JUDGMENT : S.K. Medhi, J. The extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court has been sought to be invoked by filing this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by putting to challenge the opinion rendered vide impugned order dated 17.06.2016 passed by the learned Foreigners Tribunal No.4th , Darrangin F.T. (4th ) Case No. 47/2015. By the impugned judgment, the petitioner, who was the proceedee before the learned Tribunal, has been declared to be a foreigner post 25.03.1971. 2 . The facts of the case may be put in a nutshell as follows: (i) A reference was made by the concerned Superintendent of Police (B),Darrang against the petitioner giving rise to the aforesaid F.T.(4th ) Case No. 47/2015. Initially, the reference was made under IM(D)T Act, 1983 and after the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal Vs. Union of India reported in (2005) 5 SCC 665 , the matter was placed before the Foreigners Tribunal. (ii) As per requirement u/s 9 of the Foreigner’s Act, 1946 to prove that the proceedee is not a foreigner, the petitioner had filed the written statement on 30.11.2015 along with certain documents. (iii) The learned Tribunal, after considering the facts and circumstances and taking into account of the provisions of Section 9 of the Foreigners’ Act, 1946 had come to a finding that the petitioner, as opposite party had failed to discharge the burden cast upon him and accordingly, the opinion was rendered declaring the petitioner to be a foreign national post 25.03.1971. 3. We have heard Shri AM Ahmed, learned counsel for the petitioner. We have also heard Ms. A. Verma, learned Standing Counsel, Home Department & NRC; Shri P. Sarma, learned GA, Assam; Shri N. Kalita, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Shri A.I. Ali, learned Standing Counsel, Election Commission of India and Ms. J. Sarma, learned CGC. We have also carefully examined the records which were requisitioned vide an order dated 03.03.2017. 4. Shri Ahmed, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner could prove his case with cogent evidence and in view of the fact that there was no rebuttal evidence, the learned Tribunal should have accepted the said proof and accordingly hold the petitioner to be a citizen of India. In this regard, he has referred to the evidence on affidavit tendered by 5 nos. In this regard, he has referred to the evidence on affidavit tendered by 5 nos. of DWs including the petitioner and also the following documentary evidence: (i) Ext-1Voter ID Card of petitioner; (ii) Ext-2 Voter ID Card of one Majibar Rahman; (iii) Ext-3 certified copy of the voter list-1966; (iv) Ext-4 Ration Card in the name of Sabirun Nessa; (v) Ext-5 Residential Certificate of Gaonbura; (vi) Ext-6 Affidavit of the petitioner; (vii) Ext-7unregistered land document dated 08.09.1994 in the name of Majibar Rahman; He had also produced some photo copies of voter lists of the years, 2014 and 2016 which were however not proved. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in the written statement, all material disclosures were made. It is submitted that the name of the petitioner is Miyar Ali and his father’s name is Majibar Rahman. He has proved the voter ID Card of himself and his projected father. He has proved the Voters Lists of the year 1966 containing the name of his projected grandfather, Montaj Ali and projected grandmother as Moina Bibi of village – No.1, Magurmari. He has also produced Ration Card and Residential Certificate issued by the Gaonbura. 6. He has stated that there were 5 nos. of witnesses, including the petitioner and their evidence were not properly considered. He has specifically submitted that there is no discussion or finding on the evidence of DW5 (one Md. Fazar Ali) and therefore, the impugned opinion is unsustainable in law. 7. In support of his submissions, he has relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Karim Ali Vs. Union of India reported in 2022 (3) GLT 816 wherein it has been laid down that oral evidence of the mother of a proceedee should not be discarded. He has also submitted that the DWs were not cross-examined and in absence of such cross-examination, the oral evidence stood established and proved. In this regard, He has relied upon the case of Abdul Khalique Vs. Union of India reported in 2013 (1) GLT 941 8. Per contra, Ms. Verma, learned Standing Counsel, Home Department has categorically refuted the stand taken on behalf of the petitioner. She submits that a proceeding under the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 relates to determination as to whether the proceedee is a foreigner or not. Union of India reported in 2013 (1) GLT 941 8. Per contra, Ms. Verma, learned Standing Counsel, Home Department has categorically refuted the stand taken on behalf of the petitioner. She submits that a proceeding under the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 relates to determination as to whether the proceedee is a foreigner or not. Therefore, the relevant facts are especially within the knowledge of the proceedee and accordingly, the burden of proving citizenship rests absolutely upon the proceedee, notwithstanding anything contained in the Evidence Act, 1872 and this is mandated under Section 9 of the aforesaid Act, 1946. However, in the instant case, the petitioner utterly failed to discharge the burden. It is also submitted that rebuttal evidence is not mandatory in every case and would be given only if necessary. She further submits that the evidence of a proceedee has to be cogent, relevant, which inspire confidence and acceptable and only thereafter, the question of adducing rebuttal evidence may come in. 9. The learned Standing Counsel has further submitted that the written statement is the basic document which is supposed to lay down the foundation of the case of the proceeding. She submits that there is no mention about the siblings or the mother of the petitioner and his father’s name has been stated as Majibar Rahman. There is mention of the name of the projected grandfather only in the Voter List of 1966. In this connection, she has relied upon the case of Rashminara Begum Vs. UoI & Ors. reported in 2017 (4) GLT 346 and the following observations are pressed into service- “25.Written statement is the basic statement of defence of a proceedee before the Foreigners Tribunal. Keeping in mind the mandate of Section 9 of the Foreigners Act,1946, it is incumbent upon the proceedee to disclose at the first instance itself i.e., in his written statement all relevant facts specially within his knowledge having a material bearing on his claim to citizenship of India. Material facts pleaded in the written statement are thereafter required to be proved by adducing cogent and reliable evidence. It is also trite that a party cannot traverse beyond the pleadings made in the written statement.” 10. She has also submitted that DW3 the projected father has stated that the petitioner is his 3rd son whereas no such disclosure has been made by the petitioner. It is also trite that a party cannot traverse beyond the pleadings made in the written statement.” 10. She has also submitted that DW3 the projected father has stated that the petitioner is his 3rd son whereas no such disclosure has been made by the petitioner. Further, DW3 had stated that he has castvote for the first time in 1985. Though the Voter List of 1985 has not been exhibited, the copy enclosed reveals his age to be 28 years. On the other hand, from the age disclosed in the affidavit, DW3 appears to have been born in the year 1948 and there would be a huge inconsistency with the age. 11. As regards the evidence of DW5, the learned Standing Counsel has submitted that there is no statement made by the said witness regarding his connection with the petitioner and in any case, oral evidence without any documentary support would be insignificant. In this regard, she has relied upon the case of Asia Khatoon Vs. Union of India [WP(C)/4020/2017 decided on 21.11.2019] and the following observations have been pressed into service: “The statement of DW-2 i.e. Amir Uddin, who claimed to be the father of the petitioner, cannot be relied upon in the absence of any documents showing his relationship to the petitioner. In this we would observe that in a proceeding under the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 the evidentiary value of oral testimony without support of documentary evidence is wholly insignificant. Oral testimony alone is no proof of citizenship. The evidence of DW-2, thus, falls short of being considered as cogent, reliable and admissible evidence, so much so, to establish linkage of the petitioner to him.” 12. In support of her submission that a certificate has to be proved from contemporaneous records, the learned Standing Counsel has relied upon the judgment passed in the case of Romila Khatun vs. Union of India reported in 2018 (4) GLT 373 and the following observations have been pressed into service. “ 20. It is trite that documentary evidence would have to be proved on the basis of the record and the contemporaneous record must substantiate and prove the contents of the document. Proof of document is one thing and proof of contents is another. Not only the document would have to be proved but its contents would also have to be proved. It is trite that documentary evidence would have to be proved on the basis of the record and the contemporaneous record must substantiate and prove the contents of the document. Proof of document is one thing and proof of contents is another. Not only the document would have to be proved but its contents would also have to be proved. That apart, the truthfulness of the contents of the document would also have to be established from the record. A document or the contents of the document cannot be proved on the basis of personal knowledge. …” 13. She has relied upon the case of Nur Begum Vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in 2020 (3) GLT 347 with regard to the observations qua the exercise of Certiorari jurisdiction, which read as follows: “9. On the available materials, we find that the Tribunal rendered opinion/order upon due appreciation of the entire facts, evidence and documents brought on record. We find no infirmity in the findings and opinion recorded by the Tribunal. We would observe that the certiorari jurisdiction of the writ court being supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction, this Court would refrain from reviewing the findings of facts reached by the Tribunal. No case is made out that the impugned opinion/order was rendered without affording opportunity of hearing or in violation of the principles of natural justice and/or that it suffers from illegality on any ground of having been passed by placing reliance on evidence which is legally impermissible in law and/or that the Tribunal refused to admit admissible evidence and/or that the findings finds no support by any evidence at all. In other words, the petitioner has not been able to make out any case demonstrating any errors apparent on the face of the record to warrant interference of the impugned opinion.” 14. She has also relied upon the case of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rupjan Begum Vs. Union of India reported in (2018) 1 SCC 579 , wherein it has been laid down that a certificate has to be proved on two aspects, firstly, the authenticity of the same and secondly, the authenticity of the contents. 15. The learned Standing Counsel has accordingly submitted that the writ petition be dismissed and the interim order be vacated. 16. Union of India reported in (2018) 1 SCC 579 , wherein it has been laid down that a certificate has to be proved on two aspects, firstly, the authenticity of the same and secondly, the authenticity of the contents. 