1 2026:CGHC:5903-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1282 of 2023 Jagsingh Uikey S/o Late Jaylal Uikey Aged About 45 Years R/o Murnar Awaspara, P.S. Koylibeda, District North Bastar Kanker Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station, Koylibeda District North Bastar Kanker Chhattisgarh ... Respondent (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Ms. K. Tripti Rao, Advocate For State/Respondent : Mr. Priyank Rathi, Government Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 03.02.2026 1. Heard Ms. K. Tripti Rao, learned counsel for the appellant as well as Mr. Priyank Rathi, learned Government Advocate, appearing for the State/respondent. ANURADHA TIWARI Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2026.02.03 18:07:00 +0530 2 2. This criminal appeal is filed by the appellant/accused under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’) is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 21.02.2023 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhanupratappur, District North Bastar Kanker (C.G.) in Sessions Case No. 33 of 2019, by which the appellant has been convicted for the offence punishable under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’) and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life with fine amount of Rs.2,000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for 02 months and rigorous imprisonment for 03 years with fine amount of Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for 01 month, respectively, with a further direction to run both the sentences concurrently. 3. The prosecution case, as unfolded before the trial Court, is that on 15.07.2019 at about 6:30 p.m., the applicant/informant, Ms. Rajmani Uikey (PW-09), daughter of the accused Jagsingh Uikey and the deceased Havanbai, appeared at Police Station Koylibeda along with Gaurakhlal Kaushal (PW-01) and Khemraj Mandavi (PW-05), and lodged an oral report. In her statement, PW-09 disclosed that on the date of the incident, she was present at her house along with her father Jagsingh Uikey and her mother Havanbai. Her younger brother had gone out to play. At around 10:30 a.m., her father was under the influence of alcohol, as was 3 his usual habit. The accused asked her to leave the house and attend to some work. Consequently, she took the goats to a place about 100–150 metres away and returned shortly thereafter. 4. Upon returning, she found that the door of the house was locked from inside and could hear her parents quarrelling. From inside the house, her father was shouting and accusing her mother of having an illicit relationship, stating words to the effect that she already had a husband and children and questioning her sense of shame. PW-09 attempted to open the door, but it was bolted from inside. At about 11:00 a.m., the door was opened and her father came out carrying a tangia, which was stained with blood. He told her to run away. Out of fear, she ran from the spot. 5. After some time, when PW-09 returned and attempted to enter the house, the accused told her that he had killed her mother and that she could do whatever she wanted. She then went towards the village to seek help, but found no one present. When she returned again and tried to go inside the house, the accused again warned her not to enter and stated that her mother was dead and that he had killed her with a sickle. At about 4:00 p.m., when villagers arrived at the spot, PW-09 narrated the incident to them. She further stated that her parents frequently quarrelled, that her father was addicted to alcohol, and that he habitually suspected her mother of infidelity. According to her, it was the accused Jagsingh Uikey who had assaulted and killed her mother 4 Havanbai by striking her with a sickle. 6. On the basis of the said information, merg intimation/FIR No. 05/2019 under Section 174 of the Cr.P.C. was registered at Police Station Koylibeda and investigation commenced. During the course of investigation, it was found prima facie that the death was homicidal, whereupon FIR No. 07/2019 was registered for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. 7. After completion of investigation, the police filed a charge sheet against the accused under Sections 302 and 201 IPC before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bhanupratappur, where it was registered as Criminal Case No. 355/2019. Thereafter, pursuant to the committal/surrender order dated 18.10.2019, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions and registered as Sessions Case No. 33 of 2019. 8. The trial court framed charges against the accused under Sections 302 and 201 IPC. The charges were read over and explained to him, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. In his statement, the accused asserted that he had been falsely implicated and expressed his intention to adduce evidence in defence. However, despite being afforded sufficient opportunity, no defence evidence was led. 9. In order to substantiate its case, the prosecution examined as many as twelve witnesses, namely: Gaurakhlal Kaushal (PW-01), Darsuram (PW-02), Dr. Sheetal Dugga (PW-03), Rukhmani 5 Mandavi (PW-04), Khemraj Mandavi (PW-05), Dashraj Netam (PW-06), Om Prakash Uikeyy (PW-07), Patwari Rupesh Barla (PW-08), Rajmani Uikey, daughter of the deceased and eye- witness (PW-09), Constable Tirath Teta (PW-10), Rajman Uikey, son of the deceased (PW-11) and Inspector Umesh Patil, Investigating Officer (PW-12). 