- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:19848 CRL.P No. 3605 of 2026 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 8TH DAY OF APRIL, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 3605 OF 2026 BETWEEN: SRI. NISCHAY S S/O SEENAPPA, AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS, R/AT NO. 28, MIG APARTMENTS, 2ND STAGE, KHB COLONY, BASAVESHWARNAGAR, BENGALURU – 560 079. (WRONGLY SHOWN IN FIR AS NISCHAY SRINIVAS @ NISCHAY S) (CURRENTLY IN JUDICIAL CUSTODY PARAPANA AGRAHARA, CENRAL JAIL) …PETITIONER (BY SRI. P PRASANNA KUMAR, ADVOCATE FOR SRI. SHESHA KARTHIK M REDDY, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. STATE BY YELAHANKA NEW TOWN PS, YELAHANKA SUB DIVISION, BENGALURU CITY, REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, SPP OFFICE, HIGH COURT BUILDING, KARNATAKA HIGH COURT, AMBEDKAR VEEDHI, BENGALURU – 560 009. Digitally signed by SANJEEVINI J KARISHETTY Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:19848 CRL.P No. 3605 of 2026 2. SMT. AFSANA KHATUN D/O. SAFIYAR RAHAMAN, AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS, R/AT NO. 07, 3RD CROSS 12TH MAIN, ANANTHAPURA YELAHANKA NEW TOWN BENGALURU CITY, KARNATAKA - 560 064. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. B N JAGADEESHA, ADDL. SPP FOR R1) THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S.482(FILED U/S.528 BNSS) CR.P.C PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR IN CRIME NO.89/2026 DATED 24.02.2026 REGISTERED BY THE RESPONDENT NO.1 YELAHANKA NEW TOWN POLICE FOR THE OFFENCE P/US/ 351(3) AND 69 OF BNS 2023 PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE VII ADDL. CJM BENGLAURU AGAINST THE PETITIONER/ACCUSED HEREIN (PRODUCED VIDE ANNEXURE A) AND ETC., THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:19848 CRL.P No. 3605 of 2026 CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA ORAL ORDER The petitioner is before this Court calling in question registration of a crime in Crime No.89 of 2026 registered for offences punishable under Sections 69 and 351(3) of the BNS. 2. Heard Sri P. Prasanna Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri B.N.Jagadeesha, learned Additional State Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1. 3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows: - The petitioner is a pilot and the 2nd respondent/complainant is a Flight Attendant. The petitioner and the 2nd respondent/ complainant being in the same organization fell in love and were in relationship for two years. After about 2 years, it appears the relationship between the petitioner and the complainant turned sour. On the relationship turning sour, the complainant registers a complaint on 24-02- - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:19848 CRL.P No. 3605 of 2026 2026 for the aforesaid offences. The contention of the complainant is that for over two years the petitioner has had sexual relationship with the complainant on the promise of marriage and has broken the said promise and therefore, it amounts to ingredients of Section 69 of BNS. The registration of crime in Crime No.89 of 2026 is what has driven the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner Sri P. Prasanna Kumar would vehemently contend that the acts between the petitioner and the 2nd respondent were consensual and cannot be attributed that they were on deceit of promise of marriage. The promise of marriage was never projected by the petitioner. Therefore, the said consensual acts must not be permitted to be continued even for the sake of investigation, as it would become an abuse of the process of law and runs foul of plethora of judgments of the Apex Court. 5. The 2nd respondent/complainant has filed an affidavit stating that she would not make any submissions and does not want to pursue the complaint as both of them want to move - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:19848 CRL.P No. 3605 of 2026 forward in their career. In that light, the issue whether the acts of the petitioner with the complainant can become ingredients of Section 69 of the BNS? 6. The affidavit of the complainant is clear that for two years they were in love and had several bouts of sexual intercourse. These are consensual acts and cannot become ingredients of rape. The Apex Court in the case of SAMADHAN v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA1, has held as follows: “…. …. …. 28. We find that the present case is not a case where the appellant lured respondent No. 2 solely for physical pleasures and then vanished. The relationship continued for a period of three long years, which is a considerable period of time. They remained close and emotionally involved. In such cases, physical intimacy that occurred during the course of a functioning relationship cannot be retrospectively branded as instances of offence of rape merely because the relationship failed to culminate in marriage. 29. This Court has, on numerous occasions, taken note of the disquieting tendency wherein failed or broken relationships are given the colour of criminality. The offence of rape, being of the gravest kind, must be invoked only in cases where there exists genuine sexual violence, coercion, or absence of free consent. To convert every sour relationship into an offence of rape not only trivialises the seriousness of the offence but also inflicts upon the 1 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2528 - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:19848 CRL.P No. 3605 of 2026 accused indelible stigma and grave injustice. Such instances transcend the realm of mere personal discord. The misuse of the criminal justice machinery in this regard is a matter of profound concern and calls for condemnation. 