Judgment & Order : (S.K. Medhi, J.) The extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court has been sought to be invoked by filing this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by putting to challenge the opinion rendered vide impugned order dated 20.05.2019 passed by the learned Foreigners Tribunal No. 11, Barpeta, Sorbhog in F.T. Case No. 878/2016 (Reference No. 92/14). By the impugned judgment, the petitioner, who was the proceedee before the learned Tribunal, has been declared to be a foreigner post 25.03.1971. 2. The facts of the case may be put in a nutshell as follows: (i) A reference was made by the Superintendent of Police (B), Barpeta District, against the petitioner giving rise to the aforesaid FT Case No. 878/2016 (Reference No. 92/14). (ii) As per requirement u/s 9 of the Foreigner’s Act, 1946 to prove that the proceedee is not a foreigner, the petitioner had filed the written statement on 25.10.2018 along with certain documents and adduced evidence through 3 nos. of DWs. (iii) The learned Tribunal, after considering the facts and circumstances and taking into account of the provisions of Section 9 of the Foreigners’ Act, 1946 had come to a finding that the petitioner, as opposite party, had failed to discharge the burden cast upon her and accordingly, the opinion was rendered declaring the petitioner to be a foreign national post 25.03.1971. 3. We have heard Shri M. A. Sheikh, learned counsel for the petitioner. We have also heard Shri G. Sarma, learned Standing Counsel, Home Department & NRC; Ms. R. B. Bora, learned GA, Assam, Shri N. Kalita, learned Counsel on behalf of Shri A. I. Ali, learned Standing Counsel, Election Commission of India and Shri K. K. Parasar, learned CGC. We have also carefully examined the records which were requisitioned vide an order dated 06.11.2020. 4. Shri Sheikh, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner could prove her case with cogent evidence and in view of the fact that there was no rebuttal evidence, the learned Tribunal should have accepted the said proof and accordingly hold the petitioner to be a citizen of India. In this regard, he has referred to the evidence of the 3 nos. of DWs and also the following documentary evidence. (i) Ext-1 – Certified copy of extract Voters List of 1965. In this regard, he has referred to the evidence of the 3 nos. of DWs and also the following documentary evidence. (i) Ext-1 – Certified copy of extract Voters List of 1965. (ii) Ext-2 – Certified (digital) copy of Electoral Roll of 1970 (iii) Ext-3 – Certified (digital) copy of Electoral Roll of 1989. (iv) Ext-4 - Certified (digital) copy of Electoral Roll of 1997. (v) Ext-5 – another Certified (digital) copy of Electoral Roll of 1997. (vi) Ext-6 – An EPIC standing in the name of Halema Khatun. (vii) Ext-7 Xerox copy of PAN Card in the name of Muntaj Ali. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in the written statement, all material disclosures were made. He has referred to the Voters List of 1965 containing the names of her parents as Montaj Ali (father) and Joymon Nessa (mother). The subsequent Voters List is of the year 1970 containing the names of the father - Montaj Ali and mother - Jamela Nessa along with one Jabbar Ali, whom the petitioner has stated to be her elder brother. The next Voters list is of the year 1989 containing the name of the petitioner along with her husband and another person. The next Voters list is of the year 1997 having the names of the petitioner and her husband. The petitioner has also relied upon two Certificates by the Gaonburah of Ekagaon Kopahorpar and Bandorkhuwa dated 04.08.2018 and 08.08.2018 which are found in pages 42 and 43 of the Tribunal records. Another certificate by the Gaon Panchayat dated 16.05.2015 has been produced which, however, was not proved. The petitioner has relied upon the Voters List of 1997 containing the name of the projected elder brother - Jabbar. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that evidence was adduced by 3 nos. of witnesses, namely, the petitioner as DW - 1, elder brother Jabbar Ali as DW 2 and another brother Sukur Ali as DW 3. However, the evidence of DW 3 was not taken into consideration by the learned Tribunal and it is accordingly contended that the impugned opinion is unsustainable in law. He has submitted the lineage has been proved by DW 2 and DW 3 and in this regard he has also referred to Section 50 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the evidence of DW 3 was not taken into consideration by the learned Tribunal and it is accordingly contended that the impugned opinion is unsustainable in law. He has submitted the lineage has been proved by DW 2 and DW 3 and in this regard he has also referred to Section 50 of the Indian Evidence Act. He has submitted that the aforesaid provision of law has been ignored by the learned Tribunal. 7. The learned counsel accordingly submits that in view of the availability of the aforesaid materials, the impugned opinion could not have been rendered against the petitioner and therefore, the same requires interference. 