10. The prosecution also produced documentary evidence including seizure memos, memorandum statement, spot panchnama, identification panchnama, arrest panchnama, notices under Section 175 Cr.P.C., map and site panchnamas, inquest intimation, post-mortem report, query report, chemical examination report, FIR, police statements of witnesses, Patwari’s nazri map, and other allied documents, which were duly marked as Exhibits P-01 to P-32, whereas in order to prove defence, accused has not examined any witness, but exhibited only one document. 11. On appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence brought on record, the trial Court by its judgment dated 21.02.2023, convicted the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 IPC and sentenced him as aforementioned, which has given rise to the present criminal appeal. 12. Ms. K. Tripti Rao, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court is contrary to law and facts 6 available on record and is liable to be set aside. It is contended that the learned trial Court has failed to properly appreciate the evidence led by the prosecution and has recorded findings based on conjectures and surmises rather than on legally admissible and reliable evidence. It is argued that the entire prosecution case rests upon circumstantial evidence, as there is no independent eye-witness to the alleged incident. The learned counsel submits that though PW-09 Rajmani Uikey, daughter of the deceased, has been projected as a crucial witness, her testimony does not establish that she actually witnessed the commission of the offence. At best, her evidence only shows that she saw the appellant coming out of the house with an alleged blood-stained tangia and that the appellant later made extra-judicial statements, which by themselves are weak pieces of evidence and cannot form the sole basis for conviction. 13. Ms. Rao further submits that the so-called extra-judicial confession allegedly made by the appellant before PW-09 is highly suspicious and unreliable. It is argued that the said confession was not made before any independent or respectable person of the village and has not been corroborated by any other material evidence. The law is well settled that extra-judicial confession is a weak form of evidence and, in the absence of cogent corroboration, conviction based solely on such evidence is unsustainable. It is contended that the conduct attributed to PW- 09 is unnatural and improbable. According to the prosecution, 7 despite allegedly seeing her father coming out with a blood- stained weapon and admitting to the murder of her mother, she neither immediately raised alarm nor approached the nearby villagers or police station at the earliest opportunity. The delay in lodging the report has not been satisfactorily explained by the prosecution and seriously dents the credibility of the prosecution story. 14. Ms. Rao next submits that the prosecution has failed to establish a complete chain of circumstances pointing unerringly towards the guilt of the appellant and inconsistent with his innocence. Essential links such as motive, last-seen evidence, recovery of weapon at the instance of the accused, and scientific corroboration have not been established beyond reasonable doubt. The alleged motive of suspicion and frequent quarrels is vague and general in nature and cannot be treated as a strong motive for committing murder. It is argued that the recovery of the alleged weapon (tangia/sickle) and other seized articles is doubtful and has not been proved in accordance with law. The memorandum and seizure witnesses have not supported the prosecution version in material particulars, and the alleged recovery has not been properly linked with the crime through reliable forensic evidence. Mere presence of blood on the seized articles, without establishing its origin and nexus with the deceased, does not advance the prosecution case. 8 15. Ms. Rao contends that the medical evidence does not conclusively support the prosecution version as projected. Though the post-mortem report opines that the death was homicidal, it does not specifically connect the injuries with the alleged weapon recovered from the appellant. Thus, there is a clear gap between medical and ocular evidence. She further submits that the prosecution has failed to establish the offence under Section 201 IPC, as there is no convincing evidence to show that the appellant caused disappearance of evidence or gave false information with an intention to screen himself from legal punishment. He further submits that the learned trial Court has not considered the defence of the appellant in its proper perspective and has ignored vital discrepancies and contradictions appearing in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses. The impugned judgment suffers from non-consideration of material evidence and misapplication of settled principles governing cases based on circumstantial evidence. It is lastly submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, and the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt. The conviction recorded by the learned trial Court is, therefore, unsustainable in law and deserves to be set aside. 