2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA CWP No: 1990 of 2015 And CWP No 3128 of 2015. Reserved on: 30.05.2026 Decided on: 04.06.2026 1. CWP No. 1990 of 2015. Union of India and others ...Petitioners Versus Trilochan Dass Dogra ….Respondent __ 2. CWP No. 3128 of 2015. Trilochan Dass Dogra ...Petitioner Versus Union of India and others ...Respondents Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ranjan Sharma, Judge 1Whether approved for reporting? Yes For the Petitioners : Mr. Balram Sharma, Deputy Solicitor General of India with Mr. Rajeev Sharma, Advocate, in CWP No.1990 of 2015. For the Respondent : Mr. Jeevesh Sharma Advocate, in in CWP No. 1990 of 2015. And For the Petitioner : Mr. Jeevesh Sharma Advocate, in in CWP No 3128 of 2015. For the Respondents : Mr. Balram Sharma, Deputy Solicitor General of India with Mr. Rajeev Sharma, Advocate, in CWP No. 3128 of 2015. Ranjan Sharma, Judge Union of India and others, being the petitioners in CWP No 1990 of 2015, have assailed the order dated 30.09.2014 [Annexure P-5], [referred to as the Impugned Order], passed by the Learned 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 2 - Central Administrative Tribunal [referred to as the Tribunal], whereby, the dismissal orders passed on 14.02.2008, were modified by making it effective from date of passing fresh rejection orders on 17.11.2011, with direction to consider his case for compassionate allowance, in case, the respondent-employee files an application for the same; and the connected petition i.e. CWP No 3128 of 2015, has been filed by Trilochan Dass Dogra, having been dismissed from post of Sub-Postmaster, assailing the Impugned Order passed by the Learned Tribunal on 30.09.2014 [Annexure P-5] upholding his dismissal from service; with the prayer for quashing and setting aside the Impugned Order passed by Tribunal ; with the prayer to reinstate him in service with all consequential benefits or to pass such other orders or directions, as may be necessary in facts and circumstances of this case. FACTUAL MATRIX IN CWP No 3128 OF 2015: 2. Petitioner-employee, Trilochan Dass Dogra, had set up a case that he joined service as a Postal Assistant on 17.01.1983 and was promoted as a Sub-Postmaster. It is averred that while he 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 3 - was posted in Sub-Post Office Sarimolag, in District Kangra, he was detained by the police on 23-03-2003 and FIR was registered against him on 24-03-2007 vide FIR No 56/2007 on 24-03-2007 under Section 409 IPC. Due to registration of FIR, petitioner was placed under suspension on 26-03-2007 [Annexure A-4] and his headquarters were fixed at Palampur on 30.03.2007. 2(i). Respondent No 4-Superintendent of Post Offices Dharamsala being the disciplinary authority issued a Charge-sheet on 15.06.2007 [Annexure A-5] levelling three allegations against the petitioner. The first charge as per Article-I was that petitioner had booked one Registered Parcel No 4630 on 5.3.2007 and had shown its dispatch to Pathankot Railway Mail Service on 5.3.2007 but this parcel was actually dispatched on 6.3.2007 which was alleged to be non- compliance of Rule 53 and Rule 136 of the Postal Manual. The second charge was that the petitioner was alleged to have booked another Registered Parcel No 4664 on 21.03.2007 and he failed to dispatch the same to the Pathankot Railway Mail Service or 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 4 - Palampur Headquarters on same day and this parcel was dispatched on 22.03.2007, which was alleged to be violation of Rule 171(3) and Rule 186 of the Postal Manual. The third charge consisted of four sub-charges and as per Charge no III (i), petitioner was alleged to have booked a Registered Parcel No 4669 on 23-03-2007, and failed to enter particulars thereof in receipt side of Parcel Abstract. In terms of Charge no III (ii), the petitioner was alleged to have falsified relevant records regarding Registered Parcel No 4669 booked on 23.03.2007. Charge no III (iii) alleged that petitioner had left office during working hours without permission in violation of Rule 62 of Postal Manual, Volume-III and Rule 21(3) of Postal Manual Volume VI, Part-1. The Charge No III (iv) alleged that the petitioner was alleged to have tampered with the Registered Parcel No 4669, containing answer sheets of 10+2 Examination, which were booked by Centre Superintendent Examination of GSSS Sarimolag and two answer sheets, relating to the son of petitioner and daughter of Radha Devi, GDS Packer posted in Sub Post Office Sarimolag were recovered from the 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 5 - residence of the petitioner. 2(ii). It is averred that departmental authorities intended to prove these allegations on the basis of 22 documents listed in Article-III of the Charge-sheet and by examining 9 witnesses as mentioned in Annexure-IV to the charge sheet dated 15.06.2007 [Annexure A-5]. In-response to the Charge-Sheet dated 15.06.2007, petitioner submitted defence statement on 13.07.2007, denying the charges to be wrong and false. Resultantly, one Shri R.S. Rana was appointed as Inquiry Officer on 02.08.2007, who conducted the Inquiry {though in violation of rules} and the Inquiry Officer submitted the Inquiry Report on 4.1.2008, with the findings that all Charges were proved, as petitioner had admitted Charge No 1 & II before the Inquiry Officer on 18.08.2007 and even Charge no III (i) to (iv), which were denied, by pleading not guilty, stood proved against the petitioner. 2(iii). It is averred that on receipt of Inquiry Report dated 4.1.2008 [Annexure A-7] on 7.1.2008 the Respondent no 4-disciplinary Authority, gave an opportunity to the petitioner to submit representation 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 6 - against the Inquiry Report. The petitioner submitted a representation on 1.2.2008 [Annexure A-8], denying the findings in the Inquiry Report to be perverse with the plea that the charges were not proved on the basis of oral or documentary evidence. It was averred that since the teachers had snatched the registered parcel by trespassing into the post office and these teachers had taken away the parcel outside the post-office, then, the case under Section 382 IPC ought to have been registered against these teachers. It was averred that even Raghubir Singh, a Part Time Chowkidar specifically stated that the parcel fell down in the scuffle between petitioner and two teachers. So far as Charges no I and II are concerned, the petitioner stated that the non- dispatch of registered parcel no 4630 on 5.3.2007 and registered parcel no 4664 dated 21.03.2007 were by way of inadvertence. So far as Charge no III, alleging the petitioner to have tampered parcel no 4669 on 23.03.2007 as per the statement made by Radha Devi (SW-3) during preliminary inquiry, it was submitted that aforesaid Radha Devi had 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 7 - made another statement that one Shri Suram Singh Banyal (Preliminary Inquiry Officer) had forced her to depose against the petitioner, in a room and that too in absence of the petitioner. It was averred that the allegations regarding tampering, fabrication of record and the recovery of answer sheets could not be attributed when, petitioner had not resorted to any such acts, as petitioner was detained by the police on 23.03.2007 and the alleged recovery of answer sheets was made by the police, in his absence allegedly from his residence on 24.03.2007 highly suspicious. It was averred that statement of SHO disproved the allegations. It was averred that Chairman and Secretary of School Education Board, SDM concerned and Principal of GSSS Sarimolag who had participated in verification of the parcel containing the answer-sheets were not examined. It was stated that the teacher Shri Om Prakash Rana (SW-5) had strained relations with the petitioner and his son and therefore, false accusation was made against the petitioner. Other contradictions were pointed out in the representation, which ran into 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 8 - 74 pages, with the request to give personal hearing also. 2(iv). Respondent No 4, Superintendent of Post Offices Dharamsala-Disciplinary Authority passed the dismissal orders on 14.02.2008 [Annexure A-1], without considering the points raised by petitioner in the representation and without affording a personal hearing to the petitioner. 2(v). Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner submitted an appeal to Director Postal Services, which was rejected on 04.08.2008, [Annexure A-2]. Thereafter a revision was preferred on 16.07.2009, which was also dismissed by Chief Post Master General, Postal Circle, Shimla, on 31.08.2009, [Annexure A-3], with the finding that failure to dispatch three registered parcels, i.e. registered parcel no 4630 on 5.3.2007, parcel no 4664 on 21.03.2007 and parcel no 4669 on 23.3.2007 was violative of Rule 171(3) of Postal Manual and Instructions No 23(2) below Rule 3 of the CCS (Conduct) Rules. 2(vi). The dismissal orders dated 14.02.2008 and the orders dated 04.08.2008 passed by the appellate 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 9 - authority and the orders dated 31.08.2009 passed by the revisional authority were assailed before the Learned Tribunal in O.A. No 900/HP/2010, with the plea that Inquiry was not conducted in accordance with the Rules, the documents were not supplied, personal hearing was not given and the factum of acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal case on 17.08.2011 [Annexure A-12] was ignored by the Authorities with the prayer to set-aside the impugned orders. 2(vii). The aforesaid Original Application, O.A. No 900/HP/2010, was decided by Learned Tribunal on 09.09.2011, [Annexure 3/A], whereby, the dismissal order dated 14.02.2008, and the orders dismissing the appeal dated 04.08.2008 and the orders dated 31.08.2009 dismissing the revision petition, were set-aside with the directions to the Respondent No. 2-Chief Post Master General to pass fresh orders after affording personal hearing and after considering unblemished 24 years of service and the acquittal in criminal case. 2(viii). Incompliance to the orders passed by the 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 10 - Tribunal on 09.09.2011, the petitioner submitted a representation on 01.10.2011 but same was rejected by the Respondent No 2-Chief Post Master General on 17.11.2011, [Annexure A-3/B], by reiterating the dismissal orders. ADVERSIAL ORDERS ASSAILED IN OA No 1323 /HP /2012: 3. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner filed another Original Application, OA No 1323/HP/2012, assailing the Dismissal orders, Appellate orders, Revisional orders and Fresh Rejection orders dated 17.11.2011 asserting that these orders were passed in violation of the procedure under the rules and the principles of natural justice with prayer to set-aside these orders and to reinstate him with all consequential benefits, from the date of deemed suspension on 23.03.2007 in view of his honorable acquittal, with all benefits. STAND OF RESPONDENTS IN REPLY TO ORIGINAL APPLICATION OA No 1323 / HP /2012: 3(i). In Reply to OA No 1323/HP/2012, the Respondents have come up with the stand that Dismissal Orders, Appellate Orders and the Revisional Orders were passed, with due application of mind 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 11 - on the basis of records and documentary evidence. It was stated that the petitioner was found guilty of gross irregularities and falsification of Government records and pursuant to the directions passed by Tribunal on 9.9.2011 in OA 900/HP/2010, petitioner was given personal hearing and thereafter fresh orders were passed on 17.11.2011, reiterating the earlier dismissal dated 14.2.2008. 3(ii). So far as Charges I and II are concerned [with respect to delayed dispatch of Registered Parcel No 4630 on 5.3.2007 and Registered Parcel No 4664 on 21.03.2007], Reply Affidavit states that petitioner had admitted these charges before Inquiry Officer on 18.08.2007 owing moral responsibility. It is averred that so far as Charge No III, including Sub-Charges (i) to (iv) are concerned, the petitioner had denied the charges and had pleaded not guilty [with respect to Registered Parcel No 4669 on 23.03.2007]. It is averred that a Preliminary Inquiry was conducted by Suram Singh Banyal, Inspector Post Offices Baijnath and based on the statements recorded before the Preliminary Inquiry Officer and the deposition made 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 12 - by witnesses in the regular inquiry, the Charge(s) was proved against the petitioner. It was averred that allegations of falsification of records and tampering of Parcel No 4669 on 23.03.2007 and recovery of two answer sheets of 10+2 [relating to the son of petitioner and daughter of another employee] were recovered from the house of petitioner. Reply Affidavit stated that petitioner was guilty of gross misconduct in performance of official duties and therefore, fresh orders were passed on 17.11.2011, after considering the judgement of acquittal passed by Trial Court. Respondents had placed reliance on Annexure R-1 to R-11, i.e. statements and abstract of documents, including decision rejecting the request for supplying documents. In these circumstances, the Respondents have opposed the claim, with prayer for dismissing the petition. REJOINDER TO REPLY FILED IN OA No 1323/ HP/2012: 3(iii). In response to the Reply filed in OA 1323/ HP /2012, petitioner filed a Rejoinder, controverting the stand taken in the reply and reiterating the pleas taken in the OA. 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 13 - IMPUGNED ORDER PASSED BY TRIBUNAL ON 30.09.2014 IN O.A. No 1323 /HP /2012 3(iv). Tribunal decided O A No 1323 / HP /2012, on 30.09.2014, [Annexure P-5], {referred to as the Impugned Order} with the findings [in Para 12] that the charges in the departmental proceedings have been proved and there was no lacuna in conduct of these proceedings; and the findings [in Para 12] that the charge in criminal case was a limited one whereas the charge in departmental proceedings contained additional charges and mere acquittal will not automatically lead to quashing the punishment order; with the findings [in Para 12] that in compliance to earlier orders passed by the Tribunal on 09.09.2011, fresh orders were passed on 17.11.2011 after affording personal hearing by reiterating the dismissal from 14.02.2008, in view of the incident of tampering of records and the act of detaining and delaying the parcel containing answer sheets, which were recovered by the SHO from the residence of the petitioner revealed serious misconduct and misdemeanor on the part of the petitioner and such act did not warrant any leniency; 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 14 - and the findings [in Para 13} that the punishment imposed on the basis of the inquiry conducted as per procedure was not disproportionate. However, the Tribunal passed an order [in Para 13] since the dismissal cannot be retrospective and therefore, the dismissal shall have prospective effect from date of passing of fresh orders on 17.11.2011 and not from the date of passing of earlier dismissal orders on 14.02.2008 ; with directions [in Para 14] that in case, petitioner applies, his case may be considered for grant of compassionate allowance so that petitioner and his family are not rendered destitute. GROUNDS FOR ASSAILING IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 30.09.2014 [ANNEXURE P-5] IN INSTANT PROCEEDINGS: 4. The Impugned Order passed by Learned Tribunal on 30.09.2014, [Annexure P-5], has been assailed, in present petition, on the grounds, firstly, the findings recorded in Para 12 of the Impugned Order that there was no lacuna in conducting the departmental proceedings was erroneous; and secondly, the non-production and non-supply and resultant refusal to furnish un-enlisted documents 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 15 - by incompetent authority has gravely prejudiced him by depriving him of his right to defend and the non -compliance of foundational safeguards vitiates entire proceedings, including penalty; and thirdly, findings recorded in Para 12 of Impugned Order that charges in departmental and criminal proceedings were different and mere acquittal will not automatically result in quashing the punishment was erroneous in law; and findings recorded in Para 12 of the Impugned Order that serious misconduct and misdemeanor in tampering and fabricating records, in delaying dispatch of parcel containing answer sheets, which was recovered by SHO from the residence of petitioner was perverse, is based on ipse-dixit of Inquiry Officer and this charge stands disproved by Trial Court in acquitting petitioner on 17.08.2011 [Annexure A-12]; and fourthly, the findings recorded in Para 13 of the Impugned Order that punishment imposed on the petitioner after due inquiry not disproportionate, is erroneous in law; and even mere admission on Charge No I & II cannot form basis for imposing the harshest penalty of dismissal, by ignoring “relevant factors” is untenable; and in 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 16 - the alternative, action of the Respondents in not regularizing the period of service from the date of passing of the earlier dismissal on 14.02.2008 [which was set-aside by Tribunal on 09.09.2011 in OA No 900/HP/2010] till passing of fresh rejection orders reiterating dismissal on 17.11.2011 is violative of Fundamental Rule 54 with added fact, that once the inquiry suffered from legal non-compliances therefore, resultant proceedings and all adversial orders including penalty of dismissal and its reiteration cannot stand the test of judicial scrutiny. STAND OF THE RESPONDENTS IN INSTANT PROCEEDINGS: 4(i). In instant proceedings {CWP 3128 of 2015} Respondents filed Reply-Affidavit dated 28.09.2015, of Superintendent, Post Office Dharamshala. 