[2026:RJ-JP:28865] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR (1) S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3087/2021 CNR: RJHC020177442021 | URN: CW / 7170U / 2021 Gaurav Mishra S/o Late Shri Om Prakash Mishra, aged about 42 years, Resident of Chandra Prabhu Nagar, Behind UCO Bank Makadwadi Road Ajmer, District Ajmer, Rajasthan. ----Petitioner Versus 1. State of Rajasthan, through Principal Secretary, U.D.H. Department, Government of Rajasthan, Government Sec- retariat, Jaipur, Rajasthan. 2. Land Acquisition Officer, Ajmer Development Authority, Ajmer, Rajasthan. 3. Ajmer Development Authority, Ajmer, through its Secre- tary, Ajmer Development Authority, Ajmer, Rajasthan. 4. Authorized Officer (North), Ajmer Development Authority, Ajmer, Rajasthan. ----Respondents Connected With (2) S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10986/2022 CNR: RJHC020520722022 | URN: CW / 21374U / 2022 Gaurav Mishra S/o Late Shri Om Prakash Mishra, aged about 43 years, Resident of Chandra Prabhu Nagar, Behind UCO Bank Makadwadi Road Ajmer, District Ajmer, Rajasthan. ----Petitioner Versus 1. State of Rajasthan, through Principal Secretary, U.D.H. Department, Government of Rajasthan, Government Sec- retariat, Jaipur, Rajasthan. 2. Ajmer Development Authority, Ajmer, through its Secre- tary, Ajmer Development Authority, Ajmer, Rajasthan. 3. Authorized Officer (North), Ajmer Development Authority, Ajmer, Rajasthan. ----Respondents [2026:RJ-JP:28865] (2 of 16) [CW-3087/2021] For Petitioners : Mr. Manoj Kumar Bhardwaj Advocate. For Respondents : Mr. Ajay Singh Advocate Mr. Vishal Kumar Advocate with Mr. Divyansh Mathur Advocate on be- half of Mr. Manoj Sharma Additional Advocate General. HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA Judgment REPORTABLE 23/07/2026 1. The petitioner has preferred S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3087/2021 laying challenge to the notice dated 05.02.2021 issued by Respondent No.4, Authorised Officer (North), Ajmer Development Authority, Ajmer under Section 67 (3) of the Ajmer Development Authority Act, 2013 (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the ADA Act’), whereby treating the land comprised in Khasra Nos.724 and 725 (new Khasra Nos.751 and 752), situated at Village Nausar, Tehsil and District Ajmer, as Government land acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the petitioner was called upon to show cause why the encroachment made thereupon should not be removed. The petitioner has further prayed for declaration that the acquisition proceedings culminating in award dated 31.12.1998 stand lapsed by virtue of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the Act of 2013’). 2. As regards S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10986/2022 is concerned, the petitioner has assailed legality and validity of order dated 15.07.2021 by the Ajmer Development Authority, pursuant [2026:RJ-JP:28865] (3 of 16) [CW-3087/2021] to above notice dated 05.02.2021 under Section 67(3) of the ADA Act for holding the petitioner as encroacher and to direct him to remove the encroachment made by him upon the Government land. 3. As facts, cause of action and grievances raised in both the above writ petitions are interlinked and connected, therefore, with the consent of both the parties, at the stage of application for early listing filed by the petitioner, arguments on both the above writ petitions were heard together and the same are being decided by this common judgment. 4. The case set up by the petitioner in S.B. Civil Writ Petition no. 3087/2021, in brief, is that the petitioner's father Late Shri Om Prakash and mother Late Smt. Sushma Rani purchased lands bearing Khasra Nos.724 and 725 situated at Village Nausar, Tehsil and District Ajmer through a registered sale deed dated 21.09.1978. Consequent upon execution of the sale deed, mutation was also sanctioned in favour of the purchasers by the competent authority. However, due to inadvertence, corresponding entries were not incorporated in the revenue records and the names of the erstwhile khatedars continued to be reflected in the Jamabandi. Subsequently, owing to settlement operations, old Khasra Nos.724 and 725 were renumbered as Khasra Nos.751 and 752. 5. It is pleaded that while the petitioner's parents had already become khatedar tenants by virtue of the registered sale deed and mutation order, the respondents initiated acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the Act of 1894’) for development of "Hari Bhau [2026:RJ-JP:28865] (4 of 16) [CW-3087/2021] Vistaar Yojana". Notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 was published in the Rajasthan Gazette on 13.01.1995 followed by declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 published on 22.04.1996 and in the Official Gazette on 11.06.1996. Ultimately, the Land Acquisition Officer passed an Award on 31.12.1998 determining compensation of Rs. 4,46,753/- in respect of the petitioner's land. 6. According to the petitioner, notwithstanding passing of the Award, neither compensation was ever paid to his parents or thereafter to the petitioner, nor was physical possession of the acquired land ever taken by the respondents. It is specifically pleaded that the petitioner and his family have continuously remained in occupation of the property since its purchase in the year 1978. A residential house and poultry farm were established by the petitioner's father and the petitioner continues to reside therein. 