I.C.I.C.I. LOMBARD GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED v. SMT. SANTOSH DEVI MEENA W/O LATE SHRI DULI CHAND MEENA
CW/6084/2026 · 2026-04-07
Sameer Jain
body2026
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 1106 (RAJ) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 1106 (RAJ) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
[2026:RJ-JP:14249] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6084/2026
1. I.C.I.C.I. Lombard General Insurance Company Limited, Shri Siddhi Vinayak Ganpati Mandir, I.c.i.c.i Lombard House, 414, P. Baloo Marg, A.v.s Road, Prabhadevi, Mumbai (Maharashtra) - 400025 Through The Managing Director
2. I.C.I.C.I. Lombard General Insurance Company Limited, 10Th Floor, Unit No. 1003 To 1008, Signature Tower, Dc - 2, Lalkothi Scheme, District Shopping Centre, Tonk Road, Jaipur - 302015 Through Branch Manager Both Through Their Constituted Attorney ----Petitioners Versus Smt. Santosh Devi Meena W/o Late Shri Duli Chand Meena, Resident House No.-11, Type -1, Mansarovar, Jaipur - 302020 ----Respondent For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Prakhar Agarwal with Mr. Santosh Kumar Saini For Respondent(s) :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SAMEER JAIN
Order 07/04/2026
1. The present petition is filed against the impugned order dated 20.01.2026, passed by Permanent Lok Adalat, whereby the petitioner herein was directed to pay a sum of Rs. 4,63,521/- within a period of 2 months, from the date of passing of order alongwith an interest of 7% per annum from the date of filing of the complaint, till the date of payment as well as a sum of Rs. 31,000/- as compensation for mental agony and Rs. 21,000/- as litigation expenses to the respondent-claimant herein, failing which the entire amount shall be payable with an interest of 9% per annum until realization.
2. This Court upon hearing the contentions put forth by the
learned counsel, and upon scanning the material available on
[2026:RJ-JP:14249] (2 of 6) [CW-6084/2026] record, this Court is not inclined to interfere in the instant matter, for the reasons noted hereinbelow: 2.1 That the scope of interference is minuscule and need to invoke the writ or extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court is limited. It is opined that in order to invoke such jurisdiction under constitutional provisions, warrants apparent malafides, arbitrariness and illegality. The said view is substantiated from the ratio encapsulated in Life Insurance Corpn. of India and ors. v. Asha Goel (Smt.) and another: (2001) 2 SCC 160, relevant extract from which is reproduced as under:
"10. Article 226 of the Constitution confers extraordinary jurisdiction on the High Court to issue high prerogative writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights or for any other purpose. It is wide and expansive. The Constitution does not place any fetter on exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction. It is left to the discretion of the High Court Therefore, it cannot be laid down as a general proposition of law that in no case the High Court can entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution to enforce a claim under a life insurance policy. It is neither possible nor proper to enumerate exhaustively the circumstances in which such a claim can or cannot be enforced by filing a writ petition. The determination of the question depends on consideration of several factors like, whether a writ petitioner is merely attempting to enforce his/her contractual rights or the case raises important questions of law and constitutional issues, the nature of the dispute raised; the nature of inquiry necessary for determination of the dispute etc. The matter is to be considered in the
facts and circumstances of each case. While the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a writ
[2026:RJ-JP:14249] (3 of 6) [CW-6084/2026] petition under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be denied altogether, courts must bear in mind the self- imposed restriction consistently followed by High Courts all these years after the constitutional power came into existence in not entertaining writ petitions filed for enforcement of purely contractual rights and obligations which involve disputed questions of facts. The courts have consistently taken the view that in a case where for determination of the dispute raised, it is necessary to inquire into facts for determination of which it may become necessary to record oral evidence a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution, is not the appropriate forum. The position is also well settled that if the contract entered between the parties provide an alternate forum for resolution of disputes arising from the contract, then the parties should approach the forum agreed by them and the High Court in writ jurisdiction should not permit them to bypass the agreed forum of dispute resolution At the cost of repetition it may be stated that in the above discussions we have only indicated some of the circumstances in which the High Court have declined to entertain petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution for enforcement of contractual rights and obligation; the discussions are not intended to be exhaustive. This Court from time to time disapproved of a High Court entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in matters of enforcement of contractual rights and obligation particularly where the claim by one party is contested by the other and adjudication of the dispute requires inquiry into facts. We may notice a few such cases; Mohd. Hanif v. State of Assam; Banchhanidhi Rath v. State of Orissa; Rukmanibai Gupta v. Collector,
[2026:RJ-JP:14249] (4 of 6) [CW-6084/2026] Jabalpur; Food Corpn. of India v. Jagannath Dutta and State of H.P. v. Raja Mahendra Pal." (Emphasis laid) 2.2 That in the matter at hand there is no apparent illegality and that the learned Trial Court upon assiduous scanning of the vital aspects of the matter at hand has given its conscience opinion. The relevant upheld opinion of the order dated 20.01.2026 is reproduced herein under:
"8.
