JUDGMENT : DEVASHIS BARUAH, J. Heard Mr. D. Sahu, the learned counsel appearing on behalf ofthe petitioner. Mr. R.K.D. Choudhury, the learned Senior Counsel as well as the learned Dy.SGI assisted by Ms. N. Devi, the learned counsel appears on behalf of the respondent No. 1 and Mr. M. Chetia, the learned Government Advocate appears on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2 to 6. 2. The present writ petition has been filed challenging the action on the part of the respondents in rejecting the petitioner’s claim under the Central Capital Investment Subsidy Scheme, 2007 to which the petitioner claims entitlement. 3. The brief facts which led to the filing of the instant writ petition are that the Government of India had notified the North East Industrial and Investment Promotion Policy, 2007 dated 01.04.2007 (for short, “the Industrial Policy”). Pursuant to the said Industrial Policy, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India (Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion), issued a scheme for granting incentives towards capital investment known as the Central Capital Investment Subsidy Scheme (for short, “the CCIS Scheme”) dated 27.07.2007. The said scheme was given effect from 01.04.2007. 4. The petitioner being encouraged by the Industrial Policy and the incentives announced therein took steps for expansion of its industrial unit and went into commercial production of the expanded unit on 29.03.2017. 5. It is the case of the petitioner herein that to avail the benefits under the CCIS Scheme, various eligibility conditions were set out. In addition to that, for operationalising the CCIS Scheme, Operational Guidelines were issued on 07.05.2013. The said Operational Guidelines stipulated the conditions as well as the procedure for availing the benefits under the Scheme. For the purpose of the instant dispute, Clause (vii) of the Operational Guidelines is relevant, and the same is reproduced hereinunder: “(vii) The claims for subsidy under CCIS Scheme of NEIIPP, 2007 have to be submitted to the concerned DIC in the prescribed Application Forms within one year from the date of commencement of commercial production. Cases of delayed registration will be dealt as per the clarification provided vide DIPP letter No.10(5)/2008-DBA-II/NER dated 25th August, 2008 and letter No. 10/6/2008-DBA II/NER dated 15th March, 2012. Cases of delayed registration will be dealt as per the clarification provided vide DIPP letter No.10(5)/2008-DBA-II/NER dated 25th August, 2008 and letter No. 10/6/2008-DBA II/NER dated 15th March, 2012. In case of units which do not get themselves registered by 27.07.2007/21.09.2007 due to delayed notifications of the scheme and have subsequently got themselves registered latest by 31.12.2008, claims submitted by these units within one year of registration could be deemed admissible, if State Level Committee (SLC) deems the case fit for condoning the delay. Any other case for subsequent waiver will be dealt on case specific basis by DIPP after the SLC recommends such relaxation, subject to strict proof of commencement of operation/commercial production. In such cases, final decision rests with DIPP.” 6. From a perusal of the above-quoted Clause, it would be apparent that the claim for subsidy under the CCIS Scheme had to be submitted to the concerned DIC in the prescribed Application Forms “ within one year from the date of commencement of commercial production”. 7. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner went into commercial production on 29.03.2017. The petitioner filed the application seeking benefits under the CCIS Scheme on 29.03.2018. The concerned Respondent Authorities in the Minutes of the Meetings held on 06.04.2019, 10.10.2019 and 17.08.2022 rejected the petitioner’s claim for subsidy under the CCIS Scheme on the ground that the application was filed beyond the period of one year. It is under such circumstances, the petitioner being aggrieved, has approached this Court by filing the instant writ petition. 8. The record reveals that this Court vide an order dated 19.09.2022 issued notice. 9. The record further reveals that the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 have filed a joint affidavit-in-opposition wherein at paragraph Nos. 4 and 7 it was mentioned that the petitioner did not submit the application within one year from the date of commencement of commercial production of its expanded unit. It was stated at paragraph No. 13 of the said affidavit that the petitioner submittedthe claim application belatedly, i.e., on the 366th day from the date of commencement of commercial production of the expanded unit. 10. It was stated at paragraph No. 13 of the said affidavit that the petitioner submittedthe claim application belatedly, i.e., on the 366th day from the date of commencement of commercial production of the expanded unit. 10. The question which arises in the instant proceedings is as to whether the filing of the application by the petitioner seeking benefits under the CCIS Scheme was delayed by one day, inasmuch as it is an admitted fact that on 29.03.2017, the petitioner went into commercial production of its expanded unit and filed the application on 29.03.2018. 11. This Court has duly heard the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the parties and has given an anxious consideration to the materials on record. 12. The question, as to whether, the petitioner submitted the application belatedly has to be ascertained on the basis of the Operational Guidelines, more particularly, Clause (vii) which has already been quoted hereinabove. 13. From a perusal of Clause (vii) of the Operational Guidelines, it would transpire that the prescribed application is required to be filed “ within one year from the date of commencement of commercial production”. The question, therefore, arises as to what the above quoted phrase connotes. 