2026:JHHC:13253-DB 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Commercial Appeal No. 3 of 2026 1. Mr. Jaswant Singh, S/o Late Dasondha Singh 2. Mrs. Harvinder Kaun, W/o Mr. Jaswant Singh Both are R/o 89, New Tata Line, P.O. & P.S.-Golmuri, Town- Jamshedpur, District-East Singhbhum ….. Appellants Versus 1. L & T Finance Limited, having its registered office at L & T House, Ballard State, Mumbai (Maharashtra) and local building No. 17, 3rd Floor, Opposite of Eye Hospital, Kalimati Road, P.O. & P.S.-Sakchi, Town-Jamshedpur, District-East Singhbhum 2. Tarsem Singh, S/o Late Bhijan Singh, R/o H. No. 4, 10 No. Bastee, Sukhia Road, Golmuri, P.O. & P.S.-Golmuri, Town-Jamshedpur, District-East Singhbhum ….. Respondents ----- CORAM HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR ----- For the Appellants: Mr. Kaustav Roy, Advocate For the Respondents: - ----- 02/05.05.2026 I.A. No. 5501 of 2026: 1. Heard learned counsel for the appellants/applicants. 2. The present interlocutory application seeks condonation of delay of 67 days in filing the present appeal against the judgment and decree made by the Commercial Court. 3. This appeal has been filed under Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, which provides for a limitation of 60 days for filing of this appeal. Thus, the delay is over and above the initially provided period of limitation for filing an appeal. 4. We have perused the present interlocutory application and we are satisfied that no exceptional case has been made out for condonation of this delay. 5. In the case of Government of Maharashtra vs. M/S Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd. [Civil Appeal No. 2026:JHHC:13253-DB 2 995 of 2021 decided on 19.03.2021], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has made the following observations in paragraph No. 61: “61. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, for appeals filed under section 37 of the Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days, respectively, is to be condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost by the first party’s inaction, negligence or laches.” 6. Given the above observations, the delay in commercial appeals can be condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the Court, be condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost by the first party’s inaction, negligence or laches. 7. In this case, the impugned judgment was passed on 30.01.2025 and the decree was also drawn out on 15.02.2025. An application for certified copy of the judgment was made on 15.02.2025 and the copy was issued on 25.02.2025. Though the decree was also drawn out on 15.02.2025, the application for certified copy of the decree was made after an inordinate and unexplained delay on 16.04.2025. This was way beyond the last date of the expiry of the limitation period i.e., 14.04.2025. There is no explanation why the application for certified copy of the decree was not made no sooner 2026:JHHC:13253-DB 3 the decree was made on 15.02.2025. The submission that the application for the certified copy of the decree was made after the applicants got its knowledge, is not convincing and cannot be accepted. The certified copy of the decree was ultimately issued on 23.04.2025. The period between 16.04.2025 and 23.04.2025 can certainly not be excluded for computing the limitation period. 8. Even after both the judgment and decree were available to the applicants by 23.04.2025, this appeal was filed along with an application for condonation of delay only on 01.07.2025. The inordinate delay between the period 23.04.2025 and 01.07.2025 is also not explained. The attempt is to try and exclude the period, even after expiry of the original period of limitation, which is impermissible. This points to negligence, inaction and even laches. 9. We say laches because in this case, the applicants’ suit was dismissed on the ground that the issue raised therein had already been settled in an arbitral proceeding. As against the arbitral award, the applicants have already filed an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. We do not propose to go into the merits of the matter while deciding an application for condonation of delay, however, the only purpose for referring to this fact is that it is not as if the appellants are presently remediless. 10. In any event, based entirely on the averments made in the present interlocutory application as well as the facts and circumstances as borne out from the record, we are satisfied that this is not an exceptional case where we should exercise our discretion and condone the delay, which is even more than the initial limitation period prescribed by the legislature. 2026:JHHC:13253-DB 4 11. Accordingly, by following the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Government of Maharashtra (supra) and applying its ratio to the facts of the present case, we see no good ground to condone the delay. The present interlocutory application is liable to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed without any order for costs. Commercial Appeal No. 3 of 2026: 12. As a result of dismissal of the present interlocutory application, the accompanying appeal does not survive and is accordingly dismissed without any order for costs. (M. S. SONAK, C.J.) (RAJESH SHANKAR, J.) 05.05.2026 Satish/Vikas/