[2026:RJ-JP:28807] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7366/1992 CNR: RJHC020001471992 | URN: CW / 1177U / 1992 1. Pooran Singh son of Shri Bhoori Singh; 2. Batra Ram son of Shri Bhoori Singh; Both residents of Village Basokar, Mauja Paprera, Tehsil Kumher, District Bharatpur. ----Petitioners Versus 1. The State of Rajasthan through Additional Collector, Bharatpur. 2. Board of Revenue for Rajasthan at Ajmer. 3. Shri Nawab Singh son of Shri Mangal Singh resident of Village Basokar, Sub Tehsil Kumher, District Bharatpur (since deceased) 3/1. Smt. Kamlesh aged 35 years, Wife 3/2. Lakhan Singh aged 11 years, Son 3/3 Ramabtar aged 8 years, Son No. 3/2 to 3/3 are minor and through their natural guardian mother Smt. Kamlesh, residents of Village Basokar, Sub-Tehsil Kumher, District Bharatpur. 4. Shri Ramhet Jatav son of Shri Nathu, resident of Village Paprera, Sub-Tehsil Kumher, District Bharatpur (since deceased) 4/1. Bhagwan Son 4/2. Mannu Son 4/3. Chitaria Son All are sons of Late Ramhet, resident of Village Paprera, Sub- Tehsil Kumher, District Bharatpur. 4/4. Saraswati daughter of Ramhet wife of Parbhati, resident of Sokar, Tehsil Kumher, District Bharatpur. 4/5 Gyaso duaghter of Ramhet wife of Shiv Charan, resident of Jharkai, Tehsil Nadbai, District Bharatpur. 4/6. Phoola daughter of Ramhet wife of Ram Swaroop, resident of Gagwana, Tehsil Nadbai, Bharatpur. 4/7. Safedi D/o Ramhet wife of Amar Singh resident of Gagwana, Tehsil Nadbai, District Bharatpur. 4/8. Ajuri D/o Ramhet wife of Phool Singh, resident of Takha, Tehsil Kumher, District Bharatpur. ----Respondents [2026:RJ-JP:28807] (2 of 9) [CW-7366/1992] For Petitioners : None present. For Respondents : Mr. Karan Pal Singh Advocate. HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA Judgment Date of conclusion of arguments :: 23.07.2026 Date on which judgment was reserved :: 23.07.2026 Whether the full judgment or only the operative part is pronounced :: Full Judgment Date of pronouncement :: 29.07.2026 1. By way of the present writ petition, the petitioners have assailed legality and validity of the judgment dated 01.11.1991 (Annexure-11) passed by the Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, Ajmer (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the Board of Revenue’) in Reference No. 3/1991 whereby reference was allowed, as well as have also challenged order dated 14.05.1992 (Annexure-13) passed by the Board of Revenue whereby the review petition was rejected. They have further prayed for quashing the entire reference proceedings initiated by the Additional Collector, Bharatpur (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the Additional Collector’) and culminated in the impugned orders of the Board of Revenue, which were commenced on the basis of the application submitted by Respondent No.3, Shri Nawab Singh. 2. As per memo of writ petition, the case set up by the petitioners, in brief, is that they instituted a suit under Sections 88 and 89 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the Act of 1955’) before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Bharatpur (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the SDO’) seeking declaration of their khatedari rights and correction of erroneous revenue entries in respect of the disputed land situated at Village [2026:RJ-JP:28807] (3 of 9) [CW-7366/1992] Paprera, Tehsil Kumher, District Bharatpur. The suit was decreed on 17.11.1971 in their favour after trial. Subsequently, respondent No.3, Nawab Singh, allegedly on account of personal enmity and without any locus standi, moved an application before the Additional Collector seeking a reference for setting aside the said decree. Initially, the Board of Revenue remanded the matter directing that erstwhile khatedar Ramhet be impleaded and heard by the Additional Collector. However, despite the fact that Ramhet consented that the decree was correct and expressed no objection thereto, the Additional Collector again made a reference, which was ultimately accepted by the Board of Revenue vide order dated 01.11.1991 relying upon Section 42 of the Act of 1955. The petitioners' review petition was also dismissed by the Board of Revenue vide order dated 14.05.1992. 