JUDGMENT : ANJAN MONI KALITA, J. Heard Mr. P. K. Tiwari, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. J. Tsering Kee, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Ms. T. Jini, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, representing the State of Arunachal Pradesh and Mr. H. Lampu, learned counsel, appearing for the respondent no. 2. 2. The instant petition, under Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023, has been filed by the petitioner, praying for quashing and setting aside of the FIR dated 25.02.2026, in connection with Seijosa P.S. Case No. 02/2026, registered under Section 329 (2) of BNS, 2023. 3. An FIR was lodged on 12.02.2026, before Seijosa Police Station, Pakke Kessang District, by the petitioner along with other Forest Officials, alleging, inter alia that on 11.02.2026, while proceeding towards NEC road, Seijosa, on the basis of credible an information regarding illegal smuggling of timber, the petitioner, accompanied by her PSO, the driver noticed A- grade bamboo and wooden planks lying at an under-construction building near the ADC office, Seijosa; that on enquiry, workers present at the site failed to disclose the source of the timber and bamboo; that the petitioner informed the RFO, Seijosa Ms. Mopin Ete and collected the forest produced lying in the site; that in the meantime, the petitioner received a call from the DFO, Pakke Tiger Reserve, stating that Shri Takam Nabam had approached him and claimed ownership of the building and requested the materials not to be taken; that aforesaid Takam Nabam was informed that removal of bamboo from Reserved Forest without payment of royalty is impermissible and removal of timber from Reserved Forest is a punishable offence under Assam Forest Regulation, 1891; that he agreed to pay the royalty to the Government in due course and thus, the petitioner and her team left the forest produces at the location; that thereafter, when the petitioner proceeded to continue her official duty towards NEC road to act upon the input of illegal timber removal, 4-5 vehicles, led by Shri Patroce Nabam and Shri Jairam Nabam intercepted their vehicle and wrongfully restrained the petitioner and her team; that a mob of about 30-50 persons gathered and allegedly assaulted the petitioner and her staff; that the PSO was attacked and his mobile phone was snatched while recording the incident; that Smt. Yari Nabam and others also allegedly assaulted the petitioner and her team and the vehicle keys were forcibly taken; that due to obstruction and assault, the petitioner was prevented from proceeding to NEC road to discharge her official duty. In view of the aforesaid, having no other alternative, the petitioner lodged an FIR before Seijosa police station. 4. On receipt of the FIR dated 12.02.2026, Seijosa P.S. Case No. 01/2026, under Section 126(2)/74/132/189(2)/324(3) and 351(2) of the BNS, 2023, was registered. 5. Subsequent to the registration of the said FIR, by the petitioner, a counter FIR has been filed in the Seijosa P.S. at the instance of Smt. Yari Nabam, against the petitioner and other forest officials in respect of the same incident dated 11.02.2026. The FIR was registered under Section 329(2) of BNS, 2023, against the petitioner as one of the accused persons on 25.02.2026 after an enquiry by one ASI of Seijosa Police Station. 6. The FIR was registered under Section 329(2) of BNS, 2023, against the petitioner as one of the accused persons on 25.02.2026 after an enquiry by one ASI of Seijosa Police Station. 6. The aforesaid FIR was filed alleging that the complainant Smt. Yari Nabam, a resident of A-1 village, Seijosa, is the owner of the plot of land situated in front of the ADC office, Seijosa; that the said plot of land has been in her continuous possession for the last 35 years; that she was constructing a house at the site using bamboo sourced from local groves and wooden planks; that on 11.02.2026, at about 10.30 AM, during her absence, Suman Beniwal (DFO, Khellong Division) and Mopin Ete (RFO, Seijosa Range), accompanied by armed forest personnel, arrived at her site in a forest vehicle and a forest truck; that without providing any prior notice, search warrant, or legal authorization, the accused persons entered her private property and began dismantling the standing structure using heavy machinery and tools; that her labourers panicking at the site, informed her of the demolition via telephone; that on being so informed, she alerted her relatives and a large group of villagers soon gathered at the site to stop the illegal activities; that when the villagers requested the officials to produce a legal order or a show-cause notice to justify their actions, the accused persons failed to provide any documentation; that meanwhile, being informed by the villagers, local police eventually arrived, assessed the situation and prevented further escalation; that during confrontation, the forest staff members identified as L. Lapung and Shri P. Wangpang physically assaulted her and inappropriately touched her body with the intent to outrage her modesty; that the accused persons, acting as a group of more than five persons, forcibly dismantled her structure and loaded the construction materials valued at approximately Rs. 2,50,000/- onto their truck; that the aforesaid was done