15. The learned Standing Counsel has accordingly submitted that the writ petition be dismissed and the interim order be vacated. 16. Shri N. Kalita, learned counsel for the ECI and Shri P. Sarma, learned GA, Assam have supported the submissions advanced by Ms. Verma, the learned Standing Counsel, Home Deptt. & NRC and have prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. They have submitted that this Court in exercise of its Certiorari jurisdiction does not act as an Appellate Court and it is only the decision-making process which can be the subject matter of scrutiny. They have subitted that there is no procedural impropriety or illegality in the decision-making process and therefore, the instant petition is liable to be dismissed. 17. The rival submissions made have been duly considered and the materials placed before this Court including the records of the Tribunal have been carefully perused. 18. With regard to the aspect of burden of proof as laid down in Section 9 of the Act of 1946, the law is well settled that the burden of proof that a proceedee is an Indian citizen is always on the said proceedee and never shifts. In the said Section, there is non-obstante clause that the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act would not be applicable. For ready reference, Section 9 is extracted hereinbelow- “9. Burden of proof.—If in any case not falling under Section 8 any question arises with reference to this Act or any order made or direction given thereunder, whether any person is or is not a foreigner or is or is not a foreigner of a particular class or description the onus of proving that such person is not a foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class or description, as the case may be, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), lie upon such person.” 19. In this connection, the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Fateh Mohd. Vs. Delhi Administration [ AIR 1963 SC 1035 ] which followed the principles laid down by the Constitutional Bench in the case of Ghaus Mohammad Vs. In this connection, the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Fateh Mohd. Vs. Delhi Administration [ AIR 1963 SC 1035 ] which followed the principles laid down by the Constitutional Bench in the case of Ghaus Mohammad Vs. Union of India [ AIR 1961 SC 1526 ] in the context of Foreigners Act, 1946 would be relevant which is extracted hereinbelow- “22. This Act confers wide ranging powers to deal with all foreigners or with respect to any particular foreigner or any prescribed class or description of foreigner for prohibiting, regulating or restricting their or his entry into India or their presence or continued presence including their arrest, detention and confinement. The most important provision is Section 9 which casts the burden of proving that a person is not a foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class or description, as the case may be, shall lie upon such person. Therefore, where an order made under the Foreigners Act is challenged and a question arises whether the person against whom the order has been made is a foreigner or not, the burden of proving that he is not a foreigner is upon such a person. In Union of India v. Ghaus Mohd. the Chief Commissioner of Delhi served an order on Ghaus Mohammad to leave India within three days as he was a Pakistani national. He challenged the order before the High Court which set aside the order by observing that there must be prima facie material on the basis of which the authority can proceed to pass an order under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act, 1946. In appeal the Constitution Bench reversed the judgment of the High Court holding that onus of showing that he is not a foreigner was upon the respondent.” 20. Before embarking to adjudicate the issue involved vis-a-vis the submissions and the materials on record, we are reminded that a Writ Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would confine its powers to examine the decision making process only. Further, the present case pertains to a proceeding of a Tribunal which has given its findings based on the facts. It is trite law that findings of facts are not liable to be interfered with by a Writ Court under its certiorari jurisdiction. 21. Law is well settled in this field. Further, the present case pertains to a proceeding of a Tribunal which has given its findings based on the facts. It is trite law that findings of facts are not liable to be interfered with by a Writ Court under its certiorari jurisdiction. 21. Law is well settled in this field. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, after discussing the previous case laws on the jurisdiction of a Writ Court qua the writ of certiorari, in the recent decision of Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences and Anr. Vs. Bikartan Das & Ors [Civil Appeal No. 3339 of 2023] has laid down as follows: “49. Before we close this matter, we would like to observe something important in the aforesaid context: Two cardinal principles of law governing exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution more particularly when it comes to issue of writ of certiorari. 50. The first cardinal principle of law that governs the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, more particularly when it comes to the issue of a writ of certiorari is that in granting such a writ, the High Court does not exercise the powers of Appellate Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal. The writ of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is apparent on the face of the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ, should not be issued on mere asking. 