3. The principal grounds raised in the memo of writ petition by the petitioners are that the reference was wholly without jurisdiction, as the decree dated 17.11.1971 could not have been annulled by invoking the powers under Section 82 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 or Section 232 of the Act of 1955. The Board of Revenue erred in treating the ‘declaratory decree’ as a ‘transfer’ hit by Section 42 of the Act of 1955, whereas the decree merely corrected revenue entries and declared existing khatedari rights. That apart, the proceedings were initiated at the instance of a person having no locus standi and were actuated by personal disputes. It has also been indicated that the mandatory directions issued by the Board of Revenue in the earlier remand order, particularly regarding impleadment and hearing of Ramhet, were not complied with. Despite the fact that [2026:RJ-JP:28807] (4 of 9) [CW-7366/1992] the decree had attained finality nearly two decades back and could not be reopened through reference proceedings so as to defeat the principles of limitation, finality of litigation and settled rights reference was entertained by the Board of Revenue. It was also averred that the impugned orders suffer from jurisdictional errors, misinterpretation of Section 42 of the Rajasthan Act of 1955 and violation of the principles of natural justice. Accordingly, the petitioners have prayed for quashing the orders of the Board of Revenue as well as the entire reference proceedings initiated by the Additional Collector at the instance of Respondent No.3. 4. Although the above case was listed in the category of oldest cases of this High Court with a note in the cause list that such oldest matters shall not be adjourned, yet no one appeared on behalf of the petitioners to pursue the writ petition. Looking to the age of the litigation, this Court thought it proper to decide the same on the basis of material on record as well as after hearing learned counsel for the respondents. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents opposed the writ petition and submitted that the impugned orders passed by the Additional Collector and the Board of Revenue are perfectly legal, justified and do not warrant interference in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It was contended that the decree dated 17.11.1971, though couched as a declaratory decree under Sections 88 and 89 of the Act of 1955, in substance, resulted in transfer of khatedari rights from a member of the Scheduled Caste to persons belonging to non-Scheduled Caste. Such a transaction is expressly prohibited by Section 42 of the Act of 1955 and, [2026:RJ-JP:28807] (5 of 9) [CW-7366/1992] therefore, the decree, being contrary to the statutory prohibition, was void and unenforceable. 6. It was further argued that the powers under Section 82 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 read with Section 232 of the Act of 1955 are intended to ensure legality and propriety of orders and decrees passed by subordinate revenue courts. Whenever a decree is found to have been obtained in violation of a mandatory statutory provision or by circumventing the legislative policy embodied in Section 42 of the Act of 1955, the competent revenue authorities are fully empowered to make a reference to the Board of Revenue for appropriate orders. Such jurisdiction is supervisory in nature and is meant to prevent perpetuation of illegalities in the revenue records. 7. This court meticulously examined the material on record and also heard arguments advanced by learned counsel for the respondents. 8. At the outset, it deserves to be noticed that the decree dated 17.11.1971 passed by the SDO was not merely confined to correction of revenue entries. A bare perusal of the plaint as well as the operative part of the decree unmistakably reveals that the plaintiffs sought a declaration of their khatedari rights over the disputed land and, acting upon such prayer, the learned SDO declared them to be khatedar tenants. Thus, the decree was to declare proprietary tenancy rights and was not a simple order directing correction of mutation or girdawari entries. The legal consequences flowing from such declaration cannot be ignored merely because consequential correction of revenue entries was also sought. [2026:RJ-JP:28807] (6 of 9) [CW-7366/1992] 9. The undisputed factual position is that the land originally stood recorded in the name of Ramhet, who belonged to the Scheduled Caste community, whereas the beneficiaries under the decree belonged to the Jat community, which is not a Scheduled Caste. Consequently, the decree had the direct legal effect of divesting a Scheduled Caste khatedar of his tenancy rights and conferring the same upon persons belonging to a non- Scheduled Caste. Such consequence squarely attracts the prohibition contained in Section 42 of the Act of 1955. 10. The principal ground to challenge the decree on behalf of the petitioners is that the decree merely corrected erroneous revenue entries and did not amount to a transfer of land cannot be accepted. In the present case, the inevitable consequence of the decree was the extinguishment of the khatedari rights of a Scheduled Caste person and the creation of corresponding rights in favour of persons belonging to a non-Scheduled Caste. Such consequence is nothing, but a transfer of tenancy rights within the meaning and object of Section 42 of the Act of 1955. 