5. Heard, Mr. Jeevesh Sharma, Advocate, for petitioner-employee and Mr. Balram Sharma, Learned Deputy Solicitor General of India with Mr. Rajeev Sharma, Advocate, for Respondents-Union of India, in their respective petitions and have gone through the records. 5(i). The judgment in both matters was reserved 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 17 - but since certain points needed clarification from Learned DSGI, therefore, the matter was reheard and the judgment was reserved on 30.05.2026. ANALYSIS: 6. Taking into account the entirety of facts and circumstances and the material on record, this Court is of the considered view, that the Impugned Order passed by the Learned Tribunal on 30.09.2014 [Annexure P-5], without adjudicating the core issue(s) that once the foundational decision making process i.e. departmental inquiry was faulty and bad in law, for violation of service rules and the non-adherence to legal compliances, then, the Impugned Order passed by Learned Tribunal cannot sustain, and consequently, the adversial orders, including order of dismissal of petitioner from service on 14.02.2008 [Annexure A-1] and all subsequent adversial orders are interdicted, by this Court, in view of the analysis, reasons and the discussion made in succeeding paras. 7. Now, this Court proceeds to analyse the contentions of Learned Counsel for the petitioner- employee. 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 18 - 8. First contention of Learned Counsel for the petitioner-employee is that the findings recorded in Para 12 of Impugned Order that there was no lacuna in the conduct of proceedings is erroneous, when, non-adherence to procedure prescribed under the rules and established legal principles was writ large, vitiating the inquiry and the penalty. The above plea has force, for the reason, firstly, that inquiry officer has conducted the inquiry by giving a go-bye to the rules which govern the procedure for conducting inquiry; and secondly, the inquiry officer admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the findings and therefore the inquiry and penalty based on such findings cannot sustain. INQUIRY CONDUCTED IN VIOLATION OF RULE 14 (14): 8(i). Recap of factual matrix reveals that the petitioner was Charge-sheeted under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules by Respondent No 4-Disciplinary Authority on 15.06.2007 [Annexure A-5]. In response to this, petitioner submitted his defence statement on 13.07.2007 denying the allegations. On 2.8.2007, Assistant Superintendent of Posts Una, Shri R S Rana 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 19 - was appointed as Inquiry Officer and Shri Bhupesh Katoch was appointed as the Presenting Officer. The Inquiry Officer conducted the hearing on 18.08.2007, wherein, the petitioner admitted Charge No I and II {delayed dispatch of registered parcels on next day, owing moral responsibility} but so far as Charge III including Sub-Charges (i) (ii) & (iv), the petitioner pleaded not guilty {alleging failure to enter the parcel no 4669 dated 23.03.2007 in receipt side of Parcel Abstract and in not dispatching it to the designated place but in falsifying and tampering the said parcel containing the answer sheets of 10+2 Examination of GSSS Sarimolag, out of which two answer sheets relating to son of the petitioner and daughter of one Radha Devi, GDS Packer of the same post office were recovered from residence of petitioner}. 8(ii). During the course of inquiry on 18.08.2007, the Presenting Officer produced 22 documents {as detailed in Annexure A-III of Charge Sheet} to the Inquiry Officer which were collected from the office of Secretary HPBOSE Dharamsala and from the office of Sub-Record Officer [Pathankot Railway Mail 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 20 - Service}. In addition, these documents also included other records relating to Sub-Post Office Sari-Molag, which were also enclosed with the Reply-Affidavit by the Respondents. The stand taken in Para 1 of the Reply-Affidavit, to the instant writ petition, reads as under: REPLY ON MERITS: ….Further it is submitted that during departmental investigation, it also came to notice that Registered Parcel No 4630 dated 5.3.2007 and 4664 dated 21.03.2007 booked at Molag Sub Post Office containing answer sheets of 10+2 examination of son of the applicant and daughter of Smt. Radha Devi, Gramin Dak Sewak Packer, Molag Sub Post Office along with other candidates were also detained and dispatched on the next dates of their booking. Initially, the petitioner maintained that these parcels were correctly dispatched on the very dates of their booking. But copies of postal receipts of these Parcels obtained from the office of Secretary HPBOSE Dharamsala and those of Parcel lists from Sub Record Officer [Pathankot Railway Mail Service] depicted another story and gross falsification/manipulations 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 21 - in the office record came to light as detailed below:- (i). The Registered Parcel No. 4630 booked on 5.3.2007 as evident from postal receipt [Annexure R-1] was shown booked and dispatched on the same date to Pathankot RMS as per office copy of Parcel List dated 5.3.2007 [Annexure R-2] and parcel abstract dated 5.3.2007 [Annexure R-3]. But the parcel was actually dispatched on 6.3.2007 as entered in the carbon copy of Parcel list dated 6.3.2007 [Annexure R-4] collected from Pathankot RMS, whereas the office copy of said parcel list dated 6.3.2007 carries no entry of the said parcel [Annexure R-5]. (ii). Similarly, Registered Parcel No. 4664 booked on 21.03.2007 [copy of postal receipt enclosed as [Annexure R-6] was dispatched on 22.03.2007 to Pathankot RMS by adopting another Modus Operandi. The Registered Parcel No 4669 was neither shown booked on the said date nor dispatched as evident from the Parcel Abstract. When asked to explain these manipulations, the petitioner could not give any satisfactory explanation….” 8(iii). Perusal of Inquiry proceedings as made available to this Court, indicates that 5 additional 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 22 - documents {dated 23-03-2007 regarding the charge no III, relating to Sub Post Office Sarimolag} were produced by the Presenting Officer before the Inquiry Officer on 29-09-2007. 8(iv). A bare look at the Inquiry Report dated 04-01-2008, {Annexure A-7} reveals that the Inquiry Officer held Charge No III as proved, {at pages 137 to 140 of paper book}, on the basis of documents (i.e. S-9) produced in regular inquiry on 06-11-2007 at the instance of one Shri Suram Singh Banyal, (SW-9) who had collected these documents during the preliminary inquiry in the matter. 8(v). In backdrop of facts in Para 8(i) to 8 (iv) supra, core issue is, as to whether the Inquiry Officer could hold the charge as proved merely by tendering or producing documents without proving contents of such documents and without giving an opportunity to delinquent employee to cross- examine the author or competent person having knowledge of aforesaid document (s)? MANIFEST VIOLATION OF RULE 14 (14): 8(vi). For answering this issue, it is necessary 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 23 - to take note of Rule 14 (14) of CCS (CCA) Rules as under:- (14) On the date fixed for the inquiry, the oral and documentary evidence by which the articles of charge are proposed to be proved shall be produced by or on behalf of the disciplinary authority. The witnesses shall be examined by or on behalf of the Presenting Officer and may be cross-examined by or on behalf of the Government servant. The Presenting Officer shall be entitled to reexamine the witnesses on any points on which they have been cross-examined, but not on any new matter, without the leave of the inquiring authority. The inquiring authority may also put such questions to the witnesses as it thinks fit. MANDATE OF LAW-TENDERING OF DOCUMENTS WITHOUT PROVING SAME CANNOT BE USED AGAINST EMPLOYEE: 8(vii). The issue as to whether mere production or tendering of a document, without proving the contents thereof by examining the witnesses, can be relied upon against an employee in departmental proceedings, stands answered in the negative, by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Roop Singh Negi vs 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 24 - Punjab National Bank and others, (2009) 2 SCC 570 that the mere production of documents is not enough but the contents of the said documents are to be proved by examining witnesses, in following terms: 14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding. The Enquiry Officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the Investigating Officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents.The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the Enquiry Officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence. 15. We have noticed hereinbefore that the only basic evidence whereupon reliance has been placed by the Enquiry 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 25 - Officer was the purported confession made by the appellant before the police. According to the appellant, he was forced to sign on the said confession, as he was tortured in the police station. Appellant being an employee of the bank, the said confession should have been proved. Some evidence should have been brought on record to show that he had indulged in stealing the bank draft book. Admittedly, there was no direct evidence. Even there was no indirect evidence. The tenor of the report demonstrates that the Enquiry Officer had made up his mind to find him guilty as otherwise he would not have proceeded on the basis that the offence was committed in such a manner that no evidence was left. 17. In Moni Shankar v. Union of India and Anr, [(2008) 3 SCC 484], this Court held: 17. The departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial one. Although the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable in the said proceeding, principles of natural justice are required to be complied with. The Court exercising power of judicial review are entitled to consider as to whether while inferring commission of misconduct 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 26 - on the part of a delinquent officer relevant piece of evidence has been taken into consideration and irrelevant facts have been excluded therefrom. Inference on facts must be based on evidence which meet the requirements of legal principles. The Tribunal was, thus, entitled to arrive at its own conclusion on the premise that the evidence adduced by the department, even if it is taken on its face value to be correct in its entirety, meet the requirements of burden of proof, namely-preponderance of probability. If on such evidences, the test of the doctrine of proportionality has not been satisfied, the Tribunal was within its domain to interfere. We must place on record that the doctrine of unreasonableness is giving way to the doctrine of proportionality." 23. Furthermore, the order of the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority are not supported by any reason. As the orders passed by them have severe civil consequences, appropriate reasons should have been assigned. If the enquiry officer had relied upon the confession made by the appellant, there was no reason as to why the order of discharge passed by the Criminal Court on the basis of self-same evidence should not have been taken into consideration. 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 27 - The materials brought on record pointing out the guilt are required to be proved. A decision must be arrived at on some evidence, which is legally admissible. The provisions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable in a departmental proceeding but the principles of natural justice are. As the report of the Enquiry Officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also surmises and conjectures, the same could not have been sustained. The inferences drawn by the Enquiry Officer apparently were not supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof. 8(vii-a). A document which was merely tendered or produced but without it being proved by way of oral evidence cannot be relied upon or used against an employee, stands mandated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh vs Saroj Kumar Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC 772, in the following terms: 28. An inquiry officer acting in a quasi judicial authority is in the position of an independent adjudicator. He is not supposed to be a representative of 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 28 - the department/disciplinary authority/ Government. His function is to examine the evidence presented by the department, even in the absence of the delinquent official to see as to whether the unrebutted evidence is sufficient to hold that the charges are proved. In the present case the aforesaid procedure has not been observed. Since no oral evidence has been examined, the documents have not been proved, and could not have been taken into consideration to conclude that the charges have been proved against the respondents. 8(vii-b). The issue as to whether the contents of a document be treated or held to be proved in the departmental proceedings, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has mandated in State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of Panchayati Raj, Lucknow vs Ram Prakash Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 891, that a document does not become admissible in evidence by its mere production or tendering unless such document was duly proved by examining competent persons who are bound to speak about the veracity of aforesaid documents, in following terms: 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 29 - 9. There could be no iota of doubt that the enquiry in the present case was conducted by the Enquiry Officer in clear disregard of the 1999 Rules relating to conduct of disciplinary proceedings against the employees of the appellant. 12 M/s. Bareilly Electricity Supply Company Limited v. The Workmen and Others is a decision arising from an award under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Law has been laid down therein as follows: “9. … Innumerable statements, letters, balance-sheet, profit and loss account and other documents called for or otherwise were filed on behalf of the appellants. It cannot be denied that the mere filing of any of the aforementioned documents does not amount to proof of them and unless these are either admitted by the respondents or proved they do not become evidence in the case. 14. … But the application of principle of natural justice does not imply that what is not evidence can be acted upon. On the other hand what it means is that no materials can be relied upon to establish a contested fact which are not spoken to by persons who are competent to speak about them and are subjected to 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 30 - cross-examination by the party against whom they are sought to be used. When a document is produced in a Court or a Tribunal the questions that naturally arise is, is it a genuine document, what are its contents and are the statements contained therein true. When the appellant produced the balance-sheet and profit and loss account of the company, it does not by its mere production amount to a proof of it or of the truth of the entries therein. If these entries are challenged the appellant must prove each of such entries by producing the books and speaking from the entries made therein. If a letter or other document is produced to establish some fact which is relevant to the enquiry the writer must be produced or his affidavit in respect thereof be filed and opportunity afforded to the opposite party who challenges this fact.… ” (emphasis ours) 14. What follows from a conjoint reading of the above two decisions is and what applies here is that, ‘materials brought on record by the parties’ (to which consideration in the enquiry ought to be confined) mean only such materials can be considered which are brought on record in a manner known to law. Such materials can then be 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 31 - considered legal evidence, which can be acted upon. Though the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is not strictly applicable to departmental enquiries, which are not judicial proceedings, nevertheless, the principles flowing therefrom can be applied in specific cases. Evidence tendered by witnesses must be recorded in the presence of the delinquent employee, he should be given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and no document should be relied on by the prosecution without giving copy thereof to the delinquent- all these basic principles of fair play have their root in such Act. In such light, the documents referred to in the list of documents forming part of the annexures to the chargesheet, on which the department seeks to rely in the enquiry, cannot be treated as legal evidence worthy of forming the basis for a finding of guilt if the contents of such documents are not spoken to by persons competent to speak about them. A document does not prove itself. In the enquiry, therefore, the contents of the relied on documents have to be proved by examining a witness having knowledge of the contents of such document and who can depose as regards its authenticity. In the present case, no 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 32 - such exercise was undertaken by producing any witness. 