. In the present case, the appellant has failed to demonstrate any illegality, perversity, or miscarriage of justice in the impugned orders so as to warrant interference by this Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. 5 9. It is also to be noted that the incident relates to the year 2014 and the appeal has remained pending for more than a decade. The matter has thus become considerably old and stale with the passage of time. In such circumstances, unless a clear case of perversity or gross miscarriage of justice is demonstrated, interference with an order of acquittal after such a prolonged lapse of time would not be warranted. 10. Accordingly, the acquittal appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Ramesh Sinha) Chief Justice Akhil