Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
APHC010408902026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH (Special Original Jurisdiction) Tuesday, the twenty second day of September, two thousand and twenty six The Honourable Ms. Justice B. S. Bhanumathi Civil Revision Between:
1. G. Venkataramana, S/o. Late Narayanappa, Age: 73 years, R/o. D.No.12-1-555, Ananthapuram. 2. G. Vasudevarao, S/o. Narayanappa, Age: 70 years, R/o. Gandhi Bazar, Bellary, Karnataka State. 3. G. Seshappa, S/o. Late Kondepalli Village, Tadipatri Mandal, Ananthapuramu District. 4. G. Ganesh Chowdary, S/o. Late Narayanappa, Aged: 67 years, Occ: Office Assistant, R/o. Priya Foods, Karimnagar, Telangana State. 5. G. Vidhya Sagar, S/o. R/o. D. No. 12 Ananthapuram district. 6. G. Vijayalakshmi, W/o. P. Lakshmayya, Aged: 58 years, R/o. Tilak Nagar, Guntakal, Ananthapuram district. 7. Prabhavathi, W/o. G. Venkataram Cultivation, Rayalacheruvu village, Putluru Mandal, Ananthapuram District. 8. Suseela, W/o. Eswaraiah, Age: 55 years, R/o. Jangampalli Village, Yellanuru mandal, Ananthapuram district. 9. Lakshmamma, W/o. Prasad, Aged: 54 years, R/o. Yerraguntapalli Village, Tadimarri mandal, Ananthapuram district. IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) Tuesday, the twenty second day of September, two thousand and twenty six Present The Honourable Ms. Justice B. S. Bhanumathi Civil Revision Petition No. 2175 of 2026 G. Venkataramana, S/o. Late Narayanappa, Age: 73 years, R/o. 555, Ananthapuram. G. Vasudevarao, S/o. Narayanappa, Age: 70 years, R/o. Gandhi Bazar, Bellary, Karnataka State. G. Seshappa, S/o. Late Narayanappa, Aged: 68 years, R/o. Kondepalli Village, Tadipatri Mandal, Ananthapuramu District. G. Ganesh Chowdary, S/o. Late Narayanappa, Aged: 67 years, Occ: Office Assistant, R/o. Priya Foods, Karimnagar, Telangana G. Vidhya Sagar, S/o. Late G. Narayanappa, Aged: 64 years, R/o. D. No. 12-1-555, Ashok Nagar, Ananthapuram, Ananthapuram district. G. Vijayalakshmi, W/o. P. Lakshmayya, Aged: 58 years, R/o. Tilak Nagar, Guntakal, Ananthapuram district. Prabhavathi, W/o. G. Venkataramudu, Aged: 57 years, Occ: Cultivation, Rayalacheruvu village, Putluru Mandal, Ananthapuram District. Suseela, W/o. Eswaraiah, Age: 55 years, Occ: Cultivation, R/o. Jangampalli Village, Yellanuru mandal, Ananthapuram , W/o. Prasad, Aged: 54 years, R/o. Yerraguntapalli Village, Tadimarri mandal, Ananthapuram
[3311] Tuesday, the twenty second day of September, two thousand and twenty six G. Venkataramana, S/o. Late Narayanappa, Age: 73 years, R/o. G. Vasudevarao, S/o. Narayanappa, Age: 70 years, R/o. Gandhi Narayanappa, Aged: 68 years, R/o. Kondepalli Village, Tadipatri Mandal, Ananthapuramu District.
