[2026:RJ-JP:13298-DB] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 250/2026 In S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11133/2023 University Of Rajasthan, Through Its Registrar, JLN Marg, Jaipur. ----Appellant Versus 1. Dr. Mahipal Singh Sihag Son Of Shri Ramjas Sihag, Aged About 56 Years, Resident Of R-8 Rajasthan University Campus, Jaipur ----Petitioner-respondent 2. Professor Chandra Vijay Dhabariya, Head Of Department Of Geography, University Of Rajasthan, Jaipur. ----Proforma respondent For Appellant(s) : Mr. Vishnu Kant Sharma For Respondent(s) : Dr. Savita Sihag HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE MR. SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE SHUBHA MEHTA Order Reportable 30/03/2026 1. The challenge in the present appeal is to the judgment dated 02.02.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge whereby, he has set aside the order dated 18.07.2023 whereby the petitioner was restrained and removed from discharging duties as Head of the Geography Department of University of Rajasthan and appointed another Professor as Head of the Geography Department vide order dated 04.10.2023 which too was quashed by the learned Single Judge. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the basis of challenge by the respondent before the High Court to the [2026:RJ-JP:13298-DB] (2 of 7) [SAW-250/2026] impugned order was with the assertion that the order has been passed merely because the writ petitioner-respondent had lodged an FIR with regard to appointment of other teacher and the same was made as a basis to remove him from the post of Head of the Department of Geography. 3. Learned counsel further submits that there were complaints filed by students, researchers and teachers with respect to functioning of the respondent and therefore, in order to conduct inquiry, he was removed from the post of Head of Department (HOD) and another person was appointed as HOD. 4. We find that the learned Single Judge while passing the judgment dated 02.02.2026 has noticed that the respondent was appointed on regular basis as Head of the Department for a period of three years vide order dated 21.04.2023. On 18.07.2023, the Vice Chancellor passed an order removing him from the post of HOD with direction to hand over the charge to the Dean, Science Faculty. 5. Learned Single Judge has found that there was no notice given by the Vice Chancellor to the writ petitioner before removing him from the post. It is also noticed that a Committee was formed which too has concluded that there is no sufficient material to justify the removal from the post of HOD, Geography Department. 6. The appointment of HOD is a tenure appointment and as per the guidelines of the Scheme of Rotation of headship as approved by the Syndicate vide its Res. No.6 dated 16.04.1992 following its earlier resolution dated 22.12.1985, which reads as under: “ii) the tenure of Headship of the Department be raised from 2 years to 3 years. In case where the Vice-Chancellor at his discretion feels that the [2026:RJ-JP:13298-DB] (3 of 7) [SAW-250/2026] retention of a particular person as Head beyond the tenure is necessary for completing any. Academic Project/Research Project. or work in hand, his term may be extended for one academic year or more by the Syndicate. If for any reason the Vice-Chancellor at his discretion feels that a change in the Headship or a Department even prior to the completion of the term of the exist incumbent is necessary in the interest of the Department a change in Headship of the Department be made” 7. Thus not only can the tenure be of one year but can only be extended for three years and also be extended for one academic year or more by the Syndicate. The power lies with the Vice Chancellor to change the headship of the Department even prior to the completion of the term of the existing incumbent. However, for exercising its powers, he has to exercise his discretion which obviously has to be judicial discretion. Judicial discretion has been interpreted by the Apex Court in the case of A.K. Kraipak and Ors. vs Union of India and Ors., reported in 1969 (2) SCC 262, which made the following observations: ‘‘13. The dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. For deter-mining whether a power is an administrative power or a quasi-judicial power one has to look to the nature of the power conferred, the person or persons on whom it is conferred, the framework of the law conferring that power, the consequences ensuing from the exercise of that power and the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised. Under our Constitution the rule of law pervades over the entire field of administration. Every organ of the State under our Constitution is regulated and controlled by the rule of law. In a welfare State like ours it is inevitable that the jurisdiction of the administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid rate. The concept of rule of law would lose its vitality if the instrumentalities of the State are not charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner. The requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The procedures which are considered inherent in the exercise of a judicial power are [2026:RJ-JP:13298-DB] (4 of 7) [SAW-250/2026] merely those which facilitate if not ensure a just and fair decision. In recent years the concept of quasi-judicial power has been undergoing a radical change. What was considered as an administrative power some years back is now being considered as a quasi-judicial power. The following observations of Lord Parker C.J., in Regina v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board Ex parte Lain are instructive. “With regard to Mr Bridge's second point I cannot think that Atkin L.J., intended to confine his principle to cases in which the determination affected rights in the sense of enforceable rights. Indeed, in the Electricity Commissioners case, the rights determined were at any rate not immediately enforceable rights since the scheme laid down by the commissioners had to be approved by the Minister of Transport and by resolutions of Parliament. The Commissioners