HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 6634 of 2026 Court No. - 93 HON'BLE SANTOSH RAI, J. 1. Heard Shri Dinesh Mishra, learned counsel for the appellant, Shri Prince Kumar, learned counsel for O.P. No.2 and learned AGA for the State. 2. The present appeal has been filed by the appellant to set aside/quash the entire proceedings as well as the chargesheet dated 14.07.2023 and the cognizance/summoning order dated 05.08.2023 passed by Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Sant Kabir Nagar in Sessions Case No.575 of 2023 arising out of Case Crime No.183 of 2023 under Sections 420, 406 and 506 and 120-B IPC and Sections 3(2)(va) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, P.S.- Mahuli, District- Sant Kabir Nagar. 3. In the FIR, the accused persons, namely Vishal Manji, Aneesh Ojha, the appellant herein, and Nitesh Singh, have been named. The FIR was registered under Sections 420, 406 and 506 IPC and Section 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act. The allegation against the accused persons, in brief, is that they induced the complainant to hand over his vehicle on the pretext of hiring it for transporting goods, promising rent and payment of expenses. Thereafter, Aneesh Ojha allegedly took possession of the vehicle and its documents and obtained/used signed cheques and a sum of about Rs.4 lakh, while Nitesh Singh allegedly presented one of the cheques and raised a false monetary demand of Rs.10 lakh. It is further alleged that the accused, acting in collusion, neither returned the vehicle nor paid the agreed amount and threatened the complainant, including with caste- related abuses. Versus Counsel for Appellant(s) : Deepak Kumar Tripathi Counsel for Respondent(s) : G.A., Prince Kumar Aneesh Ojha .....Appellant(s) State of U.P. and Another .....Respondent(s) 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant has been falsely implicated in the present case due to a monetary dispute between the parties. It is submitted that the informant had taken a sum of Rs.4,50,000/- from the appellant and, when repayment was demanded, issued a cheque for the said amount, which was dishonoured for insufficiency of funds, whereafter the appellant instituted proceedings under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. It is argued that the present FIR was subsequently lodged as a counterblast to the said proceedings. Learned counsel further submits that the allegations of cheating, criminal breach of trust, criminal intimidation and the offence under the SC/ST Act are false and unsupported by any independent evidence and no caste-related words were allegedly used by the appellant. It is also contended that there was an unexplained delay of about one year in lodging the complaint/application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and that the investigating officer has filed the charge-sheet without collecting credible evidence. Learned counsel for the appellant has further placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. and others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2024) 10 SCC 690, and submitted that the offences under Sections 420 and 406 IPC cannot be invoked on the same set of facts. On these grounds, it is submitted that the order taking cognizance dated 05.08.2023 and the consequential proceedings are liable to be quashed. 5. Per contra, learned A.G.A. and learned counsel for O.P. No.2 submit that the FIR was registered pursuant to the order passed on the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and, after investigation, the investigating officer collected material against the appellant and other accused and submitted the charge-sheet under Sections 420, 406, 506, 120-B IPC and Section 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act. The statements of the informant and other witnesses recorded during investigation support the prosecution version. It is further submitted that the defence regarding the alleged loan transaction, dishonoured cheque and the proceedings under Section 138 of the N.I. Act raises disputed questions of fact, which cannot appropriately be adjudicated in proceedings seeking quashing of the criminal case. The allegations made in the FIR and the material collected during investigation prima facie disclose the commission of cognizable offences; CRLA No. 6634 of 2026 2 therefore, the order taking cognizance does not call for interference at this stage. 6. On the basis of the allegations contained in the FIR, the statement of the victim recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and the material available in the case diary, the Investigating Officer submitted the charge-sheet, whereafter cognizance was taken and the appellant was summoned. The present appeal has been preferred against the cognizance/summoning order 05.08.2023. Thereafter, charges were framed on 19.07.2024 and, during the course of trial, the statement of PW-1, the complainant Vijay Kumar, has been recorded. However, the defence has not yet concluded the cross-examination of the said witness before the trial court. It is an admitted fact that some financial/monetary dispute is pending between the parties. The allegations in the FIR, coupled with the material collected during investigation, prima facie disclose the commission of the offences alleged against the appellants, including criminal intimidation, and are sufficient to warrant their prosecution. The disputed questions relating to the nature of the financial transaction and the rival claims of the parties are matters for consideration by the trial court on the basis of evidence. 7. Considering the allegations contained in the FIR, the statement of the victim recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and the material available in the case diary and the financial/monetary dispute pending between the parties, this Court is of the opinion that a prima facie case is made out against the accused-appellant. It is also undisputed that the charge has already been framed against the accused-appellant on 19.07.2024. 8. It is well settled that at the stage of framing of charge, even a strong suspicion is sufficient to proceed against the accused, and the correctness or sufficiency of the evidence is not to be meticulously examined. At the stage of consideration of discharge or framing of charge, the Court is required to evaluate the material placed on record by the prosecution, if the material available on record is strong regarding the commission of the offence by the accused, the charge is liable to be framed. 