8(vii-c). In a recent judgement, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jai Prakash Saini vs Managing Director U P Cooperative Federation Ltd, 2026 SCC Online SC 505, has mandated unless the delinquent admits the charge, the witness would have to be examined to prove the documents, in following terms: 17. From the decisions of this Court in Sur Enamel (supra) and Kharak Singh (supra), followed in Chamoli District Cooperative (supra), which deals with similar service rules as are applicable here, it is now settled that unless the charged employee accepts his guilt in clear terms, an enquiry on the charges drawn against him would have to be held. In the enquiry, the employer/department would have to take steps first to lead evidence against the workmen/delinquent charged and give an opportunity to him to cross examine those witnesses. Only thereafter, the workmen / delinquent shall be asked whether he wants to lead any evidence and/ or submit an explanation about the evidence led against him. Even in a case based solely on documentary evidence, unless the relied upon documents 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 33 - are admitted by the charged employee, a witness would have to be examined to prove those documents and when so examined, the witness would have to be tendered for cross- examination. Facts and material on record indicate that the department sought to rely upon 22 “Enlisted Documents” as mentioned in Annexure-III of Charge- sheet dated 15-06-2007, primarily relating to Charge no I & II and these documents were submitted to Inquiry Officer by the Presenting Officer on 18.08.2007. Thereafter, Presenting Officer submitted 5 Additional Documents relating to Charge no III to the Inquiry Officer on 29-09-2007. Reply-Affidavit(s) also states that “Enlisted and Un-Enlisted Documents” including postal receipts and parcel lists with respect to the Registered Parcel no. 4630 dated 5.3.2007, Registered Parcel No. 4664 dated 21.03.2007 and the Registered Parcel No 4669 dated 23.03.2007 were received from Secretary, HP Board of School Education Dharamsala and from Sub Record Officer, Pathankot Railway Mail Service by the Respondents and these documents were produced in evidence without such documents 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 34 - being proved by oral evidence during the regular inquiry. Even in regular departmental inquiry, though Indian Evidence Act is not applicable stricto-senso, but the principles for admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence and proof of documents is necessary, with the object that employee is not taken aback by relying on material behind his back and even material or document which is sought to be relied upon should not only be produced but proved in evidence by examining the witnesses who is author of such document or is a competent person having knowledge of the contents of such document(s) with intent to safeguard foundational right of delinquent to be afforded an opportunity to cross-examine such witness before using or relying upon such document against a delinquent employee. A document does not prove by itself. Perusal of Inquiry Report dated 04-01-2008 reveals that during regular inquiry, the Inquiry Officer has neither summoned nor examined any departmental witness, who was author of such documents nor competent person having knowledge of the contents of such documents who could depose 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 35 - about the contents of aforesaid documents collected from office of Secretary HP Board of School Education or from office of Sub-Record Officer Pathankot or from the office of Sub-Post Office Sari-molag, has deprived the petitioner of his right to cross examine the author or competent person having knowledge of such documents and to assert a claim regarding genuineness or authenticity of such documents. Inquiry officer has relied upon and used these documents against the petitioner. Action of Inquiry Officer in relying upon and using “inadmissible material- evidence” for proving the charges against petitioner, by transgressing limits while conducting the regular departmental inquiry leads to travesty of justice and the same is violative of the mandate of law in Union of India vs P Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 {Para 12 (h)}. Even expression “oral and documentary evidence” in Rule 14 (14) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, enables disciplinary authority to prove the charge on the basis of oral and documentary evidence. This rule mandates that incase, disciplinary authority relies on certain documents to sustain a charge, then, 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 36 - such documents have to be proved by examining the author of document or by examining a competent person having knowledge of its contents. For want of proof of documents as required by norms and law, entire foundation of the allegations made against petitioner cannot sustain. The provision of Rule 14 (14) of CCS (CCA) Rules is a substantive provision primarily having twin object, firstly, to safeguard the interests of an employee against unpermitted act of an employer or inquiry officer in placing reliance on material or documents behind the back of an employee and secondly, enabling an employee to cross -examine the author of such document or a person having knowledge of contents of such documents so as to test the genuineness or veracity of any such document, before it could be relied upon against an employee. These two “ingredients” embedded in Rule 14(14) are the heart and soul of conducting a fair and transparent departmental proceedings and that too after giving due opportunity to delinquent employee. Action of Inquiry Officer in giving complete go-bye to these legal compliances by accepting and 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 37 - using “inadmissible evidence” against the petitioner, in derogation of Rule 14 (14) of the CCS (CCA) Rules and the principles outlined by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Roop Singh Negi, Saroj Kumar, Ram Prakash Singh and Jai Prakash Saini (supra) cannot sustain. Accordingly, findings recorded in Inquiry Report, by holding Charge No III as proved, cannot sustain; and therefore, the inquiry proceedings and adversial orders i.e. dismissal orders dated 14.02.2008 and the orders dated 04.08.2008 dismissing the appeal and orders dated 31.08.2009 dismissing the revision and fresh rejection orders dated 17.11.2011, are declared illegal and inoperative. 9. Second contention of Learned Counsel is that the non-supply of documents despite requests has prejudiced the petitioner by depriving him of the right to defend himself in departmental proceedings, which was violative of the principles of natural justice. 9(i). For appreciating the above contention, it is necessary to have an overview of Rule 14 (11) (12) & (13) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, which prescribes 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 38 - the competency to decide the relevancy of documents as well as the mode and manner of requisitioning and producing documents as may be demanded by delinquent employee, reads as under: 14(11). The inquiring authority shall, if the Government servant fails to appear within the specified time or refuses or omits to plead, require the Presenting Officer to produce the evidence by which he proposes to prove the articles of charge, and shall adjourn the case to a later date not exceeding thirty days, after recording an order that the Government servant may, for the purpose of preparing his defence : (i) inspect within five days of the order or within such further time not exceeding five days as the inquiring authority may allow, the documents specified in the list referred to in sub-rule (3); (ii) submit a list of witnesses to be examined on his behalf; NOTE- If the Government servant applies orally or in writing for the supply of copies of the statements of witnesses mentioned in the list referred to in sub-rule (3), the inquiring authority shall furnish him with such copies as early as possible and in any case not later than three days before the 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 39 - commencement of the examination of the witnesses on behalf of the disciplinary authority. (iii) give a notice within ten days of the order or within such further time not exceeding ten days as the inquiring authority may allow, for the discovery or production of any documents which are in the possession of Government but not mentioned in the list referred to in sub-rule (3). NOTE: The Government servant shall indicate the relevance of the documents required by him to be discovered or produced by the Government. 14(12). The inquiring authority shall, on receipt of the notice for the discovery or production of documents, forward the same or copies thereof to the authority in whose custody or possession the documents are kept, with a requisition for the production of the documents by such date as may be specified in such requisition : Provided that the inquiring authority may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, refuse to requisition such of the documents as are, in its opinion, not relevant to the case. 14(13). On receipt of the requisition referred to in sub-rule (12), every authority having the custody or possession of the requisitioned documents shall 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 40 - produce the same before the inquiring authority: Provided that if the authority having the custody or possession of the requisitioned documents is satisfied for reasons to be recorded by it in writing that the production of all or any of such documents would be against the public interest or security of the State, it shall inform the inquiring authority accordingly and the inquiring authority shall, on being so informed, communicate the information to the Government servant and withdraw the requisition made by it for the production or discovery of such documents. MANDATE OF LAW-INTERFERENCE IF NON- SUPPLY OF DOCUMENTS CAUSES PREJUDICE: 9(ii). While outlining the tests as to whether the non-furnishing of documents causes prejudice to a delinquent employee in defending him properly and effectively has been outlined by the Honble Supreme Court in State of Patiala vs S K Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364, reads as under: 33. We may summarise the principles emerging from the above discussion. [These are by no means intended to be exhaustive and are evolved keeping in view the context of disciplinary enquiries and orders of punishment imposed by an employer upon the 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 41 - employee]: (1) An order passed imposing a punishment on an employee consequent upon a disciplinary/departmental enquiry in violation of the rules / regulations / statutory provisions governing such enquiries should not be set aside automatically. The Court or the Tribunal should enquire whether (a) the provision violated is of a substantive nature or (b) whether it is procedural in character. (2) A substantive provision has normally to be complied with as explained hereinbefore and the theory of substantial compliance or the test of prejudice would not be applicable in such a case. (3) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, the position is this: procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer / employee. They are, generally speaking, conceived in his interest. Violation of any and every procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate the enquiry held or order passed. Except cases falling under 'no notice', 'no opportunity' and 'no hearing' categories, the complaint of violation of procedural provision should be examined from the point of view of 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 42 - prejudice, viz., whether such violation has prejudiced the delinquent officer / employee in defending himself properly and effectively. If it is found that he has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be made to repair and remedy the prejudicate, including setting aside the enquiry and /or the order of punishment. If no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by itself proof of The Court may not insist on proof of prejudice in such cases. As explained in the body of the judgment, take a case where there is a provision expressly providing that after the evidence of the employer /government is over, the employee shall be given an opportunity to lead defence in his evidence, and in a given case, the enquiry officer does not give that opportunity inspite of the delinquent officer/employee asking for it. The prejudice is self-evident. No proof of prejudice as such need be called for in such a case. To repeat, the test is one of prejudice, i.e., whether the person has received a fair hearing considering all things. Now, this very aspect can also be looked at from the point 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 43 - of view of directory and mandatory provisions, if one is so inclined. The principle stated under (4) hereinbelow is only another way of looking at the same aspect as is dealt with herein and not a different or distinct principle. (4)(a). In the case of a procedural provision which is not of a mandatory characters the complaint of violation has to be examined from the standpoint of substantial compliance. Be that as it may, the order passed in violation of such a provision can be set aside only where such violation has occasioned prejudice to the delinquent employee. (b) In the case of violation of a procedural provisional which is of a mandatory character, it has to be ascertained whether the provision is conceived in the interest of the person proceeded against or in public interest. If it is found to be the former, then it must be seen whether the delinquent officer has waived the said requirements either expressly or by his conduct. If he is found to have waived its then the order of punishment cannot be set aside on the ground of said violation. If, on the other hand, it is found that the delinquent officer/employee has not it or that the provision could not be waived by him, then the Court or Tribunal should make appropriate directions [include the setting aside 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 44 - of the order of punishment], keeping in mind the approach adopted by the Constitution Bench in B. Karunkar. The ultimate test is always the same viz., test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing, as it may be called. (5). Where the enquiry is not governed by any rules/ regulations/ statutory provisions and the only obligation is to observe the principles of natural justice or, for that matter, wherever such principles are held to be implied by the very nature and impact of the order /action the Court or the Tribunal should make a distinction between a total violation of natural justice [rule of audi alteram] and violation of a facet of the said rule, as explained in the body of the judgment. In other words, a distinction must be made between no opportunity" and no adequate opportunity, i.e., between "no notice"/ "no hearing" "no fair hearing". (a) In the case of former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid [one may call it "void" or a nullity if one chooses to]. In such cases, normally, liberty will be reserved for the Authority to take proceedings afresh according to law, i.e., in accordance with the said rule [audi alteram partem]. (b) But in the latter case, the effect of violation [of a facet of the rule of audi alteram] has to be examined from the stand 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 45 - point of prejudice; in other words, what the Court or Tribunal has to see is whether in the totality of the circumstances, the delinquent officer/ employee did or did not have a fair hearing and the orders to be made shall depend upon the answer to the said query. [It is made clear that this principle [No.5] does not apply in the case of rule against bias, the test in which behalf are laid down elsewhere.] (6). While applying the rule of audi alteram partem [the primary principle of natural justice] the Court/ Tribunal /Authority must always bear in mind the ultimate and over-riding objective underlying the said rule, viz., to ensure a fair hearing and to ensure that there is no failure of justice. It is this objective which should guide them in applying the rule to varying situations that arise before them. (7). There may be situations where the interests of state or public interest may call for a curtailing of the rule of audi alteram partem. In such situations, the Court may have to balance public /State interest with the requirement of natural justice and arrive at an appropriate decision. 