nevertheless were held amenable to the jurisdiction of this court. Moreover, as can be seen from Rex v. Postmaster-General Ex parte Carmichael and Rex v. Boycott Ex parte Kesslay the remedy is available even though the decision is merely a step as a result of which legally enforceable rights may be affected. The position as I see it is that the exact limits of the ancient remedy by way of certiorari have never been and ought not to be specifically defined. They have varied from time to time being extended to meet changing conditions. At one time the writ only went to an inferior court, later its ambit was extended to statutory tribunals determining a lis inter partes. Later again it extended to cases where there was no lis in the strict sense of the word but where immediate or subsequent rights of a citizen were affected. The only constant limits throughout were that it was performing a public duty. Private or domestic tribunals have always been outside the scope of certiorari since their authority is derived solely from contract, that is, from the agreement of the parties concerned. Finally, it is to be observed that the remedy has now been extended, See Reg. v. Manchester Legal Aid Committee, Ex parte R.A. Brand & Co. Ltd. to cases in which the decision of an administrative officer is only arrived at after an inquiry or process of a judicial or quasi-judicial character. In such a case this court has jurisdiction to supervise that process. [2026:RJ-JP:13298-DB] (5 of 7) [SAW-250/2026] We have as it seems to me reached the position when the ambit of certiorari can be said to cover every case in which a body of persons of a public as opposed to a purely private or domestic character has to determine matters affecting subjects provided always that it has a duty to act judicially. Looked at in this way the board in my judgment comes fairly and squarely, within the jurisdiction of this court. It is, as Mr Bridge said, ‘a servant of the Crown charged by the Crown, by executive instruction, with the duty of distributing the bounty of the Crown.’ It is clearly, therefore, performing public duties”. 14. The Court of Appeal of New Zealand has held that the power to make a zoning order under Dairy Factory Supply Regulation, 1936, has to be exercised judicially, see New Zealand and Dairy Board v. Okita Co-operative Dairy Co. Ltd. This Court in The Purtabpore Co. Ltd. v. Cane Commissioner of Bihar and Other, held that the power to alter the area reserved under the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966, is a quasi- judicial power. With the increase of the power of the administrative bodies it has become necessary to provide guidelines for the just exercise of their power. To prevent the abuse of that power and to see that it does not become a new despotism, courts are gradually evolving the principles to be observed while exercising such powers. In matters like these, public good is not advanced by a rigid adherence to precedents. New problems call for new solutions. It is neither possible nor desirable to fix the limits of a quasi-judicial power. But for the purpose of the present case we shall assume that the power exercised by the selection board was an administrative power and test the validity of the impugned selections on that basis.’’ 8. Thus, it is apparent that the post of headship of the department creates a civil right in favour of a person, who is appointed on the said post. He acquires a higher status and becomes administrative Head of the Department too while he functions under the guidelines and instructions issued from time to time by the VC or by the Syndicate and he too has certain powers available under the self scheme rotation of actions as above. [2026:RJ-JP:13298-DB] (6 of 7) [SAW-250/2026] 9. Removing the Head of the Department, thus would be lowering down the status of the said individual. His civil rights being affected and principles of natural justice will have an application and right of hearing is, therefore, inherent before any action of removal is passed by the Vice Chancellor. 10. In the present case, we find that there is a complete lack of the procedure inherent under the scheme i.e. the principles of natural justice have not been followed. The order, therefore, would be void ab initio. We also noticed that the order was passed based on complaints and the concerned writ petitioner was not given any opportunity to answer such complaints. We, therefore, safely term the order as arbitrary. We also notice that the tenure had just started of the concerned HOD and it appears that influenced by certain other extraneous reasons and consideration, the impugned order was passed. 11. Another arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant is with respect to the observations made by the learned Single Judge relating to the enquiry report of the committee which of course was placed on record by the appellant themselves. 12. We find that there is an observation of the learned single judge that the conclusion of that of the committee is insufficient in justifying removal from the post of HOD, Geography Department. 13. In this regard, once the report is before the learned Single Judge, the submissions of learned counsel that the learned Single Judge ought not have been considered and given his observations relating to the report is wholly misconceived. The power available under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to the High Court would allow the Court to examine all the documents which have [2026:RJ-JP:13298-DB] (7 of 7) [SAW-250/2026] been placed before him/us and also make its observations thereupon. No objection, therefore, can be raised to such observations made by the learned Single Judge. On that count too, the appeal stands dismissed. 12. We, therefore, concur with the view taken by the learned Single Judge and do not find any reason to warrant interference in the order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 02.02.2026, the appeal is accordingly dismissed. 13. All pending applications also stand disposed of. (SHUBHA MEHTA),J (SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA),ACTING CJ GAURAV/RIYA/13