without any seizure memo or any legal process, which constitutes theft and dacoity; that therefore, both the parties in the presence of the Officer In-charge of Seijosa Police Station, after brief discussion, agreed to resolve the disputes amicably and accordingly, a meeting was held later that day under the Chairmanship of the ADC, Seijosa. However, the matter remained unresolved, as the DFO, i.e., the petitioner, left the meeting abruptly, showing disrespect to the ADC Seijosa; that on 12.02.2026, the petitioner herself called for settlement on that later on, she came to know in the evening that the petitioner 12.02.2026 at DFO’s transit office and the issues were resolved; had filed a false FIR against her and five others to cover up her own illegal acts. 7. By filing the aforesaid FIR against the petitioner and others, the aforesaid complainant prayed for investigation into the matter under Sections 329/61/198/333 and Section 310 (4)(5) of the BNS. 8. On receipt of the FIR, an enquiry was conducted by one ASI of Seijosa P.S. and an enquiry report dated 25.02.2026 was submitted before the Officer In-charge P.S., Seijosa. Acting upon the aforesaid enquiry report, Seijosa P.S. Case No. 02/2026 was registered on 25.02.2026, under Section 329(2) of the BNS, 2023, naming the petitioner and another forest official as accused in respect to the aforesaid incident dated 11.02.2026. 9. It is the case of the petitioner that a bare perusal of the FIR lodged by the complainant, Smt. Yari Nabam, reveals that the entire allegation arises out of official field action undertaken by the petitioner and other forest officials on 11.02.2026, while they were on patrolling duty on receipt of certain specific information regarding illegal extraction and utilization of forest produces. It is further the case of the petitioner that the FIR acknowledges that the petitioner being the DFO arrived at the site, accompanied by other forest staffs in an official vehicle and removed certain wooden planks and green bamboo allegedly used in the under-construction structure. Therefore, there is no allegation of any personal animus, private dispute or independent criminal design with mens rea to commit the offences as alleged in the FIR dated 25.02.2026 filed by the complainant. The complaint actually relates to the acts performed during the discharge of official functions and therefore, do not constitute any alleged offences as mentioned in the FIR dated 25.02.2026. Being so, it is the contention of the petitioner that the FIR has been falsely filed by the complainant alleging certain non-applicable sections which cannot be made out in the instant case and therefore, the FIR is an abuse of the process of law and therefore, the same is liable to be set aside and quashed. 10. Mr. Being so, it is the contention of the petitioner that the FIR has been falsely filed by the complainant alleging certain non-applicable sections which cannot be made out in the instant case and therefore, the FIR is an abuse of the process of law and therefore, the same is liable to be set aside and quashed. 10. Mr. P. K. Tiwari, learned Senior Counsel, submits that the impugned FIR is liable to be quashed as it does not, even if taken y, discloses the commission of any offence of the petitioner. He submits that the at it’s face value and accepted in it’s entiret basic ingredients necessary to attract section 329 of BNS, 2023, are conspicuously absent from the allegations. He submits that criminal trespass under Section 329 of BNS mandates entry with a specific criminal intent, namely, to commit an offence or intimidate, insult or annoy the person in possession. Since the FIR has not alleged any such intention at the inception of the entry of the petitioner and in absence of the indispensable element of mens rea, the panel provision, i.e., Section 329 of BNS, 2023, is not attracted in the instant case. He submits that the action complained by the complainant are directly or reasonably connected with discharge of statutory functions under Assam Forest Regulation, 1891 and any act done under the lawful authority cannot constitute the offence of criminal trespass in absence of any independent criminal intent. He submits that under Regulation 49 of the Assam Forest Regulation, 1891, a Forest Officer is empowered to seize forest produce and materials where there exist reasons to believe that a forest offence has been committed. He further submits that under Section 60 of the aforesaid regulation, forest officials are vested with powers to act without warrant where there is a reasonable suspicion of involvement in a forest offence. Therefore, he submits that action taken by the petitioner as alleged in the FIR, thus, in fact, carried out by the petitioner under the statutory authority and constitutes an act performed in discharge of official duty. Therefore, the allegation of criminal trespass, on the face of it, is not maintainable against the petitioner, as the petitioner has acted under the statutory authority which has been provided to the petitioner under the aforesaid Assam Forest Regulation, 1891. Therefore, the allegation of criminal trespass, on the face of it, is not maintainable against the petitioner, as the petitioner has acted under the statutory authority which has been provided to the petitioner under the aforesaid Assam Forest Regulation, 1891. He further submits that the petitioner entered the site, strictly in his official capacity as the DFO and on seeing certain forest produces being used and being suspected without any authority, the petitioner had entered the site of the complainant and did the needful in her official capacity. Since there was no criminal intent on behalf of the petitioner to do any illegal act, Section 329 of the BNS, 2023 cannot be made applicable against the petitioner. 11. The learned Senior Counsel further submits that the facts narrated in the impugned FIR and the enquiry report, attract the protection of the general exceptions under Section 14, 17 and 19 of the BNS, 2023, in as much as, the petitioner was acting in good faith in the course of official duty with the object of preventing suspected illegal use or transportation of forest produce. Therefore, no mens rea being involved on the part of the petitioner in the instant case, the allegation of illegal trespass cannot be made out in the instant case. He submits that the general exception is not merely a matter of defence during the trial but can be considered at the threshold where the admitted and undisputed facts clearly attract such protection. He submits that when the foundational facts necessary to invoke a penal provision itself are absent and the materials on record, demonstrate good faith exercise of statutory duty, continuation of investigation would amount to travesty of justice. He submits that in the instant case, unmistakably discloses an official act done under the authority of statute and in discharge of statutory allegation, thereby, attracting the statutory shield of Chapter-III of the BNS, 2023. He submits that it is a cardinal principle of criminal law that prosecution cannot be permitted to proceed unless the uncontroverted allegations, taken at the face value, disclose the essential ingredients of the alleged offence. He submits that the panel statutes must be strictly construed and criminal liability cannot be inferred from vague, sweeping or generalized assertions. He submits that it is a cardinal principle of criminal law that prosecution cannot be permitted to proceed unless the uncontroverted allegations, taken at the face value, disclose the essential ingredients of the alleged offence. He submits that the panel statutes must be strictly construed and criminal liability cannot be inferred from vague, sweeping or generalized assertions. He submits that in the instant case, the entire edifice of accusation against the petitioner rests solely upon her presence at the site in her official capacity as DFO, while on a lawful patrolling duty. He submits that the FIR is conspicuously silent as to any specific overt act attributable to the petitioner demonstrating criminal intent, dishonest motive, or intention to intimidate, insult, or annoy the informant. He submits that if there is any procedural irregularity also, the same does not ipso facto attract criminal culpability in the absence of mens rea. He submits that the criminal process cannot be invoked to criminalize bona fide discharge of statutory functions, nor can it be used as a retaliatory mechanism against a public servant acting under a lawful authority. In view of the aforesaid, he submits that continuance of the investigation in such circumstances would amount to a patent abuse of the process of law and therefore, the instant FIR being filed as a retaliatory tactic to harass the petitioner who was doing an official duty, should be set aside at the threshold only to avoid abuse of the process of law. 12. To support his contention that there was no mens rea involved in the instant case and there was no criminal intent at the very inception or entry of the petitioner into the site of the complainant, the Senior Counsel has referred to the case of Mohammed Biloo Vs. Kritinath Gogoi reported in 1986 1 GauLR 141 , wherein the Gauhati High Court, while discussing the provision of Section 76 and 79 of the IPC, had Hon’ble come to a finding and held that mens rea is an essential ingredient of a criminal offence and the law on the subject is clearly well settled. In the facts of that case, it was held that under Sections 379/426 IPC, mens rea on the part of the accused person would mean intention to steal and intention to cause wrongful loss or damage to the complainant and both of them are absent in the instant case. In the facts of that case, it was held that under Sections 379/426 IPC, mens rea on the part of the accused person would mean intention to steal and intention to cause wrongful loss or damage to the complainant and both of them are absent in the instant case. Therefore, the Gauhati High Court held that mens rea which is an essential ingredient in Hon’ble crime is absent from the aforesaid case to criminalize the act. In support of his reference to the aforesaid case, he submits that in the instant case also though there was an entry of the petitioner into the site of the complainant, there was no mens rea involved in the case to attract panel provision of Section 329(2) of BNS. 13. The learned Senior Counsel, to buttress his submissions that the allegations as narrated in the FIR do not make out any offence under Section 329(2) of BNS and the same being inherently improbable, there is no ground or proceeding against the petitioner, referred to the case State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors. reported in 1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 335 . He specifically referred to sub-paragraph (5) & (6) of Paragraph- 102 of the aforesaid case, which are being relevant, extracted herein below: - “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we have given the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelized and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. * * * * * * * * (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. * * * * * * * * (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.” 