G. Ganesh Chowdary, S/o. Late Narayanappa, Aged: 67 years, Occ: Office Assistant, R/o. Priya Foods, Karimnagar, Telangana Late G. Narayanappa, Aged: 64 years, 555, Ashok Nagar, Ananthapuram, G. Vijayalakshmi, W/o. P. Lakshmayya, Aged: 58 years, R/o. udu, Aged: 57 years, Occ: Cultivation, Rayalacheruvu village, Putluru Mandal, : Cultivation, R/o. Jangampalli Village, Yellanuru mandal, Ananthapuram , W/o. Prasad, Aged: 54 years, R/o. Yerraguntapalli Village, Tadimarri mandal, Ananthapuram
2 BSB, J C.R.P. No. 2175 of 2026
10. G. Sarala, W/o. Narasimha, Aged: 50 years, R/o. Reddyvaripalem Village, Tadipatri mandal, Ananthapuram district. 11. Salamma, W/o. Naidu, Aged: 85 years, Occ: Cultivation, R/o. Kondapalli Village, Tadipatri mandal, Ananthapuramu district. 12. G. Umadevi, W/o. late G. Venkata Ramana, Aged: 70 years, R/o. D. No.12-2-75, Ashok Nagar, Ananthapuram. 13. G. Rajesh, S/o. Late G.Venkata Ramana, Aged: 45 years, R/o. D. No.12-2-75, Ashok Nagar, Ananthapuram. 14. G. Rajini, W/o. Late G.Venkata Ramana, Aged: 43 years, R/o. D. No.12-2-75, Ashok Nagar, Ananthapuram. ...Petitioners and
1. Gandikota Savithri, W/o. G. Subbarayudu, Aged: 65 years, R/o. Mandia Subba Reddy Colony, Kakkalapalli Village, Ananthapuram Rural Mandal, Ananthapuram district. 2. V. Chowdamma, W/o. V. Hanumanna, Aged: 65 years, R/o. Mandia Subba Reddy Colony, Kakkalapalli Village, Ananthapuram Rural Mandal, Ananthapuram district. 3. C. Ramanjineyulu, S/o. G. Giriyappa, Aged: 70 years, R/o. Mandla Subba Reddy Colony, Kakkalapalli Village, Ananthapuram Rural Mandal, Ananthapuram district. 4. C. Ramanjineyulu, S/o. Sunkanna, Aged: 75 years, R/o. Mandia Subba Reddy Colony, Kakkalapalli Village, Ananthapuram Rural Mandal, Ananthapuram district. 5. C. Nagaraju, S/o. C. Pedda Kullayappa, Aged: 65 years, R/o. Mandla Subba Reddy Colony, Kakkalapalli Village, Ananthapuram Rural Mandal, Ananthapuram district. 6. V. Venkata Reddy, S/o. V. Nagi Reddy, Aged: 77 years, R/o. Mandla Subba Reddy Colony, Kakkalapalli Village, Ananthapuram Rural Mandal, Ananthapuram district. 7. K. Sivalingeswara Prasad, S/o. Venkatesulu, Aged: 60 years, R/o. Mandla Subba Reddy Colony, Kakkalapalli Village,
3 BSB, J C.R.P. No. 2175 of 2026 Ananthapuram Rural Mandal, Ananthapuram district. 8.
M. Sudhakar, S/o. M. Narappa, Aged: 65 years, R/o. Mandla Subba Reddy Colony, Kakkalapalli Village, Ananthapuram Rural mandal, Ananthapuram district. 9. Dhussainamma, W/o. D. Moulali, Aged: 65 years, R/o. Mandla Subba Reddy Colony, Kakkalapalli Village, Ananthapuram Rural Mandal, Ananthapuram district. 10. K. Amarun, W/o. K.Jeelan Basha, Aged: 65 years, R/o. Mandla Subba Reddy Colony, Kakkalapalli Village, Ananthapuram Rural Mandal, Ananthapuram district. 11. V. Lal Mohan, S/o. V.Chowdanna, Major, R/o. Mandla Subba Reddy Colony, Kakkalapalli Village, Ananthapuram Rural Mandal, Ananthapuram district. 12. V. Sanjeev Kumar, S/o. V. Chowdanna, Major, R/o. Mandla Subba Reddy Colony, Kakkalapalli Village, Ananthapuram Rural Mandal, Ananthapuram district. 13. Anitha, W/o. Nagendra, Major, R/o. Mandla Subba Reddy Colony, Kakkalapalli Village, Ananthapuram Rural Mandal, Ananthapuram district. 14. Government of Andhra Pradesh, rep. by its District Collector, Ananthapuram, Ananthapuramu district. 15. Revenue Divisional Officer, Ananthapuram, Ananthapuram district. 16. Tahsildar, Ananthapuram, Ananthapuramu district. 17. Mamilla Vasanthi, W/o. M. Subbarayudu, Aged: 67 years, R/o. Mandla Subba Reddy Colony, Kakkalapalli Village, Ananthapuram Rural Mandal, Ananthapuram district. 18. C. Chandrayudu, S/o. C. Narappa, Aged: 75 years, R/o. Mandla Subba Reddy Colony, kakkalapalli Village, Ananthapuram Rural Mandal, Ananthapuram district. 19. C. Narayana Swamy, S/o. C.Sunkanna, Aged: 75 years, R/o. Mandla Subba Reddy Colony, Kakkalapalli Village, Ananthapuram Rural Mandal, Ananthapuram district. 4 BSB, J C.R.P. No. 2175 of 2026