9(ii-a). While reinforcing the tests as laid down in the case of S K Sharma (supra), the issue [in 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 46 - Para 4] as to whether the documents which were not proved during inquiry or the documents which were not supplied has prejudiced an employee by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh vs Ram Prakash Singh, 2025 SCC Online 891, in the following terms: 46. Imagine a scenario where the employer seeking to get rid of an inconvenient employee succeeds in its endeavour and dismisses him following an enquiry, flawed in itself, by relying on the report of enquiry without furnishing copy of the same to him. In such an eventuality, the dismissed employee while approaching a tribunal/court for redress has to do so without having access to the materials considered in the report. This is best exemplified by the present case where the report of enquiry has neither been furnished to the respondent nor placed on record before all the adjudicatory fora. In the absence of such access, can the delinquent employee be expected to demonstrate prejudice suffered by him ? We are not sure how the burden can be discharged by the employee in such a case. This lack of access to the report would severely hamper the ability of the employee to demonstrate ‘prejudice’ and to build a strong case 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 47 - for succeeding in his challenge to the order of punishment. Besides, the lengthy legal process could be agonizing, and especially without any earning, may not only lead to financial strain and diminished resolve but could eventually end up with the employee abandoning the challenge. Drawing from experience, we understand how employers take advantage and employ methods to drag on proceedings for years and thereby ensure that through the process of ‘wear and tear’, the employee (if he has been either dismissed or removed from service) loses steam and, inevitably, lacking interest in the challenge effectively gets thrown out of the legal arena by forces beyond his control. 47. These are vital considerations which, in our considered opinion, need to engage the mind of every court while deciding to apply the test of ‘prejudice’. In a battle between the mighty lion and the weak lamb when the former is in an overpowering position, should the courts lean in its favour and put the weak to the sword for not having demonstrated ‘prejudice’ when a brazen violation of the law declared by the Constitution Bench is brought to its notice? Why should the mighty not be made answerable as to why the report of enquiry has not been furnished and to bear whatever consequences 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 48 - that are bound to follow its failure, omission or neglect in this behalf ? In a society governed by the rule of law and when the preambular promise is to secure equality and justice for all, the weak lamb is certainly entitled in law to demand that the ratio decidendi of B. Karunakar (supra) be followed to the ‘T’. We regret, reliance placed in some of the decisions primarily on certain English decisions on whether ‘opportunity would have served any purpose’, may not be appropriate for acceptance in our service jurisprudence. 70. Respondent, undoubtedly, was denied a reasonable opportunity to defend himself in the enquiry by the appellant, as ordained by the 1999 Rules. The manner in which the disciplinary proceedings were conducted and continued against the respondent did not satisfy the requirements of ‘due process’. The flaws creeping in such proceedings have rendered the same wholly illegal. The routine course of action in a case, such as the present, where an order of punishment is set aside on grounds of breach of statutory rules and the charged officer is not acquitted on merits, is to remit the case to the disciplinary authority and direct resumption from the stage the proceedings is found to stand vitiated. 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 49 - 9(iii). For analyzing this contention, this Court proceeds to divide this issue into two parts, firstly, as to whether the Disciplinary Authority-Respondent no 4 could reject the request made by the petitioner for production of un-enlisted documents by acting contrary to rules; and secondly, as to whether the non-supply of documents has prejudiced the petitioner and its effect thereof. NON-PRODUCTION AND NON-SUPPLY OF THE UNENLISTED DOCUMENTS DEHORS STATUTORY RULES VITIATES PROCEEDINGS: 9(iii-a). Regarding the first part, in terms of the scheme of the CCS (CCA) Rules, the Disciplinary Authority-Respondent no 4 issued a charge sheet on 15.06.2007, and “Enlisted documents” and “List of witnesses”, on which, the authorities intended to prove the charges against the petitioner. The EnListed Documents,” mentioned in Annexure-III to the charge sheet, were duly supplied and there is no dispute regarding the same. The dispute in the instant case, relates to “non-supply of Un-Enlisted Documents” to the petitioner and the rejection of request therefor. Material on record reveals that in terms of the 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 50 - mandate of the rules, the petitioner served a notice -request on 29-8-2007 {Annexure P-14} and again on 08-09-2007 {at page 358 of paper book} requesting the Inquiry Officer for requisitioning and producing 18-Un-Enlisted Documents being relevant for the purposes of defending himself and after recording a finding that these documents were relevant, the Inquiry Officer forwarded the request on 17.09.2007 {Annexure A-15}, directing the custodian authorities to produce documents. Out of total 18-UnEnlisted documents, the petitioner was permitted to inspect 5 documents on 29.09.2007 whereas Inquiry Officer recorded the proceedings on 29-09-2007, that 5 other documents could not be supplied as they were found to be “not relevant” by the Respondent No4- Disciplinary authority. Feeling aggrieved against the rejection of request and the non-production and non-supply of documents, petitioner again requested the Inquiry Officer on 10.10.2007 [at page 364 of paper book] and again on 17.10.2007 [at Page 368 of paper book] but these requests were rejected on 23-10-2007, [Annexure P-16 at page 375] by reiterating 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 51 - that Disciplinary Authority-Respondent No 4-Supdt of Post Offices Dharamshala treated these documents as “not relevant” coupled with the fact that the stage of supplying the documents was over. The rejection of request and the resultant non-supply of “Un-Enlisted Documents” to petitioner is erroneous in law, for the reason, that firstly, on receipt of notice-request for production of un-enlisted documents in terms of Rule 14 (11) of the CCS (CCA), the Inquiry Officer is bound to “examine the relevancy of documents” in terms of Rule 14 (12) of the rules; and secondly, in the instant case, the Inquiry Officer recorded a categorical finding on 17.09.2007 {Annexure A-15}, that the “requisitioned documents were relevant to the defence of petitioner- charged officer”; and thirdly, once the Inquiry Officer had recorded a finding approving the “relevancy of documents” then, the action of Disciplinary Authority -Respondent No 4 in treating the required documents as “not relevant” was without authority of law, when, the Rules as referred to above, solely empower Inquiry Officer to determine relevancy of documents 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 52 - which were sought to be requisitioned and produced during regular inquiry ; and fourthly, the action of the Inquiry Officer in not ensuring the production of documents merely on the directions-orders given by Disciplinary Authority-Respondent No 4 impedes the purity and fairness in departmental proceedings; and fifthly, non-compliance of Rule 14 (13) of the CCS (CCA) Rules is writ large, for the reason that custodian authority having possession of documents could refuse to forward the requisitioned records, by recording reasons, in case, production of documents was “against public interest or security of state”; and sixthly, none of the eventuality existed pointing out that the production of documents shall affect public interest or security of state and therefore, non-production/non-supply of documents was uncalled for; and lastly, even, rejection of request and non- production /non-supply of “Un-enlisted Documents” on the directions-orders of higher authority-disciplinary authority, who as per the rules, did not have any authority to intervene and give directions to Inquiry Officer in the ongoing inquiry proceedings, so as 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 53 - to overturn or set at naught, the conscious decision taken by the Inquiry Officer himself on 17.09.2007 {Annexure A-15}, that the “requisitioned documents were relevant to the defence of the petitioner-charged officer”. In these circumstances, non-adherence to the statutory rules and legal compliances has resulted in denying a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to defend himself in departmental proceedings. PETITIONER GRAVELY PREJUDICED FOR NON PRODUCTION AND NON-SUPPLY OF DOCUMENTS: 9(iii-b). Regarding the second part, that the non-production and the non-supply of the un-enlisted documents, resulting in initializing the prejudice and in aggravating the prejudice, is writ large in view of the discussion made in succeeding paras herein. Material on record reveals that a Charge Sheet against the petitioner on 15.06.2007, levelling three Charges. For preparing his defence, the petitioner made a request on 29-08-2007 {Annexure A-14} to Inquiry Officer for ensuring the production of 18 Un- Enlisted documents [13 documents at Sr no 1 to 13 and 5 other documents as (a) to (h)] from various authorities [Sub Post Office Sari-molag, the Centre 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 54 - Supdt Examination of GSSS Sari-molag; Sub-Record Officer RMS Pathankot (Punjab); from SHO FIR No 56 of 2007 dated 24.03.2007; results of students of 10+2 and orders appointing Shri Om Parkash Rana as member of Flying Squad from Secretary Education Board Dharamshala; the previous academic record of two students from the school and other records from school i.e. GSSS Sari-molag (in District Mandi)]. Similar request was made to the Inquiry Officer on 08-09-2007 [Annexure R-8]. Perusal of day to day proceedings reveals that out of total 18 documents, 5 documents were not be supplied, as these documents were treated as not relevant by Inquiry Officer, on directions-orders of Disciplinary Authority-Respondent No 4, [as per communication dated 28-09-2007, Annexure R-9]. Feeling aggrieved the petitioner submitted fresh representations on 10.10.2007 and on 17.10.2007 for producing and supplying documents but these requests were again rejected on 23-10-2007 [Annexure P-16] by reiterating that Respondent No 4-Disciplinary had treated these documents as “not relevant” coupled with the fact 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 55 - that the stage of supplying the documents was over. 9 (iii-c). Prejudice initialized when, Inquiry Officer recorded an order on 29.09.2007 and had thereafter passed another order on 23-10-2007 [Annexure P-16], refusing to produce and to supply the requisitioned documents to the petitioner by acting contrary to the CCS (CCA) Rules and that too by acting on the directions-orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority -higher authority, despite the fact that such higher authority did not have any power and competency to decide the question of “relevancy of documents”, except in an eventuality, where, the production of document was against public interest and security of the state, which eventualities did not exist in instant case. Moreover, in terms of the mandate of Rule 14 (11)(iii) read with Rule 14 (12) & (13) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, since the Inquiry Officer was the designated authority to decide the question of “relevancy of documents” and by acting in pursuit thereof, once Inquiry Officer had recorded a finding on 17.09.2007 [Annexure A-15], that the requisitioned 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 56 - documents were relevant, then, the refusal and/or non-production and non-supply of documents has deprived the petitioner of his valuable right to defend himself in the disciplinary proceedings, which was violative of the principles of natural justice. Prejudice aggravated, as Inquiry Officer continued with the inquiry, leading to the Inquiry Report dated 04-01-2008 [Annexure A-7] holding the Charge No I & II (i.e. admitted charge) as proved and in holding the Charge No III (i) to (iv) (contested charge) as proved against the petitioner. Even after receipt of Inquiry Report, the petitioner submitted a detailed representation running into 34 pages, against the findings contained in the Inquiry Report on 01-02-2008 [Annexure A-8], stating that the inquiry was not conducted in a fair manner as the documents requisitioned by petitioner for preparing his defence were not supplied and with the additional plea that the findings recorded qua Charge no III were perverse and were not supported by the oral and documentary evidence [at pages 159 to 180 of paper book] but without considering the pleas taken in representation 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 57 - dated 01-02-2008 [Annexure A-8], the Respondent No 4-Disciplinary authority passed the dismissal orders on 14-02-2008 [Annexure A-1], in a casual and cryptic manner. Even while submitting the statutory appeal on 29-03-2008 [Annexure A-9] and the similar pleas raised in the revision petition preferred on 16-07-2009 [Annexure A-11] stating that the inquiry conducted without supplying documents were untenable and even the findings recorded in the Inquiry report and dismissal orders being perverse and not supported by oral and documentary evidence was liable to be set-aside. [at pages from 183 to 193, with reference to A-9 and at pages from 203 to 260 with reference to A-11]. Meanwhile the petitioner stood acquitted in the criminal case originating from FIR No 56 of 2007 dated 24.03.2007 and after acquittal, the petitioner filed OA No 900/HP/2010 and in terms of orders dated 09-09-2011, [at page 97] the dismissal orders, the appellate orders and revisional orders were quashed and set-aside, with directions to pass fresh orders, leading to passing of fresh orders on 17.11.2011 [Annexure A-3/B], reiterating the dismissal 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 58 - orders. Prejudice gravely aggravated, when, fresh rejection orders passed by the Respondent No 4 on 17.11.2011 [Annexure A-3/B], reiterating the dismissal orders was assailed before Learned Tribunal in OA No 1323/HP/2012, raising various pleas, including the plea [in Para 5(i) at page 58] that the inquiry conducted without supplying the documents, despite requests, has resulted in depriving the petitioner of his valuable right to prepare his defence and in denying a reasonable opportunity to defend himself was untenable and thus the inquiry, the inquiry report and dismissal orders, not supported by oral and documentary evidence was perverse, arbitrary and unsustainable. Perusal of communication dated 28-09-2007 [Annexure R-9, at page 406] with the Reply-Affidavit filed by the Respondents in OA No 1323/HP/2012, establishes that the Respondent No 4-Disciplinary Authority had found documents to be “not relevant”, ignoring that the aforesaid authority had “neither any authority nor competency to decide the question 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 59 - of relevancy of requisitioned un-enlisted documents”, in facts of instant case, and when, such competency was vested in Inquiry Officer, who refused to act impartially and independently, so as to ensure the production of documents but had acted at the dictates of higher authorities [as in communication dated 28-09-2007 [Annexure R-9] illegally. Fairness and impartiality has been compromised by Inquiry Officer, who was bound to act as an umpire but he had acted as an agent of department by rejecting the request for producing /supplying documents at the dictates of Disciplinary Authority-Respondents No 4, leading to an improper and unfair inquiry resulting in miscarriage of justice to the petitioner, qua the findings recorded on contested Charge No III (i) (ii) and (iv). Based on the above discussion, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the petitioner has been gravely prejudiced, for conducting departmental inquiry in defiance of and by not adhering to the legal compliances under the statutory rules and the principles mandated in the case of S K Sharma 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 60 - and Ram Prakash Singh (supra). Even, violation of a procedural provision [Rule 14 (11) to (13)] which is of a mandatory character, by giving a complete go-bye to the due process of law cannot sustain. Moreover, action of the Inquiry Officer in depriving the petitioner of his valuable right to prepare his defence and to defend himself during inquiry on the basis of the requisitioned documents, in facts of instant case, has resulted in an improper and unfair inquiry, leading to travesty of justice. Even, Learned Tribunal has erred in not adjudicating this foundational issue, which goes to the root of the matter, by abdicating the powers and jurisdiction vested in it. In these circumstances, the inquiry and consequential adversial actions are interdicted and set-aside. 