30. In Prashant v. State of NCT of Delhi, (2025) 5 SCC 764, this Court speaking through one of us (Nagarathna, J.) observed that a mere break-up of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in the initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marriage. The relevant portion is extracted as under: “20. In our view, taking the allegations in the FIR and the charge-sheet as they stand, the crucial ingredients of the offence under Section 376(2)(n)IPC are absent. A review of the FIR and the complainant's statement under Section 164CrPC discloses no indication that any promise of marriage was extended at the outset of their relationship in 2017. Therefore, even if the prosecution's case is accepted at its face value, it cannot be concluded that the complainant engaged in a sexual relationship with the appellant solely on account of any assurance of marriage from the appellant. The relationship between the parties was cordial and also consensual in nature. A mere break up of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marital relationship. Further, both parties are now married to someone else and have moved on in their respective lives. Thus, in our view, the continuation of the prosecution in the present case would amount to a gross abuse of the process of law. Therefore, no purpose would be served by continuing the prosecution.” (underlining by us) 31. This Court is conscious of the societal context in which, in a country such as ours, the institution of marriage holds deep social and cultural significance. It is, therefore, - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:19848 CRL.P No. 3605 of 2026 not uncommon for a woman to repose complete faith in her partner and to consent to physical intimacy on the assurance that such a relationship would culminate in a lawful and socially recognised marriage. In such circumstances, the promise of marriage becomes the very foundation of her consent, rendering it conditional rather than absolute. It is, thus, conceivable that such consent may stand vitiated where it is established that the promise of marriage was illusory, made in bad faith, and with no genuine intention of fulfilment, solely to exploit the woman. The law must remain sensitive to such genuine cases where trust has been breached and dignity violated, lest the protective scope of Section 376 of the IPC be reduced to a mere formality for those truly aggrieved. At the same time, the invocation of this principle must rest upon credible evidence and concrete facts, and not on unsubstantiated allegations or moral conjecture. … …. … 33. The appellant has unequivocally asserted that, during the subsistence of the relationship, no grievance or allegation was ever raised by respondent No. 2 regarding the absence of consent in their physical relations. It was only upon the appellant's refusal to fulfil her demand for payment of the sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- that the present criminal proceedings came to be instituted. Furthermore, the alleged incidents are stated to have occurred between 12.03.2022 and 20.05.2024; however, the FIR was lodged only on 31.08.2024, i.e. nearly three months after the last alleged act of sexual intimacy. 34. The FIR is conspicuously silent as to any specific allegation that the appellant had either forcibly taken or compelled respondent No. 2 to accompany him to the hotel, nor does it disclose any circumstance suggesting deceit or inducement on the part of the appellant to procure her presence there. Therefore, the only logical inference that emerges is that respondent No. 2, of her own volition, visited and met the appellant on each occasion. It is also borne out from the record that whenever the appellant brought up the subject of marriage, respondent No. 2 herself opposed the proposal. In such circumstances, the contention of respondent No. 2 that the physical relationship between the parties was premised upon any - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:19848 CRL.P No. 3605 of 2026 assurance of marriage by the appellant is devoid of merit and stands unsustainable. 35. We deem it appropriate to refer to the decision of this Court in Rajnish Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2025) 4 SCC 197, whereby it was held that when a woman who willingly engages in a long-term sexual relationship with a man, fully aware of its nature and without any cogent evidence to show that such relationship was induced by misconception of fact or false promise of marriage made in bad faith from the inception, the man cannot be held guilty of rape under Section 376 of the IPC. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted as under: “33. There is no dispute that from the year 2006 onwards, the complainant and the appellant were residing in different towns. The complainant is an educated woman and there was no pressure whatsoever upon her which could have prevented her from filing a police complaint against the accused if she felt that the sexual relations were under duress or were being established under a false assurance of marriage. On many occasions, she even portrayed herself to be the wife of the appellant thereby, dispelling the allegation that the intention of the appellant was to cheat her right from the inception of the relationship. 34. We cannot remain oblivious to the fact that it was mostly the complainant who used to travel to meet the appellant at his place of posting. Therefore, we are convinced that the relationship between the complainant and the appellant was consensual without the existence of any element of deceit or misconception. 35. Further, the application filed by the complainant at One Stop Centre, Lalitpur on 23-3- 2022, makes it abundantly clear that she was in a consensual relationship with the appellant since 2006. It is alleged in the complaint that when she had proposed that they should marry and live together, the appellant physically abused her and beat her up. If at all there was an iota of truth in this allegation then the FIR should have been registered immediately after this incident. However, it is only when it came to the knowledge of the complainant that the appellant was getting - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:19848 CRL.P No. 3605 of 2026 married to another woman, in an attempt to stop his marriage, she filed aforesaid complaint at the One Stop Centre wherein she also admitted that she was equally guilty as the appellant and therefore, his marriage must be stopped. xxx 39. It is, therefore, clear that the accused is not liable for the offence of rape if the victim has wilfully agreed to maintain sexual relations. The Court has also recognised that a prosecutrix can agree to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused.” (underlining by us) 36. By the impugned order dated 06.03.2025, the High Court observed that although it was contended on behalf of the appellant that the relationship between him and respondent No. 2 was consensual in nature, no such categorical statement was made by him in the memo of application and that the plea of consent was merely inferred. In this regard, reliance was placed by the High Court on the case of Ganga Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2013) 7 SCC 278 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ) 505 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 314, wherein this Court had stated that unless there was a specific defence of a consensual relationship, such a defence cannot be inferred. 