p. 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK CRL. REV. No.86 of 2026 Manaswini Jena … Petitioner Mr. D.R. Mohapatra, Advocate -versus- Binayak Mohapatra …. Opposite Party Mr. S.K. Mohanty, Advocate CORAM: JUSTICE V. NARASINGH Order No. ORDER 11.02.2026 03. 1. Heard learned counsel for the Petitioner and learned counsel for the Opposite Party. 2. This Criminal Revision has been filed assailing the judgment dated 24.11.2025 passed by the learned 3rd Addl. Sessions Judge, Cuttack in Criminal Appeal No.06 of 2025 directing payment of interim maintenance of Rs.15,000/- from the date of the order (24.11.2025). 3. It is apt to note here that such order has been assailed by the wife- Petitioner, whereas the Opposite Party has not assailed the same. The order is primarily challenged on the ground that the same is against the dictum of the Apex Court in the Case of Rajnesh Vrs. Neha and anr., reported in (2021) 2 p. 2 SCC 324, more particularly paragraph-96, wherein the Apex Court dealt with the effective date of directing for payment of maintenance. 4. Learned counsel submits that the impugned order is an outcome of non-application of mind and is against the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Rajnesh(Supra). Hence, the same warrants interference. For convenience of reference said Paragraphs- 96 and 131, on which much reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the Petitioner, are extracted hereunder; “xxx xxx xxx 96. ⁠The view that maintenance ought to be granted from the date when the applica-tion was made, is based on the rationale that the primary object of maintenance laws is to protect a deserted wife and dependent children from destitution and vagrancy. If maintenance is not paid from the date of application, the party seeking maintenance would be deprived of sustenance, owing to the time taken for disposal of the application, which often runs into several years. xxxx p. 3 131. We make it clear that maintenance in all cases will be awarded from the date of filing the application for maintenance, as held in Part B - IV above. xxx xxx xxx” 5. Learned counsel Mr. Mohanty, appearing on behalf of the Opposite Party, submits that there is no infirmity in the order in as much as the same has been passed in due exercise of the jurisdiction vested in the Court under Section 20 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. In this context, he draws the attention of this Court to sub- section (5) of Section 20 of the said Act and submits that since there is no stipulation as to the date from which compensation is to be awarded and taking into account the factual matrix of the case at hand, while enhancing the compensation from Rs.5,000/- to Rs.15,000/- on grounds of equity, the Appellate Court has passed an order which does not warrant any interference. 6. It is apt to note that while passing the impugned order, the learned Appellate Court had referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Rajnesh(Supra). But while passing the impugned order, in the operative portion thereof, it is p. 4 directed that the same shall be paid from “the date of the order. Reason(s) for directing the payment to be effective from the date of the order is conspicuous by its absence. 7. Hence, in the considered view of this Court, the interest of justice would be subserved if the matter is remanded to the learned Appellate Court for fresh adjudication. 8. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside. The matter is remanded to the learned Appellate Court with a request to take up the matter with expediency it merits. 9. The CRLREV along with the pending I.As, if any, stand disposed of. (V. NARASINGH) Judge Soumya Designation: Jr. Stenographer