16. On the other hand, Mr. Priyank Rathi, learned Government Advocate, appearing on behalf of the State/respondent vehemently opposes the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant and supports the impugned judgment of conviction and 9 order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court. It is submitted that the learned trial Court has meticulously appreciated the oral and documentary evidence on record and has recorded well- reasoned findings, which do not call for any interference by this Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. He further submits that the prosecution has successfully proved its case beyond reasonable doubt by establishing a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances which unmistakably points towards the guilt of the appellant and is wholly inconsistent with any hypothesis of innocence. The evidence of PW-09 Rajmani Uikey, daughter of the deceased, is cogent, trustworthy, and inspires full confidence. Her testimony clearly establishes that immediately after the occurrence, the appellant came out of the house carrying a blood-stained tangia and thereafter repeatedly admitted before her that he had killed her mother. Being a natural witness and a close family member present at the spot, there is no reason for her to falsely implicate her own father and shield the real culprit. 17. It is submitted by Mr. Rathi that the so-called extra-judicial confession made by the appellant cannot be brushed aside lightly. The said confession was made voluntarily and consistently before PW-09 and stands duly corroborated by surrounding circumstances, including the conduct of the appellant, the recovery of the weapon, and the medical evidence. Learned State counsel contends that law does not prohibit conviction on the 10 basis of extra-judicial confession, provided it is truthful and finds corroboration, which is clearly present in the instant case. It is contended that the delay in reporting the incident stands fully explained. PW-09 was a young daughter who had witnessed a gruesome incident involving her parents. Being threatened by the appellant and frightened by his conduct, her initial conduct of running away and subsequently informing the villagers cannot be termed as unnatural. The FIR was lodged within a reasonable time after the villagers assembled, and there is no material to suggest any deliberation, consultation, or concoction. 18. It is argued by Mr. Rathi that the motive for the commission of the offence stands clearly established. The evidence on record demonstrates that the appellant was addicted to alcohol and was persistently suspicious of the fidelity of his wife, leading to frequent quarrels. Such motive assumes significance particularly in a case involving murder within the four walls of the house. He also submits that the medical evidence fully corroborates the prosecution case. The post-mortem report confirms that the death of Havanbai was homicidal in nature and that the injuries sustained by the deceased were possible by a sharp-edged weapon like a tangia or sickle, as alleged by the prosecution. Thus, there is complete consistency between ocular, medical, and circumstantial evidence. It is further contended that the offence under Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code has also been duly proved. The conduct of the appellant in preventing PW-09 from 11 entering the house after the incident, coupled with his statements and behaviour, clearly establishes his intention to conceal the offence and cause disappearance of evidence. 19. Mr. Rathi contends that minor discrepancies or contradictions, if any, appearing in the testimony of prosecution witnesses are natural and do not go to the root of the case. Such discrepancies, rather than discrediting the prosecution, lend assurance to the genuineness of the evidence. Lastly, learned State counsel submits that the impugned judgment does not suffer from any perversity or illegality. The learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant after due appreciation of evidence and application of settled principles of law. No ground is made out for interference in appeal, and therefore, the criminal appeal deserves to be dismissed. 20. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the original records of the trial Court with utmost circumspection and carefully as well. 21. The first question for determination in the present appeal is whether the learned trial Court was justified in holding that the death of the deceased Havanbai was homicidal in nature. 22. PW-12 Umesh Patil, the Investigating Officer, has deposed that while he was posted as Station House Officer at Police Station Koylibeda, on 15.07.2019, on the basis of information given by the 12 informant Rajmani Uikey (PW-09), he registered Inquest/FIR No. 05/2019 under Section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is Ex.P.-20, bearing his signatures. During investigation, after recording the statement of the informant, he registered FIR No. 07/2019 under Section 302 IPC against the accused, which is Ex.P.-21. He further stated that thereafter, in compliance with the provisions of Section 175 Cr.P.C., he got the inquest proceedings conducted, issued notices to the witnesses vide Ex.P.-07 and prepared the body panchnama and body map panchnama Ex.P.- 08 in the presence of witnesses, which were duly signed by Gaurakh Lal Kaushal (PW-01), Khemraj Mandavi (PW-05) and Rajmani Uikey (PW-09). PW-12 further deposed that he prepared the application for post-mortem examination Ex.P.-26 and sent the dead body of the deceased for autopsy at Community Health Centre, Koylibeda. 23. The medical evidence on record, led through PW-03 Dr. Sheetal Dugga, is of considerable significance. A close scrutiny of the medical evidence on record, particularly the testimony of PW-03 Dr. Sheetal Dugga and the post-mortem report Ex.P.