Page No.# 1/7 GAHC010278022025 2026:GAU-AS:3654- DB THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : I.A.(Crl.)/56/2026 GOPENDRA SINGH S/O KH. SANGAI SINGH, R/O KEIRENPHABI MAMANG LEIKAI, LUWANGSANGBAM GODOWN MANING, P.S.- IMPHAL EAST, DIST- IMPHAL EAST, MANIPUR VERSUS NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY NOT GIVEN Advocate for the Petitioner : MS. M KUMARI, B U LASKAR,MS. H KONWAR,MR. M KALITA,MR D NANDI Advocate for the Respondent : SC, NIA, BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN DEV CHOUDHURY HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PRANJAL DAS ORDER 12-03-2026 (A.D. Choudhury, J) 1. The present Interlocutory Application has been filed by the Page No.# 2/7 applicant seeking condonation of the delay of 150 days in preferring the connected Criminal Appeal against the order dated 13.06.2025, passed in Misc. Case (NIA) No. 14/2025 arising out of Spl.Case (NIA) No. 02/2012. 2. The learned Special Judge, NIA Assam, under its order dated 13.06.2025, passed in Misc. Case (NIA) No. 14/2025 rejected the bail prayer of the applicant. 3. Mr. R. K. D. Choudhury, learned Dy.SGI referring to Section 21 (5) of the National Investigating Agency Act, argues that the present application cannot be entertained in view of the bar under the aforesaid Section. 4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 5. Section 21(5) of the National Investigating Agency (NIA, for short) Act prescribes that an appeal shall ordinarily be filed within 30 days, extendable by the appellate Court on sufficient cause, but contains a restrictive speculation that “ no appeal shall be entertained after expiry of 30 days.” 6. On a plain reading, the provision appears to engraft an absolute outer limitation foreclosing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction beyond the prescribed period. 7. This is the objection raised by Mr. R. K. D. Choudhury, learned Dy.SGI is appearing for the NIA. Page No.# 3/7 8. The interpretation of the aforesaid provision has led to clear divergence among High Courts. While the High Courts of Allahabad, Bombay, Jammu & Kashmir & Ladakh and Delhi have held that the 90-day time limit is discretionary, a contrary view has been taken by the High Courts of Calcutta and Kerala. In the aforesaid backdrop, the Hon’ble Apex Court is considering the issue in SLP(Criminal) Diary No(s). 5217/2024, given the conflicting views of the High Courts. Such factum is available in the order dated 05.04.2024 passed in the aforesaid SLP. 9. The learned counsel for the parties submits that the matter is still pending consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court. However, the Hon’ble Apex Court also clarified that the pendency of the proceeding before the Apex Court shall not operate as a stay on any proceeding before the High Court. 10. The view against the condonation of delay beyond the prescribed outer limit proceeds on the premise that the negative phraseology employed in Section 21 (5) is preemptory and admits of no exception. 11. The alternative is purposive; this line of authority proceeds on a constitutional footing. It recognises that the appellate power of the High Court cannot be constricted by the procedural rigidity so as to defeat substantive justice. 12. Courts subscribing to this approach have held that delay beyond 90 days may yet be condoned upon demonstration of Page No.# 4/7 sufficient cause, particularly where refusal would result in grave prejudice. 13. In certain cases, even substantial delays have been condoned, emphasising that access to justice cannot be sacrificed at the altar of technicalities. 14. The rigour of Section 21(5) does stand clarified by a constitutional reading. Such an interpretation harmonises the statutory provision with the guarantee of life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which encompasses the right to fair procedural and meaningful access to justice. Procedural prescription, however stringent, cannot be construed in a manner that extinguishes substantive rights or results in manifest injustice, though at the same time, finality of litigation has always been a concern. 15. Thus, such power is to be exercised with circumspection and, in our view, only when there is a case of denial of access to justice and Section 21(5) must be read in consonance with constitutional guarantees, rather than an exclusionary clause. 16. In the present case, the respondents' objections, founded on the statutory bar, must be tested on that principle. The question is not merely of limitation but for the Court's duty to ensure that justice is not defeated by procedural constraints. 17. The fact remains that the appellant has remained in custody Page No.# 5/7 for the last 11 years since his arrest in connection with Spl. NIA Case No. 2/2012 (arising out of RC-03/2011/NIA-GUW). 18. The explanation for the delay is twofold; First ground for delay is the illness of appellant's brother, who has been diligently pursuing the case, and he hails from the State of Manipur, and the second ground is the disturbances prevailing in the State of Manipur, which have disrupted access to legal remedies, more particularly residing in Manipur, and to file an application in the State of Assam. The fact remains that the applicant hails from Manipur. 19. These circumstances, explained, cannot be regarded as either implausible or lacking in bona fide. The Court may take judicial notice of the situation prevailing in the region during the relevant period. 20. In matters of impacting personal liberty, a liberal approach in condonation is not merely permissible but warranted. To non-suit, the appellant on the ground of delay in the facts of the present case would amount to foreclosing a valuable right of appeal. 21. The length of the delay is indeed a relevant factor to be considered when deciding an application for condonation of delay. However, when sufficient causes are shown, the discretion vested in the Courts to condone delay is to be exercised, though sufficient cause shall not mean a mere explanation given superficially. 22. In the case in hand, we have found that the applicant has Page No.# 6/7 sufficiently explained the reasons for the delay and has substantiated that, due to his brother's illness, he was prevented from approaching the Court promptly and within the prescribed period of limitation. We do not see any negligence, lack of bona fide, or inaction on the part of the applicants and at the same time, the personal liberty of the applicant is to be examined in the connected appeal. 23. Based on the available materials, it cannot be said that the applicant was not diligent or that the delay was intentional. 24. Thus, having considered the explanation tendered by the applicants, this Court is satisfied that the delay occasioned in preferring the connected Criminal Appeal was neither deliberate nor actuated by negligence but resulted from bona fide circumstances beyond the control of the applicant. In the absence of gross laches or mala fide intention attributable to the applicant, this Court would lean in favour of the adjudication on merits. 25. In the given facts of the present case, the explanation furnished inspires confidence, and no prejudice is demonstrated to have been caused to the respondent by such delay. 26. Accordingly, in the interest of justice and having satisfied that the causes shown are sufficient to condone the delay of 150 days, we deem it appropriate to condone the delay. 27. The instant Interlocutory Application stands allowed and disposed of. Page No.# 7/7 28. The Registry shall process the connected appeal and, if found defect-free, list it under the appropriate heading, preferably on 22.04.2026. JUDGE JUDGE Comparing Assistant