10. Third contention is that Learned Tribunal had erred in recording a finding in Para 12 of the Impugned Order that the charges in departmental and criminal proceedings were different and mere acquittal in criminal case cannot be made the basis for quashing the punishment orders in departmental 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 61 - proceedings is erroneous on facts and in law. 10(i). For appreciating this contention, it is necessary to have a recap of Charge III, including sub-charges (i) to (iv), which was the subject matter of departmental proceedings against the petitioner, reads as under: Annexure A-5 Dated: 15-06-2007 RELEVANT EXTRACT OF CHARGE SHEET Statement of articles of Charge Sheet framed against Sh. Trilochan Dass Dogra SPM Molag (Placed under suspension) Article-1 Sh. Trilochan Dass Dogra while working as Sub Postmaster Molag SO is alleged to have booked a Reg. Parcel No. 4630 on 05.03.2007 containing Answer Sheets of plus two examination (Paper English) and shown it dispatched to Pathankot RMS in the office copy of Parcel list as well as Parcel abstract dated 05.03.2007 but alleged to have actually dispatched it on 06.03.2007 by manipulating the office record and further alleged to have failed to show the same in deposit in parcel Abstract on 05.3.2007, in violation of Rule 171 (3) and Rule 186 of Postal Man. Vol. VI Part-1 and also alleged to have not included the above parcel of Due Mail meant 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 62 - for dispatch on the same date as required vide Rule 53 read with Rule 136 of Postal Man. Vol. V. Therefore, the said Sh. Trilochan Dass Dogra is alleged to have falsified/manipulated the relevant record of his office untrust worthy in contravention of G.O.I instructions No. 23(2) (Part-II) below Rule 3 of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964. Article-II Sh. Trilochan Dass Dogra is alleged to have booked a Reg. Parcel No. 4664 on 21.03.2007 containing answer sheets of Plus 2 exam (Paper Hindi) and failed to dispatch it on 21.03.2007 either to Pathankot RMS for Palampur HQ and further alleged to have shown the same booked and dispatched on 22.03.2007 in Parcel Abstract of the date. The said Shri Trilochan Dass Dogra is further alleged to have failed to show the same in deposit on 21.03.2007 as required of him vide Rule 171 (3) and Rule 186 of Postal Manual Vol. VI Part-1 and therefore, alleged to have falsified the relevant record of his office untrust worthy, in violation of GOI instructions No 23(2) (Part-II) below Rule 3 of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964. Article-III (i). Sh. Trilochan Dass Dogra while working as SPM Molag SO had booked Reg Parcel No.4669 containing Answer 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 63 - Sheets of Plus two examination (Paper History) at 1230 hours on 23.03.2007 and alleged to have failed to enter the particulars thereof on the receipt side of the Parcel Abstract of the date, in violation of Rule 171 (3) of Postal Man. Vol. VI Part-1. (ii). The said official is alleged to have failed to dispatch the above Regd. Parcel no.4669 to its destination in violation of Rule 53 read with Rule 136 of Postal Manual Vol. V and also alleged to have failed to show the same in deposit on 23.03.2007 in Parcel Abstract, in violation of Rule 186 of Postal Manual Vol. VI Part-I and further alleged to have shown dispatched two parcels in the parcel Abstract dated 23.3.2007 but actually dispatched only one Regd Parcel No 4668, duly entered in the Parcel list dated 23.3.2007 and thus alleged to have falsified the relevant record untrust worthy, in violation of GOI instructions No.23(2) of Part-II, below Rule 3 of CCS (Conduct) Rule, 1964. (iii). Sh. Trilochan Dass Dogra is alleged to have left the office during working hrs on 23-03-2007 in violation of Rule 62 of Postal Manual Vol III and failed to afford proper custody to office keys violating the provision of rule 21(3) of Postal Man. Vol.VI Part-1. 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 64 - (iv). The said Sh. Trilochan Dass Dogra is alleged to have detained and tampered the Regd Parcel No 4669 containing answer sheets of plus two exam (Paper History) in which his son and daughter of Smt. Radha Devi GDS packer Molag had appeared under Roll No 95149 and 95115 respectively. The answer sheets bearing above Roll Nos are alleged to have been recovered/seized by the Police from the residence of the said Sh. Trilochan Dass Dogra. Thus, the said official is alleged to have acted untrust worthy and against the interest and reputation of his master in contravention of GOI instructions No. 23(2) of (Part-II) and instruction No 23 (1, 3, 5) Part-II below Rule 3 of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964. Therefore, the said Sh. Trilochan Dass Dogra by his above acts as outlined in Articles-1 to III, is alleged to have violated the provision of Rule 38 of Postal Manual Vol. VI Part-I and also alleged to have failed to maintain absolute integrity, devotion to duty and has acted in a manner unbecoming of a Govt servant as enjoined upon him vide Rule 3 (1) (i), (ii) and (iii) of CCS (Conduct) Rule, 1964. 10(i-a). The above charges were sought to be proved on the basis of 22 documents as mentioned 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 65 - in Annexure-III to charge-sheet {Memorandum of Charges}, by examining 9 witnesses, as mentioned in Annexure-IV to charge-sheet, read as under: Annexure A-III List of documents by which the articles of Charge framed against Shri Trilochan Dass Dogra SPM Molag (Under Suspension) are proposed to be sustained. 1-4. Written statements of Shri Trilochan Dass Dogra SPM Molag recorded by the IPO Baijnath on 3.4.2007, 16.5.2007, 28.5.2007 and 13.6.2007. 5. Office copy of Parcel List dated 5.3.2007 of Molag SO meant for Pathankot RMS. 6. Carbon copy of Parcel List dated 6.3.2007 of Molag SO Meant for Pathankot RMS. 7. Photocopy of Postal Receipt issued on 5.3.2007 for booking of Regd Parcel No. 4630 at Molag S.O. 8-9. Office Copies of Parcel Lists dated 21.03.2007 and 22.3.2007 of Molag S.O Meant for Pathankot RMS. 10-11.Carbon copies of Parcel Lists dated 21.3.2007 and 22.03.2007 of Molag S.O meant for Pathankot RMS. 12. Photocopy of Postal Receipts issued on 21.03.2007 for booking of Regd. Parcel No. 4664 at Molag S.O. 13. Written statement of Sh. Amar Singh (Sevadar) Govt. Sr. Sec. School Sari Molag dated 28.03.2007 recorded by the IPO Baijnath. 14-16.Written statement of Smt. Radha Devi GDS packer Molag dated 24.03.2007, 25.03.2007 and 14.05.2007 recorded by the IPO Baijnath. 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 66 - 17. Written statement of Shri Raghubir Singh P/T Chowkidar Molag S.O. dated 19.04.2007 recorded by the IPO Baijnath. 18. Written statement of Shri Ravinder Singh Rana (Dy. Centre Supdt.) Lecturer Govt. Sr. Sec. School Sari Molag dated 28.03.2007 recorded by the IPO Baijnath. 19. Written statement of Shri Om Parkash Rana (Member of Flying Squad) Lecturer, Govt Sr. Sec. School Sari Molag dated 17.4.2007 recorded by the IPO Baijnath. 20. Written statement of SHO, P.S. Lambagaon, dated 19.4.2007 recorded by the IPO Baijnath. 21. Letter No 996/5 A dated 21.5.2007 sent by SHO Lambagaon A/T IPO Baijnath. 22. Parcel Abstract of Molag SO dated 5.3.2007, 6.3.2007, 21.3.2007, 22.3.2007 and 23.3.2007. Sd/- Supdt. Post Offices, Dharamsala Division. Annexure A-IV List of Witnesses by whom the articles of Charge framed against Shri Trilochan Dass Dogra SPM Molag (under suspension) are proposed to be sustained. 1. Shri Amar Singh (Sevadar), Govt. Sr. Sec. School, Sari Molag. 2. Shri Ravinder Singh Rana (Dy. Centre Supdt.) Lecturer, Govt. Sr. Sec. School Sari Molag. 3. Shri Om Parkash Rana (Lecturer) Govt. Sr. Sec. School, Sari Molag. 4. Smt. Radha Devi, GDS Packer Molag. S.O. 5. Shri Raghbir Singh P/T Chowkidar Molag, S.O. 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 67 - 6. Shri Tilak Raj, SHO Police Station Lambaogaon. 7. Shri Suram Singh Banyal, IPO Baijnath. 8. Shri Joginder Lal Mailoverseer Baijnath. 9. Smt. Simro Devi (Sevadar) Govt. Sr. Sec. School, Sari Molag. Sd/- Supdt. Post Offices Dharamsala Division, Dharamsala. 10(i-b). Pursuant to registration of FIR No 56 of 2007 dated 24.03.2007, accusation as per prosecution story, was as under: 2. Briefly stated the case of the prosecution is that complainant Om Parkash Rana (PW-2) was member of SDM Flying squad. On 23.03.2007 he received a secret information that Trilochan Post Master, Post Office Sarimolag (hereinafter to be referred as the accused with whom answer sheets of 10+2 were deposited for dispatching to the office of HPBSE, used to take out the answer sheet of his son Sameer studying in 10+2 in Sari-molag Government Senior Secondary School and after getting the same filled used to dispatch the answer sheets next day. He narrated the matter to Ravinder Kumar Rana (PW-3) Deputy Superintendent, Senior Secondary School Sarimolag who assured him to look into the same and to check weigh the mail bag being transmitted around 5.15 p.m in Shimla to Chadihar bus. 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 68 - Around 5.00 p.m, they asked Sewadar Amar Singh (PW-8) to check the mail bags. On checking Amar Singh (PW) told that parcel containing answer sheets was not in the bus. Om Parkash Rana (PW-2) and Ravinder Kumar Rana (PW-3) thereupon went to the house of the accused and inquired about the same. Accused stated to have sent /dispatched the mail. Om Parkash (PW-2) told him that the parcel was not in the mail bag and that he would lodge a complaint against him. He also narrated the occurrence telephonically to SDM Jaisinghpur. The accused followed them and entered into the post office. After sometime, he alongwith parcel of answer sheets came out of post office. On being asked as to what was he carrying, he said that it was none of their business. A scuffle ensued in between the accused and Om Parkash and Ravinder Kumar Rana, as a result whereof parcel fell and answer sheets scattered on the ground. Om Parkash and Ravinder Kumar Rana caught the accused and also collected the answer sheets. In the meanwhile SDM alongwith Investigating Officer reached on the spot. Immediately, hereafter investigating officer recorded the statement of the complainant Om Parkash Ex PW-2/A which ultimately led way to the registration 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 69 - of formal FIR Ex PW-11/A against the accused. Investigation commenced. During investigation, Investigating Officer SI Tilak Raj (PW-11) prepared rough site plan Ex.PW-11/C on the spot, took answer sheets Ex. PW-1 to Ex. P-50, parcel cover Ex.P-54 and brief case Ex. P-53 into possession vide Fard Ex. PW-2/A and gave them on Superdari to Kewal Ram Verma (PW-1) and procured photo copies of 50 answer sheets vide Fard Ex.PW-1/D. Investigating Officer SI Tilak Raj (PW-11) who recorded disclosure statement of the accused Ex. PW-2/B and pursuant thereto recovered answer sheets of Roll No 95115 and 95149 Ex. P-51 and Ex.P-52 vide Fard Ex. PW-2/C, prepared sought site plan qua the place of recovery. Investigating Officer SI Tilak Raj (PW-11) gave answer sheets Ex.P-51 over Ex P-52 to Kewal Ram Verma (PW-1) on superdari vide Fard Ex.PW-1/A and also obtained photocopies thereof. Investigating Officer SI Tilak Raj also procured postal receipts Ex.P-54-1, obtained identification book of 10+2 morning session Ex. PW-12/A, parcel abstracts Ex PW-5/A and Ex. PW-5/B and prosecution sanction Ex. PW-11/N. The investigating Officer SI Tilak Raj (PW-11) also retained seal impressions Ex PW-2/F, Ex PW-11/P, Ex.PW-2/E and Ex.PW-2/D and recorded the statements of the witnesses. On 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 70 - completion of investigation and on being satisfied of the commission of offence punishable under Section 409 of IPC, charge sheet against the accused was presented in the Court. 3. Charge under Section 409 of IPC was framed against the accused to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 7. The following points arise for determination in the present case: (1). Whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond reasonable doubt that on 23.03.2007 around 5.15 p.m the accused posted as post master post office Sarimolag, being entrusted with a parcel containing answer sheets dishonestly misappropriated or converted them to his own use and willfully and unauthorizedly delayed the transmission thereof to the office of HPBSE? (2). Final Order. 10(i-c). In criminal case, the prosecution sought to prove the charge on the basis of following PWs and documents:- List of witnesses Sr. No. Name of witnesses 1. PW1 Kewal Ram Verma PW 2. PW2 Om Prakash -do- 3. PW3 Ravinder Kumar -do- 4. PW4 Ashwani Kumar -do- 5. PW5 Bhuvesh Katoch -do- 6. PW6 Champa Devi -do- 7. PW7 Jagdish Chand -do- 8. PW8 Amar Singh -do- 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 71 - 9. PW9 Raghubir Singh -do- 10. PW10 Roshan Lal -do- 11. PW11 SI Tilak Raj -do- 12. PW12 Salig Ram -do- 13. PW13 HC Subhash Chand -do- List of Exhibits Sr No Date of Exhibits Description of Exhibits 1. Ex.PW1/D 5.6.2008 Fard and postal receipt Ex. P 54-1 2. Ex.PW2/A 10.6.09 Statement U/S 154 CrPC 3. Ex.PW2/B -do-Statement U/S 27 of Evidence Act 4. Ex.PW2/C -do-Fard qua answer Sheets 5. Ex.PW2/D -do-Recovery Fard 6. Ex.PW2/E -do-Recovery Fard 7. Ex.PW2/F -do-Recovery Fard 8. Ex.PW5/A&B 24.5.2010 Parcel abstracts 9. Ex.PW11/A 24.03.2007 FIR (sic 16-07-2007} 10. Ex.PW10/C 16.7.2010 Site plan 11. Ex.PW2/A1 10.6.2009 Fard qua Ex.P53 to P55 12. Ex.PW1/A 5.6.2008 Fard qua Ex.P53 13. Ex.PW1/C -do-Application for Obtaining photocopies of answer sheets 14. Ex.PW1/B -do- 15. Ex.PW11/D -do- 16.7.2010 16. Ex.PW11/E -do-Application for obtaining receipt of parcel 17. Ex.PW11/M 16.7.2010 Application for obtaining prosecution sanction 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 72 - 18. Ex.PW11/N -do-Prosecution sanction 19. Ex.PW11/O -do-Letter dt.14.8.2007 20. Ex.PW11/F -do-Rapat No. 19 21. Ex.P1 to 50 5.6.2008 Answer sheets 22. Ex.Pw2/D 10.6.2009 Sample seals to Ex.PW2/F 23. Ex.PW11/P -do-16.7.2010 24. Ex.PW4/A 11.12.2009 Application obtaining copies of answer sheets 25. Ex.P 51 5.6.2005 Answer sheets & Ex.P 52 26. Ex.PW11/G 16.7.2010 Statements u/s161 CrPC 27. Ex.PW12/A 18.9.2010 Photocopies of identification books 10(i-d). Consequent upon the trial, petitioner was acquitted of the charges by the Learned Trial Court on 17.08.2011 [Annexure A-12], in the following terms: 24. The accused has not refuted his being post master in post office Sarimolag at the relevant time. He, however, has denied the charges against him and has claimed innocence. 25. The aforesaid being the admitted and disputed facts, the prosecution, it in order to succeed was/is required to prove that: (i). SDM Jaisinghpur Jagdish, PW-7 had constituted a flying squad consisting of Om Parkash and Ravinder Kumar. 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 73 - (ii). That flying squad on 23.07.2007 around 5.15 p.m at Sarimolag found accused’s having opened the parcel containing history answer sheets of 10+2 examination having removed two answer sheets of roll number 95149 and 95115 and having delayed transmission of the parcel; (iii). That accused made disclosure statement Ex.PW-2/B and pursuance thereto got the removed answer sheets of Roll number 95149 and 95115 recovered. 26. Coming to the first point, Jagdish Chand, SDM Jaisinghpur (PW-7) has stated that flying squad is constituted in writing and duties of its members are also specified in writing. He has admitted that duration of duty is specifically provided and daily proceedings of the flying squad are maintained. In the case in hand, however, neither constitution of flying squad nor its duty abstract is there on the record nor it admittedly has been taken into police possession by the Investigating Officer (PW-11). Jagdish Chand SDM Jaisinghpur (PW-7) though has stated that he being SDM had initiated proceedings of the instant case yet he unequivocally has admitted that he had not authorized Om Parkash (PW-2) and Ravinder Rana 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 74 - (PW-3) to take parcel of the answer sheets from the post office. 27. It, thus, is evident that there is nothing on record qua constitution of SDM flying squad and Om Parkash (PW-2) and Ravinder Kumar (PW-3) having been authorized to take parcel containing answer sheets of 10+2 history examination from the post office. 28. Aforesaid lapse, if is ignored and it is assumed for a while that SDM flying squad was duly constituted and that it comprised of Om Parkash (PW-2) and Ravinder (PW-3), even then the prosecution is not absolved of its duty to prove tampering of parcel by the accused. The prosecution witnesses, however, have come up with different versions qua alleged recovery of tampered parcel and 50 answer sheets from the accused: (i). As Om Parkash (PW-2) has stated that immediately after coming to know that the parcel containing answer sheets had not been dispatched to HPBSE, he alongwith Ravinder Kumar (PW-3) rushed to the house of the accused to inquire about the same, whereas, Ravinder Kumar (PW-3) has stated that they immediately on coming to know qua the same rushed to the post office; 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 75 - (ii). As Om Prakash (PW-2) has stated that answer sheets recovered from the accused were lying in an open parcel, whereas Ravinder Kumar (PW-3), who admittedly had closed and sealed parcel containing answer sheets has stated that parcel containing answer sheets of 10+2 history examination was intact and had opened only when it had fallen on the ground; (iii). As Om Parkash (PW-2) has stated that answer sheets had fallen the moment they had apprehended the accused whereas Ravinder Kumar (PW-3) has stated that answer sheets had fallen from the parcel when they were going to the principal office. 