14. Supreme Court, the learned Senior Counsel submits that in the In view of the aforesaid observations of the Hon’ble instant case, since there is no offence made out from a simple reading of the impugned FIR as well as the enquiry report, there is no reason for proceeding against the petitioner in the instant case. He further added that the above referred provisions of Assam Forest Regulation, 1891, specifically gives authority to a Forest Officer, in the instant case, the DFO to enquire and seize if there is any suspicion of any alleged commission of any offence under the aforesaid Regulation, 1891. He submits that since there is no mens rea or criminal intent involved in the instant case, as apparent from the facts of the case, there is no offence committed by the petitioner in the instant case and therefore, the impugned FIR be set aside and quashed. He submits that Regulation 70 of the aforesaid Regulation of 1891 provides that no suit or criminal prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against any public servant or anything done in good faith or committed to be done likewise under these Regulations or the Rules or Orders made there into. Therefore, in the instant case, since the allegations made in the FIR were carried out by the petitioner in good faith in the capacity of public servant being the DFO, the petitioner is protected under Regulation 70 of the aforesaid Regulation of 1891. Therefore, he submits that being so protected, the impugned FIR is liable to be set aside and quashed on that ground alone. 15. Ms. T. Jini, learned Addl. Therefore, he submits that being so protected, the impugned FIR is liable to be set aside and quashed on that ground alone. 15. Ms. T. Jini, learned Addl. P.P., on the other hand, fairly submits that apparently, the petitioner had entered the premises of the complainant without any intention of committing any offence under criminal trespass or house trespass. The facts revealed that the action was carried out by the petitioner under good faith that the petitioner was having the authority to carry out such seizure on being in suspicion that the bamboo and the wooden planks used were procured without payment of any royalties or in terms of the said Regulation of 1891. She further submits that since the Regulation, 1891, provides protection to such Forest Officer while on duty under Regulation 70 of the aforesaid Regulation, 1891, the offence as alleged in the FIR cannot said to have been committed by the petitioner. 16. Mr. H. Lampu, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent no. 2, the complainant submits that in the instant case, the impugned FIR clearly makes out a prima facie case against the petitioner and therefore, the instant case is not a case wherein this Court should quash the FIR under the power of Section 528 of the BNSS. He submits that the petitioner though, was on an official duty, without any authority, dismantled the under-construction house of the complainant with the help of the official staff. He submits that the bamboo and timbers used in the construction of the house of the complainant, were procured legally and there is no material to show that those materials were illegally procured and against the provisions of the said Regulation of 1891. He submits that the enquiry report submitted in the instant case by the ASI, Seijosa Police Station, also clearly reveals that there is reasonable ground to proceed for further legal action against the DFO as per the procedure, under Section 329(2) BNS or any other legal Section. It was revealed that the petitioner had given an order to the staff for removal of those bamboo and wooden planks without following the provisions laid down under Section 152 of the BNSS. It was revealed that the petitioner had given an order to the staff for removal of those bamboo and wooden planks without following the provisions laid down under Section 152 of the BNSS. Therefore, he submits that since a case has been made out in terms of the allegations in the FIR as well as in the enquiry report, the instant petition, praying for quashing of the impugned FIR dated 25.02.2026 is liable to be dismissed. 