8. Per contra, Shri Sarma, the learned Standing Counsel, Home Department has categorically refuted the stand taken on behalf of the petitioner. He submits that a proceeding under the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 relates to determination as to whether the proceedee is a foreigner or not. Therefore, the relevant facts are especially within the knowledge of the proceedee and accordingly, the burden of proving citizenship rests absolutely upon the proceedee, notwithstanding anything contained in the Evidence Act, 1872 and this is mandated under Section 9 of the aforesaid Act, 1946. However, in the instant case, the petitioner utterly failed to discharge the burden. It is also submitted that rebuttal evidence is not mandatory in every case and would be given only if necessary. He further submits that the evidence of a proceedee has to be cogent, relevant, which inspire confidence and acceptable and only thereafter, the question of adducing rebuttal evidence may come in. 9. The learning Standing Counsel has further submitted that the written statement is the basic document which is supposed to lay down the foundation of the case of the proceeding and the written statement in the instant case lacks details and is totally vague. There is no date or year of the birth of the petitioner and there is no details of the family members. In this connection, he has relied upon the following observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal vs. Union of India reported in (2005) 5 SCC 665 : “17. There is good and sound reason for placing the burden of proof upon the person concerned who asserts to be a citizen of a particular country. In this connection, he has relied upon the following observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal vs. Union of India reported in (2005) 5 SCC 665 : “17. There is good and sound reason for placing the burden of proof upon the person concerned who asserts to be a citizen of a particular country. In order to establish one's citizenship, normally he may be required to give evidence of (i) his date of birth (ii) place of birth (iii) name of his parents (iv) their place of birth and citizenship. Some times the place of birth of his grand parents may also be relevant like under Section 6-A(1) (d) of the Citizenship Act. All these facts would necessarily be within the personal knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of the State. After he has given evidence on these points, the State authorities can verify the facts and can then lead evidence in rebuttal, if necessary. If the State authorities dispute the claim of citizenship by a person and assert that he is a foreigner, it will not only be difficult but almost impossible for them to first lead evidence on the aforesaid points. This is in accordance with the underlying policy of Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.” 10. He has submitted that there are major inconsistencies in the documents produced by the petitioner. So far as the Voters List of 1970 is concerned, the age of the projected brother Jabbar has been shown to be 25 years and the next Voters List where his name appears is of the year 1997. There is no explanation as to why the name of the brother was not enlisted in any of the Voters List in between which is of a long period of 27 years. He has also submitted that discrepancy of Voters List cannot give any advantage to a proceedee and in this regard, he has relied upon the case of Basiron Bibi Vs Union of India reported in 2018 (1) GLT 372 and the relevant observations are extracted herein below: "30. He has also submitted that discrepancy of Voters List cannot give any advantage to a proceedee and in this regard, he has relied upon the case of Basiron Bibi Vs Union of India reported in 2018 (1) GLT 372 and the relevant observations are extracted herein below: "30. Reliance placed in the case of Abdul Matali @ Mataleb (Md.) (supra), can be of no assistance to the petitioner inasmuch, as it has already been clarified by this Court in previous decisions that the said decision did not lay down any law and was a decision confined to the facts and circumstances of that case. Regarding discrepancies in the voters' lists which the petitioner contended were not her creation being entered into by officials of Election Commission and therefore should not be used adversely against the petitioner, such contention is without any substance. The voters' lists were adduced as evidence by the petitioner herself to prove her case that she was not a foreigner but a citizen of India. Petitioner cannot insist that only that portions of the voters' lists which are in her favour should be accepted and those portions going against her should be over-looked. This is not how a document put forward as a piece of evidence should be examined. The document has to be appreciated as a whole." 11 . In support of his submission that a certificate has to be proved from contemporaneous records, the learned Standing Counsel has relied upon the judgment passed in the case of Romila Khatun vs. Union of India reported in 2018 (4) GLT 373 and the following observations have been pressed into service. “20. It is trite that documentary evidence would have to be proved on the basis of the record and the contemporaneous record must substantiate and prove the contents of the document. Proof of document is one thing and proof of contents is another. Not only the document would have to be proved but its contents would also have to be proved. That apart, the truthfulness of the contents of the document would also have to be established from the record. A document or the contents of the document cannot be proved on the basis of personal knowledge.…” 12. He has also drawn the attention of this Court to the case of Nur Begum vs. Union of India and Ors. That apart, the truthfulness of the contents of the document would also have to be established from the record. A document or the contents of the document cannot be proved on the basis of personal knowledge.