9. In Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat and Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2013) 11 SCC 476, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as CRLA No. 6634 of 2026 3 under:- "………. While framing charges, court is required to evaluate materials and documents on record to decide whether facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value would disclose existence of ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, the court is not required to go deep into the probative value of materials on record. It needs to evaluate whether there is a ground for presuming that accused had committed offence. But it should not evaluate sufficiency of evidence to convict accused. Even if there is a grave suspicion against the accused and it is not properly explained or court feels that accused might have committed offence, then framing of charges against the accused is justified. It is only for conviction of accused that materials must indicate that accused had committed offence but for framing of charges if materials indicate that accused might have committed offence, then framing of charge is proper. Materials brought on by prosecution must be believed to be true and their probative value cannot be decided at this stage. The accused entitled to urge his contentions only on materials submitted by prosecution. He is not entitled to produce any material at this stage and the court is not required to consider any such material, if submitted. Whether the prima facic case made out depends upon facts and circumstances of each case. If two views are possible and materials indicate mere suspicion, not being grave suspicion, against accused then he may be discharged. The court has to consider broad probabilities of case, total effect of evidence and documents produced before it. The court should not act as mouthpiece of prosecution and it is impermissible to have roving enquiry at the stage of framing of charge." 10. In Rajbir Singh v. State of U.P. and Another, (2006) 4 SCC 51, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held, by quoting the decision in State of Bihar vs. Ramesh Singh, (1977) SCC (Cri) 533, as under:- CRLA No. 6634 of 2026 4 "Reading [Ss. 227 and 228] together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. If the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial." 11. In Ghulam Hassan Beigh v. Mohammad Maqbool Magrey and Others, (2022) 12 SCC 657, the Apex Court held as under:- "21. This Court in Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4, considered the scope of enquiry a Judge is required to make while considering the question of framing of charges. After an exhaustive survey of the case law on the CRLA No. 6634 of 2026 5 point, this Court, in para 10 of the judgment, laid down the following principles: "10. ... (1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. (2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused. (4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced Judge cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was CRLA No. 6634 of 2026 6 conducting a trial." 23. In Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368, this Court had an occasion to consider the scope of Sections 227 and 228 CrPC. The principles which emerged therefrom have been taken note of in para 21 as under: "21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge: (i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case. (ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. (iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. (v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before CRLA No. 6634 of 2026 7 framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. (vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. (vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal." 12. Thus, having considered the entire facts and circumstances of the case, the material and evidence available on record, the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as discussed herein above, I am of the considered opinion that the learned trial court has rightly framed charges against the accused-appellant under Sections 420, 406 and 506 and 120-B IPC and Sections 3(2)(va) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. The impugned order framing charges is well reasoned and does not suffer from any illegality, perversity or infirmity warranting interference by this Court. 13. So far as the submission of learned counsel for the appellant with regard to Sections 420 and 406 IPC, in the light of the judgment of the Apex Court in the Delhi Race Course case, is concerned, it is pertinent to note that the said judgment was not in existence at the time of taking cognizance or during the relevant proceedings before the court concerned. Therefore, the applicability and effect of the said judgment on the facts CRLA No. 6634 of 2026 8 and circumstances of the present case may appropriately be considered by the learned trial court during the course of trial in the light of the evidence available on record. 14. Accordingly, the present appeal stands dismissed. 15. In case the appellant is not enlarged on bail, he is directed to appear before the court concerned and move bail application, within two weeks from today. It is made clear that no application seeking extension of the aforesaid period shall be entertained by this court. 16. In case, the appellant moves bail application before the court concerned, the same shall be considered and decided by the trial court expeditiously and preferably on the same day, in light of principles laid down by the Supreme Court as well as this Court regarding surrender and bail. 17. In case, the appellant fails to appear before the court concerned within the stipulated period, the trial court will be at liberty to adopt appropriate coercive proceedings, in accordance with law, for securing the presence of the appellant. 18. Registrar (Compliance) is directed to communicate the instant order to the court concerned through District and Sessions Judge, Sant Kabir Nagar by e-mail/FAX within 48 hours. September 29, 2026 Ankit. CRLA No. 6634 of 2026 9 (Santosh Rai,J.) Digitally signed by :- ANKIT VISHWAKARMA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad