2026:HHC:19450 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 53 of 2017 Reserved on: 28.4.2026 Date of Decision: 25.5.2026. Bimal Sharma ...Petitioner Versus The Mandi Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd. & anr. ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr Hitesh Bali, Advocate, vice Mr Surender Verma, Advocate. For Respondent No.1 : Mr G.R. Palsra, Advocate. For Respondent No.2/State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 7.11.2015, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction dated 9.1.2014 and order of sentence dated 10.1.2014, passed by learned Special Judicial Magistrate, Mandi, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (The parties shall 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:19450 hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that a complaint was filed before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act). It was asserted that the complainant is a co-operative Society duly registered under the H.P. Co-operative Societies Act. It is carrying out the banking business. The complainant had advanced a loan to the accused. The accused failed to repay the amount, and an amount of ₹2,78,482.55, including interest at the rate of 16.5% up to 28.2.2011, was outstanding against the accused. The accused issued a cheque drawn on Oriental Bank of Commerce to discharge his liability. The complainant deposited the cheque before the Bank, but it was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’. The complainant sent a legal notice to the accused, but it was returned with an endorsement ‘refused’, which is a deemed service. The accused failed to pay the amount despite the deemed service of the notice. Hence, the complaint was filed before the learned Trial Court for taking action against the accused as per the law. 3 2026:HHC:19450 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The complainant examined Harvilas Behal (CW1), Prakash Singh Chandel (CW2) and Karam Chand (CW3) to prove its complaint. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.PC denied the complainant’s case in its entirety. He asserted that witnesses had deposed falsely against him and that he was innocent. He examined himself (DW1). 5. The learned Trial Court held that the accused had admitted the issuance of the cheque in the complainant’s favour. He claimed that he had returned the amount to the complainant. However, he had failed to prove this defence. The cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’. A notice was sent to the correct address and was returned with an endorsement ‘refused’, which is a deemed service. All the ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act were duly satisfied. Hence, the learned 4 2026:HHC:19450 Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for six months and pay a compensation of ₹50,000/- to the complainant. 6. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Mandi HP (learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused had issued a cheque to the complainant. The plea taken by the accused that he had returned the amount to the complainant was not proved. The cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’, and the accused had failed to pay the amount despite the deemed service of the notice. All the ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act were duly satisfied. Learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. Learned Trial Court had imposed an adequate sentence, and no interference was required with the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. 5 2026:HHC:19450 7. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. The complainant had failed to prove the existence of consideration and the debt/liability. The statement of the accused was wrongly rejected by the learned Courts below. An excessive sentence was imposed upon the accused. Hence, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Hitesh Bali, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr G.R. Palsra, learned counsel for respondent No.1 and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent No.2-State. 9. Mr Hitesh Bali, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. The plea taken by the accused that he had repaid the amount to the complainant was duly proved on record on the balance of probability, and the learned Courts below erred in rejecting this plea. The necessary 6 2026:HHC:19450 requirement of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, that the cheque was issued in discharge of the debt/liability, was missing. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and orders passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 10. Mr G.R. Palsra, learned counsel for respondent No.1/complainant submitted that the accused admitted his signature on the cheque and learned Courts below were justified in drawing the presumption that the cheque was issued for consideration to discharge the debt/liability. The accused had failed to rebut the presumption attached to the cheque, and the learned Courts below had rightly held that the cheque was issued for consideration to discharge the debt/liability. The cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’, and the notice was deemed to be served upon the accused. All the ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act were satisfied. Both the learned Courts below have concurrently held the accused to be guilty, and this Court should not interfere with the concurrent finding of facts while deciding the present revision petition. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 7 2026:HHC:19450 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed on page 207: - “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error that is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 8 2026:HHC:19450 13. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: “14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. 15.It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986, where the scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are 9 2026:HHC:19450 merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.” 14. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169: “12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) 5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other 10 2026:HHC:19450 words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise amount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional 11 2026:HHC:19450 jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” 15. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205: “16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.” 16. This position was reiterated in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed: “27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of 12 2026:HHC:19450 perversity, upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir Singh(supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. 28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court. 17. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 18. The accused Vimal Kishore (DW1) stated that he had taken a loan of ₹50,000/- in his name and ₹25,000/- in the name of his wife from the complainant Bank. He was regularly paying the instalments. He had received a notice regarding the demand of ₹72,457/- on 4.1.2011. He had handed over a cheque of ₹50,000/- to the bank as a one-time settlement (Mark D1). The Bank had also filed a civil suit for the recovery of the amount. He had paid an amount of ₹50,000/- to the complainant. He admitted in his cross-examination that the amount was being recovered as arrears of land revenue. He 13 2026:HHC:19450 admitted that the cheque (Ex.CW1/C) was issued by him towards a one-time settlement. 19. The statement of the accused shows that he has not disputed the taking of the loan and his liability to pay ₹50,000/-. He stated that he had issued the cheque of ₹ 50,000/- as a one- time settlement under the terms of the letter (Mark D1). Therefore, both the learned Courts below had rightly concluded that the cheque was issued by the accused towards the discharge of his liability. 20. Harvilas Behal (CW1) stated that the complainant had deposited the cheque before the Bank, but it was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’. His statement is duly corroborated by the memo of dishonour (Ex.CW1/D) in which the reason for dishonour has been mentioned as ‘insufficient funds’. The accused Vimal Kishore (DW1) admitted in his cross- examination that an amount of ₹1400/- was available in his account on 3.1.2011. The memo of dishonour mentions the date of dishonour as 16.2.2011. The statement of the accused corroborates the contents of the memo (Ex.CW1/D) that the cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘insufficient 14 2026:HHC:19450 funds’. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mandvi Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Nimesh B. Thakore, (2010) 3 SCC 83: (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 625: (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1: 2010 SCC OnLine SC 155 that the memo issued by the Bank is presumed to be correct and the burden is upon the accused to rebut the presumption. It was observed at page 95: 24. Section 146, making a major departure from the principles of the Evidence Act, provides that the bank's slip or memo with the official mark showing that the cheque was dishonoured would, by itself, give rise to the presumption of dishonour of the cheque, unless and until that fact was disproved. Section 147 makes the offences punishable under the Act compoundable. 21. In the present case, the accused admitted that he had ₹1400/- in his account, which was insufficient to honour the cheque of ₹50,000/-. Therefore, it was duly proved that the cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’. 22. Harvilas Behal (CW1) stated that the Bank had issued a notice (Ex.CW1/E) to the accused asking him to pay the money within 15 days of receipt. This notice was sent through registered letter, which was returned with an endorsement of ‘refused’. His statement is corroborated by the registered envelope (Ex.CW1/G), which bears an endorsement of ‘refused’. 15 2026:HHC:19450 It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in C.C. Allavi Haji vs. Pala Pelly Mohd. 2007(6) SCC 555, that when a notice is returned with an endorsement ‘refused’, it is deemed to be served. It was observed: “8. Since in Bhaskaran's case (supra), the notice issued in terms of Clause (b) had been returned unclaimed and not as refused, the Court, posed the question: "Will there be any significant difference between the two so far as the presumption of service is concerned?" It was observed that though Section 138 of the Act does not require that the notice should be given only by "post", yet in a case where the sender has dispatched the notice by post with the correct address written on it, the principle incorporated in Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (for short 'G.C. Act') could profitably be imported in such a case. It was held that in this situation service of notice is deemed to have been effected on the sendee unless he proves that it was not really served and that he was not responsible for such non-service.” 23. A similar view was taken in Krishna Swaroop Agarwal v. Arvind Kumar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1458, wherein it was observed: “13. Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1887, deals with service by post: “27. Meaning of Service by post.-Where any [Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorizes or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression “serve” or either of the expressions “give” or “send” or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be 16 2026:HHC:19450 effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document, and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post”. 14. The concept of deemed service has been discussed by this Court on various occasions. It shall be useful to refer to some instances: 14.1 In Madan and Co. v. Wazir Jaivir Chand (1989) 1 SCC 264, which was a case concerned with the payment of arrears of rent under the J&K Houses and Shops Rent Control Act, 1966. The proviso to Section 11, which is titled “Protection of a Tenant against Eviction”, states that unless the landlord serves notice upon the rent becoming due, through the Post Office under a registered cover, no amount shall be deemed to be in arrears. Regarding service of notice by post, it was observed that in order to comply with the proviso, all that is within the landlord's domain to do is to post a pre-paid registered letter containing the correct address and nothing further. It is then presumed to be delivered under Section 27 of the GC Act. Irrespective of whether the addressee accepts or rejects, “there is no difficulty, for the acceptance or refusal can be treated as a service on, and receipt by the addressee.” 14.2 In the context of Section138of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, it was held that when the payee dispatches the notice by registered post, the requirement under Clause (b) of the proviso of Section 138 of the NI Act stands complied with and the cause of action to file a complaint arises on the expiry of that period prescribed in Clause (c) thereof. [See:C.C. Alavi Hajiv. Palapetty Mouhammed (2007) 6 SCC 555] 14.3 The findings in C.C. Alavi(supra) were followed in Vishwabandhu v. Srikrishna (2021) 19 SCC 549. In this case, the summons issued by the Registered AD post was received back with endorsement “refusal”. In 17 2026:HHC:19450 accordance with Sub-Rule (5) of Order V Rule 9ofCPC, refusal to accept delivery of the summons would be deemed to be due service in accordance with law. To substantiate this view, a reference was made to the judgment referred to supra. 14.4 A similar position as in C.C. Alavi (supra) is adopted by this Court in various judgments of this Court in Greater Mohali Area Development Authority v. Manju Jain (2010) 9 SCC 157; Gujarat Electricity Board v. Atmaram Sungomal Posani (1989) 2 SCC 602; CIT v.V. K. Gururaj (1996) 7 SCC 275; Poonam Vermav. DDA (2007) 13 SCC 154; Sarav Investment & Financial Consultancy (P) Ltd. v. Lloyds Register of Shipping Indian Office Staff Provident Fund (2007) 14 SCC 753; Union of India. S.P. Singh (2008) 5 SCC 438; Municipal Corpn., Ludhianav. Inderjit Singh (2008) 13 SCC 506; and V.N. Bharat v. DDA (2008) 17 SCC 321. 24. Therefore, the learned Courts below had rightly held that notice was deemed to have been served upon the accused. 25. In any case, it was laid down in C.C. Allavi Haji vs. Pala Pelly Mohd. 2007(6) SCC 555, that the person who claims that he had not received the notice has to pay the amount within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the summons from the Court and in case of failure to do so, he cannot take the advantage of the fact that notice was not received by him. It was observed: “It is also to be borne in mind that the requirement of giving notice is a clear departure from the rule of Criminal Law, where there is no stipulation of giving notice before filing a complaint. Any drawer who claims that he did not receive the notice sent by post, can, within 15 18 2026:HHC:19450 days of receipt of summons from the court in respect of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, make payment of the cheque amount and submit to the Court that he had made payment within 15 days of receipt of summons (by receiving a copy of the complaint with the summons) and, therefore, the complaint is liable to be rejected. A person who does not pay within 15 days of receipt of the summons from the Court, along with a copy of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, cannot obviously contend that there was no proper service of notice as required under Section 138, by ignoring the statutory presumption to the contrary under Section 27 of the G.C. Act and Section 114 of the Evidence Act. In our view, any other interpretation of the proviso would defeat the very object of the legislation. As observed in Bhaskaran’s case (supra), if the giving of notice in the context of Clause (b) of the proviso was the same as the receipt of notice, a trickster cheque drawer would get the premium to avoid receiving the notice by adopting different strategies and escape from the legal consequences of Section 138 of the Act.” (Emphasis supplied). 26. The accused claimed that he had paid ₹50,000/- to the bank. However, he did not produce any receipts to establish this fact. He had only produced a receipt of ₹2,000/-, which was issued on 20.9.2013 after the date of dishonour. Therefore, learned Courts below had rightly rejected the plea of the accused that he had paid the money to the complainant. 27. Therefore, it was duly proved on record that the accused had issued a cheque to the complainant to discharge his debt/liability, which cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’ and the accused failed to pay 19 2026:HHC:19450 the amount despite the deemed service of the notice. Hence, all the ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act were duly satisfied, and the learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. 28. Learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for six months. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 138 that the penal provision of section 138 is deterrent in nature. It was observed at page 203: “6. The object of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is to infuse credibility into negotiable instruments, including cheques, and to encourage and promote the use of negotiable instruments, including cheques, in financial transactions. The penal provision of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is intended to be a deterrent to callous issuance of negotiable instruments such as cheques without serious intention to honour the promise implicit in the issuance of the same.” 29. Keeping in view the deterrent nature of the punishment, the sentence of six months cannot be said to be excessive. 20 2026:HHC:19450 30. The learned Trial Court awarded the compensation of ₹50,000/-, which is the cheque amount. The complainant lost money that it would have gained by lending the money to someone. It had to engage a counsel to prosecute the complaint filed by him. Therefore, it was entitled to be compensated for its loss. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kalamani Tex v. P. Balasubramanian, (2021) 5 SCC 283: (2021) 3 SCC (Civ) 25: (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 555: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 75 that the Courts should uniformly levy a fine up to twice the cheque amount along with simple interest at the rate of 9% per annum. It was observed at page 291: - 19. As regards the claim of compensation raised on behalf of the respondent, we are conscious of the settled principles that the object of Chapter XVII of NIA is not only punitive but also compensatory and restitutive. The provisions of NIA envision a single window for criminal liability for the dishonour of a cheque as well as civil liability for the realisation of the cheque amount. It is also well settled that there needs to be a consistent approach towards awarding compensation, and unless there exist special circumstances, the courts should uniformly levy fines up to twice the cheque amount along with simple interest @ 9% p.a. [R. Vijayan v. Baby, (2012) 1 SCC 260, para 20: (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 79: (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 520]” 31. Thus, the amount of ₹ 50,000/-cannot be said to be excessive. 21 2026:HHC:19450 32. No other point was urged. 33. In view of the above, the present revision petition fails, and it is dismissed. 34. The present revision stands disposed of, and so are the pending applications, if any. 35. A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith. 36. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 25th May, 2026 (Chander)