29. Om Parkash (PW2) and Ravinder Kumar (PW3) though have given varied counts of the counts aforesaid, yet, they both alike have stated that they had not counted the answer sheets and thus did not know as to how many answer sheets parcel contained and answer sheets of which roll number, if any, was missing. Not only this Ravinder Kumar (PW3) even had gone to the extent that answer sheets for the first time were counted by board officials. Interesting to note that no board official to this effect and answer sheets' being deficit in 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 76 - number, however, has been examined by the prosecution. 31. The prosecution, thus, has also failed to prove initial recovery of torn parcel and 50 answer sheets from the accused. 32. Now coming to the recovery of answer sheets of Roll Nos 95149 and 95115, it has also not been established on the record for the following reasons: (i) as Om Parkash (PW2) and Ravinder Kumar (PW3) the alleged witnesses to disclosure statement of the accused Ex.PW2/B have denied making of such statement by the accused; (ii) as Om Parkash (PW2) and Ravinder Kumar (PW3) the alleged witnessed to recovery fard Ex. PW2/C per which two answer sheets of roll nos 95149 and 95115 were recovered from the house of the accused have denied to have witnessed said recovery rather have stated that they never went to the house of the accused nor did know as to where was / is it situate; (iii) as Om Parkash (PW2) and Ravinder Kuinar (PW3) have stated that their signatures on recovery fard dt. 24.3.2007 Ex. PW2/C and dt 23.3.2007 Ex.PW2/A1 were 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 77 - taken simultaneously that too without disclosing contents thereof to them. 32. Aforesaid being evidence, it can safely be concluded that the prosecution has failed to prove dishonest misappropriation of the parcel containing 52 answer sheets and conversion thereof to his own use by the accused more so when there is nothing on the record that parcel cover dispatched from the school contained specific identification of its contents. Similarly, failure of the accused to dispatch the parcel on 23.3.2007 as is evident from the parcel abstract Ex. PWS/), at the most can be said to be negligence on his part, however, it in the light of evidence accused supra in no manner could be construed as willful detention of the parcel containing 52 answer sheets by him with some ulterior motive or malafide intention. 33. In view of above, it can safely be concluded that the prosecution has failed to prove the instant case beyond reasonable doubt. This point, thus, is decided against the prosecution and is answered in negative. 34. In view of my findings returned on the point No.1 above, the accused is held not guilty and is acquitted of the charge U/S 409 of IPC….” 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 78 - Sd/- Judicial Magistrate 1st Class (2) Palampur, District Kangra, H.P. MANDATE OF LAW-EFFECT OF ACQUITTAL ON DEPARTMENTAL ENQUIRY: 10(ii). In normal parlance, the mandate of law encompasses that if an employee is acquitted in a criminal case, then, mere acquittal does not preclude the employer from taking action, if it is otherwise permissible. Since the degree of proof in criminal proceedings mandates to prove the guilt “beyond all reasonable doubts” whereas the degree of proof for recording commission of delinquency is based on “preponderance of probabilities.” Mere acquittal in criminal proceedings does not absolve an employee from liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction, in terms of the mandate of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Depot Manager APSRTC vs Mohd Yusuf Miya, (1997) 2 SCC 699, and then in the case of Ajit Kumar Nag vs General Manager (P), Indian Oil Corporation, Haldia & Ors (2005) 7 SCC 764, and in Noida Entrepreneur’s Association vs NOIDA & Ors (2007) 10 SCC 385, and in 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 79 - Union of India vs Dalbir Singh, (2021) 11 SCC 321, these principles have been reiterated. 10(ii-a). Exception to general principle has been outlined that once charges, grounds and evidence in criminal case and the departmental proceedings were same then, in case of honourable acquittal it would not be expedient to continue with the departmental proceedings, in view of the principle outlined by the Honble Supreme Court in Corpn of the City of Nagpur vs Ramchandra (1981) 2 SCC 714, in the following terms: 6. The other question that remains is if the respondents are acquitted in the criminal case whether or not the departmental inquiry pending against the respondents would have to continue. This is a matter which is to be decided by the department after considering the nature of the findings given by the criminal court. Normally where the accused is acquitted honorably and completely exonerated of the charges it would not be expedient to continue a departmental inquiry on the very same charges or grounds or evidence, but the fact remains, however, that merely because the accused is acquitted, the power of the 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 80 - authority concerned to continue the departmental inquiry is not taken away nor is its direction (discretion) in any way fettered. " 10(ii-b). The principle that once the charges in criminal case and departmental proceedings were based on identical set of facts and were sought to be proved by same set of witnesses and after honourable acquittal, it would be unjust, unfair and oppressive to allow findings recorded in departmental proceedings to stand, in terms of the mandate of the Honble Supreme Court in the case Capt M Paul Antony vs Bharat Gold Mines Ltd, (1999) 3 SCC 679, as under: 34. There is yet another reason for discarding the whole of the case of the respondents. As pointed out earlier, the criminal case as also the departmental proceedings were based on identical set of facts, namely "the raid conducted at the appellant's residence and recovery of incriminating articles therefrom. The findings recorded by the enquiry officer, a copy of which has been placed before us, indicate that the charges framed against the appellant were sought to the proved by police officers and panch witnesses, 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 81 - who had raided the house of the appellant and had effected recovery. They were the only witnesses examined by the enquiry officer and the enquiry officer, relying upon their statements, came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case but the Court, on a consideration of the entire evidence, came to the conclusion that no search was conducted nor was any recovery made from the residence of the appellant. The whole case of the prosecution was thrown out and the appellant was acquitted. In this situation, therefore, where the appellant is acquitted by a judicial pronouncement with the finding that the "raid and recovery" at the residence of the appellant were not proved, it would be unjust, unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded at the ex parte departmental proceedings to stand. 10(ii-c). While deciding the issue of sustainability of departmental proceedings and penalty, where criminal case was instituted on same facts and evidence without there being any iota of difference, then, after honorable acquittal, the findings recorded in departmental proceedings will turn out to be 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 82 - oppressive and erroneous, in view of the mandate of the Honble Supreme Court in G M Tank vs State of Gujrat (2006) 5 SCC 446, in the following terms: 31. In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the department as well as criminal proceedings were the same without there being any iota of difference, the appellant should succeed. The distinction which is usually proved between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of proof would not be applicable in the instant case. Though finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was found to be valid by the Courts below, when there was an honourable acquittal of the employee during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the dismissal, the same requires to be taken note of and the decision in Paul Anthony's case (supra) will apply. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be allowed. 10(ii-d). Dismissal of an employee was set-aside in a case, where, prosecution failed to prove the case after full consideration of prosecution evidence in case, the charges in both proceedings were identical or similar and evidence, witnesses and 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 83 - circumstances are one and same. Expressions “benefit of doubt” or “honorable acquittal” would not make any difference if the judgment passed in criminal case held the charge as “not proved or disproved,” entitling an employee for reinstatement in service in view of judgement of the Honble Supreme Court in Ram Lal vs State of Rajasthan (2024) 1 SCC 175, in following terms: 8. The following two questions arise for consideration: 8.1(a) Whether the dismissal of the appellant from service pursuant to the departmental enquiry was justified ? 8.1(b) On the facts of the case, what is the effect of the acquittal, ordered by the Appellate Judge in the criminal trial, on the order of dismissal passed in the departmental enquiry? 12. However, if the charges in the departmental enquiry and the criminal court are identical or similar, and if the evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same, then the matter acquires a different dimension. If the court in judicial review concludes that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge, the Court in judicial review can grant 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 84 - redress in certain circumstances. The court will be entitled to exercise its discretion and grant relief, if it concludes that allowing the findings in the disciplinary proceedings to stand will be unjust, unfair and oppressive. Each case will turn on its own facts. [See G.M. Tank vs. State of Gujarat & Others, (2006) 5 SCC 446, State Bank of Hyderabad vs. P. Kata Rao, (2008) 15 SCC 657 and S. Samuthiram (supra). 25. Expressions like “benefit of doubt” and “honorably acquitted”, used in judgments are not to be understood as magic incantations. A court of law will not be carried away by the mere use of such terminology. In the present case, the Appellate Judge has recorded that Exh. P-3, the original marksheet carries the date of birth as 21.04.1972 and the same has also been proved by the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution. The conclusion that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge can only be arrived at after a reading of the judgment in its entirety. The court in judicial review is obliged to examine the substance of the judgment and 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 85 - not go by the form of expression used. 26. We are satisfied that the findings of the appellate judge in the criminal case clearly indicate that the charge against the appellant was not just, “not proved”-in fact the charge even stood “disproved” by the very prosecution evidence. As held by this Court, a fact is said to be “disproved” when, after considering the matters before it, the court either believes that it does not exist or considers its non- existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it does not exist. A fact is said to be “not proved” when it is neither “proved” nor “disproved” [See Vijayee Singh and Others v. State of U.P. (1990) 3 SCC 190]. 27. We are additionally satisfied that in the teeth of the finding of the appellate Judge, the disciplinary proceedings and the orders passed thereon cannot be allowed to stand. The charges were not just similar but identical and the evidence, witnesses and circumstances were all the same. This is a case where in exercise of our discretion, we quash the orders of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority as allowing them to stand will be unjust, unfair 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 86 - and oppressive. This case is very similar to the situation that arose in G.M. Tank (supra). 30. In view of the above, we declare that the order of termination dated 31.03.2004; the order of the Appellate Authority dated 08.10.2004; the orders dated 29.03.2008 and 25.06.2008 refusing to reconsider and review the penalty respectively, are all illegal and untenable. 10(ii-e). Once the charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances in departmental inquiry and criminal case are “identical or substantially similar” then in such a situation, the findings recorded in the disciplinary inquiry warrant interference, in the light of the mandate of the Honble Supreme Court in Maharana Pratap Singh vs State of Bihar and Ors 2025 SCC Online SC 890, as under: 25. The issues for determination that emerge for decision are: (i) Whether due process was followed in dismissing the appellant from service and whether his dismissal from service is justified, on facts and in the circumstances, that have unfolded before us ? (ii) Whether, in light of the facts, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances of the case the charges in the criminal proceedings are substantially identical 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 87 - to those in the departmental proceedings, such that an acquittal in the criminal case would render the findings in the disciplinary proceedings vulnerable ? (iii). …not relevant…. 47. While an acquittal in a criminal case doesnot automatically entitle the accused to have an order of setting aside of his dismissal from public service following disciplinary proceedings, it is well-established that when the charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances in both the departmental inquiry and the criminal proceedings are identical or substantially similar, the situation assumes a different context. In such cases, upholding the findings in the disciplinary proceedings would be unjust, unfair, and oppressive. This is a position settled by the decision in G. M. Tank (supra), since reinforced by a decision of recent origin in Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan. 48. To assess the degree of similarity between the charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances in the disciplinary and criminal proceedings, it is indeed crucial to review the materials placed before the Court where such an issue arises… 50. The judgment acquitting the appellant reveals that the prosecution "miserably failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt" as both the 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 88 - informant and PW-2 refused to identify the appellant in court. This discussion confirms that the appellant's acquittal was based not on mere technicalities. In Ram Lal (supra), this Court held that terms like "benefit of doubt" or "honorably acquitted" should not be treated as formalities. The Court's duty is to focus on the substance of the judgment, rather than the terminology used. 55. Law is trite that while exercising its powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the High Court does not exercise powers that are available to an appellate court. It is the decision -making process that falls for scrutiny. Be that as it may, the High Courts can rectify errors of law or procedural irregularities if any, that lead to a manifest miscarriage of justice or breach of the principles of natural justice. Law is also well-established that the standards for establishing a guilt in disciplinary proceedings differ from those applicable to criminal proceedings. However, it is equally true that departmental authorities are obligated to provide a fair opportunity to the parties involved, and what constitutes a fair opportunity must be determined based on the facts and circumstances of each case, as has been laid down 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 89 - in State of Mysore v. Shivabasappa Shivappa Makarpur AIR 1963 SC 375..” 