- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:8221-DB WP No. 10113 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 11TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND WRIT PETITION No. 10113 OF 2025 (S-KSAT) BETWEEN: 1. THE REGISTRAR, KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTHA, M.S. BUILDING, DR. B.R. AMBEDKAR ROAD, BANGALORE 560 001. 2. THE ADDITIONAL REGISTRAR ENQUIRIES-II, KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA, M.S.BUILDING, BANGALORE 560 001, REPRESENTED BY ITS THE REGISTRAR, KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTHA. …PETITIONERS (BY SRI C. RAJESH, ADVOCATE FOR SRI VENKATESH S. ARBATTI, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRIES, M.S.BUILDING, DR. B.R. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI, BANGALORE 560 001. Digitally signed by VINUTHA B S Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:8221-DB WP No. 10113 of 2025 2. THE DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF MINES AND GEOLOGY, KHANIJA BHAVAN, RACE COURSE ROAD, BANGALORE 560 001. 3. THE ACCOUNTANT GENERAL (A AND E), KARNATAKA, PALACE ROAD, PARK HOUSE, BANGALORE 560 001. 4. SRI BASAVARAJ, SON OF SRI BASANNA, AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS, RETIRED ASSISTANT ENGINEER, DEPARTMENT OF MINES AND GEOLOGY, BANGALORE 560 001. RESIDING AT No.385, 'NISARGA', 5TH BLOCK, 5TH MAIN, HBR LAYOUT, 1ST STAGE, BRINDAVANNAGAR, BANGALORE 560 043. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI VIKAS ROJIPURA, AGA FOR R1 TO R3) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASHING THE ORDER DATED 25/06/2019 PASSED BY THE KARNATAKA ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL AT BANGALORE IN APPLICATION No.6911/2017, AS PER ANNEXURE-A ETC. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ORDERS THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT and HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:8221-DB WP No. 10113 of 2025 ORAL ORDER (PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT) The petitioners, the Registrar and Additional Registrar of the Karnataka Lokayukta are before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India aggrieved by the order dated 25.06.2019 in Application No.6911/2017, whereunder fourth respondent's application was allowed by quashing the order of entrustment as well as Articles of Charge dated 29.07.2016 (Annexure-A6). 2. Heard C. Rajesh, learned counsel for Sri Venkatesh Arbatti, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Vikas Rojipura, learned Additional Government Advocate for respondent Nos.1 to 3 and perused the entire writ petition papers. 3. Respondent No.4 approached the Tribunal questioning the Entrustment of Enquiry order dated 08.10.2013 (Annexure-A5) referring the enquiry against him under Rule 14-A of the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 and consequent Articles of Charge dated 29.07.2016. Respondent No.4 contended before the Tribunal - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:8221-DB WP No. 10113 of 2025 that the Articles of Charge is barred under Rule 214(2)(b)(ii) of the Karnataka Civil Services Rules (KCSRs) and the Tribunal accepting the said contention, set aside the order of entrustment as well as Articles of Charge against which, the Karnataka Lokayukta is before this Court in this writ petition. 4. Sri C. Rajesh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Sri Venkatesh Arbatti, learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that respondent No.4 retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation on 31.05.2015, whereas the Articles of Charge is issued in respect of an incident which had taken place in the year 2013. Therefore, the Tribunal could not have quashed the Articles of Charge only on the ground that the Articles of Charge are contrary to Rule 214(2)(b)(ii) of KCSRs. Further, he would submit that there are a number of Delinquent Government Officers (DGOs) and respondent No.4 is one of such DGO's. Therefore, learned counsel would pray for allowing the writ petition and to set aside the order passed by the Tribunal. 5. When the Court queried with regard to delay of more than 6 years in preferring the present writ petition, - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:8221-DB WP No. 10113 of 2025 learned counsel for the petitioners invited the attention of this Court to paragraph 2.18 of the writ petition and submits that as the Government failed to file writ petition, the Lokayukta Authorities took action to file writ petition. Hence, he prays for condoning the delay and to entertain the writ petition. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as learned Additional Government Advocate, we are not inclined to interfere with the order passed by the Tribunal. 6.1 At the first instance, the petition is liable to be rejected only on the ground of delay and latches itself. The order of the Tribunal is dated 25.06.2019 and the present writ petition is filed before this Court on 01.04.2025. Respondent No.4, as on the date of filing of the application before the Tribunal was aged 62 years and as on this date, he is nearly more than 68 years. 7. Be that as it may. The explanation of the Lokayukta Authorities at paragraph 2.18 for delay in preferring the writ petition reads as follows; "2.18 That the Petitioner's Institution awaiting that Respondent No.1 to 3 may challenge the - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:8221-DB WP No. 10113 of 2025 impugned order dated 25.06.2019, in A.No. 6911/2017 passed by the Hon'ble KSAT. However, while following upon the cases it has come to the knowledge of the Petitioner and the Counsel that the Respondent No.1 to 3 have not challenged the same. Hence, there is a delay in filing the above petition. The delay is caused due to the aforesaid bona fide reason and is not deliberate." 8. The above averment would indicate that the petitioners-Lokayukta were awaiting respondent Nos.1 to 3 to challenge the impugned order passed by the Tribunal and as the Government had not challenged the same, the petitioners preferred the present writ petition. The explanation offered by the petitioners is not acceptable. If the petitioners-Lokayukta are aggrieved by any order, it is upon them to challenge the order before an appropriate forum and they should not wait for any others to challenge the impugned order. 9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mrinmoy Maity vs. Chhanda Koley and Others (2024 SCC OnLine Sc 551), with regard to delay in preferring the writ petition and the appeals by the Government Authorities has observed as follows; “9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that writ petitioner ought to - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:8221-DB WP No. 10113 of 2025 have been non-suited or in other words writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and latches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or latches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action. 10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting party that for all times to come the delay is not to be condoned. There may be myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a straight jacket formula with mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled. 11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:8221-DB WP No. 10113 of 2025 much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B., (2009) 1 SCC 768 has held to the following effect: “56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. 57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai, [AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261], Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court, [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India, [(1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR 969]). This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, [(1969) 1 SCC 110], Durga - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:8221-DB WP No. 10113 of 2025 Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1 SCC 84]). 58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose.” 12. It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by this Court in Karnataka Power Corportion Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322 whereunder it has been held that the High Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if there is negligence or omissions on the part of the applicant to assert his right. It has been further held thereunder: “6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769]. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably. 7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, [[L.R.] 5 P.C. 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher, - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:8221-DB WP No. 10113 of 2025 [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service, [(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329]. Sir Barnes had stated: “Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.” 8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1 SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470] that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:8221-DB WP No. 10113 of 2025 guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution- makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. 9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, [(1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251] that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.” 13. Reiterating the aspect of delay and latches would disentitle the discretionary relief being granted, this Court in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 has held: “16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:8221-DB WP No. 10113 of 2025 a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.” 10. Respondent No.4 retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation on 31.05.2015, whereas the Articles of Charge was issued on 29.07.2016 by the petitioners- Lokayukta Authorities in respect of an incident that took place in February, March and April, 2010, which is clear from the Articles of Charge placed on record at pages 140 and 141. Therefore, the Tribunal is justified in quashing the Articles of Charge, as it is contrary to Rule 214(2)(b)(ii) of KCSRs. Thus, there is no merit in the writ petition. - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:8221-DB WP No. 10113 of 2025 11. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed on merit as well as on the question of delay and latches. Pending interlocutory applications stand disposed of. Sd/- (S.G.PANDIT) JUDGE Sd/- (K. V. ARAVIND) JUDGE DDU List No.: 1 Sl No.: 15