APHC010291452019 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3521] WEDNESDAY, THE 23rd DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2026 PRESENT THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 977/2019 Between: 1. BURADA VENKATA RATNAM,, D/O SATYANAYRARANA PARUDU AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS, OCC HOUSEHOLD DUTIES, D. NO. 24-9- 1/2, KADIRI DANAPPA STREET, KOTA VEEDHI, VISHAKHAPATNAM DISTRICT. ...PETITIONER AND 1. STATE OF AP, REP.BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT BUILDINGS, AMARAVATHI, GUNTUR DISTRICT. 2. KANTUMUCHU SRINIVASA RAO AVULA CHINNA, S/O SATYANANDAM, EMPLOYEE IN VISHAKAPATNAM POT TRUST, AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS, R/O 24-9-10, KADIRI DANAPPA STREET, KOTA VEEDHI, VISHAKHAPATNAM DISTRICT. 3. KANTUMCHU SANATAN, 5/0 SATYANANDAM AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS, R/O 24-9-10, KADIRI DANAPPA STREET, KOTA VEEDHI, VISHAKHAPATNAM DISTRICT. 4. KANTUMUCHU ANANDA, S/O SATYANANDAM AGED 48 YEARS, R/O 24-9-13, KADIRI DANAPPA STREET, KOTA VEEDHI, VISHAKHAPATNAM DISTRICT, PRESENTLY R/O 39-10-36/1, MURA NAGAR, MADHVOARA, VISHAKHAPARNAM -7 5. KANTUMUCHU TIRUMALAGIRI, S/O SATYAMNANDAM AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS, R/O 24-9-10, KADIRI DANAPPA STREET, KOTA VEEDHI, VISHAKHAPATNAM DISTRICT. PRESENTLY RESIDING OF 39-10-36/1, MURALI NAGAR, MADHVDARA, VISHAKHAPATNAM -7 2 6. KADIRI ADANNA, S/O NOT KNOWN, EMPOLYEE PORT TRUST, AAGED 52 YEARS, R/O 24-9-10, KADIRI DANAPPA STREET, KOTA VEEDHI, VISHAKHAPATNAM DISTRICT. 7. KADIRI SATYAVATHI, W/O ADANNA, NOT KNOWN, EMPOLYEE PORT TRUST, AGED 48 YEARS, R/O 24-9-10, KADIRI DANAPPA STREET, KOTA VEEDHI, VISHAKHAPATNAM DISTRICT. ...RESPONDENT(S): Counsel for the Petitioner: 1. S A V RATNAM Counsel for the Respondent(S): 1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (AP) 2. ELEVATED AS JUDGE 3. C PRAKASH REDDY 3 The Court made the following: ORDER: The Criminal Revision Case has been preferred under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘the Cr.P.C.’) challenging the Judgment dated 29.07.2019 in Criminal Appeal No.145 of 2014 on the file of the II Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Visakhapatnam, whereby and whereunder the Judgment dated 22.07.2014 in C.C.No.No.792 of 2009 on the file of the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Visakhapatnam, acquitting respondent Nos.2 to 7 of the alleged charges punishable under Sections 448 and 323 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for brevity, ‘the I.P.C.’), was confirmed. 2. Heard the learned counsel for petitioner, the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor and the learned counsel for respondent Nos. 2 to 7. 3. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for both sides. I have perused the entire record. 4. Now the point for consideration is: “Whether Judgment dated 29.07.2019 in Criminal Appeal No.145 of 2014 on the file of the II Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Visakhapatnam, whereby and whereunder the Judgment dated 22.07.2014 in C.C.No.No.792 of 2009 on the file of the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Visakhapatnam, acquitting respondent Nos.2 to 7 of the alleged charges punishable under Sections 448 and 323 read with 34 of ‘the I.P.C.’ was confirmed, is correct, legal, and proper with respect to its finding, sentence, or judgment, and there are any material irregularities? and to what relief?” 4 5. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v State of Bihar1 at Paragraph Nos.12 & 13 held as under: “. We have carefully considered the material on record and we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in reappreciating the evidence on record and coming to a different conclusion in a revision preferred by the informant under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub-section (3) of Section 401 in terms provides that nothing in Section 401 shall be deemed to authorize a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. The aforesaid sub-section, which places a limitation on the powers of the revisional court, prohibiting it from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, is itself indicative of the nature and extent of the revisional power conferred by Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the High Court could not convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction directly, it could not do so indirectly by the method of ordering a retrial. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the High Court will ordinarily not interfere in revision with an order of acquittal except in exceptional cases where the interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice. The High Court will not be justified in interfering with an order of acquittal merely because the trial court has taken a wrong view of the law or has erred in appreciation of evidence. It is neither possible nor advisable to make an exhaustive list of circumstances in which exercise of revisional jurisdiction may be justified, but decisions of this Court have laid down the parameters of exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in an appeal against acquittal by a private party. (See D. Stephens v. Nosibolla [1951 SCC 184 : AIR 1951 SC 196 : 1951 Cri LJ 510] , K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of A.P. [AIR 1962 SC 1788 : (1963) 1 Cri LJ 8] , Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram [(1973) 2 SCC 583 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 903] , Pakalapati Narayana Gajapathi Raju v. Bonapalli Peda Appadu [(1975) 4 SCC 477 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 543 : AIR 1975 SC 1854] and Mahendra Pratap Singh v. Sarju Singh [AIR 1968 SC 707 : 1968 Cri LJ 665] .) 6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in D. Stephens v Nosibolla2 at Paragraph No.10 held as under: “The revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under S. 439, Cr.P.C., is not to be lightly exercised, when it is invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal, against which the Govt. has o right of appeal under S. 417. It could be exercised only in exceptional 1(2002) 6 SCC 650 2AIR 1951 SC 196 5 cases where the interests of public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality, or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. This jurisdiction is not ordinarily invoked or used merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view of the law or mis- appreciated the evidence on record.” 