1 2026:CGHC:1103-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 969 of 2025 Subodh Mishra S/o Shri Devchandra Mishra Aged About 46 Years R/o Mahamaya Automobiles Pali, District- Korba Chhattisgarh, ... Appellant versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary (Revenue) Department of Revenue Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar Raipur, District- Raipur Chhattisgarh, 2 - Collector Korba District- Korba (Chhattisgarh) 3 - Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue) Katghora Tehsil Katghora District- Korba Chhattisgarh, 4 - Officer In Charge Land Acquisition Branch Korba District- Korba Chhattisgarh, 5 - The South Eastern Coal Fields Limited Through Its Chairman Cum Managing Director, SECL Head Quarters, Seepat Road Bilaspur Chhattisgarh, 6 - The Chief General Manager South Eastern Coal Fields Limited, Korba Area, Korba, Chhattisgarh, ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Kabeer Kalwani, Advocate For Respondents/State : Mr. Praveen Das, Addl. Advocate General For Respondents/SECL : Mr. Pankaj Singh, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Arvind Kumar Verma , Judge ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA Digitally signed by ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA 2 Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 0 8 .01 .2026 1 Heard Mr. Kabeer Kalwani, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Praveen Das, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the respondents/State and Mr. Pankaj Singh, learned counsel, appearing for the respondents/SECL. 2 By way of present writ appeal under Section 2 of Sub-Section (1) of the Chhattisgarh High Court (Appeal to Division Bench Act, 2006, the appellant, who was writ petitioner in the writ petition, has challenged the order dated 03.11.2025 passed by learned Single Judge in WPC No.6776/2007 (Subodh Mishra Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Others), by which the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner/appellant herein has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge. 3 Brief facts necessary for disposal of this appeal are that the petitioner by way of writ petition bearing WPC No. 6776 of 2007 has challenged the land acquisition proceeding No. 10-A/82/2009- 05 including notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on the ground that Land Acquisition Officer failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of the Act, 1894. Taking into consideration the fact that award has been passed by the Land Acquisition Officer on 06.09.2007, prior to filing of the writ petition and same has not been challenged in the 3 said writ petition, the learned Single Judge has dismissed the said writ petition vide impugned order dated 03.11.2025 as not maintainable. However, the petitioner was granted liberty to take recourse to law. Being aggrieved by the said order passed by the learned Single, the instant appeal has been preferred by the writ petitioner/ appellant. 4 Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that the learned Single Judge erred in dismissing the writ petition solely on the ground that an award dated 06.09.2007 had been passed prior to the filing of the writ petition, without examining the jurisdictional defects and statutory violations relating to Part VII, Section 5-A, and the invalidity of the notifications. He further submits that jurisdictional errors cannot be cured by the mere passing of an award. He also submits that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that when the acquisition is fundamentally void due to non-compliance with mandatory statutory provisions, the existence of an award does not bar the challenge. A void process cannot culminate in a valid award. Hence, the writ petition was maintainable. 5 On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents/State as well as learned counsel, appearing for respondents/SECL vehemently opposed the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant and submitted that the appellant’s submissions are wholly misconceived and contrary to settled law. The learned 4 Single Judge rightly dismissed the writ petition on the sole and sufficient ground that the award dated 06.09.2007 had been passed prior to the filing of the writ petition. They further submit that it is well settled that once an award is passed, the acquisition proceedings attain finality and cannot be reopened in writ jurisdiction, save in exceptional cases of fraud or total lack of jurisdiction, neither of which is pleaded or established here. The appellant’s attempt to label alleged procedural lapses under Part VII or Section 5-A as “jurisdictional defects” is merely an afterthought to overcome the bar against post-award challenges. They also submit that the contention that a void process cannot culminate in a valid award is wholly inapplicable in the absence of any demonstrated lack of authority or statutory nullity. Once the award is passed, the land vests in the State free from all encumbrances, and the writ petition was rightly held to be not maintainable. 6 We have considered the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7 It is not in dispute that the award in the present case was passed on 06.09.2007, much prior to the filing of the writ petition. The challenge to the acquisition proceedings was, therefore, clearly post-award. The law is well settled that once an award is passed, the land acquisition proceedings attain finality and the land vests absolutely in the State free from all encumbrances. Interference in 5 writ jurisdiction after passing of the award is permissible only in exceptional circumstances such as fraud or a demonstrable and inherent lack of jurisdiction. No such exceptional circumstance has been pleaded or established by the appellant. 8 The alleged non-compliance with Part VII or Section 5-A of the Act, even if assumed for the sake of argument, would not render the acquisition void ab initio. Such contentions pertain to procedural irregularities which ought to have been raised at the appropriate stage and cannot be permitted to be agitated after the proceedings have culminated in an award. The attempt of the appellant to characterize the alleged statutory violations as jurisdictional defects is misconceived and appears to be an afterthought to circumvent the settled bar against post-award challenges. In the absence of any statutory nullity or lack of authority, the contention that a void process cannot culminate in a valid award is inapplicable to the facts of the present case. 9 In view of the above discussion, we find no infirmity in the order passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition as not maintainable. The appeal is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Arvind Kumar Verma) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Chandra