17. This Court has heard the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties. 18. It may be relevant herein to consider the provisions of Assam Forest Regulation, 1891. The following provisions of the said Regulation of 1891 being relevant are extracted herein below: - “ 3. (1) “Forest Officer” means any person appointed by name or as holding an office by or under the orders of the (State) Government to be a Conservator, Deputy Conservator, Assistant Conservator, Sub-Assistant Conservator, Forest Ranger, Forester or Forest Guard, or to discharge any function of a Forest Officer under this Regulation or any rule thereunder; (2) “tree” includes palms, bamboos, stumps, brush-wood and canes; (3) "Timber" means trees when they have fallen or have been felled or all wood, whether cut out or fashioned or hollowed out for any purpose or not and include trees when cut into prices or sizes or peeled out or sliced out (veneer) for manufacturing of plyboard, block board or any other purposed or not. (4) "Forest produce" includes – (a) the following, whether found in or brought from, Forest or not, that is to say - timber, charcoal, caoutchouc, catechu, wood oil, resin natural varnish, bark, lac, myrabolams, and rhinoceros horns, and rhinoceros horns and (b) the following when found in, or brought from, a Forest that is to say- (i) trees and leaves and fruits and all other parts or produce, not hereinbefore mentioned, of trees, (ii) plants not being trees, including grass creepers, reeds and moss, and all parts of produce of such plants. (iii) Wild animals and skin (tusk and horns, other than rhinoceros horns), bones, silk, cocoons, honey and wax and all other parts or produce of animals, and (iv) Peat, surface-oil, rock and minerals (including lime stone, laterite, mineral oils and all products of mines or quarries); (5) "Forest offence" means an offence punishable under this regulation or any rule thereunder; 43. (1) Timber falling under any of the following description namely: (a) timber found adrift, breached, stranded or sunk, (b) timber bearing marks which have not been registered under rules made under Section 40, (c) timber which has been supermarked, or on which marks have been obliterated, altered or defaced by fire of otherwise, and (d) in such area as the (State) Government directs, all unmarked timber, shall be deemed to be the property of the state Government unless and until any person established his right thereto as provided in their chapter. 49. (1) When there is reason to believe that a forest offence has been a committed in respect of any forest produce, such produce together with all tolls, boats, motorised boats, vessels, cattle, carts, rafts, machineries, vehicles, trucks, ropes, chains or any other implements, articles or material used in the commission of such offence may be seized by any Forest Officer not below the rank of Forester or any Police Officer not below the rank of Sub Inspector of Police. 69. All Forest Officers shall be deemed to be public servants within the meaning of the Indian penal code. 70. No suit or criminal prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against any public servant or anything done in good faith or omitted to be done likewise under these Regulations or the rules or orders made thereunder.” 19. A careful reading of the aforesaid Regulations provide that the petitioner being a DFO is a Forest Officer under the definition of Regulation 3(1). It is also seen from the above that a Forest Officer has been given sufficient powers under the aforesaid Regulation, 1891, to enquire about forest produce, if they are found to be used or stranded in a place. A Forest Officer has been given the power under the aforesaid Regulation to seize the forest produce if there is sufficient suspicion that a forest offence has been committed in respect of any forest produce. It is also seen that forest officials being a public servant, if the Forest Officer does certain acts or omits from doing certain act done in good faith, the Forest Officer is protected under Regulation 70 of the aforesaid Regulation, 1891. 20. Be that as it may, from the facts of the case, it is seen that an allegation of offence under Section 329(2) has been made against the petitioner. 20. Be that as it may, from the facts of the case, it is seen that an allegation of offence under Section 329(2) has been made against the petitioner. Section 329 of BNS, 2023, relates to criminal trespass and house trespass. Section 329 being relevant in the instant case is extracted herein below: - “Criminal trespass and house -trespass. — (1) Whoever enters into or upon property in the possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property or having lawfully entered into or upon such property, unlawfully remains there with intent thereby to intimidate, insult or annoy any such person or with intent to commit an offence is said to commit criminal trespass. (2) Whoever commits criminal trespass by entering into or remaining in any building, tent or vessel used as a human dwelling or any building used as a place for worship, or as a place for the custody of property, is said to commit house-trespass. (3) Whoever commits criminal trespass shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both. (4) Whoever commits house-trespass shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both.” 21. Having regard to the aforesaid provisions contained in Section 329, it appears that in order to make out a case against the petitioner for the offence under Section 329, materials regarding the intent of the accused person to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property is required to be present. It is also seen that an accused having lawfully entered into or upon such property, unlawfully remains there with the intent thereby to intimidate, insult or annoy any such person with intent to commit an offence has to be there. 