10(iii). For assessing the degree of similarity, in relation to the contested Charge No III (i) (ii) & (iv) of the Charge sheet [Memorandum of Charges] dated 15-06-2007, for having booked regd parcel no 4669 on 23-03-2007 and not dispatching it but in tampering and fabricating the parcel containing answer sheets {of 10+2 examination, including sheets pertaining to his son and the daughter of another employee, Radha Devi} which were alleged to have been recovered from his residence on 24-03-2007. Material on record indicates that based on alleged incident, petitioner was detained by police on 23-03-2007 and FIR No 56/2007 dated 24-03-2007, alleging tampering and fabrication of registered parcel no 4669 booked on 23-03-2007 in Sub Post Office Sari-molag, containing the answer sheets, which were alleged to have been recovered from the residence of the petitioner. Pertinently, the material on record goes on to establish that the charges, evidence, witnesses 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 90 - and the circumstances in the departmental inquiry and the criminal proceedings were “identical or substantially similar”, regarding Charge No III (i) (ii) & (iv) of Charge-sheet dated 15-6-2007 had its origin with reference to alleged accusation contained in FIR No 56/2007. The case records establish that after due trial, the allegations regarding “place of alleged incidence” and “mode and manner of alleged occurrence was disproved. Even the allegation of tampering and fabrication of parcel was not proved. Further the allegation that the alleged two answer- sheets were recovered from house of the petitioner was not proved. A perusal of the judgement of acquittal establishes that the witness examined by prosecution, including the complainant and others in criminal case was totally negated and disproved the allegation regarding the Charge No III, as set- up in departmental proceedings. After holding a full- fledged trial, Learned Trial Court has recorded a definite conclusion that the charge was not proved leading to the acquittal of petitioner, which certainly is an honourable acquittal. The findings recorded 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 91 - by the Inquiry Officer in Inquiry Report, regarding alleged incident, and the allegation of tampering and fabrication and the allegation of recovery of answer sheet from residence of petitioner was based on mere ipse-dixit of inquiry officer and conjectures and surmises and such findings regarding Charge No III being perverse cannot sustain. The decision-making process giving a “go-bye to due process of law” by not conducting the departmental proceedings as mandated under the CCS (CCA) Rules and by non- adherence to established legal compliances has gravely prejudiced the petitioner by depriving him of the valuable right to defend himself in the departmental proceedings. Once the decision-making process is erroneous in law and the same has resulted in miscarriage of justice, and acquittal of the petitioner after full consideration of prosecution evidence has negated the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings qua Charge No III then, such findings cannot be permitted to stand against the petitioner. Permitting the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings in relation to Charge No III (i) (ii) & (iv) 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 92 - to stand, despite honourable acquittal shall amount to reinforcing the sting which already stood negated by Trial Court and permitting it to be reinforced shall be highly unjust, unfair and oppressive, as per the principles outlined by the Honble Supreme Court in Ramachandra, Capt M Paul Antony, G M Tank, Ram Lal and in the case of Maharana Pratap Singh (supra). Consequently, entire proceedings i.e. inquiry, inquiry report and the adversial orders including dismissal orders in relation to Charge No III (i) (ii) & (iv), does not stand the test of judicial scrutiny and Impugned Order passed by Learned Tribunal cannot sustain on facts and law and is set-aside. 11. Fourth contention of Learned Counsel is that the findings recorded in Para 13 of the Impugned Order that punishment imposed on the petitioner after due inquiry was not disproportionate, is erroneous in law. 11(i). For appreciating this, it is necessary to have recap of circumstances, warranting judicial interference in matters concerning the imposition of punishment by disciplinary authorities. 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 93 - 11(i-a). The general principle is that the question of quantum of punishment in disciplinary proceedings is primarily for the disciplinary authority to decide and jurisdiction of Writ Court or Tribunal is limited and is confined to well-known principles known as “Wednesbury principle”. 11(ii). The exceptional circumstances warranting interference in the matters relating to departmental proceedings and punishment have been outlined by Honble Supreme Court in the following cases:- 11(ii-a). While outlining the scope of interference in disciplinary proceedings, including the quantum of punishment where disciplinary authorities have held the proceeding against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision or by allowing them to be influenced by extraneous considerations or where the conclusions reached is on the face of it is wholly capricious or that no reasonable person could have arrived at such decision, stands 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 94 - outlined by Three Judges of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh vs Chitra Venkata Rao (1975) 2 SCC 557, in following terms:- 21. ….The High Court may interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion…” 11(ii-b). While dealing with scope of interference in quantum of punishment in case of trivial charge revealing negligence which did not result in loss to the department, the Honble Supreme Court in Bhagat Ram vs State of Himachal Pradesh, (1983) 2 SCC 442 held as under: 15. It is equally true that the penalty 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 95 - imposed must be commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct, and that any penalty disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.” 11(ii-c). While dealing with scope of interference in quantum of punishment or sentence the Honble Supreme Court has held in Ranjit Thakur vs Union of India (1987) 4 SCC 611, as under: 25. Judicial review generally speaking, is not directed against a decision, but is directed against the "decision making process". The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the Court-Martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the Court Martial, if the decision of the Court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 96 - are recognized grounds of judicial review. In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, Lord Diplock said: "... Judicial Review has I think developed to a stage today when without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds upon which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground l would call 'illegality'. the second irrationality' and the third 'procedural impropriety'. That is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of 'proportionality' which is recognized in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the European Economic Community ...” 11(ii-d). While dealing with scope of interference in quantum of punishment, the Courts can mould the relief, if the punishment imposed shocks the conscience of the Court, by remitting back the matter or in rare cases, to impose appropriate punishment supported with reasons, as per the principles outlined 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 97 - by the Honble Supreme Court in B C Chaturvedi vs Union Of India (1995) 6 SCC 749, in following terms:- “18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court / Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary /appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.” 11(ii-e). While dealing with scope of interference in quantum of punishment, the Courts can show indulgence in view of Wednesbury’s principle, if 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 98 - an order was contrary to law, or relevant factors were not considered, or irrelevant factors were considered, or the decision was one which no reasonable person could have taken or on Doctrine of proportionality, if exercise of discretion infringes rights excessively, as mandated by the Honble Supreme Court in Om Kumar vs Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386, in the following terms: 25. We shall, therefore, have to examine the cases of Sri Om Kumar and of Sri Virendra Nath from the stand point of basic principles applicable under Administrative Law, namely, Wednesbury principles and the doctrine of proportionality. It has, therefore, become necessary to make reference to these principles and trace certain recent developments in the law. I (a) Wednesbury principle: 26. Lord Greene said in 1948 in the Wednesbury case that when a statute gave discretion to an administrator to take a decision, the scope of judicial review would remain limited. He said that interference was not permissible unless one or other of the Om Kumar and Ors vs Union Of India following conditions were satisfied-namely the order was contrary to law, or relevant factors were not considered, or irrelevant 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 99 - factors were considered; or the decision was one which no reasonable person could have taken. These principles were consistently followed in UK and in India to judge the validity of administrative action. It is equally well known that in 1983, Lord Diplock in Council for Civil Services Union v. Minister of Civil Services, (1983) 1 AC 768 (called the GCHQ case) summarized the principles of judicial review of administrative action as based upon one or other of the following-viz illegality, procedural irregularity and irrationality. He, however, opined that 'proportionality' was a future possibility.' (b) Proportionality: 27. The principle originated in Prussia in the nineteenth Century and has since been adopted in Germany, France and other European countries. The European Court of Justice at Luxembourg and the European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg have applied the principle while judging the validity of administrative action. But even long before that, the Indian Supreme Court had applied the principle of 'proportionality' to legislative action since 1950, as stated in detail below. 28. By 'proportionality', we mean the question whether, while regulating exercise of fundamental rights, the appropriate or least restrictive choice of measures has 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 100 - been made by the legislature or the administrator so as to achieve the object of the legislation or the purpose of the administrative order, as the case may be. Under the principle, the Court will see that the legislature and the administrative authority 'maintain a proper balance between the adverse effects which the legislation or the administrative order may have on the rights, liberties or interests of persons keeping in mind the purpose which they were intended to serve'. The legislature and the administrative authority are, however, given an area of discretion or a range of choices but as to whether the choice made infringes the rights excessively or not is for the Court. That is what is meant by proportionality” 11(ii-f). Regarding the scope of interference in punishment imposed in disciplinary proceedings the Honble Supreme Court has outlined in the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank vs Rajender Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372, as under: “19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarized as follows: 19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 101 - departmental authorities. 19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. 19.3.Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set side as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co- delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 102 - of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co- delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable.” 11(ii-g). Principles outlining the scope of judicial review in matters relating to imposition of punishment in disciplinary proceedings have been spelt out in cases of Ajay Kumar Upadhyay vs Director General SSB and Ors (2022) 20 SCC 608 and in Union of India vs Subrata Nath (2024) 20 SCC 402, {Para 24] in case, the punishment shocks conscience of Court or is found to be flawed for reasons as enumerated in the case of P Gunasekran, in following terms: 24. To sum up the legal position, being fact finding authorities, both the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority are vested with the exclusive power to examine the evidence forming part of the inquiry report. On finding the evidence to be adequate and reliable during the departmental inquiry, the Disciplinary 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 103 - Authority has the discretion to impose appropriate punishment on the delinquent employee keeping in mind the gravity of the misconduct. However, in exercise of powers of judicial review, the High Court or for that matter, the Tribunal cannot ordinarily reappreciate the evidence to arrive at its own conclusion in respect of the penalty imposed unless and until the punishment imposed is so disproportionate to the offence that it would shock the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal or is found to be flawed for other reasons, as enumerated in P. Gunasekaran (supra). If the punishment imposed on the delinquent employee is such that shocks the conscience of the High Court or the Tribunal, then the Disciplinary / Appellate Authority may be called upon to re-consider the penalty imposed. Only in exceptional circumstances, which need to be mentioned, should the High Court /Tribunal decide to impose appropriate punishment by itself, on offering cogent reasons therefor. 11(ii-h). While dealing with scope of judicial scrutiny in matters relating to imposition of punishment, the Courts can interfere, in case, the circumstances are such that no reasonable person would impose such punishment which was questioned or disciplinary 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 104 - authority had used sledgehammer for cracking a nut and the punishment is not commensurate with the gravity of misconduct, the Honble Supreme Court in Punjab & Sind Bank vs Raj Kumar, 2026 SCC Online SC 519, has held:- 9. What follows from the precedents noted above is that courts should exercise restraint while interdicting orders of punishment. Normally, no court in exercise of its power of judicial review should interfere with an order of punishment imposed on a delinquent as a measure of disciplinary action by the competent authority and substitute its own judgment for that of the former. This is premised on the reason that the disciplinary authority is the best judge of the situation, and the requirements of maintaining discipline within the work force. While it is not the law that the courts should invariably stay at a distance when legality and/ or propriety of a particular punishment is questioned, judicial scrutiny of the disciplinary action by way of punishment could arise only if the circumstances are such that no reasonable person would impose the punishment which is questioned and/or such punishment has the effect of shocking the conscience of the court. To put in simpler words, 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 105 - interference could be warranted if it appeals to the court that the disciplinary authority has ‘used a sledgehammer for cracking a nut’. A punishment, which is strikingly or shockingly disproportionate and is not commensurate with the gravity of misconduct, proved to have been committed in course of inquiry or otherwise, would border on arbitrariness and offend Article 14 of the Constitution. ADMISSION OF CHARGES I & II CANNOT IPSO- FACTO LEAD TO HARSHEST PENALTY: 11(iii). First Charge as per Charge sheet was that petitioner booked one Registered Parcel No 4630 on 5.3.2007 and shown its dispatch to Pathankot Railway Mail Service on 5.3.2007 but this parcel was actually dispatched on 6.3.2007 which was alleged to be non-compliance of Rule 53 and Rule 136 of Postal Manual. The second charge was that the petitioner was alleged to have booked another Registered Parcel No 4664 on 21.03.2007 and he failed to dispatch it to Pathankot Railway Mail Service or Palampur Headquarters on the same day and this parcel was dispatched on 22.03.2007, which was alleged to be violative of Rule 171(3) and Rule 186 of the Postal 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 106 - Manual. Stand of Respondents is that the petitioner admitted aforesaid Charges I and II before Inquiry Officer on 18.08.2007 owing moral responsibility. 11(iii-a). Now, question arising for consideration is as to whether for mere admission of Charges I & II, the Respondents could ipso-facto impose the harshest of penalty on petitioner ? 11(iii-b). For appreciating the issue, the provision of Rule 53 and Rule 136 of Postal Manual Volume V and Rule 171(3) and Rule 186 of Postal Manual Vol-V reads as under: Rule 53. Due mails and unusual mails: The term due mail comprises all the bags, articles and documents which must be dispatched every day or at regular intervals. The terms unusual mail comprises parcel bags, packet bags, special bags, camp bags, telegraph bags and any other bags not included in the term “due mail”. Rule 136. Supply of Due Mail and Sorting List: The due mail and sorting list consists of (i) the due mail-list of receipts and dispatch (ii) the letter mail sorting list and (iii) the registered and parcel 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 107 - mail sorting list, in three separate parts each of which can ordinarily be printed or prepared in manuscript as the case may require, on a single page of the prescribed form-the list for the Out and In trips of sections being kept separate. These lists are prepared and supplied as follows: (a) For Post Offices and Mail Offices in communication with offices in more than one RMS Division-By the Head of the Circle. The lists for Post Offices being prepared in manuscript and supplied direct to each office and those for sections and Mail Offices being printed and supplied to the Superintendents concerned or their own use and for distribution to Inspectors, Record Assistants, officials in charge of sets and individual Sorting Assistants. One copy of the list for a Post Office is also supplied to the Superintendent of Post Offices concerned and one copy of the list for a section or mail office-to each of the other Heads of Circles have under him Post Offices, Mail Offices and section to communication with that section or office. (b) For Post Offices in direct communication with a Mail Office in one RMS Division only and all Mail Offices in a RMS Division in 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 108 - communication with the Mail Offices of the particular RMS Division itself- By the Superintendent RMS of the Division. (c) All sub-offices and branch offices as are either transit offices except those in direct communication with RMS and for Transit Sections under the control of Superintendent of Post Offices-By the Superintendent of Post Offices in manuscript. 