JUDGMENT : Mridul Kumar Kalita, J. 1. Heard Mr. K. N. Choudhury, the learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. N. Gautam, the learned counsel for the appellants. Also heard Mr. D. Saikia, the learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. R. Borpujari, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1. Though, notices on the other respondents were duly served, however, none has appeared on their behalf, when the matter was called on for hearing. Hence, this Court decided to proceed ex-parte against them. 2. This appeal under Order 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has been filed by the appellants, namely, (1) Asomiya Pratidin, (2) Sri Jayanta Baruah and (3) Sri Jatin Choudhury, impugning the order dated 11.02.2026, passed by the Court of learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) No. 1, Kamrup (M) in Misc (J) Case No. 156/2026 in connection with the Title Suit No. 85/2026, whereby, ex-parte ad interim injunction was granted in favour of the present respondent No. 1 by injuncting the present appellants from making, publishing, circulating or disseminating any further defamatory statements or materials concerning the present respondent No. 1 with regard to the news items published, on 05.02.2026, in the Assamese daily newspaper, Asomiya Pratidin, which were captioned as “ RAAJYAT NAAME-BENAAME SAMPATTI KROY – MUKHYA MANTRIR PARIYAALOR 12 HEJAAR BIGHAA BHUMI”, and (ii) “ HIMANTA BISWA KAARO NAHAY JAARE GHANISTHA HOICHE, TAREI PITHIT CHURI BAHUAAICHE”. 3. The facts relevant for consideration of the instant appeal, in brief, are that the present respondent No. 1, namely, Dr. Himanta Biswa Sarma had filed a Title Suit bearing Title Suit No. 85/2026, before the Court of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) No. 1, Kamrup (M) at Guwahati against the present appellants and three other persons, namely, (1) Sri Gaurav Gogoi, (2) Sri Jitendra Singh and (3) Sri Bhupesh Baghel (who are arrayed as respondent Nos. 2, 3 & 4 respectively in the instant appeal). 4. In the said suit, the present respondent No. 1 has prayed for a declaration that the news items mentioned hereinbefore, which were published in the newspaper Asomiya Pratidin on 05.02.2026 are defamatory and has harmed the name, fame, reputation, goodwill and future prospects of the present respondent No. 1. The present respondent No. 1 has also prayed for a compensation to the tune of Rs. 5,00,00,00,000/- (Rupees Five Hundred Crores) for the damage done by the respondents to his reputation. The present respondent No. 1 has also prayed for a compensation to the tune of Rs. 5,00,00,00,000/- (Rupees Five Hundred Crores) for the damage done by the respondents to his reputation. The relief of permanent prohibitory injunction has also been prayed for restraining the present appellants and other defendants from making any statement, printing, publishing, circulating or disseminating any news items in furtherance of the above- mentioned news items. The respondent No. 1 has also prayed for a relief of permanent mandatory injunction by directing the present appellants to publish clarification and apology in connection with the aforesaid news items published in the Asomiya Pratidin Newspaper on 05.02.2026. 5. It is also averred by the present respondent No.1, in the plaint filed by him, before the Trial Court, in the Title Suit No. 85/2026, that on 14 th February 2026, the present appellant published two news items in the Asomiya Pratidin newspaper with the caption as already indicated in paragraph No. 2 hereinabove. The said news items were published on the basis of certain allegations made against the present respondent No. 1 by the present respondent Nos. 2, 3 & 4 in a press conference addressed by them jointly at Rajib Bhawan, Guwahati on 04.02.2026. 6. It is also averred in the plaint, filed by the present respondent No. 1, before the Trial Court, that in the news items defamatory remarks were made against the present respondent No. 1 and his wife. It was alleged that the present respondent No. 2 accused the present respondent No. 1 and his wife of occupying 12,000 Bighas of land in the State. It was also alleged that the respondent No. 1 is “impolite and arrogant Chief Minister”, land grabber, betrayer politician and liar Chief Minister of all times. 7. Similarly, in the aforementioned news items, the present respondent No. 4 has accused the present respondent No. 1 of being a “master fraudster” and “that he has frauded all his intimates”, and that “a gang including his wife has plundering in Assam”. Similarly, the present respondent No. 3 has been quoted in the news items to have said that “Himanta Biswa Sarma has sold Assam and his family is doing business by selling Assam”. He was further quoted as saying that the respondent No. 1 “stabbed a former Chief Minister and has become Chief Minister through back door”. Similarly, the present respondent No. 3 has been quoted in the news items to have said that “Himanta Biswa Sarma has sold Assam and his family is doing business by selling Assam”. He was further quoted as saying that the respondent No. 1 “stabbed a former Chief Minister and has become Chief Minister through back door”. It was also alleged that respondent No. 1 has imposed “HBS Tax” and has been involved in Louis Berger, Sarda, PM Sampada, North Cachar Hills scams. 