20. C. Nagamuniyamma, W/o. C. Venkata Swamy, Aged : 65 years, R/o. Mandla Subba Reddy Colony, Kakkalapalli Village, Ananthapuram Rural mandal, Ananthapuram district. 21. T. Venkata Lakshmi, W/o. T. Narayana Swamy, Aged: 67 years, R/o. Mandla Subba Reddy Colony, Kakkalapalli Village, Ananthapuram Rural Mandal, Ananthapuram district. 22. Shaik Noor Basha, S/o. Shaik Peera Sab, Aged: 70 years, R/o. Mandla Subba Reddy Colony, Kakkalapalli Village, Ananthapuram Rural Mandal, Ananthapuram district. 23. Shaik Madar Sab, S/o. S. Mahaboob, Aged: 75 years, R/o. Mandla Subba Reddy Colony, Kakkalapalli Village, Ananthapuram Rural Mandal, Ananthapuram district. 24.
J. C. Ramadasu, S/o. J. C. Chennappa, Aged: 70 years, R/o. Mandla Subba Reddy Colony, Kakkalapalli Village, Ananthapuram Rural Mandal, Ananthapuram district. 25. A. Tajuddin, S/o. A. Mahaboob Basha, Aged: 71 years, R/o. Mandla Subba Reddy Colony, Kakkalapalli Village, Ananthapuram Rural Mandal, Ananthapuram district. ...Respondents
Counsel for the petitioners : Atchyutananda Dondeti Counsel for the respondents : Ravi Teja Padiri
5 BSB, J C.R.P. No. 2175 of 2026 ORDER:
This revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is filed against the order, dated 14.07.2026, allowing I.A. No.175 of 2026 in O.S. No.115 of 2010 on the file of the Court of the Principal Civil Judge (Senior Division), Ananthapuramu, filed under Order VIII, Rule 1A (3) C.P.C. to receive the following three (3) documents as evidence on behalf of the petitioners / defendants 1 to 13. Sl. No. Document 1 Registration extract of sale deed bearing NO.2522 / 41, dated 19.12.1941, with respect to the land, as stated in the plaint schedule property, executed by Mangala Kishtappa and Ramanijineyulu in favour of Akuledu Chidambaramma, W/o. Pulla Reddy. 2 Served copy of the plaint in O.S. No. 23 / 2023 on the file of the Special Sessions Judge / SC/ST –cum- Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ananthapuram. 3 Notice of summons issued by the SC / ST Court, Ananthapuram, to the 38th defendant, namely, K.P. Ajay in O.S. No. 23 / 2023. 2. The respondents Nos. 1 to 14 / plaintiffs filed the suit against the petitioners and the other respondents Nos. 18 to 27 for declaration of title and recovery of possession of the suit schedule property pleading, briefly stated, that Gonuguntla Narayanappa purchased the suit schedule property under a registered sale deed, dated 22.04.1967, and after his death, the property devolved upon his wife, Gonuguntla Lakshmamma. Gonuguntla Lakshmamma also died 1 ½ years before
6 BSB, J C.R.P. No. 2175 of 2026 filing of the suit and thus, the plaintiffs Nos.
1 to 10 alone became owners having succeeded the property of G.Narayanappa and G.Lakshmamma. It is further pleaded that by way of gift deed, dated 16.05.1985, executed in favour of Salama, plaintiff No.11, which was acted upon, the plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 11 are residing jointly and enjoying the plaint schedule property with absolute right, title with interest and possession. But, the defendants Nos.4 to 22 started disturbing the plaintiffs’ right and possession by raising huts in the property naming it as Mandla Subbareddy colony and further proclaiming that the government promised them to issue pattas for the property and also that the defendants Nos. 1 to 3 have nothing to do with the property. b. The suit was resisted by filing a written statement of the defendant No.3 and also another written statement of the defendant No.12. It was pleaded that the land in Sy. No. 30 admeasuring Ac.13.10 cents of Kakkalapalli village is Mangal Inam as per the revenue records and there is no recorded evidence as to how the land in Sy. No. 30 admeasuring Ac.5.09 cents was transferred in the name of Gonuguntla Naidu and moreover, there are no entries made in the village accounts about conversion of mangal inam into ryotwari patta. The other pleadings are not relevant for the purpose of disposal of this revision petition. 3.
Pending the suit, I.A. No. 175 of 2026 was filed stating that the petitioners and the other co-defendants, besides some other persons, occupied the plaint schedule property to some extent and that the petitioners pleaded that the plaint schedule property is inam land notified as government land and later, the petitioners and others constructed permanent houses therein and the Municipal Corporation, Ananthapuram, assigned door numbers to the houses and the electricity
7 BSB, J C.R.P. No. 2175 of 2026 department provided service connections to the houses and the government named the area as ‘Mandla Subbareddy colony’ and further intended to grant house site patta and the petitioners participated in the elections with the said addresses. It is further mentioned that the list documents are very necessary to prove the case set out in the written statement and for deciding the rival claims of the parties. 4. The petition was opposed by filing counter of the respondents 1 to 14 / plaintiffs denying the statements made in the affidavit annexed to the petition and further stating that the petitioners did not state the relevancy of the documents in their affidavit nor did they plead about the documents in the written statement and therefore, the documents cannot be received in evidence without proper pleading. It is also contended that the document No.1 is an old document, yet there is no reference of it in the written statement and further the recitals in the document are incorrect and it must have been brought up by the petitioners. With regard to the copy of the plaint sought to be filed, it is stated that it is irrelevant to the present suit since the plaintiffs in that suit have no right in the present plaint schedule property and moreover, the petitioners did not state anything about the alleged right of the plaintiffs in O.S. No. 23 of 2023.
I.A. No. 175 of 2026 is further opposed on the ground that the suit is reopened for the purpose of adducing evidence on the issue of mandatory injunction and therefore, the proposed documents which are irrelevant for the said issue shall not be permitted to be received. 5. A counter of respondent No.17 was filed opposing the petition stating that the documents sought to be filed will not affect the right of the government and the documents need not be considered in the light of the written statement filed by this respondent. 8 BSB, J C.R.P. No. 2175 of 2026
6. After hearing both the parties, the trial Court allowed the petition on the ground that the matter cannot be completely adjudicated on merits unless the documents are permitted to be placed in evidence and moreover, no prejudice would be caused to the petitioners (sic. respondents / plaintiffs) to establish their case. However, since there is delay in filing the petition, the trial Court imposed nominal costs of Rs.200/- payable on or before 20.07.2026 to the respondents failing which the petition stands dismissed. 7. Aggrieved by the order, this revision petition was filed. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently contended that the proposed documents have no substance in the pleadings or do they have any relevance to the issues. It is further submitted that since the evidence was reopened for the limited purpose, the proposed documents cannot be allowed at this juncture. 9. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents / petitioners in I.A. No. 175 of 2026 submitted that the plaintiffs filed, along with the plaint, documents at Sl. Nos.1 to 6 besides the pleaded documents at Sl. Nos.7 & 8 etc., but failed to produce the document No.1 now proposed to be filed which is most relevant for the deciding the issue regarding the nature of the property.
He further submitted that the document No.3 is a summon relating to the document No.2 and whereas the document No.2 is relevant not just that the plaintiffs herein are the parties to it, but regarding the fact that the pleadings similar to the one taken in defence by the petitioners / defendants is the same in the plaint in O.S. No. 23 of 2023. He has drawn the attention of this Court to the pleadings taken in the written statement of the defendants Nos. 1 to 14 regarding the nature of the land in Sy. No. 3, i.e., mangal
9 BSB, J C.R.P. No. 2175 of 2026 inam in respect of the very same property and the document at Sl. No. 1 exactly relates to the very same land and therefore, it is frivolous to contend that the documents proposed to be filed have no relevance to the property in dispute and have no basis in the pleadings. That apart, he placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Mohammed Abdul Wahid Vs. Nilofer and another1, wherein at paragraphs Nos. 37 & 38, it was held as to the scope of the settled law regarding the documents to be received in evidence basing on pleas required to be stated in the pleadings. Paragraphs Nos. 37 & 38 read as under:-
“37. It is settled law that what is not pleaded cannot be argued, as for the purposes of adjudication, it is necessary for the other party to know the contours of the case it is required to meet. It is equally well settled that the requirement of having to plead a particular argument does not include exhaustively doing so. We may refer to Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College [(1987) 2 SCC 555] (2-Judge Bench), wherein it was observed as follows:
“6.... It is well settled that in the absence of pleading, evidence, if any, produced by the parties cannot be considered.
It is also equally settled that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleading and that all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by it. The object and purpose of pleading is to enable the adversary party to know the case it has to meet. 1 (2024) 2 Supreme Court Cases 144
10 BSB, J C.R.P. No. 2175 of 2026 To have a fair trial it is imperative that the party should settle the essential material facts so that the other party may not be taken by surprise. The pleadings however should receive a liberal construction; no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair-splitting technicalities. Sometimes, pleadings are expressed in words that may not expressly make out a case in accordance with a strict interpretation of the law. In such a case the court must ascertain the substance of the pleadings to determine the question. It is not desirable to place undue emphasis on form, instead, the substance of the pleadings should be considered. Whenever the question about lack of pleading is raised the enquiry should not be so much about the form of the pleadings; instead, the court must find out whether in substance the parties knew the case and the issues upon which they went to trial. Once it is found that in spite of deficiency in the pleadings, parties knew the case and they proceeded to trial on those issues by producing evidence in that event it would not be open to a party to raise the question of absence of pleadings in appeal....”
38.
We may also refer to Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia [(1977) 1 SCC 511], wherein a bench of two learned judges observed:
11 BSB, J C.R.P. No. 2175 of 2026
“25...If the plea or ground of defence "raises issues of fact not arising out of the plaint", such plea or ground is likely to take the Plaintiff by surprise, and is therefore required to be pleaded. If the plea or ground of defence raises an issue arising out of what is alleged or admitted in the plaint, or is otherwise apparent from the plaint, itself, no question of prejudice or surprise to the plaintiff arises. Nothing in the Rule compels the defendant to plead such a ground, not debars him from setting it up at a later stage of the case, particularly when it does not depend on evidence but raises a pure question of law turning on a construction of the plaint.”
That apart, he has also referred to the following decisions:- (i) Sugandhi (dead) by L.Rs Vs. P. Rajkumar2, wherein it was held at paragraph No. 9 as follows:
“9. It is often said that procedure is the handmaid of justice. Procedural and technical hurdles shall not be allowed to come in the way of the court while doing substantial justice. If the procedural violation does not seriously cause prejudice to the adversary party, courts must lean towards doing substantial justice rather than relying upon procedural and technical violation. We should not forget the fact that litigation is nothing but a journey towards truth which is the foundation of justice
2 (2020) 10 SCC 706
12 BSB, J C.R.P. No. 2175 of 2026 and the court is required to take appropriate steps to thrash out the underlying truth in every dispute.”
(ii) Garment Craft (India) (P) Ltd. Vs. Prakash Chand Goel 3, wherein the Supreme Court held at paragraph No.16 as follows:
“16. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227, this Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd. [(2001) 8 SCC 97] has observed:
6.
The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in a number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this Article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do the duty expected or required of them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in
3 (2022) 4 SCC 181
13 BSB, J C.R.P. No. 2175 of 2026 place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal has come to.”
(iii) Shalini Shyam shetty Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil4, wherein the Supreme Court laid down the following principles at paragraph No.49 as follows:
“49. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different.
(b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or
4 (2010) 8 SCC 329
14 BSB, J C.R.P. No. 2175 of 2026 Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh Vs. Amarnath (AIR 1954 SC 215) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, 'within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them.
(g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and
15 BSB, J C.R.P. No. 2175 of 2026 manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Ors. reported in [(1997) 3 SCC 261] and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu.