51. The second cardinal principle of exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is that in a given case, even if some action or order challenged in the writ petition is found to be illegal and invalid, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction thereunder can refuse to upset it with a view to doing substantial justice between the parties. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this flexible power to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity projects. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this flexible power to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity projects. The legal formulations cannot be enforced divorced from the realities of the fact situation of the case. While administering law, it is to be tempered with equity and if the equitable situation demands after setting right the legal formulations, not to take it to the logical end, the High Court would be failing in its duty if it does not notice equitable consideration and mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. Any other approach would render the High Court a normal court of appeal which it is not.” 22. This Court has noticed that with regard to the presentation of the petitioner qua the notice received from the Tribunal, it is seen that in the written statement, there is no disclosure of the relevant facts at all. There is no mention about the siblings or the mother and only the name of the projected father has been disclosed as Majibar Rahman. There is a mention of a Voter List of 1966 which contains the name of the projected grandfather as Montaj Ali. No other documents have been mentioned in the written statement. In this connection, it would be beneficial to refer to the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal (supra): “17. There is good and sound reason for placing the burden of proof upon the person concerned who asserts to be a citizen of a particular country. In order to establish one's citizenship, normally he may be required to give evidence of (i) his date of birth (ii) place of birth (iii) name of his parents (iv) their place of birth and citizenship. Some times the place of birth of his grand parents may also be relevant like under Section 6-A(1) (d) of the Citizenship Act. All these facts would necessarily be within the personal knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of the State. After he has given evidence on these points, the State authorities can verify the facts and can then lead evidence in rebuttal, if necessary. All these facts would necessarily be within the personal knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of the State. After he has given evidence on these points, the State authorities can verify the facts and can then lead evidence in rebuttal, if necessary. If the State authorities dispute the claim of citizenship by a person and assert that he is a foreigner, it will not only be difficult but almost impossible for them to first lead evidence on the aforesaid points. This is in accordance with the underlying policy of Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.” 23. Though the petitioner had proved the Voter List of the year 1966 containing the names of his projected grandparents, no further voter lists were proved to show any linkage of the petitioner with the projected grandparents. With regard to the Ration Card, a Ration Card cannot be a determinative factor in establishing one’s citizenship, that too in absence any other supportive documents which are required to be duly proved in accordance with law. As regards the Gaonbura Certificate, the same was proved by the Gaonbura as DW2. However, the said DW2 could not support his oral evidence by any contemporaneous records. He had further deposed that he is the Gaonbura of Magurbari whereas from the records, it transpires that the father of the petitioner himself was a resident of village Dhanshiri Khuti and the petitioner himself was of Dhanshiri Khuti. In this regard, this Court takes aid of the judgment rendered in the case of Rupjan Begum (supra) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court had made the following observations: “15. The certificate issued by the G.P. Secretary merely acknowledges the shifting of residence of a married woman from one village to another. The said certificate by itself and by no means establishes any claim of citizenship of the holder of the certificate. This is made clear in the illustrative list of documents itself by specifying the same to be only a supporting document. The certificate in question only enables its holder to establish a link between the holder and the person from whom legacy is claimed. This is made clear in the illustrative list of documents itself by specifying the same to be only a supporting document. The certificate in question only enables its holder to establish a link between the holder and the person from whom legacy is claimed. It has been made clear in the several reports of the learned State Coordinator, NRC, Assam that a claim accompanied by such a certificate, without details of the legacy person, is to be discarded and in the event information as to the legacy person has been furnished, the certificate in question is to be used for the limited purpose of providing a linkage after due enquiry and verification. 