8. In the aforesaid suit, the respondent No. 1 has also filed an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, praying for grant of temporary injunction against the present appellants and other respondents. The said application was registered as Misc. (J) Case No. 156/2026. In the said Misc. Case a prayer has also been made for dispensing with the notice to the opposite parties under Rule 3 of Order 39 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 9. Accordingly, by Order dated 11.02.2026, passed in Misc. (J) Case No. 156/2026, the Trial Court granted ex-parte ad interim injunction restraining the opposite parties (present appellants and present respondent Nos. 2, 3, 4 & 5) from making, publishing, circulating or disseminating any further defamatory statements or materials concerning the present respondent No. 1 regarding the news items, published on 05.02.2026, in Assamese newspaper “Asomiya Pratidin” as already described in paragraph No. 2 of this judgment, till the appearance of the opposite parties before the Trial Court. The notices were issued to the appellants and other opposite parties in the said Misc. Case fixing 09.03.2026 for appearance and service report. 10. Mr. K. N. Choudhury, the learned senior counsel for the appellants has submitted that the Trial Court has erred in the granting of ex- parte ad interim injunction against journalistic pieces the present appellants without arriving at a prima facie satisfaction that the contents sought to be injuncted are prima facie malicious or palpably false. He submits that granting ex-parte ad interim injunction at a pre-trial stage in a cavalier manner results in stifling of public debate. He submits that ex-parte ad interim injunction against publication houses may be granted only in exceptional cases or after a full-fledged trial. He submits that granting ex-parte ad interim injunction at a pre-trial stage in a cavalier manner results in stifling of public debate. He submits that ex-parte ad interim injunction against publication houses may be granted only in exceptional cases or after a full-fledged trial. He submits that the Trial Court had failed to take into consideration the aforementioned principles and without coming to any prima facie finding regarding the falsehood or maliciousness of the contents of the aforementioned news items ex- parte ad interim injunction was granted against the present appellants. 11. He further submits that even the three-fold test of establishing (i) prima facie case, (ii) balance of convenience and (iii) irreparable loss, for grant of ex-parte ad interim injunction was not consider by the Trial Court. He submits that though the Trial Court has discussed in the impugned judgment as to what constitute the three golden principles for grant of temporary injunction, however, it has failed to discuss the applicability of those principles to the facts of the instant case. He submits that the power to grant discretionary relief of ex- parte ad interim injunction was exercised arbitrarily and perversely by the Trial Court. 12. The learned senior counsel for the appellants also submits that the Trial Court failed to take into consideration that no evidence has been produced by the respondent No. 1 before the Trial Court to support his contention that the news items published on 05.02.2026, caused reputational harm to him. He further submits that neither any discussion to that effect has been made in the impugned order by the Trial Court. 13. The learned senior counsel for the appellants submits that this is a fit case where the appellants may be given opportunity of being heard before considering the question as to whether it is a fit case for grant of temporary injunction as prayed for. He submits that the impugned order is, therefore, liable to be set aside to the extent it granted ex-parte ad interim injunction against the present appellants. In support of his submission, the learned senior counsel for the appellants has cited the following rulings – i. “ Bloomberg Television Production Services India Private Limited and Others Vs. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited ” reported in (2025) 1 SCC 741 ii. “ Wander Ltd. and Another Vs. Antox India P. Ltd. ” reported in (1990) (Supp) SCC 727 14. In support of his submission, the learned senior counsel for the appellants has cited the following rulings – i. “ Bloomberg Television Production Services India Private Limited and Others Vs. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited ” reported in (2025) 1 SCC 741 ii. “ Wander Ltd. and Another Vs. Antox India P. Ltd. ” reported in (1990) (Supp) SCC 727 14. On the other hand, Mr. D. Saikia, the learned senior counsel for the respondent No. 1 has raised two preliminary points on the question of maintainability of the instant appeal. Firstly, he submits that in the cause title of the memo of appeal, the appellants have not stated the exact provision of statute under which the appeal has been filed as required under Rule 2 of Chapter 4 of Guwahati High Court Rules. He submits that the appellants have only mentioned in the cause title that this is an application under Order 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, whereas, Order 43 Rule 1 of the said Code contains Clause (a) to Clause (w), however, the appellants have not specifically mentioned in the cause title of the memo of appeal as to under which specific provision of Order 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the instant appeal has been filed, which has made it difficult for the respondent No.1 to advance his defence against the appeal pin pointedly. He submits that though this is a curable defect, however, if the appellant refuses to rectify the same, the appeal is liable to be rejected on that ground only. 15. The learned senior counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the memo of appeal is also bad in law for not having any prayer in the same. He submits that the appellants have not made any prayer in the memo of appeal. He submits that as apart from present appellants, there were other defendants in the suit filed by the respondent No. 1, and all of them were injuncted by the impugned Order. He submits that in absence of a specific prayer in the memo of appeal, it may not be clear for the Court to ascertain as to whether the appellants are seeking any modification in the impugned order or they are seeking the impugned order to be set aside in toto. 16. He submits that in absence of a specific prayer in the memo of appeal, it may not be clear for the Court to ascertain as to whether the appellants are seeking any modification in the impugned order or they are seeking the impugned order to be set aside in toto. 16. The learned senior counsel for the respondent No. 1 submits that if a Court considers or grants a relief for which no prayer was made, it deprives the respondent of an opportunity to oppose or resist such a relief, and same would lead to miscarriage of justice. He submits that though in Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, it is not specifically mentioned that the prayer shall have to be mentioned in the memo of appeal, however, it is a settled proposition of law that relief which is not prayed for may not be granted. In support of his submission, he has cited a ruling of the Apex Court in the case of “ Akella Lalitha Vs. Konda Hanumantha Rao and Another ” , reported in 2022 SCC Online, SC 928 . He submits that though, this is a curable defect, however, if the appellant refuses to rectify the same, the appeal is liable to be rejected on that ground only. 17. The learned senior counsel for the respondent No.1 has further submitted that the Respondent No. 1 is a well-known politician of India and was holding the post of Chief Minister of Assam at the time when the defamatory news was published in the newspaper against him. He also submits that the newspaper Asomiya Pratidin, in which above-mentioned defamatory news were published, is the highest circulating Assamese newspaper in the entire Northeast India and the respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4 have made imputations against respondent No. 1 in the press conference organized by them only with the sole purpose of damaging the reputation and image of the respondent No.1 for gaining undue political mileage in the elections which were to be held immediately thereafter. 18. He submits that the allegations levelled against him in the press conference as well as in the news item are false, frivolous, fabricated and concocted without any iota of truth and the same has been denied on oath by the respondent No.1. 19. 18. He submits that the allegations levelled against him in the press conference as well as in the news item are false, frivolous, fabricated and concocted without any iota of truth and the same has been denied on oath by the respondent No.1. 19. The learned senior counsel for the respondent No. 2 has submitted that the respondent No. 2, being a public servant, is required to submit all details of his property as well as the details of the property of his family members to the Government, which he has done. It is also submitted that even at the time of contesting Assembly Elections, the details of his property are submitted in form of affidavit before the Election Commission of India. He submits that such details are also stated in the Income Tax Return submitted by the respondent No. 1 before the Income Tax Department. He submits that the aforementioned affidavits/details submitted by the respondent No.1 before the relevant statutory authorities belies the defamatory imputations made by the appellants and respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 against the respondent No.1. 