-13, reveals that the deceased Havanbai sustained multiple grievous and fatal injuries on vital parts of the body, clearly indicative of a violent assault. PW-03 has stated that at the time of post-mortem examination conducted on 16.07.2019 at about 11:00 a.m., the body of the deceased was found in a state of rigor mortis, establishing that death had occurred prior to the examination. On 13 external and internal examination, the following significant injuries were noticed: • Fracture of the knee region — the bone above the knee joint was found fractured, accompanied by a deep abrasion/scratch measuring approximately 2.5 × 2.5 inches. The nature of this injury suggests the application of substantial force. • Incised wound on the right hand, measuring about 1 × 1 inch, consistent with a sharp-edged weapon. Such an injury assumes importance as it may also suggest a defensive attempt on the part of the deceased. • Fracture of the lower jaw (chin) with an associated abrasion measuring about 1 × 1.5 inches, indicating a forceful blow to the facial region. • Multiple fractures of the ribs — ribs 1 to 7 on the right side of the chest were found fractured, demonstrating repeated and forceful impact directed towards the torso. • Lacerated wound over the frontal region of the head, measuring about 3.5 × 2 × 0.5 inches, which is a vital part of the body. • Two deep gaping wounds behind the right ear, each measuring approximately 2 × 1 inches, with associated fracture of the skull. These injuries are particularly significant as they directly affect the cranial region and are sufficient in 14 the ordinary course of nature to cause death. On internal examination, semi-digested food was found in the stomach and small intestine, indicating that death occurred within a few hours of the last meal, thereby corroborating the time of occurrence as stated by the prosecution. • The vital organs such as liver, spleen, kidney and bladder were found congested, further supporting the occurrence of traumatic shock and injury prior to death. 24. PW-03 has categorically opined that the cause of death was head injury and that the death was homicidal in nature, occurring within 12 to 36 hours prior to post-mortem examination. Importantly, during cross-examination, the medical witness expressly refuted the defence suggestion that such extensive injuries could be the result of accidental fall on a hard surface, stone, or tree. The defence failed to elicit any contradiction or improbability in the testimony of PW-03. 25. The number, severity, and location of injuries, particularly on vital parts like head, chest, and jaw clearly demonstrate that the deceased was subjected to a brutal and repeated assault. Such injuries could not have been self-inflicted, accidental, or caused by a single fall. The presence of incised wounds further rules out the possibility of accidental trauma and unequivocally points towards use of a sharp-edged weapon. 26. Thus, the medical evidence not only establishes the homicidal 15 nature of death but also provides strong corroboration to the prosecution narrative regarding the manner and timing of the offence. 27. From a conjoint reading of inquest report Ex.P.-20, FIR Ex.P.-21, post-mortem application Ex.P.-26 and the medical evidence of PW-03, it is clearly established that the incident occurred on 15.07.2019 at around 11:00 a.m., that the dead body bore multiple ante-mortem injuries of severe nature, and that the cause of death was not accidental or natural but homicidal. 28. The medical evidence fully corroborates the prosecution version and inspires confidence. The nature, number, and location of injuries rule out any possibility of accidental death. The defence has failed to raise any plausible alternative explanation. 29. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that the learned trial Court was fully justified in holding that the death of the deceased Havanbai was homicidal in nature, and the said finding does not warrant any interference. 30. The next question for consideration would be whether the learned trial Court was justified in holding that the appellant is the author of the crime, on the basis of the following circumstances:– (i) That the homicidal death of the deceased Havanbai stands duly proved by the prosecution on the basis of the post- mortem report (Ex.P-13) and the medical evidence of Dr. 16 Sheetal Dugga (PW-03), who conducted the post-mortem examination and categorically opined that the death was homicidal in nature and caused due to head injury. (ii) That the incident occurred inside the house of the appellant, and the presence of the appellant at the place of occurrence at the relevant point of time stands established. The fact of death of the deceased being within the exclusive knowledge of the appellant has been clearly brought on record through the testimony of Rajmani Uikey (PW-09), daughter of the deceased and the appellant, who stated that immediately after the incident the appellant came out of the house carrying a blood-stained tangia and thereafter repeatedly admitted before her that he had killed her mother. (iii) That despite the said incriminating circumstances being put to the appellant during his examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he failed to offer any plausible explanation as to how the deceased sustained fatal injuries inside the house or under what circumstances she died. The appellant merely denied the allegations and claimed false implication, which, in the facts of the present case, cannot be treated as a satisfactory explanation. (iv) That in view of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, where the fact as to how the deceased met with a homicidal death inside the dwelling house was especially within the 17 knowledge of the appellant, the burden was upon him to explain the same. His failure to discharge this burden provides an additional link in the chain of circumstances pointing towards his guilt. 