7. In order to substantiate continuous possession, the petitioner has placed on record electricity bills commencing from the year 1998 onwards, electricity bills issued in the years 2001 and 2003, telephone bills issued in the name of the petitioner's brother, receipts relating to payment of house tax and photographs depicting the residential construction existing upon the land. According to the petitioner, these documents are enough to establish that the respondents never took possession of the acquired property. 8. The petitioner has further relied upon the proceedings of the meeting of the Ajmer Development Authority dated 13.12.2017 (Annexure-10), wherein while considering the [2026:RJ-JP:28865] (5 of 16) [CW-3087/2021] proposal relating to de-acquisition, it was recorded that as per the available record, compensation had neither been paid, nor deposited before the Court and no surrender deed had been executed by the khatedar for allotment of developed land in lieu of compensation. The petitioner contends that the said Minutes of Meeting dated 13.12.2017 also acknowledge existence of construction over the land and clearly negates the respondents' stand that possession had been taken. 9. The petitioner has further pleaded that since neither compensation had been paid nor possession had been taken despite expiry of more than fifteen years from the date of award, the acquisition proceedings automatically lapsed on 01.01.2014 by operation of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. 10. It has further been averred that after lapse of acquisition proceedings, Respondent No.4 issued notice dated 05.02.2021 under Section 67 of the ADA Act treating the land as Government land and proposing eviction. The petitioner immediately submitted a detailed reply on 26.02.2021 asserting that the acquisition itself had lapsed and, therefore, the respondents had absolutely no authority to invoke proceedings under Section 67 of the ADA Act. According to the petitioner, despite receipt of the reply filed by the petitioners justifying his legitimate title and possession, the respondents have treated the petitioner as encroacher vide order dated 15.07.2021 and directed him to remove the alleged encroachment, which compelled the petitioner to file another S.B. Civil Writ Petition 10986/2022 invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. [2026:RJ-JP:28865] (6 of 16) [CW-3087/2021] 11. The petitioner has accordingly prayed for declaration that the acquisition proceedings initiated in respect of Khasra Nos.724 and 725 (new Khasra Nos.751 and 752) culminating in award dated 31.12.1998 have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 and consequently, the impugned notice dated 05.02.2021 as well as order dated 15.07.2021 deserve to be quashed. 12. Respondents opposed the writ petitions by way of filing reply. It is averred that the land stood validly acquired long back and the petitioner is merely an unauthorised occupant over Government land. While not disputing issuance of notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act of 1894 or passing of award dated 31.12.1998, the respondents have pleaded that though mutation had been sanctioned in favour of the petitioner's parents, corresponding entries were never incorporated in the revenue record and, therefore, notices under Section 12(2) were issued to the persons whose names continued to be recorded as khatedars. 13. The respondents have further alleged that the petitioner's parents had already sold the residential house and poultry farm to other persons, yet the petitioner has suppressed material facts. The respondents have also contended that electricity bills, telephone bills, municipal receipts and photographs do not establish lawful possession and are wholly irrelevant once the land stood acquired. It has further been pleaded that out of total acquisition measuring about 115 bighas, possession of approximately 105 bighas was taken and compensation was paid to several khatedars either in cash or by [2026:RJ-JP:28865] (7 of 16) [CW-3087/2021] allotment of developed land. It has been asserted that notices under Section 12(2) of the Act of 1894 had been issued to the recorded khatedars and compensation had been tendered to them. The respondents have also pleaded that cash compensation relating to the petitioner's land was deposited before the competent Court under Section 31 of the Act of 1894 on 29.10.2021. 14. The respondents have further relied upon the Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority vs. Manoharlal & Others, (2020) 8 SCC 129, to contend that acquisition proceedings do not lapse merely because compensation has not been actually received by a claimant and that where compensation has been tendered or where majority of landholders have received compensation, acquisition remains unaffected. It is further pleaded that the petitioner's claim is highly belated and stale and, therefore, deserves rejection. 15. The respondents have also stated that the land in question forms an integral part of Hari Bhau Vistaar Yojana and constitutes facility area under the sanctioned layout plan and, therefore, cannot be released from acquisition. According to them, the petitioner illegally obtained building permission from the Municipal Corporation and attempted to raise construction over acquired land, necessitating issuance of notice dated 05.02.2021 under Section 67 of the ADA Act. 16. Mr. Manoj Bhardwaj, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner vehemently argued that the respondents' own official record completely demolishes their defence. Inviting attention to [2026:RJ-JP:28865] (8 of 16) [CW-3087/2021] the minutes of the meeting of the Ajmer Development Authority dated 13.12.2017, it was contended that the respondent-authority itself admitted that compensation had neither been paid nor deposited before any Court and that no surrender deed had been executed. It was further argued that paragraph 12 of the reply contains a categorical admission that compensation was deposited under Section 31 of the Act of 1894 only on 29.10.2021. Since such deposit admittedly took place nearly eight years after enforcement of the Act of 2013, it was submitted that the statutory consequence under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 had already taken effect on 01.01.2014 and could not thereafter be nullified. 17. Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner has produced overwhelming documentary evidence in the form of electricity bills, house tax receipts, telephone bills and photographs demonstrating uninterrupted possession, whereas the respondents have failed to produce even a single possession memo, Panchnama or any other record showing taking over of physical possession. It was argued that mere assertions in the reply cannot substitute proof of actual possession contemplated by law. 18. Per contra, Mr. Ajay Singh and Mr. Divyansh Mathur, learned counsel appearing for the respondents reiterated the stand taken in the reply and contended that the acquisition proceedings stood concluded long back. It was argued that notices under Section 12(2) of the Act of 1894 had been issued to the recorded khatedars, compensation had been tendered and subsequently deposited before the Court. Reliance was placed [2026:RJ-JP:28865] (9 of 16) [CW-3087/2021] upon the Constitution Bench judgment in Indore Development Authority (supra) to contend that acquisition cannot lapse merely because compensation was not actually received by a claimant. 19. Having given thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and carefully scrutinised the pleadings, documentary evidence placed on record, at the outset, it deserves to be noticed that foundational facts are not in dispute. Notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 came to be issued on 13.01.1995, declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 followed on 22.04.1996 and the award was ultimately passed on 31.12.1998. Consequently, on the date when Act of 2013 came into force on 01.01.2014, nearly fifteen years had expired from the date of passing the award. Therefore, the first statutory requirement to attract provisions of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 regarding completion of more than 5 years from the date of award, on the date of enforcement of new Act indisputably stands satisfied. 20. The controversy, therefore, narrows down to the fulfillment of the remaining two statutory requirements, namely, whether compensation had been paid or deposited in accordance with law before 01.01.2014 and whether physical possession of the acquired land had actually been taken by the acquiring authority. 21. Before examining the factual controversy, it would be appropriate to refer that the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority (supra), authoritatively settled the scope and ambit of Section 24(2) of the [2026:RJ-JP:28865] (10 of 16) [CW-3087/2021] Act of 2013. The Constitution Bench held that the word "or" occurring in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 has to be read as "nor" and, therefore, acquisition proceedings lapse only where both the conditions coexist, namely, (i) physical possession has not been taken; and (ii) compensation has not been paid in accordance with law. The Constitution Bench further explained that mere non-deposit of compensation in Court would not by itself result in lapse if compensation had been duly tendered to the landowner. Likewise, where possession has been taken in accordance with law, acquisition would not lapse merely because compensation remained unpaid. At the same time, the Constitution Bench unequivocally held that where both the essential conditions coexist on the date of commencement of the Act of 2013, the acquisition would lapse by operation of law. 22. Thus, the present case has to be examined strictly in the light of the principles laid down in the aforesaid Constitution Bench judgment. This court finds that the respondents have attempted to justify continuation of the acquisition by contending that notices under Section 12(2) of the Act of 1894 were issued to the recorded khatedars and compensation was tendered to them. However, upon careful examination of the material available on record, this Court finds no documentary evidence supporting such assertion. 23. On this aspect, it would be relevant to refer the proceedings of the meeting of the Ajmer Development Authority held on 13.12.2017, placed on record of Writ Petition No. 3087/2021 by the petitioner as Annexure-10, which assumes considerable significance. The said proceedings were prepared [2026:RJ-JP:28865] (11 of 16) [CW-3087/2021] much prior to institution of the present litigation. The minutes specifically record that as per the file available with the Authority, compensation had neither been paid nor deposited with the competent Court. The proceedings further record that no surrender deed had been executed by the khatedar for obtaining developed land in lieu of compensation. These observations contained in the official proceedings amount to a clear admission by the acquiring body itself regarding the factual position prevailing as on 13.12.2017. 24. Furthermore, In paragraph 12 of the reply, the respondents have categorically pleaded that cash compensation was deposited before the competent Court under Section 31 of the Act of 1894 on 29.10.2021. This pleading, in fact, clearly establishes that till 29.10.2021, no amount had been deposited before the competent Court. 25. Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 came into operation on 01.01.2014. Consequently, the factual position existing on that date alone becomes relevant for determining whether the acquisition stood saved or lapsed. If compensation admittedly had not been deposited before the Court till 29.10.2021, it necessarily follows that no such deposit existed on 01.01.2014. Thus, even according to the respondents themselves, compensation had neither been deposited before the competent Court nor paid to the petitioner prior to commencement of the Act of 2013. 26. The respondents have attempted to rely upon notices issued under Section 12(2) of the Act of 1894. However, issuance of notice calling upon a person to receive compensation cannot be equated with actual payment of compensation. Significantly, one [2026:RJ-JP:28865] (12 of 16) [CW-3087/2021] such notice dated 20.01.1999 has been placed on record by the respondents themselves. A careful reading of the said notice reveals that the recipient was merely called upon to receive compensation, failing which possession would be taken under Section 16 of the Act of 1894. The notice does not establish that compensation was ever actually disbursed. 27. In the considered opinion of this Court, once the respondents themselves admit that compensation came to be deposited under Section 31 of the Act of 1894 only on 29.10.2021, such subsequent deposit cannot satisfy the statutory requirement to show such deposition as on 01.01.2014. 28. The second requirement under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 relates to taking of physical possession. The petitioner has consistently maintained that neither he, nor his predecessors were ever dispossessed from the acquired land. In support thereof, the petitioner has produced electricity bills extending over several years commencing immediately after passing of the award, telephone bills, municipal house tax receipts and photographs depicting existence of the residential house standing over the property. These documents constitute consistent evidence to show possession of the petitioner over the property in dispute. Admittedly, even the proceedings of the Ajmer Development Authority dated 13.12.2017 acknowledge existence of construction over the land. 29. The only document relied upon by the respondents is the notice dated 20.01.1999. Ironically, the said notice advances the petitioner's case rather than the respondents'. The notice itself records that if compensation is not received, possession shall [2026:RJ-JP:28865] (13 of 16) [CW-3087/2021] thereafter be taken. Thus, on the date of issuance of the notice itself, possession admittedly had not been taken. Thereafter, no material whatsoever has been produced showing that possession was in fact assumed. 30. It would be relevant to refer that in the case of Banda Development Authority, Banda vs Moti Lal Agrawal & Others, (2011) 5 SCC 394, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down following legitimate mode to take possession in the acquisition proceedings: “37. The principles which can be culled out from the abovenoted judgments are: (i) No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to what act would constitute taking of possession of the acquired land. (ii) If the acquired land is vacant, the act of the State authority concerned to go to the spot and prepare a panchnama will ordinarily be treated as sufficient to constitute taking of possession. (iii) If crop is standing on the acquired land or building/structure exists, mere going on the spot by the authority concerned will, by itself, be not sufficient for taking possession. Ordinarily, in such cases, the authority concerned will have to give notice to the occupier of the building/structure or the person who has cultivated the land and take possession in the presence of independent witnesses and get their signatures on the panchnama. Of course, refusal of the owner of the land or building/structure may not lead to an inference that the possession of the acquired land has not been taken. (iv) If the acquisition is of a large tract of land, it may not be possible for the acquiring/designated authority to take physical possession of each and every parcel of the land and it will be sufficient that symbolic possession is taken by preparing appropriate document in the presence of independent witnesses and getting their signatures on such document. (v) If beneficiary of the acquisition is an agency/instrumentality of the State and 80% of the total compensation is deposited in terms of Section 17(3-A) and substantial portion of the acquired land has been utilised in furtherance of the particular public purpose, then the court may reasonably presume that possession of the acquired land has been taken.” 31. While examining the factum of possession in the light of above judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court finds [2026:RJ-JP:28865] (14 of 16) [CW-3087/2021] that despite asserting that possession had already been taken, the respondents have failed to produce the most material piece of evidence, namely, the possession memo, or any panchnama in respect of constructed structure. If possession had genuinely been taken, production of the possession proceedings or panchnama would have been the simplest course available to the respondents. The absence of such primary evidence, despite respondents being the custodian of the acquisition record, compels this Court to draw an adverse inference against the respondents under Section 114 illustration (g) of the Indian Evidence Act. Possession under the Land Acquisition Act is a question of fact and must be proved by cogent documentary evidence. The burden squarely rested upon the respondents, however, they have failed to discharge the same. 32. Therefore, the present case squarely satisfies the requirements laid down by the Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority (supra). Consequently, this Court is left with no manner of doubt that both the statutory conditions contemplated under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 stood fulfilled and the acquisition proceedings stood lapsed by operation of law. 33. The right to property, though no longer a fundamental right, continues to enjoy constitutional protection under Article 300A of the Constitution of India. No person can be deprived of his property except by authority of law. Where acquisition proceedings themselves stand lapsed by operation of Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013, the acquiring authority cannot continue to treat the land as Government land. [2026:RJ-JP:28865] (15 of 16) [CW-3087/2021] 34. Once the very foundation of vesting disappears, all consequential actions founded thereupon necessarily collapse. Therefore, issuance of notice dated 05.02.2021 followed by order dated 15.07.2021 under Section 67 of the ADA Act treating the petitioner's property as Government land becomes wholly without jurisdiction. The impugned notice proceeds entirely on the assumption that the land vested in the State Government and that the petitioner was an unauthorised occupant over Government land. 35. Once the acquisition itself ceased to exist, the respondents could not have proceeded to treat the land as Government land, nor could they have invoked the provisions of Section 67 of the ADA Act for dispossessing the petitioner. The respondents ceased to have any legal authority to invoke powers under Section 67 of the ADA Act. The impugned action, therefore, is wholly arbitrary, contrary to law and violative of Article 300A of the Constitution of India. 36. Much emphasis has been laid by the respondents on the allegation that the petitioner's parents had sold part of the property in favour of third parties. In the opinion of this Court, the said controversy is wholly irrelevant for deciding the present writ petition. However, looking to the fact that notice under Section 67 of the ADA Act was given to the petitioner, as well as examining proceedings of the Ajmer Development Authority dated 13.12.2017 which were also drawn in respect of the petitioner, this Court finds that whether title ultimately vested in the petitioner or in some subsequent purchaser may have relevance for inter-se dispute, if any, between the private parties, however, [2026:RJ-JP:28865] (16 of 16) [CW-3087/2021] such dispute has absolutely no bearing upon the limited question arising under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. 37. Accordingly, both the above writ petitions succeed and are hereby allowed. It is declared that the land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in respect of Khasra Nos.724 and 725 (new Khasra Nos.751 and 752), situated at Village Nausar, Tehsil and District Ajmer, culminating in award dated 31.12.1998, stood lapsed by operation of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 with effect from 01.01.2014. Consequently, the impugned notice dated 05.02.2021 and consequential order dated 15.07.2021 issued by Respondent-Authorised Officer (North), Ajmer Development Authority, Ajmer treating the aforesaid land as Government land and initiating proceedings under Section 67 of the Ajmer Development Authority Act, 2013 are declared illegal, without jurisdiction, arbitrary and unsustainable in law, and the same are accordingly quashed and set aside. 38. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. 39. Office is directed to place a copy of this judgment on record of connected writ petition. (ANAND SHARMA),J MANOJ NARWANI/101-102