22. As for Section 329(2) of the BNS, it is clear that the element of criminal trespass has to be there for commission of an offence of house trespass as well. Therefore, in both house trespass and criminal trespass, the intent to commit an offence or intimidate, insult or annoy in possession of such property has to be grave. 22. As for Section 329(2) of the BNS, it is clear that the element of criminal trespass has to be there for commission of an offence of house trespass as well. Therefore, in both house trespass and criminal trespass, the intent to commit an offence or intimidate, insult or annoy in possession of such property has to be grave. Criminal trespass being an essential element in house trespass, the same has to be present for commission of an offence under house trespass. 23. In the instant case, from the facts as revealed, shows that the petitioner along with the other officers were, in fact, going for some checking after receipt of some information about illegal activities in NEC road and while proceeding to NEC road, the team, including the petitioner, noticed the half built house of the informant wherein the petitioner saw certain forest produces being used. The team supposedly enquired about those forest produce, some of which were lying beside the house and some were being used for some construction activities, no satisfactory reply was received from the workers working there. Therefore, the petitioner instructed the team members to keep aside those forest produces beside the road. Therefore, from the aforesaid facts, it cannot be reasonably made out that any offence of any criminal trespass and house trespass, prima facie, has been committed by the petitioner along with the team. From the background of the aforesaid facts, it is seen that the Regulation, 1891, provides sufficient powers to the Forest Officers to enquire about the forest produces, which were suspected to be used unauthorisedly. The enquiry report submitted by the Enquiry Officer, Seijosa P.S. dated 25.02.2026, observed that the petitioner and her staff had violated the procedure of Section 152 of the BNSS, and how the guidelines of 2024 had been violated or relevant in the Supreme Court’s guidelines 2024 without detailing instant case. 24. The enquiry report submitted by the Enquiry Officer, Seijosa P.S. dated 25.02.2026, observed that the petitioner and her staff had violated the procedure of Section 152 of the BNSS, and how the guidelines of 2024 had been violated or relevant in the Supreme Court’s guidelines 2024 without detailing instant case. 24. As far as Section 152 of BNSS is concerned, the same is about conditional order for removal of nuisance which empowers the concerned District Magistrate or a Sub- Divisional Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government, on receipt of a report of a police officer or other information and on taking evidence, can remove certain obstruction or nuisance, if so required from any public place or from any way, river or channel which is or may be lawfully used by the public. 25. Section 152 of BNSS, in the considered view of this Court, is not relevant in the facts of the instant case and therefore, the same is not considered. 26. From the above discussions, in the instant case, the facts and the allegations alleged in the FIR as well as in the enquiry report does not, prima facie, made out any case under Section 329(2) of the BNS. The Court has also considered the relevant provisions of the Assam Forest Regulation, 1891, which covers the powers and allows the activities of a Forest Officer also as seen in the instant case. It is also seen that from the facts narrated, no criminal intent or pre-meditation from the side of the petitioner could be found present in the instant case. 27. Having coming to the aforesaid conclusion, this Court is of the considered opinion that continuation of the proceeding, arising out of Seijosa P.S. Case No. 02/2026, registered on 25.02.2026 under Section 329(2) of BNS, 2023, against the petitioner shall be an abuse of the process of the Court and such abuse cannot be allowed to go on. This Court is of the opinion that the allegations made in the FIR are absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which a prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused/petitioner and others. 28. This Court is of the opinion that the allegations made in the FIR are absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which a prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused/petitioner and others. 28. Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) , this Court is of the Taking into the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme considered opinion that the instant case is squarely covered by the ratio laid down case of the aforesaid Bhajan Lal (supra) and therefore, the by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the instant criminal petition is allowed by setting aside and quashing the FIR dated 25.02.2026, registered as Seijosa P.S. Case No. 02/2026, under Section 329 (2) of the BNS, 2023. 29. In terms of the aforesaid direction, the instant criminal petition is disposed of as allowed. 30 . Case Diary is to be sent back immediately.