20. The learned senior counsel for the respondent No.1 submits that before publishing the aforementioned defamatory news items, the appellants did not take any care to verify the veracity of allegations made against the present respondent No. 1. He submits that the appellant should have verified the veracity of imputations made against the respondent No. 1 before publishing the same in their newspaper. However, as the sole purpose of publication of the news was to damage the reputation of the respondent No. 2 so that the political mileage is gained by his political adversaries, namely respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4, the defamatory news items were published against the respondent No.1 without any verification. He submits that all the imputations made against the respondent No. 2 has been categorically denied by the appellant in the plaint which is supported, in addition to a verification by an affidavit by the respondent No. 2. 21. The learned senior counsel for the respondent No.1 has also submitted that these aspects were taken into consideration by the Trial Court while granting ex parte ad interim injunction against the present appellants. 21. The learned senior counsel for the respondent No.1 has also submitted that these aspects were taken into consideration by the Trial Court while granting ex parte ad interim injunction against the present appellants. He submits that in the impugned order after considering the materials on record, the Trial Court came to a prima facie finding that the defamatory publications were made against the Respondent No. 2 without any authentic documents or any basis for the same. He submits that the Trial Court also took into consideration that unless an ad interim ex parte injunction is granted against the present appellants, it would have led to multiplicity of suit as there would not have any restraint in publishing successive news items on the subject by the appellants in the event of not granting an ad interim ex parte injunction. 22. The learned senior counsel for the respondent No.1 also submits that since the assembly elections were to be held very soon, the sole purpose of the publication of the news item mentioned hereinbefore was to defame the respondent No. 2 and damage his reputation so as to get a political mileage in the ensuing Assembly elections. He submits that since the timing of publication of defamatory news item is crucial in this case, this case is a case of exceptional nature where the news items published against the present respondent No.1 were malicious and palpably false and therefore, the Trial Court did no wrong in granting the ex parte ad interim injunction, that too for a limited period till the appearance of the other respondents and the appellants before the Trial Court. He submits that the golden principles necessary for grant of ex parte ad interim injunction were discussed by the Trial Court in Paragraph No. 10 and 11 of the impugned judgment. 23. The learned senior counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the ex parte ad interim injunction was granted by the Trial Court only for a limited period till the appearance of the other opposite parties and the case was fixed on 09.03.2026. He submits that it was open for the present appellants to appear before the Trial Court on that date and plead their case by filing written objection wherein they could have prayed for vacating the ex parte ad interim injunction. However, on the next date no such prayer was made. He submits that it was open for the present appellants to appear before the Trial Court on that date and plead their case by filing written objection wherein they could have prayed for vacating the ex parte ad interim injunction. However, on the next date no such prayer was made. Rather, the present appellants did not file any objection before the Trial Court and sought time for filing objection. He submits that the ex parte ad interim injunction granted against the opposite parties were extended by the Trial Court till next date i.e., on 29.04.2026 and thereafter, till 14.05.2026. 24. The learned senior counsel for the respondent further submits that since the Trial Court has cited reasons for granting ex parte ad interim injunction against the present appellant in the impugned order, same cannot be regarded as arbitrary or perverse and therefore, no interference in the impugned order is required by this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. He, therefore, prays for dismissing the instant appeal. 