Page No.# 1/4 GAHC010195722025 2026:GAU-AS:10413 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : CRP(IO)/371/2025 SAUMITRA NATH S/O LATE SAMANTA NATH, R/O TARAKESWAR LANE, SHIBBARI ROAD, P.O. TARAPUR, P.S. SILCHAR, PIN 788003, DIST. CACHAR, ASSAM. VERSUS SUSMITA NATH W/O SRI SAUMITRA NATH, D/O LATE SIDDHARTHA NATH, R/O TARAKESWAR LANE, SHIBBARI ROAD, P.O. TARAPUR, P.S. SILCHAR, PIN 788003, DIST. CACHAR, ASSAM. Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. S P CHOUDHURY, MS B DEVI Advocate for the Respondent : MR. O LASKAR, MS A GOGOI,MR. U N CHATTRY :: BEFORE :: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PARTHIVJYOTI SAIKIA O R D E R 29.07.2026 Heard Mr. S.P. Choudhury, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. O. Laskar, the learned counsel representing the sole respondent. 2. This is an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order dated 05.07.2025 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Cachar, Silchar in F.C. (Civil) Case No.74/2023. Page No.# 2/4 3. The petitioner filed a divorce proceeding before the Family Court. He examined two witnesses and declined to adduce further evidence. Therefore, the case was posted for recording evidence of the defendant side. 4. At that time, the petitioner filed an application before the court below stating that he wanted to examine some more witnesses, but his lawyer had mistakenly submitted before the court that the petitioner would not examine any more witnesses. The petitioner, therefore, prayed that he may be given opportunities to examine some more witnesses. 5. In the meantime, the defendants have already filed evidence of two witnesses. 6. On 05.07.2025, the trial court refused the prayer of the petitioner, primarily on the ground that the petitioner did not name the witnesses whom he wanted to examine. 7. Mr. O. Laskar, the learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the provision of Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be invoked to reopen evidence for the purpose of further examination-in-chief or cross-examination. In order to buttress his point, Mr. Laskar has relied upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that was delivered in K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy, (2011) 11 SCC 275 . Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the said judgment are quoted as under: “11. There is no specific provision in the Code enabling the parties to reopen the evidence for the purpose of further examination-in-chief or cross-examination. Section 151 of the Code provides that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the court. In the absence of any provision providing for reopening of evidence or recall of any witness for further examination or cross-examination, for purposes other than securing clarification required by the court, the inherent power under Section 151 of the Code, subject to its limitations, can be invoked in appropriate cases to reopen the evidence and/or recall witnesses for further examination. This inherent power of the court is not affected by the express power conferred upon the court under Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code to recall any witness to enable the court to put such question to elicit any clarifications. 12. The respondent contended that Section 151 cannot be used for reopening evidence or Page No.# 3/4 for recalling witnesses. We are not able to accept the said submission as an absolute proposition. We however agree that Section 151 of the Code cannot be routinely invoked for reopening evidence or recalling witnesses. The scope of Section 151 has been explained by this Court in several decisions [see Padam Sen v. State of U.P. [AIR 1961 SC 218 : (1961) 1 Cri LJ 322] , Manohar Lal Chopra v. Seth Hiralal [AIR 1962 SC 527] , Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] , Ram Chand and Sons Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. v. Kanhayalal Bhargava [AIR 1966 SC 1899] , Nain Singh v. Koonwarjee [(1970) 1 SCC 732] , Newabganj Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India [(1976) 1 SCC 120 : AIR 1976 SC 1152] , Jaipur Mineral Development Syndicate v. CIT [(1977) 1 SCC 508 : 1977 SCC (Tax) 208 : AIR 1977 SC 1348] , National Institute of Mental Health & Neuro Sciences v. C. Parameshwara [(2005) 2 SCC 256] and Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj [(2010) 8 SCC 1 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 212] ]. We may summarise them as follows: (a) Section 151 is not a substantive provision which creates or confers any power or jurisdiction on courts. It merely recognises the discretionary power inherent in every court as a necessary corollary for rendering justice in accordance with law, to do what is “right” and undo what is “wrong”, that is, to do all things necessary to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of its process. (b) As the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive, Section 151 recognises and confirms that if the Code does not expressly or impliedly cover any particular procedural aspect, the inherent power can be used to deal with such situation or aspect, if the ends of justice warrant it. The breadth of such power is coextensive with the need to exercise such power on the facts and circumstances. (c) A court has no power to do that which is prohibited by law or the Code, by purported exercise of its inherent powers. If the Code contains provisions dealing with a particular topic or aspect, and such provisions either expressly or by necessary implication exhaust the scope of the power of the court or the jurisdiction that may be exercised in relation to that matter, the inherent power cannot be invoked in order to cut across the powers conferred by the Code or in a manner inconsistent with such provisions. In other words the court cannot make use of the special provisions of Section 151 of the Code, where the remedy or procedure is provided in the Code. (d) The inherent powers of the court being complementary to the powers specifically conferred, a court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in Section 151 of the Code when the matter is not covered by any specific provision in the Code and the exercise of those powers would not in any way be in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or be against the intention of the legislature. (e) While exercising the inherent power, the court will be doubly cautious, as there is no legislative guidance to deal with the procedural situation and the exercise of power depends upon the discretion and wisdom of the court, and in the facts and circumstances of the case. The absence of an express provision in the Code and the recognition and saving of the inherent power of a court, should not however be treated as a carte blanche to grant any relief. (f) The power under Section 151 will have to be used with circumspection and care, only where it is absolutely necessary, when there is no provision in the Code governing the matter, when the bona fides of the applicant cannot be doubted, when such exercise is to meet the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process of court.” Page No.# 4/4 8. Mr. Choudhury has submitted that it was the fault of the lawyer who declined to adduce further evidence though the petitioner had already instructed the said lawyer that he will be examining more witnesses. 9. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsels of both sides. 10. Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be routinely invoked for reopening evidence or recalling witnesses. There is no specific provision in the Code of Civil Procedure, which enables the party to reopen evidence for the purpose of further examination-in-chief or cross-examination. 11. Once the lawyer declined to adduce further evidence, his client cannot claim that his lawyer was not acting on his instructions. This Court is of the opinion that under the given circumstances there are sufficient materials to show that the petitioner has been indulging in dilatory tactics. 12. The present revision petition is devoid of any merit and dismissed accordingly. JUDGE Comparing Assistant