(l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict
16 BSB, J C.R.P. No. 2175 of 2026 administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.”
(iv) Mohd. Yunus Vs. Mohd. Mustaqim 5, wherein it was held at paragraph No. 7 as follows:-
5 (1983) SCC 566
17 BSB, J C.R.P. No. 2175 of 2026
“7. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited "to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority," and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less an error of law. for this case there was, in our opinion, no error of law much less an error apparent on the face of the record.
There was no failure on the part of the learned Subordinate Judge to exercise jurisdiction nor did he act in disregard of principles of natural justice. Nor was the procedure adopted by him not in consonance with the procedure established by law. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or Tribunal. It will not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior court or tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the decision.”
(v) R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder Vs. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple6, wherein it was held at paragraph No. 29 as follows:-
“29. In a suit for recovery of possession based on title it is for the plaintiff to prove his title and satisfy the Court that he, in law, is entitled to dispossess the defendant from his possession over the suit property and for the possession to be restored with him. However, as held in A. Raghavamma and Anr. v. Chenchamma and Anr., [1964] 2 SCR 933, there is an essential distinction
6 (2003) 8 SC 752
18 BSB, J C.R.P. No. 2175 of 2026 between burden of proof and onus of proof: burden of proof lies upon a person who has to prove the fact and which, never shifts. Onus of proof shifts. Such a shifting of onus is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence. In our opinion, in a suit for possession based on title once the plaintiff has been able to create a high degree of probability so as to shift the onus on the defendant it is for the defendant to discharge his onus and in the absence thereof the burden of proof lying on the plaintiff shall be held to have been discharged so as to amount to proof of the plaintiffs title.”
10.
The learned counsel for the revision petitioner also placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Mohammed Abdul Wahid (supra). 11. The provision of Order VIII, Rule 1A (3) C.P.C. reads as under:- 1A. Duty of defendant to produce documents upon which relief is claimed or relied upon by him. (1) Where the defendant bases his defence upon a document or relies upon any document in his possession or power, in support of his defence or claim for set off or counter claim, he shall enter such document in a list, and shall produce it in court when the written statement is presented by him and shall, at the same time, deliver the document and a copy thereof, to be filed with the written statement. 19 BSB, J C.R.P. No. 2175 of 2026 (2) Where any such document is not in the possession or power of the defendant, he shall, wherever possible, state in whose possession or power it is. (3) A document which ought to be produced in Court by the defendant under this rule, but, is not so produced shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit.”
A reading of the above provision does not indicate the petitioner has to state the reason as to why a document in respect of which leave to be granted shall be stated to grant such leave. A wide discretion is given to a Court. Of course, the discretion shall be properly exercised depending upon the facts and circumstances in each case. The petitioner stated the reason for not filing these documents along with the written statement. 12. As rightly contended by the respondents / petitioners in I.A. No 175 of 2026, the property covered by the proposed document at Sl. No.1 is the same as is referred in the written statement.
It is the document relating to the genesis of the nature of the property. It is very much essential to adjudicate the dispute in the suit in the light of the defence taken by these defendants. Since it is only granting leave to file the documents, the question of appreciation of evidence therein does not arise at this juncture, however, the learned counsel for the respondents / plaintiffs contended many things about the documents which contentions are not relevant to be discussed as they relate to appreciation of evidence. 13. Insofar as the documents at Sl. Nos. 2 & 3 are concerned, since they were not in existence as on the date of filing of the written
20 BSB, J C.R.P. No. 2175 of 2026 statement, there is no possibility for their reference in the written statement. They are relevant only to the extent of similarity of defence and causing prejudice. The knowledge of the plaintiffs about suit is not in dispute. In fact, the plaintiffs in O.S. No. 23 of 2023 are also parties in O.S. No.115 of 2010. 14. The further contention that reopening of evidence is for a limited purpose is concerned, though the scope of reopening may be for a particular purpose, the evidence sought to be produced is not extraneous to it, since mandatory injunction is connected to the title of which, in turn, is connected to the issue of the nature of property and its conversion into patta land, which is the core issue in the case for the purpose of determining the title of the parties. Copy of the order reopening the evidence is not before this Court. 15. As such, there is no merit in the revision petition. 16. Accordingly, the revision petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed. __________________ B.S. BHANUMATHI, J Dt.
22.09.2026 RAR Whether the order is: Speaking Yes/No / Reasoned Yes/No Reportable Yes/No / Non-Reportable Yes/No