P a g e | 1 Date of reserved for orders : 07.09.2026 Date of pronouncement : 19.09.2026 Date of uploading : 22.09.2026 APHC010301212023 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) SATURDAY, THE 19th DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2026 PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE BALAJI MEDAMALLI WRIT PETITION NO: 15603 OF 2023 Between: 1. B SWAMI NAIK, S/o Late B. Tulasi Ram Naik Aged about 45 years, Occ. ARSI (Suspension) 0/o. The Superintendent of Police, Y.S.R District, Kadapa, R/o. Door No.5/67-1, Ravindra Nagar, Kadapa, Y.S.R District. ...Petitioner AND 1. THE STATE OF AP, rep., by its Principal Secretary, Home Department, Secretariat Buildings, Velgapudi, Amaravati, Guntur District. 2. The Deputy Inspector of Police, Kurnool Range, Kurnool District. 3. The Superintendent of Police, Y.S.R District, Kadapa. 4. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Faction Zone, Y.S.R District, Kadapa 5. The Superintendent of Police, Prakasam District, Ongole. 6. The Inspector of Police, Giddalur Circle, Prakasam District ...Respondents P a g e | 2 Counsel for the Petitioner: V R REDDY KOVVURI Counsel for the Respondents: GP FOR SERVICES I P a g e | 3 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE BALAJI MEDAMALLI WRIT PETITION NO: 15603 OF 2023 O R D E R: This writ petition is filed seeking the following relief: “…to issue an appropriate order or direction more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus declaring the action on the part of the respondent No.2 in initiation of the departmental enquiry for the same set of facts/allegations on which a criminal case is pending adjudication before the Court of the Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Giddalur, Prakasam District instead of awaiting for the decision of criminal Court as arbitrary, illegal and quite contrary to well established legal principles in the case of CAPT.MPA UL ANTHONY Versus. BHARAT GOLD MINES LIMITED AND ANOTHERAND ANOTHER reported in (1999) 3 SCC 679 apart from being violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed to me under the Articles 14 and 21 of Constitution of India and consequently set aside the Memorandum of Charges in C.No.C2/OEPR-24/2023, dated 12.04.2023 issued by the respondent No.2 …” 2. The brief facts of the case are that: Petitioner, while working as an Armed Reserve Sub-Inspector in the office of the 3rd respondent, a case in Crime No.388 of 2022 of Giddalur Police Station, Prakasam District, for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code was registered against the petitioner, on the allegation that he caused the death of his wife. Thereby, he was arrested and remanded to judicial custody and was subsequently released on regular bail pursuant to the order dated 25.11.2022 in Crl.M.P.No.735 of 2022. 3. During the course of investigation, the police have examined witnesses cited as LWs.1 to 24 and filed a charge sheet before the Court of the P a g e | 4 Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Giddalur, which was taken on file as P.R.C.No.5 of 2023 and on committal, the same is numbered as Sessions Case No.85 of 2024 on the file of VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Markapur. 4. While the criminal proceedings were pending, the 4th respondent recorded the statements of certain witnesses cited in the charge sheet and submitted a report recommending initiation of departmental proceedings against the petitioner. Pursuant thereto, the 3rd respondent requested the 2nd respondent to initiate disciplinary proceedings, and the 2nd respondent issued a Memorandum of Charges vide proceedings in C.No.C2/OEPR-24/2023, dated 12.04.2023. 5. The grievance of the petitioner is that the departmental proceedings have been initiated on the very same set of facts and allegations which are the subject matter of the pending criminal case and permitting the departmental enquiry to proceed simultaneously would cause serious prejudice to the petitioner's defence in the criminal proceedings. Therefore, petitioner has approached this Court by filing the present writ petition, seeking to set aside the Memorandum of Charges and consequently stay all further proceedings pursuant thereto. 6. On the other hand, respondents filed counter affidavit stating that petitioner, while working as Reserve Sub-Inspector in YSR District, was involved in Crime No.388 of 2022 of Giddalur Police Station, registered under P a g e | 5 Section 302 IPC, for allegedly causing the death of his wife by throttling her neck. Thereby, petitioner was arrested and remanded to judicial custody and was subsequently placed under suspension under Rule 8(2)(a) of the A.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1991. 7. Thereafter, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him under Rule 20 of the A.P.C.S. (CC&A) Rules, 1991, by issuing a Memorandum of Charges dated 12.04.2023 for violation of Rule 3 of the A.P.C.S. (Conduct) Rules, 1964. Pursuant to that, an Enquiry Officer and a Presenting Officer were appointed and the enquiry is in progress. 8. The case of the respondents is that, the DGP, AP, Mangalagiri had issued instructions vide C.O.Circular Memo dated 08.07.2021 stating that as per Rule 20 of the A.P.C.S. (CC&A) Rules, 1991, there is no bar to simultaneous continuation of departmental and criminal proceedings, as they are distinct in nature and governed by different standards of proof. Therefore, the departmental enquiry against the petitioner can be proceeded with and concluded without awaiting the outcome of the criminal case, unless there is any specific direction from a competent Court. As such, there is no illegality or irregularity in proceeding with the departmental enquiry. 9. Heard Sri V.R.Reddy Kovvuri, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Sri K.Varun Shyam Kumar, learned Assistant Government Pleader for Services–I. P a g e | 6 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that S.C.No.85 of 2024 on the file of the VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Markapur, culminated in acquittal of the petitioner vide Judgment dated 10.02.2026. He has placed the said judgment on record and submitted that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt in respect of the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and no evidence is forthcoming against the petitioner to establish the guilt of the accused. Accordingly, the petitioner was found not guilty and acquitted under Section 235(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). As such, the same has to be treated as Honourable Acquittal. 11. Learned counsel for petitioner further submits that the charge memo issued against the petitioner was based solely on the allegations contained in the charge sheet filed in the aforesaid Sessions Case. No independent witnesses were examined in the departmental proceedings, and the witnesses and evidence relied upon therein are the same as those relied upon by the prosecution in the criminal case. As such, the charge in the departmental proceedings and the criminal prosecution arise out of the same set of facts, allegations, witnesses and material. Therefore, as the competent court recorded a categorical finding that the prosecution had failed to bring home the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt and accordingly acquitted the petitioner and as the charges in the departmental enquiry and the criminal court are identical or similar, and as the evidence, witnesses and P a g e | 7 circumstances are one and the same, petitioner is entitled for exoneration from the charges leveled against him in the departmental proceedings. 12. In support of his contention, learned counsel for petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan1, wherein the relevant portion reads as under: 28. Expressions like “benefit of doubt” and “honourably acquitted”, used in judgments are not to be understood as magic incantations. A court of law will not be carried away by the mere use of such terminology. In the present case, the Appellate Judge has recorded that Ext. P-3, the original marksheet carries the date of birth as 21-4-1972 and the same has also been proved by the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution. The conclusion that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge can only be arrived at after a reading of the judgment in its entirety. The Court in judicial review is obliged to examine the substance of the judgment and not go by the form of expression used. 29. We are satisfied that the findings of the Appellate Judge in the criminal case clearly indicate that the charge against the appellant was not just, “not proved” — in fact the charge even stood “disproved” by the very prosecution evidence. As held by this Court, a fact is said to be “disproved” when, after considering the matters before it, the court either believes that it does not exist or considers its non-existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it does not exist. A fact is said to be “not proved” when it is neither “proved” nor “disproved” (see Vijayee Singh v. State of U.P. [Vijayee Singh v. State of U.P., (1990) 3 SCC 190 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 378] 30. We are additionally satisfied that in the teeth of the finding of the Appellate Judge, the disciplinary proceedings and the orders passed thereon cannot be allowed to stand. The charges were not just similar but identical and the evidence, witnesses and circumstances were all the same. This is a case where in exercise of our discretion, we quash the orders of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority as allowing them to stand will be unjust, unfair and oppressive. This case is very similar to the situation that arose in G.M. Tank [G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 5 SCC 446 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1121] . 1 (2024) 1 SCC 175 P a g e | 8 13. Placing reliance on the above, learned counsel submitted that the expressions “benefit of doubt” and “honourably acquitted”, used in judgments are not to be understood as magic incantations. A court of law will not be carried away by mere use of such terminology. The conclusion that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge can only be arrived at after a reading of the judgment in its entirety and the Court in judicial review is obliged to examine the substance of the judgment and not go by the form of expression used and a fact is said to be “not proved” when it is neither “proved” nor “disproved. It was finally held that the disciplinary proceedings and the orders passed therein cannot be allowed to stand as the charges were not just similar but identical and the evidence, witnesses and circumstances were all the same. Accordingly, disciplinary proceedings were quashed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above said judgment. 14. Learned counsel for petitioner also placed reliance on a judgment of Division Bench of this Court in Bandreddy Raja Gopal Reddy v. High Court of Judicature, Registrar (Vigilance), Hyd2, wherein the Division Bench of this Court placing reliance on the judgment of Ram lal’s case (cited supra) held that a court of law will not be carried away by mere use of terminology like “benefit of doubt and “honourable acquittal”. The conclusion that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding after full consideration of the prosecution 2 2025: APHC:11571 P a g e | 9 evidence had to be looked into and mere acquittal by a criminal court will not confer upon the employee a right to claim any benefit, including reinstatement. However, if the charges in the departmental enquiry and the criminal court are identical or similar, and if the evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same, then the matter acquires a different dimension. Accordingly, the Division Bench of this Court allowed the writ petition exonerating the petitioner therein from the charges. 15. Per contra, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the respondents submitted that, though the charges were framed basing on the criminal prosecution lodged against the petitioner but the evidence and the charges are entirely different. Petitioner, being personnel of uniform force cannot indulge in such a heinous offence. Therefore, the disciplinary authority thought it fit to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. Accordingly, charge memo was issued and examined various witnesses. Though some of the witnesses in the criminal proceedings and departmental proceedings are one and the same, an independent enquiry sought to be done in the subject matter. Learned Assistant Government Pleader further submits that mere acquittal in a criminal case cannot be construed as an automatic closure of disciplinary proceedings, unless both the proceedings are set out on same facts and circumstances. 16. Referring to the judgment in S.C.No.85 of 2024, learned Assistant Government Pleader submits that the criminal Court acquitted the petitioner P a g e | 10 primarily on the ground that the prosecution failed to produce and examine the material witnesses. Placing reliance on paragraph No.20 of the said judgment, he submits that PWs.1 to 10, who were cited as material witnesses, turned hostile and did not depose anything incriminating the petitioner or establish his responsibility for the death of the deceased. Learned Assistant Government Pleader further submits that, apart from the witnesses examined in the criminal proceedings, the respondent authorities examined an additional witness, namely, Kancharla Saraswathi, who was shown at Sl.No.9 of the list of witnesses appended to the charge memo. Therefore, it cannot be said that the departmental proceedings were based entirely on the same evidence and material as that of criminal prosecution. 17. Learned Assistant Government Pleader placed reliance on judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia3, wherein the relevant portion reads as under: 11. As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal court is concerned, in our opinion, the said order does not preclude the Corporation from taking an action if it is otherwise permissible. In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on the offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof 3 (2005) 7 SCC 764 P a g e | 11 necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused “beyond reasonable doubt”, he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of “preponderance of probability”. Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the appellant that since he was acquitted by a criminal court, the impugned order dismissing him from service deserves to be quashed and set aside. 18. Placing reliance on the above, learned Assistant Government Pleader submitted that departmental proceedings are entirely different from the criminal prosecution. The criminal prosecution is meant for inflicting appropriate punishment on the offender, whereas the departmental proceedings are to deal with delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a criminal trial, the incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not applicable to the departmental proceedings. In the criminal case, the guilt of the accused has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Whereas, in the departmental proceedings, penalty can be imposed on the basis of preponderance of probabilities. The acquittal of the accused by criminal court does not ipso facto absolve the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction. 19. In the instant case, though the departmental proceedings were initiated on the basis of the charge sheet and the alleged involvement of the petitioner P a g e | 12 in the criminal case, the departmental enquiry is independent of the criminal prosecution. Therefore, no interference with the departmental proceedings is warranted at this stage. It is always open to the petitioner to place all relevant material, including the judgment of acquittal passed by the competent criminal Court, before the departmental authorities for their consideration in accordance with law. 20. Considered the submissions and perused the material on record. On perusal of the material available on record, it is evident that the departmental enquiry was initiated against the petitioner solely on the basis of his alleged involvement in the criminal case registered for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC, on the allegation that he caused the death of his wife. The charge sheet filed by the prosecution was taken as S.C.No.85 of 2024 on the file of the VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Markapur. The criminal Court, after considering the evidence adduced by the prosecution, recorded a finding that, except the evidence of PW.13, the Investigating Officer, there was no incriminating evidence establishing the involvement of the petitioner in the alleged offence. Accordingly, the petitioner was acquitted by the criminal court for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. The respondents initiated the departmental enquiry by relying upon the statements of the witnesses cited in the criminal case, apart from one additional witness, namely, Kancharla Saraswathi. The witnesses examined in the criminal case had turned hostile and did not support the prosecution case. P a g e | 13 Thus, apart from the evidence of PW.13, no other evidence was found by the criminal Court to establish the involvement of the petitioner in the alleged offence. 21. Reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner in Ram lal’s case (cited supra) is to the effect that a court of law will not be carried away by the mere usage of terminology like benefit of doubt or honourable acquittal and the court in judicial review is obliged to examine the substance of the judgment and not go by the form of expressions used. It is well settled law that mere acquittal by criminal court will not confer on the employee a right to claim any benefit including of quashing of the departmental proceedings. However, if the charges in the departmental enquiry and criminal court are identical or similar and if the evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same then the matter requires to be considered for appreciation basing on the findings recorded by the criminal court. 22. In the instant case, the charge memo was issued based on the allegations contained in the charge sheet, and the witnesses and evidence are one and the same in disciplinary proceedings as well as in the criminal proceedings, except one additional witness. Mere examining one additional witness in the departmental proceedings, by itself, cannot be said to constitute independent material sufficient to distinguish the disciplinary proceedings from the criminal prosecution, particularly when the charges, allegations, witnesses and circumstances substantially arise out of the same occurrence. Further, P a g e | 14 the criminal court had considered the evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution and after proper appreciation came to conclusion that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the guilt of the accused. Therefore, in such facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the opinion that the charge in the departmental proceedings and the criminal prosecution arise out of the same set of facts, allegations, witnesses and material. Continuation of the departmental enquiry against the petitioner is unjust and cannot be allowed to stand in view of the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above referred Ram lal’s case (cited supra). 23. In view of the foregoing reasons, this writ petition is allowed. Consequently, Memorandum of Charges in C.No.C2/OEPR-24/2023, dated 12.04.2023 issued by the respondent No.2 is hereby quashed. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications, pending, if any, shall stand closed. __________________________ JUSTICE BALAJI MEDAMALLI Date: .09.2026 Dvs P a g e | 15 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE BALAJI MEDAMALLI WRIT PETITION NO: 15603 OF 2023 Date: 19.09.2026 Dvs