16. The certificate issued by the G.P. Secretary, by no means, is proof of citizenship. Such proof will come only if the link between the claimant and the legacy person (who has to be a citizen) is established. The certificate has to be verified at two stages. The first is the authenticity of the certificate itself; and the second is the authenticity of the contents thereof. The latter process of verification is bound to be an exhaustive process in the course of which the source of information of the facts and all other details recorded in the certificate will be ascertained after giving an opportunity to the holder of the certificate. If the document and its contents is to be subjected to a thorough search and probe we do not see why the said certificate should have been interdicted by the High Court, particularly, in the context of the facts surrounding the enumeration and inclusion of the documents mentioned in the illustrative list of documents, as noticed above. In fact, the said list of illustrative documents was also laid before this Court in the course of the proceedings held from time to time and this Court was aware of the nature and effect of each of the documents mentioned in the list.” 24. Exhibit 7 is admittedly an unregistered document which will not have any relevancy in establishing the citizenship. Moreover, the said document is in the name of Majibar Rahman – the projected father. As would be evident from the records, there is gross inconsistency in the name of the projected father. While the petitioner has described himself to be the son of Majibar Rahman, the projected father as DW3 has stated his name as Majibar Akman. Moreover, the said document is in the name of Majibar Rahman – the projected father. As would be evident from the records, there is gross inconsistency in the name of the projected father. While the petitioner has described himself to be the son of Majibar Rahman, the projected father as DW3 has stated his name as Majibar Akman. Further, it reveals from the voter list of 1985 (not exhibited) that his name is Majibar Ali, who was 28 years of age in the year 1985. 25. As regards the evidence adduced, the petitioner as DW1 did not disclose any material facts. DW2 is the Gaonbura and as observed above, he is of village No.1, Magurmari and the proceedee and his projected father are of village Dhanshiri Khuti. As regards the Certificate issued by him, the same contains the National Emblem which is unauthorized. 26. As regards the submission that there is no discussion or finding on the evidence of DW5, though the same may be correct as a matter of fact, to ensure that there is a substantial justice, we have examined the said evidence which is present in the original records. DW5, in his evidence has not stated anything as to how he was connected with the proceedee. He has simply said that the father of the proceedee was born in the village and the grand-father was also born in 1 No. Magurmari and that the name of the grand-father had appeared in the voter list of 1966. No documents, as such, were proved by the said DW5. The age of the DW5 has not been disclosed in the affidavit and as mentioned above, the name of the father in the Voter List of 1985 (not exhibited) would disclose that he is from village Dhansiri Khuti. It is a settled law that in matters of determination of foreigners, oral evidence would not lay a substantial role. In view of the above, we are of the view that the evidence of DW5 would not have played any significant role in the adjudication process and no prejudice has been suffered by the petitioner. 27. It is a settled law that in matters of determination of foreigners, oral evidence would not lay a substantial role. In view of the above, we are of the view that the evidence of DW5 would not have played any significant role in the adjudication process and no prejudice has been suffered by the petitioner. 27. In the cases of Bijoy Das Vs.UoI reported in 2018 (3) GLT 118 and Nur Begum (supra),this Court has laid down that in proceedings of this nature, oral evidence alone would not be enough and such evidence is required to be supported and corroborated by documentary evidence and contemporaneous records. The case of Karim Ali (supra) relied upon by the petitioner is distinguishable on fact as apart from the oral evidence of the mother, there were other documentary evidence.The reliance upon the case of Abdul Khalique (supra) by the petitioner would be of no aid as the same is required to be examined under the facts and circumstances of the case. Admittedly, in the instant case, there was no representation on behalf of the State and therefore, there could not have been any rebuttal evidence. Further, the observations are to be read in consonance with the observation made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal (supra) wherein it has been laid down that rebuttal evidence can be given only when it is necessary. We are of the opinion that in view of the requirement of Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, the burden of proof is entirely upon a proceedee and only when the said burden is discharged, the questions of rebuttal evidence may arise. 28. In the instant case, the written statement is absolutely vague and apparently, has not met the requirement, as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal (supra). There is a requirement to disclose the following: (i) his date of birth; (ii) place of birth (iii) name of his parents (iv) their place of birth and citizenship Further, there may be a requirement to give the details of the grandparents. It has been stated that all these facts would necessarily be within the personal knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of the State. 29. It has been stated that all these facts would necessarily be within the personal knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of the State. 29. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that the impugned order dated 17.06.2016 passed by the learned Foreigners Tribunal No.4th , Darrang in F.T. (4th) Case No. 47/2015 does not call for any interference. Accordingly, this writ petition being devoid of merits is dismissed. The interim order stands vacated. 30. The actions consequent upon the opinion rendered by the learned Tribunal would follow in accordance with law. 31. The records of the aforesaid impugned order dated 17.06.2016 passed bythe learned Foreigners Tribunal No.4th , Darrang in F.T. (4th ) Case No. 47/2015 be returned to the concerned Foreigners Tribunal forthwith, along with a copy of this order.