25. In response to the plea of maintainability raised by the learned senior counsel for the respondent No. 1, the learned senior counsel for the appellants has submitted that as regards the plea of not specifically mentioning the exact provision of Order 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in the cause title of the memo of appeal, he submits that same is a curable defect and even if it is not rectified, the Court can treat it as an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 (r) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. He submits that it is a well-settled principle of law that where the authority making an order has power conferred upon it by a statute to make an order made by it and the order is made without indicating the provision under which it is made, the order would be deemed to have been made under the provision enabling the making of it and as such, even if exact provision of law is not mentioned in the cause title of the memo of appeal, this Court has power to treat the same as an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 (r) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In support of his submission, he has cited the ruling of the Apex Court in the case of “ Pournami Oil Mils and Others Vs. In support of his submission, he has cited the ruling of the Apex Court in the case of “ Pournami Oil Mils and Others Vs. State of Kerela and Another ” reported in 1986 (SUPP.) SCC 728 26. As regards the contention that the memo of appeal does not contain any prayer, the learned senior counsel for the appellants submits that as regards what should be contained in the memo of appeal has been specifically provided in Order 41 Rule 1 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 that the memo of appeal shall set forth concisely under distinct heads the grounds of objection to the decree appealed from, there is no mention therein of mentioning any specific prayer portion in the memo of appeal and as such, he submits that even if no prayer has been made in the memo of appeal, the said appeal is not liable to be dismissed or rejected on that count. 27. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for both sides and have gone through the materials available on record. I have also gone through the rulings cited by the learned counsel for both sides in support of their respective submissions. 28. As regards the contention of the learned senior counsel for the respondent regarding mentioning of specific provision in the cause title of the memo of appeal under which the said appeal has been filed, the Rule 2 of Chapter IV of the Gauhati High Court Rules provides that in every application presented to the High Court, there should be stated immediately after the cause title, the section and the statute under which the application is made. In the instant case, though the appellants have stated that the present appeal has been filed under Order 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, it has been not specifically mentioned that the said appeal is under Order 43 Rule 1 (r) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 29. Though, the nomenclature of an application is really not material and grounds stated therein have to be seen, yet it cannot be said that a party shall be permitted to violate the procedural requirement of rules with impunity. 29. Though, the nomenclature of an application is really not material and grounds stated therein have to be seen, yet it cannot be said that a party shall be permitted to violate the procedural requirement of rules with impunity. There is a purpose in indicating the exact nomenclature in clear and precise manner as to under what provision of law an application or an appeal is filed, as it gives a clear notice to the adversary party so that it can prepare its defence, accordingly. However, in the instant case, considering the fact that the appellants have only failed to mention the specific sub- clause of Order 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in the memo of appeal, this Court is of considered opinion that the appellant should have been more cautious. However, said non- mentioning of the specific provision, in the considered opinion of this Court has not affected the root of the case as well as its merit and it is not a substantial breach either to reject the memo of appeal or to dismiss the appeal on that ground alone. 30. Similarly, as to what should be the contents of the memo of appeal has been specifically provided in Order 41 Rule 1 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Though, in case of plaints, the Order 7 Rule 1 (g) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 specifically provides that the relief which plaintiffs claim shall be mentioned in the plaint. However, no such requirement of mentioning the relief or prayer in the memo of appeal is there in Order 41 Rule 1 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It is always convenient for the Court to fathom as to what relief is sought for by the appellant in the appeal, if the prayer portion is specifically included in the memo of appeal. However, as there is no statutory requirement for mentioning the prayer or relief sought for in appeal in the memo of appeal, same may not be a ground for rejection of the memo of appeal under Order 41 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or for dismissing the appeal. 31. However, as there is no statutory requirement for mentioning the prayer or relief sought for in appeal in the memo of appeal, same may not be a ground for rejection of the memo of appeal under Order 41 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or for dismissing the appeal. 