Research › Search › Judgment

High Court of Chhattisgarh · body

2026 DAILYLAW 10885 (CHH)

BHAGWATI PRASAD BAJPAI v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

WPS/5156/2022 · 2026-02-05

Shri Sachin Singh Rajput

body2026

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

1 2026:CGHC:6901 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 5156 of 2022 Bhagwati Prasad Bajpai S/o Late Shri J.N. Bajpai, Aged About 67 Years, Retired From The Post Of Second Class Clerk In Pt Ravi Shanker Shukla University Raipur, R/o Sector-Ii, Link 8, D.D. Nagar, Raipur, Tahsil And District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh. Pin- 492010 ... Petitioner versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary Higher Education Department Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, New Raipur, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 2 - The Director Directoate Of Higher Education, Block-Iii, Indrawati Bhawan, Atal Nagar New Raipur, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Pt. Ravishanker Shukla University Through Its Registrar, Pt Ravishanker Shukla University G.E. Road, Raipur, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 4 - The Finance Officer Pt. Ravishanker Shukla University, Raipur, G.E. Road, Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondents For Petitioner : Mr. J. K. Gupta, Advocate For Res. Nos. 1 & 2/State : Mr. Ghanshyam Patel, Deputy Government Advocate ({Hon’ble Shri Justice Sachin Singh Rajput}) Order on Board 06/02/2026 1. Instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been preferred by the petitioner seeking following reliefs :- (i) That the Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for 2 entire record pertaining to the case of petitioner for kind perusal of this Hon’ble Court. 10.2 That the Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondent No. 3 to pay the remaining GPF and gratuity amount and consequential benefits to the petitioner accordingly. 10.3 That the Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondent No. 3 to pay remaining 10% amount GPF, Gratuity and other consequential benefits to the petitioner in accordance with law. 10.4 Any other relief, which may be deemed, fit by this Hon’ble Court just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may also be provided in favour of the petitioner.” 2. Facts of the case, as projected by the petitioner, are that the petitioner was working on the post of Clerk with the respondent No. 3, Pt. Ravishanker Shukla University and retired from his services on 31.03.2017 after attaining the age of superannuation. The petitioner made a representation to the respondents authorities for releasing of his admissible retiral dues, however, the same could not be paid, thus this writ petition has been filed with the above prayed following relief. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that after about 7 years of the retirement of the petitioner, a communication dated 21.03.2022 was sent to the petitioner by the respondent No. 3 directing him to deposit the amount of Rs.65,208/- in the treasury of the Pt. Ravishanker Shukla University. He submits that the said recovery appears to be made due to some excess payment made to the petitioner on account of wrong fixation of his pay scale. He submits that though in the relief clause, the petitioner has not prayed for quashment of the said order 3 (Annexure P/1), however withholding the admissible retrial dues of the petitioner appears to be on account of some recovery to be made from the petitioner. He further submits that the relief may be molded and the order annexure P/1 may be set aside in light of the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Punjab & others Vs. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) and others 1 . He submits that the judgment of Rafiq Masih (supra) has subsequently been reiterated and followed by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Thomas Daniel vs. State of Kerala and others 2 and Jogeswar Sahoo & ors. vs. The District Judge, Cuttack & ors.,3. Thus, he prays that the impugned recovery order passed against the petitioner, that too after his retirement, may be set aside. 4. Mr. Neeraj Chaubey, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 3 & 4 submits that the petitioner is being paid 90% anticipatory pension and according to Statute 32 of the University, for grant of pension and gratuity to the officers/employees of Pt. Ravishankar Shukla, University, Raipur, the pension and gratuity is to be paid by the State Government. He further submits that due to passing of the order dated 21.03.2022 (Annexure P/ 1), the respondent Nos. 3 & 4 / University are unable to forward the case for final pension to the State Government. 5. Learned counsel for respondent No. 1 & 2/State submits that State is a formal party and no relief has been claimed against the State. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material 1 (2015) 4 SCC 334 2 2022 SCC OnLine 536 3 2025 SCC OnLine SC 724 4 available to record. 7. The factual scenario in this case is not in dispute that the petitioner in this petition has claimed the payment of his admissible retiral dues. Submission of Mr. Choubey, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 3 & 4 is that respondent No. 3 is paying 90% of the anticipatory pension and there is recovery of Rs. 65208/- to be made from the petitioner. He further submitted that the final pension shall be paid to the petitioner after the said amount is to be deposited. 