31. The circumstance ‘Occurrence inside the house of the appellant and his presence at the relevant time’ - pertains to the place of occurrence and presence of the appellant. The evidence on record clearly establishes that the incident occurred inside the dwelling house of the appellant. 32. PW-09 Rajmani Uikey, daughter of the deceased and the appellant, has deposed that on the date of incident, she was present in the house along with her parents. She categorically stated that her father (the appellant) was intoxicated and quarreled with her mother accusing her of infidelity. She further stated that when she went outside briefly, the door was locked from inside and she heard her parents quarrelling. 33. Her testimony further reveals that shortly thereafter, the appellant came out of the house holding a blood-stained tangia and directed her to flee. Later on multiple occasions, he openly admitted before her that he had killed her mother by assaulting her with a sickle/tangia. 34. The house where the incident took place was not accessible to outsiders at the relevant time. There is no evidence of any third person entering the house. The presence of the appellant at the 18 spot is not only established through PW-09 but is also admitted by the appellant himself. 35. The testimony of PW-09 cannot be discarded merely because she is a related witness. On the contrary, she is a natural witness and the most competent person to narrate the events. There is no evidence of animosity or motive on her part to falsely implicate her own father for the murder of her mother. Her evidence has remained consistent and unshaken during cross-examination. 36. Thus, the prosecution has successfully established that: • the incident occurred inside the house of the appellant; • the appellant was present inside the house at the relevant time; and • immediately after the incident, he emerged with a blood- stained weapon. 37. This circumstance, when examined in its correct perspective, assumes crucial significance and operates as a strong incriminating link against the appellant. The evidence on record unmistakably establishes that the incident occurred within the closed confines of the appellant’s dwelling house, a place to which no outsider had access at the relevant time. The appellant was admittedly present inside the house with the deceased shortly before the occurrence, and no evidence has been led to suggest the entry or presence of any third person. 19 38. The next circumstance ‘Failure of the appellant to explain incriminating circumstances under Section 313 Cr.P.C.’ relates to the conduct of the appellant during his examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is evident from the record that all material incriminating circumstances were put to the appellant, including: • homicidal death of his wife inside the house, • his presence at the place of occurrence, • his conduct immediately after the incident, • testimony of PW-09 regarding extra-judicial confession. 39. Despite the same, the appellant did not offer any explanation as to how the deceased sustained fatal injuries inside the house. He did not even attempt to set up an alternative version of events. His response was confined to bald denial and claim of false implication. 40. It is well settled that an explanation under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is not a mere formality. When circumstances are proved against an accused and are within his knowledge, failure to offer explanation assumes significance. In the present case, silence of the appellant assumes greater importance because the incident occurred within the four walls of his house. 41. Thus, the trial Court has rightly observed that such unexplained silence strengthens the prosecution case and provides additional 20 assurance to the chain of circumstances. 42. The last circumstance ‘Applicability of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act’ - Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact lies upon him. Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, states as under: - 43. “106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.—When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.” 44. This provision states that when any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person the burden of proving that fact is upon him. This is an exception to the general rule contained in Section 101, namely, that the burden is on the person who asserts a fact. The principle underlying Section 106 which is an exception to the general rule governing burden of proof applies only to such matters of defence which are supposed to be especially within the knowledge of the other side. To invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the main point to be established by prosecution is that the accused persons were in such a position that they could have special knowledge of the fact concerned. 