37. The said finding of the High Court, however, fails to appreciate that a plain reading of the FIR in question itself reveals that the relationship between the parties was, in fact, consensual, inasmuch as respondent No. 2 met the appellant whenever he expressed a desire to meet her. Furthermore, respondent No. 2, being a major and an educated individual, voluntarily associated with the appellant and entered into physical intimacy on her own volition. It is also pertinent to note that, at the relevant time, the marriage of respondent No. 2 was subsisting. In light of the foregoing circumstances, even upon a bare reading of the material on record, it is manifest that the relationship between the parties was consensual, and therefore, the absence of an express statement to that effect in the memo of application, as emphasised in the impugned order, - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:19848 CRL.P No. 3605 of 2026 cannot be held against the appellant when the same can be otherwise clearly discerned. 38. At this stage it is material to refer to the decision of this Court in Mahesh Damu, wherein the following observations were made: “29. It must also be clear that for a promise to be a false promise to amount to misconception of fact within the meaning of Section 90IPC, it must have been made from the very beginning with an intention to deceive the woman to persuade her to have a physical relationship. Therefore, if it is established that such consent was given under a misconception of fact, the said consent is vitiated and not a valid consent. In this regard we may refer to Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana [Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660], in which it was held as follows : (SCC pp. 682-84, paras 21 & 24) “21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:19848 CRL.P No. 3605 of 2026 only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives. xxx 24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The ‘failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact must have an immediate relevance’. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.” (underlining by us)” In AMOL BHAGWAN NEHUL v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA2, the Apex Court has held as follows: “…. …. …. 8. Having heard both sides in this case and after carefully considering the material on record, the following attributes come to the fore: (a) Even if the allegations in the FIR are taken as a true and correct depiction of circumstances, it does not appear from the record that the consent of the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 was obtained against her will and merely on an assurance to marry. The Appellant and the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 were acquainted since 08.06.2022, and she herself 2 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1230 - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:19848 CRL.P No. 3605 of 2026 admits that they interacted frequently and fell in love. The Complainant/Respondent no. 2 engaged in a physical relationship alleging that the Appellant had done so without her consent, however she not only sustained her relationship for over 12 months, but continued to visit him in lodges on two separate occasions. The narrative of the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 does not corroborate with her conduct. (b) The consent of the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 as defined under section 90 IPC also cannot be said to have been obtained under a misconception of fact. There is no material to substantiate “inducement or misrepresentation” on the part of the Appellant to secure consent for sexual relations without having any intention of fulfilling said promise. Investigation has also revealed that the Khulanama, was executed on 29.12.2022 which the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 had obtained from her ex-husband. During this time, the parties were already in a relationship and the alleged incident had already taken place. It is inconceivable that the Complainant had engaged in a physical relationship with the Appellant, on the assurance of marriage, while she was already married to someone else. Even otherwise, such promise to begin with was illegal and unenforceable qua the Appellant. (c) There is no evidence of coercion or threat of injury to the Complainant/Respondent no. 2, to attract an offence under section 506 IPC. It is improbable that there was any threat caused to the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 by the Appellant when all along the relationship was cordial, and it was only when the Appellant graduated and left for his hometown to Ahmednagar, the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 became agitated. We also cannot ignore the conduct of the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 in visiting the native village of the Appellant without any intimation, which is also unacceptable and reflects the agitated and - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:19848 CRL.P No. 3605 of 2026 unnerved state of mind of the Complainant/Respondent no. 2. For the same reason, the criminal prosecution against the Appellant herein is probably with an underlying motive and disgruntled state of mind. (d) There is also no reasonable possibility that the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 or any woman being married before and having a child of four years, would continue to be deceived by the Appellant or maintain a prolonged association or physical relationship with an individual who has sexually assaulted and exploited her. 9. In our considered view, this is also not a case where there was a false promise to marry to begin with. A consensual relationship turning sour or partners becoming distant cannot be a ground for invoking criminal machinery of the State. Such conduct not only burdens the Courts, but blots the identity of an individual accused of such a heinous offence. This Court has time and again warned against the misuse of the provisions, and has termed it a folly3 to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and prosecute a person for an offence under section 376 IPC.” (Emphasis supplied at each instance) In the light of undisputed facts and the law laid down by the Apex Court , permitting investigation even in the case at hand would become an abuse of the process of law and result in miscarriage of justice. - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:19848 CRL.P No. 3605 of 2026 7. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: O R D E R (i) Criminal Petition is allowed. (ii) FIR in Crime No.89 of 2026 dated 24-02-2026 registered by Yelahanka New Town Police and pending before VII Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bengaluru stands quashed. Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE BKP List No.: 5 Sl No.: 7