14. This Court finds it pertinent to take note of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Haru Das Gupta Vs. State of West Bengal reported in (1972) 1 SCC 639 , wherein the Supreme Court was dealing with the question as to whether an order of detention was passed within a period of three months from the date of detention. The Supreme Court explained as to what the term “within” connotes at paragraph Nos. 4 and 5 of the said judgment. The said paragraphs, being relevant for the purpose of the instant proceedings, are reproduced hereinunder: “ 4. The question is when can the period of three months from the date of detention be said to have expired. When a period of time running from a given day or event to another day or event is prescribed by law or fixed by contract and the question arises whether the computation is to be made inclusively or exclusively of the first-mentioned or of the last-mentioned day, regard must be had to the context and to the purpose for which the computation has to be made. [Halsbury’s Laws of England, (3rd. Edn.) Vol. 37, p. 92]. [Halsbury’s Laws of England, (3rd. Edn.) Vol. 37, p. 92]. There is, however, a volume of authority in England showing that where a certain thing has to be done within a specified period, the day on which the cause of action arose is to be excluded from computation and the day on which such action is taken is to be included. As early as 1840, Parke, B, laid down this rule in Young v. Higgon. In Badcliffe v. Bartholomen Wills, J., relying on Williams v. Burgess and Hardy v. Ryle held that a complaint under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, filed on June 30, in respect of an act alleged to have been committed on May 30, was “within one calendar month after the cause of such complaint shall arise”. He held so on the principle that the day on which the cause for the complaint arose had to be excluded while computing the period within which under the Act the complaint had to be filed. In Williams v. Burgess, the statute directed warrants of attorney to be filed “within twenty-one days after their execution”, and it was held that a warrant executed on the 9th day of the month would be regarded as having been filed in proper time if filed on the 30th, the day of execution being one which had to be excluded. On the other hand, in a case where a settler by a settlement, dated May 13, 1892, conveyed real estate upto and to the use of the trustees upon trust thereinafter declared and it was thereby declared that they should stand possessed of the said premises during the term of twenty-one years from the date thereof upon trust to apply the rents and profits as therein mentioned and it was further declared that the trustees should at the expiration of the said term of twenty-one years sell the said premises and pursuant to the said trust for sale the trustees contracted to sell the real estate on June 20, 1913, it was held that the term of twenty-one years commenced from the midnight of May 12, 1892, and therefore, the trust was not void for remoteness on the ground of exceeding a term of twenty-one years from its creation. (See English v. Cliff) 5. (See English v. Cliff) 5. These decisions show that courts have drawn a distinction between a term created within which an act may be done and a time limited for the doing of an act. The rule is well-established that where a particular time is given from a certain date within which an act is to be done, the day on that date is to be excluded. (See Goldsmiths Company v. West Metropolitan Railway Company). This rule was followed in Cartwright v. Maccormack where the expression “fifteen days from the date of commencement of the policy” in a cover note issued by an insurance company was construed as excluding the first date and the cover note to commence at midnight of that day, and also in Marren v. Damson Bentley & Co. Ltd. a case for compensation for injuries received in the course of employment, where for purposes of computing the period of limitation the date of the accident, being the date of the cause of action, was excluded. (See also Stewart v. Chadman and In re North, Ex parte Wasluck) Thus, as a general rule the effect of defining a period from such a day until such a day within which an act is to be done is to exclude the first day and to include the last day. [See Halsbury’s Laws of England, (3rd Edn.). Vol. 37, pp. 92 and 95.] There is no reason why the aforesaid rule of construction followed consistently and for so long should not also be applied here.” 15. The above principle of law as laid down by the Supreme Court clearly shows that when a particular period is given from a certain day within which an act is to be done, the day on that date is to be excluded. The said principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Haru Das Gupta (supra) was followed by the Supreme Court in later judgments in the case of Saketh India Ltd. & Others Vs. India Securities Ltd. reported in (1999) 3 SCC 1 as well as in the case of Econ Antri Ltd. Vs. Rom Industries Ltd. & Another reported in (2014) 11 SCC 769 16. India Securities Ltd. reported in (1999) 3 SCC 1 as well as in the case of Econ Antri Ltd. Vs. Rom Industries Ltd. & Another reported in (2014) 11 SCC 769 16. This Court also finds it relevant to take note of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Tarun Prasad Chatterjee v. Dinanath Sharma reported in (2000) 8 SCC 649 wherein the Supreme Court was dealing with the limitation for filing an election petition in terms with Section 81(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The Supreme Court, while dealing with the said provision, referred to Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and observed that when a period is delimited by a Statute or a Rule which has both a beginning and an end, and the word “from” is used indicating the beginning, the opening day is to be excluded and the last day is to be excluded when the word “to” is used. It was also categorically observed that in order to exclude the first day of the period, the crucial thing to be noted is whether the period of limitation is delimited by a series of days or by a fixed period. It was observed that the said aspect was intended to obviate difficulties or inconvenience