171. Treatment of Articles presented for Registration: (1)-(2) …not relevant.. (3). The upper copy of the receipt should then be detached from the journal and handed over to the person who presented the article for registration, except in the case of an article registered by the Postmaster on service in which case the receipt should be left on record in the journal. All articles registered each day should be entered on receipt side of the abstract concerned. 186. Examination of registered and parcel abstracts and of articles in deposit: (1). Registered articles of the letter mail and parcel mail which cannot be delivered at once, or are unclaimed or to be redirected or have been refused or received missent, should be entered in the registered or parcel abstract [Form R.P-33 or 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 109 - R.P.-8], as the case may be, against the appropriate item “In deposit”. So long as registered articles remain in deposit, their numbers must be detailed each day in the abstract. When such articles are disposed of they should be shown on the issue side of the abstract opposite to the proper entries. Perusal of Rule 53 indicates that all bags, articles and documents, being “due mail” were required to be despatched at every day or at regular intervals but in case a parcel was entered in “Form R.P.-8” then, the provision of Rule 186 of the Postal Manual indicates that such article cannot be delivered at once. In instant case, a perusal of Annexures R-7 dated 05-03-2007 and 21-03-2007 [at page 413-415] with Reply-Affidavit filed before Tribunal and similar documents Annexure R-3 [at page 494 to 497] with Reply Affidavit filed to instant writ petition, undoubtedly go on to establish that registered parcels, qua Charge No I & II, relating to the aforesaid two dates were booked under R.P. 8 of Postal Manual, leading to permissible inference that these parcels were not strictly liable to be 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 110 - dispatched further on the same day, in view of exigencies. 11(iv). At this stage, it is necessary to take note of Rule 11 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, providing for imposing following penalties on an employee: 11. Penalties The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons and as hereinafter provided, be imposed on a Government servant, namely:- Minor Penalties: (i) to (iv) …not relevant… Major Penalties: (v) to (vi) …not relevant... (viii). compulsory retirement (viii). removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment under the Government; (ix) dismissal from service which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment under the Government. Provided that, in every case in which the charge of possession of assets disproportionate to known-sources of income or the charge of acceptance from any person of any gratification, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act is established, 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 111 - the penalty mentioned in clause (viii) or clause (ix) shall be imposed: Provided further that in any exceptional case and for special reasons recorded in writing, any other penalty may be imposed.s Rule 11, mandates that the imposition of penalty on delinquent employee cannot be exercised disproportionately and arbitrarily, but the exercise of discretion has to satisfy the twin requirements of “good and sufficient reasons”. Imposition of a penalty can be construed to have fructified, only if, “good reasons” existed for initiating the departmental proceedings, for which an inquiry was conducted in consonance with statutory rules-norms. Based on evidence adduced and the proof of charges, the Authorities were then to consider as to whether “sufficient reasons” existed for imposing any of the penalties on an employee, after considering relevant parameters i.e. accusation against delinquent; the role required to be performed by delinquent employee; inaction or violation of rules/norms by delinquent; extent of violation in reference to applicable rules- norms; and magnitude and gravity of established 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 112 - misconduct; and period of service rendered and the service which was yet to be performed but for the penalty imposed. The rule making authority had inserted a provisio to Rule 11, that the harshest penalty of dismissal was liable to be imposed in cases, where gravest of misconduct was established and established misconduct was of such magnitude involving or was relatable to or was akin to the possession of assets disproportionate of known sources of income or acceptance from any person of any gratification, other than legal remuneration for doing or forbearing to do any official act is established. The insertion of provisio below Rule 11 (ix) acts as a guiding factor for disciplinary authority, that the harshest penalty of dismissal from service cannot be imposed by exercising discretion in an improper, unfettered and casual manner and that too by ignoring “relevant factors” as to whether the penalty imposed was commensurate with the misconduct or was disproportionate, in facts of each case. CONCLUSION: 12. Based on the above discussion, this Court 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 113 - has no hesitation to hold that the Respondent No 4-Disciplinary Authority has exercised discretion in imposing harshest of penalty of dismissal in an arbitrary and whimsical manner and that too by “ignoring relevant considerations”, i.e. the accusation against the delinquent; the role required to be performed by delinquent employee; inaction or violation of rules/norms by delinquent ; the extent of violation in reference to applicable rules-norms; and the magnitude-gravity of established misconduct; and to take into account other relevant factors i.e. the period of service rendered and service yet to be rendered and future career progression besides other extenuating circumstances, which would have accrued, but for the penalty. Discretion vested in disciplinary authority cannot be exercised so as to use a sledgehammer to crack a nut and the penalty imposed should not be disproportionate or unduly harsh, which, no reasonable person would have imposed against a delinquent employee. In respect of Charge No I & II, mere admission of charges does not ipso-facto confer a 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 114 - discretion on Respondent No 4-Disciplinary Authority for imposing harshest penalty of dismissal, ignoring “relevant considerations” that mere delayed despatch of registered parcel by one day due to negligence, was not of such a magnitude for which severest of punishment could have been imposed. Further, even rules-norms in Postal Manual, as reproduced above, foresees that in case due to any exigency or act or omission, a registered parcel could not be dispatched on the same day or regular intervals then, such registered parcels were to be entered in Form RP-8. Since the petitioner had entered both registered parcel in Form RP-8 {one parcel dated 05-03-2007 and one parcel dated 21-03-2007}, and the rules-norms relied upon in the Postal Manual recognises “permissible delayed delivery” then, the mere admission by the petitioner, accepting negligence in delayed dispatch of parcel by one day cannot lead to imposition of harshest penalty of dismissal. In respect of Charge No III (i) (ii) & (iv), this Court has already quashed the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer, which were accepted 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 115 - by the Respondent No-4 Disciplinary authority, [in terms of the discussion made in Para 10 (iii) supra] in view of the fact that “due process of law was given a go-bye”. The Inquiry Officer had entertained documents, which were merely produced but were never proved by witnesses i.e. either by examining the author of such documents or competent person having knowledge of contents of such documents. Legal compliances in Rule 14 (14) of CCS (CCA) Rules was violated. The action of the Inquiry Officer -Authorities in relying upon “inadmissible evidence” has deprived the petitioner of his foundational right to cross-examine the author or competent person. Even non-production and supply of “Un-Enlisted Documents” despite having pointed out “relevancy of documents”, which was duly approved by the Inquiry Officer on 17.09.2007 {Annexure A-15}, was violative of Rule 14 (ii) & (12). Communication dated 28-09-2007, Annexure R-9, sent by the Disciplinary Authority-Respondent No 4 in treating the required documents as “not relevant” was without authority of law, as the Rules solely empowered the Inquiry 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 116 - Officer to determine relevancy of documents sought to be requisitioned and produced during regular inquiry. Inquiry Officer could not refuse to ensure production of documents on directions-orders given by the Disciplinary Authority-Respondent No 4 impedes purity and fairness in departmental proceedings. Once there was nothing on record to establish that production of documents was “against public interest or security of state”, then, non-compliance of Rule 14 (13), was writ large. Even, rejection of request and the non-production of “Un-enlisted Documents” on directions-orders of higher authority-disciplinary authority, establish that the Inquiry Officer was bent upon to act as an agent of the Authorities so as arrive at findings against the petitioner and non-adherence to statutory rules and legal compliances has gravely prejudiced the petitioner, by denying him a reasonable opportunity to defend himself in the departmental proceedings. Even, on the principle of preponderance of probabilities, the findings recorded by Inquiry Officer were perverse. The decision-making process has resulted in miscarriage of justice, 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 117 - and once after due appreciation of the prosecution evidence, the petitioner was acquitted and the findings recorded in departmental proceedings were negated, qua the Charge No III (i) (ii) & (iv), then, the sting which stood negated by Trial Court and had lost its effect cannot be permitted to be reinforced, which shall be highly unjust, unfair and oppressive as per the principles outlined by the Honble Supreme Court, as aforesaid. Even, the twin core requirements of imposition of a penalty for “good and sufficient reasons”, is not satisfied in instant case, due to the flawed inquiry conducted in violation of the statutory rules and in ignoring “relevant considerations” as discussed above. Allowing penalty of dismissal to remain, shall amount to giving leverage and premium to the authorities for their omissions and inactions, which shall be highly arbitrary. In facts of instant case, the imposition of harshest penalty of dismissal has shocked conscience of this Court, warranting interference. Consequently the proceedings in relation to Charge No III (i) (ii) & (iv) and all adversial orders including the dismissal 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 118 - orders, does not stand the test of judicial scrutiny and same are quashed and set-aside. 13. Learned DSG has assailed the Impugned Order dated 30.09.2014 [Annexure P-5}, passed by Learned Tribunal on the ground that dismissal orders passed on 14.02.2008 could not be made effective from the date of passing the fresh rejection orders on 17.11.2011. Since this Court has quashed the entire proceedings, including adversial orders then, this Court does not feel it appropriate to analyze this aspect. 14. Flowing from the above narration of facts, the applicable statutory rules, the mandate of law and the material on record, the Impugned Order dated 30.09.2014, [Annexure P-5], passed by Learned Tribunal suffers from inherent illegality and infirmity and accordingly, the Impugned Order is interdicted and quashed and set-aside. MODIFYING PENALTY AND MOULDING OF RELIEF: 15. In instant case, the petitioner joined service with the Respondents-Employer as Postal Assistant on 17.01.1983 and was promoted as Sub-Postmaster. 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 119 - Upon initiation disciplinary proceedings, the harshest of penalty of dismissal from service was imposed on 14-02-2008 [Annexure A-1] and other subsequent adversial orders were issued against the petitioner. The dismissal order and other subsequent adversial orders have been quashed by this Court. By now, petitioner has reached the age of superannuation and due to this, he cannot be reinstated in service. Though in the normal course, this Court would have remitted the matter back to the Authorities for imposing any other penalty, which was commensurate with the alleged misconduct [qua admitted Charge no I & II, for having delaying the dispatch of two registered parcel on two occasions, when Charge No III (i) (ii) & (iv) stands quashed in view of honorable acquittal and non-compliance of rules and imposition of disproportionate penalty of dismissal was arbitrary and unwarranted, due to which the petitioner has been gravely prejudiced. Imposing a penalty, which is not commensurate with the alleged misconduct and is disproportionate is a relevant aspect, to show indulgence, in view of prolonged 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 120 - 24 years of service rendered and the fact that he was entitled for further career progression and was on honourable acquittal qua Charge No III (i) (ii) & (iv) and the admitted Charges I & II point towards negligence, which was a trivial, but without having caused any financial loss to the authorities or any other person. Dismissal was all the more injurious to the petitioner and his family. While dealing with a similar fact-situation, the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Sahab Singh (D) through LR’s vs Director General, RPF, Rail Bhawan & Ors, 2025 SCC Online SC 2924, has modified the penalty from dismissal to compulsory retirement. Taking into account the totality of facts and circumstances and in view of non-adherence to legal compliances and in view of the admission of alleged misconduct {relating to Charge No I & II as discussed above} and the fact that petitioner had rendered 24 years of service; therefore, in facts of instant case, this Court modifies penalty and moulds the relief, by directing the Authorities to treat the petitioner to have “Compulsorily 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 121 - Retired from service from 14.02.2008”, instead of the penalty of dismissal from service imposed on 14.02.2008 to meet the ends of justice ; and entitling petitioner for all service benefits, including Gratuity, Pension etc. from 14.02.2008, inaccordance with law. 16. No other point was raised/argued. DIRECTIONS: 17. In view of above discussion and for the reasons recorded hereinabove, the writ petition filed by the Petitioner-Employee is allowed and the writ petition filed by Respondent-Employer is dismissed, in following terms:- (i). Civil Writ Petition, i.e. CWP No 1990 of 2015, titled as Union of India & others versus Trilochan Dass Dogra, is dismissed ; (ii). Civil Writ Petition, i.e. CWP 3128 of 2015, titled as Trilochan Dass Dogra versus Union of India & others is allowed; (iii). Impugned Order dated 30.09.2014, [Annexure P-5], passed by Learned Central Administrative Tribunal in OA 1323/HP/2012, is quashed and set-aside; (iv). Authorities-Respondents shall treat 2026:HHC:21859-DB REPORTABLE - 122 - petitioner to have Compulsory Retired from service from 14.02.2008, instead of dismissal; (v). Upon moulding of relief, Authorities Respondents shall grant all service benefits including Gratuity, Pension etc. to the petitioner w.e.f. 14.02.2008 with all consequential benefits; (vi) As a sequel to the above directions, entire proceedings qua Charge No-III and the penalty of dismissal dated 14.02.2008, and the orders rejecting appeal and revision, including fresh rejection orders dated 17.11.2011 are quashed and set-aside; (vii). Benefits flowing in terms of this judgment shall be released to the petitioner within four weeks from the receipt of certified/downloaded copy of this judgement; (viii). Parties to bear respective costs. In aforesaid terms, both petitions and all pending applications, if any, shall accordingly stand disposed of. (G.S. Sandhawalia) (Ranjan Sharma) Chief Justice Judge June 04, 2026. (TM)