45. In the matter of Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer1, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the general 1 AIR 1956 SC 404 21 rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 of the Evidence Act is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution, to establish facts which are “especially” within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The Supreme Court while considering the word “especially” employed in Section 106 of the Evidence Act, speaking through Vivian Bose, J., observed as under: - “11. … The word "especially" stresses that it means facts that are preeminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than he whether he did or did not. It is evident that cannot be the intention and the Privy Council has twice refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on an accused person to show that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. These cases are Attygalle v. The King, 1936 PC 169 (AIR V 23) (A) and Seneviratne v. R. 1936-3 ER 36 AT P.49 (B).” Their Lordships further held that Section 106 of the 22 Evidence Act cannot be used to undermine the well established rule of law that save in a very exceptional class of case, the burden is on the prosecution and never shifts. 46. The decision of the Supreme Court in Shambhu Nath Mehra (supra) was followed with approval recently in the matter of Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar2 in which it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as under: - “22. Thus, Section 106 of the Evidence Act will apply to those cases where the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts which are within the special knowledge of the accused. When the accused fails to offer proper explanation about the existence of said other facts, the court can always draw an appropriate inference. 23. When a case is resting on circumstantial evidence, if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of burden placed on him by virtue of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, such a failure may provide an additional link to the chain of circumstances. In a case governed by circumstantial evidence, if the chain of circumstances which is required to be established by the prosecution is not established, the failure of the accused to 2 (2021) 10 SCC 725 23 discharge the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not relevant at all. When the chain is not complete, falsity of the defence is no ground to convict the accused.” 47. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the matter of Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab3, while considering the provisions contained in Sections 103 & 106 of the Evidence Act, held that the burden of proving a plea specially set up by an accused which may absolve him from criminal liability, certainly lies upon him, but neither the application of Section 103 nor that of 106 could, however, absolve the prosecution from the duty of discharging its general or primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. It was further held by their Lordships that it is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof may lie upon the accused. Their Lordships also held that the burden of proving a plea specifically set up by an accused, which may absolve him from criminal liability, certain lies upon him. 48. The principle of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gurcharan Singh (supra) has been followed with approval by their Lordships in the matter of Sawal Das v. State of Bihar4 and it has been held that burden of proving the case 3 AIR 1956 SC 460 4 AIR 1974 SC 778 24 against the accused was on the prosecution irrespective of whether or not the accused has made out a specific defence. 49. In the present case, it stands conclusively proved from the prosecution evidence that the deceased Havanbai suffered a homicidal death inside the residential house which she shared exclusively with the appellant. The medical evidence of Dr. Sheetal Dugga (PW-03), supported by the post-mortem report (Ex.P-13), establishes beyond doubt that the death was not natural or accidental but the result of brutal assault. The evidence further establishes that no outsider was present inside the house at the relevant time, and the appellant was very much present in the house when the incident occurred. Consequently, the manner in which the deceased sustained multiple fatal injuries and the circumstances leading to her death were matters especially within the knowledge of the appellant alone. 50. Once the prosecution successfully established the foundational facts—namely, (i) the homicidal death of the deceased, (ii) the place of occurrence being the appellant’s house, and (iii) the presence of the appellant at the relevant time—the evidentiary burden unmistakably shifted upon the appellant to offer a plausible and acceptable explanation as to how the deceased met with such a violent end. However, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the appellant did not offer any explanation whatsoever. He merely denied the 25 prosecution case and pleaded false implication, without disclosing any circumstances which could probabilise his innocence or explain the occurrence. Such a bald denial, in the face of overwhelming incriminating circumstances, cannot be treated as a satisfactory discharge of the burden cast upon him under Section 106 of the Evidence Act. 51. It is well-settled that Section 106 does not dispense with or dilute the primary obligation of the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. However, once the prosecution has led cogent evidence establishing the basic incriminating facts, the accused cannot be permitted to maintain complete silence in respect of matters within his special knowledge. The appellant’s failure to explain how the deceased sustained multiple grievous injuries inside the house, coupled with his presence at the spot and absence of any alternative hypothesis, furnishes a strong additional link in the chain of circumstantial evidence, pointing unerringly towards his guilt. The trial Court has, therefore, rightly invoked and applied the principle under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, and this Court finds no infirmity, illegality, or perversity in the said approach warranting interference in appeal. 