8. Perusal of the recovery order Annexure P/1, it is clear that the same was issued on 21.03.2022. The order dated 04.01.2021 appended alongwith chart indicates that the petitioner retired on 31.03.2017 and also indicates the fixation of 6th pay commission. By this writ petition, no relief for setting aside the order Annexure P/1 is claimed. In the case in hand, none of the parties could dispute that the petitioner is not a class III employee and the Annexure P/ 1 was issued after 7 years of his retirement. Now, the question comes as to whether in absence of any specific prayer for quashment of Annexure P/1, whether such relief can be granted to the petitioner or not. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of M. Sudakar vs. V. Manoharan & others 4 in paragraph 14 has held as under: “14. The power to mould relief is always available to the Court possessed with the power to issue high prerogative writs. In order to do complete justice it can mould the relief, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. In the facts of a given case a writ petitioner may not be entitled to the specific relief claimed by him but this itself will not 4 (2011) 1 SCC 484 5 preclude the Writ Court to grant such other relief which he is otherwise entitled. Further delay and latches does not bar the jurisdiction of the Court. It is a matter of discretion and not of jurisdiction. The learned Single Judge had taken note of the relevant facts and declined to dismiss the writ petition on the ground of delay and latches.” 10. In this context, some observation made in the paragraph 23 by Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Union of India and another vs. B.C. Chaturvedi 5 requires to be reproduced as under :- “23. It deserves to be pointed out that the mere fact that there is no provision parallel to Article 142 relating to the High Courts, can be no ground to think that they have not to do complete justice between the parties, the same cannot be ordered. Absence of provision like Article 142 is not material, according to me. This may be illustrated by pointing out that despite there being no provision in the Constitution parallel to Article 137 conferring power of review on the High Court, this Court held as early as 1961 in Shivdeo Singh's case, AIR 1963 SC 1909, that the High Courts too can exercise power of review, which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction. I would say that power to do complete justice also inheres in every court, not to speak of a court of plenary jurisdiction like a High Court. of course, this power is not as wide which this Court has under Article 142. That, however, is a different matter.” 11. From the factual scenario that emerges from the record, it is clear 5 (1995) 6 SCC 749 6 that the petitioner retired in the year 2017 and the recovery order was issued in the year 2022, i.e., 7 years after the retirement of the petitioner. It is nobody’s case that the petitioner is not a class-III employee and nothing is found to suggest that excess amount was said to have been paid to the petitioner on account of any misrepresentation or any fraud played by the petitioner. 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rafiq Masih (White Washer) and others (supra) has considered this issue in great detail and it has been held that when payment has been mistakenly made by the employer, in excess of their entitlement, certain recoveries have been held to be impermissible in law. The law which has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph 18 is produced hereinbelow :- “18. it is not possible to postulate all situations of hardship where payments have mistakenly been made by an employer, in the following situations, a recovery by the employer would be impermissible in law: (i) Recovery from employees belonging to Class- III and Class-IV service (or Group 'C' and Group 'D' service). (ii)Recovery from retired employees, or employees who are due to retire within one year,of the order of recovery. (iii)Recovery from employees, when the excess payment has been made for a period in excess of five years, before the order of recovery is issued (iv)Recovery in cases where an employee has wrongfully been required to discharge duties of a higher post, and has been paid accordingly, even 7 though he should have rightfully been required to work against an inferior post. (v)In any other case, where the Court arrives at the conclusion, that recovery if made from the employee, would be iniquitous or harsh or arbitrary to such an extent, as would far outweigh the equitable balance of the employer's right to recover.” 13. It has been further held by Hon’ble Supreme Court that recovery from employees belongings to Class-III & Class-IV category is impermissible in law where the payment has been made mistakenly by the employer in excess entitlement. 14. The judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rafiq Masih (supra) has also been followed with approval in the case of Thomas Daniel (supra) and Jogeswar Sahoo (supra). Thus, taking into consideration the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme court in afore-cited cases and the fact situation of the case, this Court is inclined to mould the relief and set aside the impugned Annexure P/ 1. Accordingly, impugned order dated 15.07.2015 is set aside. 15. The concerned respondent are directed to settle the admissible retiral dues of the petitioner within a period of 60 days from the date of receipt / submission of copy of this Order and pay the arrears within the stipulated period. 16. In light of above fact situation of the case, this writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. Sd/- (Sachin Singh Rajput) JUDGE Ami AMITA DUBEY Digitally signed by AMITA DUBEY Date: 2026.02.23 13:08:59 +0530