7. The Hon’ble Apex Court in K.Chinnaswamy Reddy v State of AP3, at Paragraph No.7 held as under: “7. It is true that it is open to a High Court in revision to set aside an order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal; but this jurisdiction should in our opinion be exercised by the High Court only in exceptional cases, when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. Sub-section (4) of S. 439 forbids a High Court from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction and that makes it all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not, convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering retrial when it cannot itself directly convert a finding of acquittal into a finding of conviction. This places limitations on the power of the High Court to set aside a finding of acquittal in revision and it is only in exceptional cases that this power should be exercised. It is not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies. We may, however, indicate some cases of this kind which would in our opinion justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision. These cases may be: where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the accused, or where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce. or where the appeal court has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial court or by the appeal court, or where the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offence, which is invalid under the law. These and other cases of similar nature can properly be held to be cases of exceptional nature, where the High Court can justifiably interfere with an order of acquittal; an in such a case it is obvious that it cannot be said that the High Court was doing indirectly what it could not do directly in view of the provisions of S. 439 (4). We have, therefore, to see whether the order of the High Court setting aside the order of acquittal in this case can be upheld on these principles.” 3AIR 1962 SC 1788 6 8. In Jagannath Chowdhary v. Ramayan Singh4, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while elaborating upon the ambit of revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ lucidly articulated that such power is inherently discretionary, but the discretion must be exercised judiciously, never arbitrarily. Judicial discretion, as the Court emphasized, must be “informed by tradition, methodised by analogy and disciplined by system,” thereby, confining its invocation to circumstances of glaring procedural defects, manifest errors of law, or flagrant miscarriage of justice. The revisional forum is not an appellate tribunal for re-scrutiny of evidence or substitution of possible alternative views, its application is restrictive, reserved for exceptional situations where correction of illegality or prevention of gross injustice is imperative. The Court further clarified that while the High Court retains supervisory authority over subordinate courts, both administratively and judicially, the jurisdictional sweep under Section 401 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ remains circumscribed. In the facts under consideration, the High Court was held to have transgressed its revisional limits by setting aside an acquittal and directing a fresh judgment, which constituted a significant departure from the normal course of revisional adjudication. 9. Keeping in view of all the principles laid down in the judgments referred supra, I shall proceed to decide this Revision Case without there being any iota of re-appreciation of evidence by sitting like a second appellate court. This Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 397 read with Section 401 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ cannot invoke it’s revisional power as a Second Appellate 4AIR 2002 SC 2229 7 Court and re-appreciation of evidence is not possible in the revision case as laid down in the decisions in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh and Jagannath Chowdhary supra. However, this Court is not denuded of its powers to examine whether judgments impugned are correct, legal and proper with respect to their findings, sentence or even judgment and there are any material irregularities. If there are manifest illegalities and interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of those manifest illegalities or to prevent a great miscarriage of justice, this Court is empowered to evaluate the evidence and analyze it and come to a just conclusion. 10. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Hussainara Khatoon (IV) v. Home Secretary State of Bihar 5 held that right to speedy trial which includes hearing of the Appeal and Revision is part of a Fundamental Right under Article 21 of the Constitution. In addition to the appeals, the right to a speedy trial also includes criminal revisions as per the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajdeo Sharma v. State of Bihar6. The right of speedy trial of the revisionist is being violated because of delay in disposal of the revision within a reasonable time. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner reiterated the grounds of the Revision, but the issues relating to all those grounds were categorically answered by the learned Trial Court and further confirmed by the learned Appellate Court. This Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence of the 5AIR 1979 SC 1360 6 (1999) 7 SCC 604 8 witnesses of the prosecution by sitting as a second Appellate Court as per the judgments cited supra. 12. There are no merits in the present Criminal Revision Case as the learned Appellate Court has rightly appreciated and examined the evidence of the witnesses of the prosecution, and confirmed the Judgment of acquittal of the learned Trial Court. The grounds of revision are unsustainable, as there were no material irregularities in the order passed by the learned Appellate Court and the learned Trial Court, and it is not in flagrant violation of justice. Therefore, the revision case is liable to be dismissed. 13. In the result, the Criminal Revision Case is dismissed, confirming the Judgment dated 29.07.2019 in Criminal Appeal No.145 of 2014 on the file of the II Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Visakhapatnam. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall stand closed. _________________________ DR. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J Date: 23.09.2026 DRNR/VMM 9 110 THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.977 of 2019 Date:23.09.2026 DRNR/VMM