11. The ground raised by the petitioners that Ramhet himself admitted the petitioners' claim and later expressed no objection to the decree is equally devoid of merit. A statutory prohibition enacted in public interest cannot be defeated by consent, admission or waiver of the parties. Jurisdiction exercised under Section 82 is intended to uphold the legality of proceedings and not merely to adjudicate private disputes. Once the competent authority noticed that the decree had the effect of defeating the statutory mandate of Section 42 of the Act of 1955, [2026:RJ-JP:28807] (7 of 9) [CW-7366/1992] it became its duty to take corrective action notwithstanding the subsequent stand taken by Ramhet. 12. Equally untenable is the ground taken by the petitioner that Respondent No.3 lacked locus standi to move the application before the Additional Collector. The legality of the reference does not depend upon the personal interest or otherwise of the informant who brought the matter to the notice of the competent authority. The reference was ultimately made by the Additional Collector in exercise of statutory powers vested in it. 13. The contention that the decree had attained finality after lapse of nearly twenty years also does not persuade this Court. Finality of judicial proceedings undoubtedly serves an important purpose; however, such finality cannot validate an order which is void or contrary to an express statutory prohibition. A decree passed in contravention of a mandatory provision enacted in public interest cannot acquire legality merely because it remained unquestioned for a long period. 14. The petitioners have also assailed the jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue on the ground that the matter ought to have been heard by a Division Bench and not by a Single Member. As rightly observed by the Board of Revenue itself, the jurisdiction exercised in the present matter was under Section 82 while deciding a reference. The source of power was the statutory provision governing references and not the appellate jurisdiction under the Act of 1955. Merely because the consequence of accepting the reference resulted in setting aside the decree would not alter the nature of jurisdiction exercised. The Board has rightly distinguished between appellate jurisdiction for setting aside [2026:RJ-JP:28807] (8 of 9) [CW-7366/1992] decrees and supervisory jurisdiction exercised while deciding a statutory reference. This Court finds no jurisdictional infirmity in the said reasoning. 15. Likewise, no substance is found in the plea that the proceedings suffered from violation of principles of natural justice. The record reveals that the Board of Revenue had initially remanded the matter specifically directing that Ramhet be afforded an opportunity of hearing. Thereafter, notice was issued to him and his reply was obtained. The petitioners also actively participated in the proceedings before the Additional Collector as well as before the Board of Revenue and were afforded adequate opportunity to place their objections. Mere non-impleadment of Ramhet at a subsequent stage does not vitiate the proceedings when his stand already stood recorded before the competent authority and the issue involved was essentially one concerning legality of the decree vis-à-vis Section 42 of the Act of 1955. 16. This Court is also unable to accept the submission that Section 42 of the Act of 1955 is confined only to transfers by sale, gift or bequest. The legislative object underlying the provision cannot be frustrated by permitting prohibited alienations to be achieved through consent decrees or declaratory decrees. Acceptance of such contention would render the statutory protection wholly illusory and enable parties to circumvent the prohibition through indirect devices. 17. In the light of above, this court finds that the impugned orders passed by the Board of Revenue is based upon appreciation of the pleadings, the decree, the revenue record and the statutory provisions governing the field. The findings recorded are neither [2026:RJ-JP:28807] (9 of 9) [CW-7366/1992] perverse, nor unsupported by the material available on record. No jurisdictional error, procedural impropriety or manifest illegality has been demonstrated warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its extraordinary writ jurisdiction. 18. Viewed from any angle, this Court is satisfied that the Board of Revenue rightly concluded that the decree dated 17.11.1971 resulted in an impermissible transfer of khatedari rights from a Scheduled Caste member to persons belonging to a non-Scheduled Caste in violation of Section 42 of the Act of 1955 and that exercise of revisional/reference jurisdiction to annul such decree was fully justified. The impugned orders, therefore, suffer from no legal infirmity warranting interference. 19. Accordingly, the writ petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed and the same is hereby dismissed. 20. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. (ANAND SHARMA),J MANOJ NARWANI