सथम प ीगण की यह आप है क पादीया को
पाद ुत कने का कोई लो ै!ाई नहीं है। प ीगण की
उ% आप म& कोई 'क बल कट नहीं होता है। ाथ*या बीमत
मृतक ,ी दली च. मीना की 'मप/ है औ उसके मृतक के 'मप/
होने के संबं' म& प ीगण की कोई आप ाद नहीं है। अतः
बीमत मृतक की प/ होने से ाथ*या को हगत पाद ुत कने
का 'क अ'का है। प ीगण की एक अ4 आप यह है क आई.सी.आई.सी.आई. ब5क भी आ7क प का है 8से प का
नहीं बनाया है. इसलए यह कण म:ाई! ऑफ नेसेसी पाट*
का होने के काण खा8 कये 8ाने यो> है। प ीगण की उ%
आप म& भी कोई 'क बल कट नहीं होता है। ाथ*या ?ाा
प ीगण से ही अनुतोष चाहा गया है एं ाथ*या ने आई.सी.आई.सी. आई ब5क से कोई अनुतोष नहीं चाहा है एं कण
के 8ो तA है उनम& आई.सी.आई.सी. आई ब5क आ7क प का
नहीं कट होता है औ उसके बना भी कण म& 4ाय नणयन कया
8ा सकता है। अतः प ीगण की उ% आप भी ना'ा कट
होती है।
13. प ी बीमा कBनी ?ाा पादीया का Cगत Dेम यांEक
तीके से औ के ल माE तकनीकी आ'ाों से न कया 8ाना
कट होता है 8बक कण के तAों से यह FG है क पादीया
के पत ,ी दुली चंद मीना की मृHु कोड-19
के काण ेJFेटK
फे Lू के काण Nई थी 8ो क अपने आप म& एक गभी JOत औ
बीमाी थी एं कोड-19
की बीमाी बीमत दुली चंद मीना ?ाा
पॉलसी लये 8ाते समय अJQ 8ानकाी म& मी नहीं थी। माननीय
मRास उS 4ायालय के उपो% 4ायक TGांत म& उJUJखत
[2026:RJ-JP:14249] (5 of 6) [CW-6084/2026]
सVातों भानाओं की ोशनी म& एं 4ाय साYा के सVाZ की
TG से भी ाथ*या का Cगत Dेम बीमा कBनी ?ाा खा8 कया
8ाना उचत 4ाय संगत कट नहीं होता है।
14.
उपो% ेचनानुसा कण के तAों पJOतयों को
देखते Nए पादीया का Cगत Dेम प ी बीमा कBनी ?ाा
यांEक तीके से तकनीकी आ'ा प खा8 कया 8ाना उचत
कट नहीं होता है। अतः पादीया का यह पाद [ीका कया
8ाता है।" 2.3 That the amount as awarded by the learned Trial Court is justified vis-a-vis the facts and circumstances of the matter and the same ought not to be interfered by the High Court, under its supervisory or writ jurisdiction, as this Court is of a considered opinion that for redressal and awarding such amount, minute disputed question of facts are addressed and the appropriate authority to carry out the said exercise is the trial court. It is also noteworthy that the orders passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat are conclusive, and final in nature, as per the scheme and objective of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, more specifically Section 22E, which is reproduced as under:
"22E. Award of Permanent Lok Adalat to be final.—(1) Every award of the Permanent Lok Adalat under this Act made either on merit or in terms of a settlement agreement shall be final and binding on all the parties thereto and on persons claiming under them. (2) Every award of the Permanent Lok Adalat under this Act shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court. (3) The award made by the Permanent Lok Adalat under this Act shall be by a majority of the persons constituting the Permanent Lok Adalat. (4) Every award made by the Permanent Lok Adalat under this Act shall be final and shall not be called
[2026:RJ-JP:14249] (6 of 6) [CW-6084/2026] in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding. (5) The Permanent Lok Adalat may transmit any award made by it to a civil court having local jurisdiction and such civil court shall execute the
order as if it were a decree made by that court."
3. In summation of the abovenoted, it can be jot down that the orders passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat, ought not to be judicially reviewed unless there is apparent arbitrariness or the
order is ex facie non speaking; that when the amount awarded is justified, and the order passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat covers all the parameters of vital consideration and circumstances, rather is sans any perversity, arbitrariness, violation of natural justice, malafides; that in view of ex facie non-arbitrariness and the view laid down in Life Insurance Corpn. of India (supra), that as per the mandate of Section 22E of the governing statute, which makes it categorically clear that the orders passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat are conclusive and final in nature, this Court is not inclined to entertain the present petition.
4. In view of the aforementioned, the instant petition is dismissed being bereft of any merits and no apparent arbitrariness in the order impugned. However, in the instant matter, the point of law pertaining to consideration of insurance claims during/amidst the period of COVID-19, is kept open. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed.
(SAMEER JAIN),J Pooja /7