that may be caused to parties. Paragraph Nos. 12 and 14 of the said judgment, being relevant, are reproduced hereinunder: “ 12. Section 9 says that in any Central Act or regulation made after the commencement of the General Clauses Act, 1897, it shall be sufficient for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word “from”, and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any period of time, to use the word “to”. The principle is that when a period is delimited by statute or rule, which has both a beginning and an end and the word “from” is used indicating the beginning, the opening day is to be excluded and if the last day is to be included the word “to” is to be used. In order to exclude the first day of the period, the crucial thing to be noted is whether the period of limitation is delimited by a series of days or by any fixed period. In order to exclude the first day of the period, the crucial thing to be noted is whether the period of limitation is delimited by a series of days or by any fixed period. This is intended to obviate the difficulties or inconvenience that may be caused to some parties. For instance, if a policy of insurance has to be good for one day from 1st January, it might be valid only for a few hours after its execution and the party or the beneficiary in the insurance policy would not get reasonable time to lay claim, unless 1st January is excluded from the period of computation. 14. By Section 81(1), the legislation fixes the period for filing election petition and at the same time states that no elector or candidate shall file election petition before the date of election of the returned candidate and if there are more than one returned candidates at the election and dates of their election are different, the later of those two dates. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant contended that if the date of election of the candidate is excluded from computing the period of limitation of 45 days, the period of limitation would be extended by one day and, therefore, it is against the mandate of the statute. It was also contended that the filing of the application on the date of election of the returned candidate cannot be considered as a valid presentation of petition as envisaged in the section. We do not think that any such interpretation is possible by a conjoint reading of Section 81(1) of the RP Act, 1951 and Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The first day for the period of limitation is required to be excluded for the convenience of the parties and if the declaration of the result is delayed or is done late in the night, the candidate or elector would hardly get any time for presentation of the election petition. Law comes to the rescue of such parties to give full forty-five days’ period for filing the election petition. Nevertheless, any petition presented on the date of election of the returned candidate would be certainly within the period of limitation as it is a presentation on the date of election of the returned candidate.” 17. Law comes to the rescue of such parties to give full forty-five days’ period for filing the election petition. Nevertheless, any petition presented on the date of election of the returned candidate would be certainly within the period of limitation as it is a presentation on the date of election of the returned candidate.” 17. Taking into account the above principles, it is the opinion of this Court that in terms with Clause (vii) of the Operational Guidelines as quoted herein above, the Application Form had to be filed “within one year from the date of commencement of commercial production”, which would mean that the date of commencement of commercial production has to be excluded while computing the period of one year. 18. Accordingly, in the instant case as the date of commencement of commercial production was 29.03.2017, the period of one year would commence from 30.03.2017. Therefore, the petitioner having filed the application on 29.03.2018, this Court is of the opinion that the said application was filed within the period of one year from the date of commencement of commercial production of the petitioner’s expanded unit. 19. Considering the above, the instant writ petition stands disposed of with the following observations and directions: (i) The application filed by the petitioner on 29.03.2018 was well within the period prescribed in Clause (vii) of the General Operational Guidelines for Registration of Industrial Units and Procedure for Handling Subsidy Claims under the Central Capital Investment Subsidy (CCIS) Scheme of NEIIPP, 2007. (ii) The impugned Minutes of the Meetings dated 06.04.2019; 10.10.2019 and 17.08.2022 insofar as the same relate to the petitioner are interfered with. (iii) The Respondent Authorities, more particularly the Principal Secretary, Industry and Commerce Department, Government of Assam, as well as the respondent No. 6, are directed to consider the application filed by the petitioner on29.03.2018 claiming benefits under the CCIS Scheme. (iv) This Court has not decided as to whether the petitioner is entitled to the said benefits under the CCIS Scheme. The same shall depend upon the necessary verification to be carried out by the concerned Respondent Authorities. (iv) This Court has not decided as to whether the petitioner is entitled to the said benefits under the CCIS Scheme. The same shall depend upon the necessary verification to be carried out by the concerned Respondent Authorities. However, for the sake of clarity, it is observed and directed that the application filed by the petitioner was well within the period prescribed in Clause (vii) of the General Operational Guidelines for Registration of Industrial Units and Procedure for Handling Subsidy Claims under the Central Capital Investment Subsidy (CCIS) Scheme of NEIIPP, 2007. (v) The exercise directed hereinabove to be conducted by the respondents be completed preferably within a period of 6 (six) months from the date on which a certified copy of the instant judgment is served upon the respondent No. 2.