31. On perusal of the impugned order, it appears that the Trial Court, in paragraph No. 11 therein, has observed that the petitioner (respondent No.1 herein) has a prima facie case and balance of convenience in his favour and that the injury which he will suffer in the event of not granting of ad interim ex parte injunction would be irreparable. The Trial Court also came to conclusion that in the event a restraint order is not passed, there is every possibility of multiplicity of proceeding in respect of the subject matter of the suit. The Trial Court also came to the finding that the imputations made against the respondent No.1 are defamatory in nature and same are published without any authentic documents or proof in support of the allegations which are levelled against the respondent No.1. 32. It also appears that the ad interim ex parte injunction was granted during the period of service of notice to the opposite parties, i.e., till 09.03.2026. It also appears that on the said date, the aforesaid restraint order was extended on 09.03.2026, till 29.04.2026, and thereafter, it was extended till 14.05.2026, i.e., till tomorrow. It also appears that though, the present appellants had appeared before the Trial Court, they are yet to file any written objection in the Misc. (J) Case No. 156/2026. Neither they have prayed for vacation of ex parte ad interim injunction before the Trial Court. 33. It is a settled proposition of law that an Appellate Court, including this Court, will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the Court of first instance and substitute its own discretion, except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the Court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunction. 34. As regards what can be considered as a perverse order, the Apex Court, in the case of “ Associate Builders Vs. Delhi Development Authority ” reported in (2015) 3 SCC 49 has observed as follows: “32. 34. As regards what can be considered as a perverse order, the Apex Court, in the case of “ Associate Builders Vs. Delhi Development Authority ” reported in (2015) 3 SCC 49 has observed as follows: “32. A good working test of perversity is contained in two judgments. In Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons [1992 Supp (2) SCC 312] , it was held : (SCC p. 317, para 7) “7. … It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law.” In Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police [ (1999) 2 SCC 10 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 429] , it was held : (SCC p. 14, para 10) “10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with.” 35. Thus, from above, it appears that there is a broad distinction between decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. However, if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever, compendious it may be, the conclusion would not be treated as perverse and the finding would not be interfered with. 36. In the instant case, the Trial Court took into consideration the fact that the non-issuance of ex parte ad interim injunction may result into multiplicity of suits. It also took into consideration that the materials on record clearly indicates that the reputation of the respondent No.1 has been dented before the society due to the utterance made by the respondent Nos. It also took into consideration that the materials on record clearly indicates that the reputation of the respondent No.1 has been dented before the society due to the utterance made by the respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 as well as due to publication of the above-mentioned news items without any authentic basis for making such imputations. The Trial Court could have discussed the golden principles involved in granting of ex parte ad interim injunction more elaborately, however, the brevity of such discussion, in itself, would not make the impugned order perverse per se, justifying any interference by this Court at this stage. More so, also considering the discretionary nature of the interim relief granted to the respondent No.1 for a limited period and also considering the fact that the ex parte ad interim injunction is extended only till tomorrow, i.e., 14.05.2026, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned order at this stage. 37. Further, considering the fact that the matter is fixed before the Trial Court tomorrow, i. e., 14.05.2026, this Court is not inclined to delve upon the merits of the contentions raised by both the parties. As the matter is still pending before the Trial Court, any observation made by this Court on the merit of the case may have a bearing on the Trial Court during final consideration of the Misc. (J) Case No. 156/2026, which may cause pre-judice to one of the parties. As the aforesaid Misc. Case is fixed before the Trial Court tomorrow, i. e., 14.05.2026, the appellants may put forth their case before the Trial Court by filing written objection and may seek any relief, to which they are legally entitled to, before the said Court. 38. The Trial Court shall make all endeavours to dispose of the Misc. (J) Case No. 156/2026 as expeditiously as possible, after giving opportunity of being heard to both the sides. 39. This appeal is accordingly, disposed of.