52. Upon an overall, cumulative and holistic appreciation of the entire oral and documentary evidence available on record, this Court finds that each circumstance relied upon by the prosecution has been firmly proved, and when taken together, they form an 26 unbroken and complete chain of circumstances pointing exclusively towards the guilt of the appellant. 53. Firstly, the homicidal nature of death of the deceased Havanbai stands conclusively established through the unimpeached medical evidence of Dr. Sheetal Dugga (PW-03) and the post-mortem report (Ex.P-13), which reveals multiple grievous injuries, particularly on vital parts of the body, clearly ruling out any hypothesis of accidental or natural death. 54. Secondly, it is an undisputed and well-proved fact that the incident occurred inside the residential house of the appellant, a place which was under his exclusive control and domain. The prosecution has further succeeded in establishing the presence of the appellant at the place of occurrence at the relevant point of time, thereby placing him in close proximity to the occurrence of the crime. 55. Thirdly, the testimony of Rajmani Uikey (PW-09), the daughter of the deceased and the appellant, credibly establishes that the appellant was last seen in the company of the deceased immediately preceding the incident, and soon thereafter, she witnessed the appellant coming out of the house carrying a blood- stained tangia, which is a highly incriminating circumstance corroborated by the medical and forensic evidence on record. 56. Fourthly, the evidence further reveals that the appellant made extra-judicial admissions before PW-09 soon after the incident, 27 acknowledging that he had killed the deceased. Such admissions, coming from a natural witness who had no reason to falsely implicate her own father, carry significant probative value and lend further assurance to the prosecution case. 57. Fifthly, despite these grave and incriminating circumstances having been specifically put to the appellant during his examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he completely failed to furnish any plausible or satisfactory explanation regarding the homicidal death of the deceased inside the house. A mere bald denial or plea of false implication, in the face of overwhelming evidence, cannot absolve the appellant or weaken the prosecution case. 58. Lastly, the case squarely attracts the applicability of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as the circumstances relating to the cause of death of the deceased inside the dwelling house were facts especially within the knowledge of the appellant. His failure to discharge this burden provides a strong and decisive additional link in the chain of circumstances. 59. Thus, when all the aforesaid circumstances are considered collectively and in their cumulative effect, they form a complete, coherent, and unbroken chain of circumstances which leads to one and only one irresistible conclusion, namely, that the appellant and none else is the author of the crime. Each incriminating circumstance stands firmly proved and is intrinsically 28 linked with the others, excluding every possible hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the appellant. The chain of circumstantial evidence so established is of a conclusive nature and tendency, wholly inconsistent with any explanation other than the guilt of the appellant, and is incapable of being explained on any other reasonable or plausible theory. 60. In view of the foregoing detailed discussion and upon careful scrutiny of the entire evidence on record, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned trial Court has meticulously analyzed the oral and documentary evidence in its correct perspective and has rightly recorded the conviction of the appellant. The conclusions drawn by the trial Court are logical, well-reasoned, and based upon sound appreciation of evidence. No perversity, illegality, or material irregularity has been demonstrated which would warrant interference in the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. 61. Accordingly, the criminal appeal preferred by the appellant fails and is hereby dismissed. 62. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 21.02.2023 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhanupratappur, District North Bastar Kanker (C.G.) in Sessions Case No. 33 of 2019, convicting the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, are hereby affirmed. 29 63. It is stated at the Bar that the appellant is presently lodged in jail. In view of the dismissal of the appeal and affirmation of the judgment passed by the learned trial Court, the appellant shall continue to remain in custody and shall serve out the sentence as awarded to him by the learned trial Court, in accordance with law. 64. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is undergoing his jail sentence to serve the same on the appellant informing him that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Anu