…” 12. He has also drawn the attention of this Court to the case of Nur Begum vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in 2020 (3) GLT 347 wherein certain observations regarding exercise of Certiorari jurisdiction have been made which read as follows: “9. On the available materials, we find that the Tribunal rendered opinion/order upon due appreciation of the entire facts, evidence and documents brought on record. We find no infirmity in the findings and opinion recorded by the Tribunal. We would observe that the certiorari jurisdiction of the writ court being supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction, this Court would refrain from reviewing the findings of facts reached by the Tribunal. No case is made out that the impugned opinion/order was rendered without affording opportunity of hearing or in violation of the principles of natural justice and/or that it suffers from illegality on any ground of having been passed by placing reliance on evidence which is legally impermissible in law and/or that the Tribunal refused to admit admissible evidence and/or that the findings finds no support by any evidence at all. In other words, the petitioner has not been able to make out any case demonstrating any errors apparent on the face of the record to warrant interference of the impugned opinion.” 13 . He has also relied upon the case of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rupajan Begum vs. Union of India reported in (2018) 1 SCC 579 , wherein it has been laid down that a certificate has to be proved on two aspects, firstly, the authenticity of the same and secondly, the authenticity of the contents. 14 . The learned Standing Counsel has accordingly submitted that the writ petition be dismissed and the interim order be vacated. 15 . The learned counsel for the other respondents have supported the submissions advanced on behalf of the Home Deptt. & NRC and have prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. They have submitted that this Court, in exercise of its Certiorari jurisdiction does not act as an Appellate Court and it is only the decision making process which can be the subject matter of scrutiny. & NRC and have prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. They have submitted that this Court, in exercise of its Certiorari jurisdiction does not act as an Appellate Court and it is only the decision making process which can be the subject matter of scrutiny. It is submitted that there is no procedural impropriety or illegality in the decision making process and therefore, the instant petition is liable to be dismissed. They have further submitted that the procedure adopted for adjudication of a reference by a Foreigners Tribunal is summary in nature and there is also a time frame for completion. It is also submitted that there is a question of national security by the unabated influx of foreign nationals and before any action is taken, the proceedee is given an opportunity whereby he or she is required to prove the citizenship. 16 . The rival submissions made have been duly considered and the materials placed before this Court including the records of the Tribunal have been carefully perused. 17 . With regard to the aspect of burden of proof as laid down in Section 9 of the Act of 1946, the law is well settled that the burden of proof that a proceedee is an Indian citizen is always on the said proceedee and never shifts. In the said Section, there is non-obstante clause that the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act would not be applicable. For ready reference, Section 9 is extracted hereinbelow- “9. Burden of proof.—If in any case not falling under Section 8 any question arises with reference to this Act or any order made or direction given thereunder, whether any person is or is not a foreigner or is or is not a foreigner of a particular class or description the onus of proving that such person is not a foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class or description, as the case may be, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), lie upon such person.” 18 . In this connection, the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Fateh Mohd. Vs. Delhi Administration [ AIR 1963 SC 1035 ] which followed the principles laid down by the Constitutional Bench in the case of Ghaus Mohammad Vs. In this connection, the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Fateh Mohd. Vs. Delhi Administration [ AIR 1963 SC 1035 ] which followed the principles laid down by the Constitutional Bench in the case of Ghaus Mohammad Vs. Union of India [ AIR 1961 SC 1526 ] in the context of Foreigners Act, 1946 would be relevant which is extracted hereinbelow- “22. This Act confers wide ranging powers to deal with all foreigners or with respect to any particular foreigner or any prescribed class or description of foreigner for prohibiting, regulating or restricting their or his entry into India or their presence or continued presence including their arrest, detention and confinement. The most important provision is Section 9 which casts the burden of proving that a person is not a foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class or description, as the case may be, shall lie upon such person. Therefore, where an order made under the Foreigners Act is challenged and a question arises whether the person against whom the order has been made is a foreigner or not, the burden of proving that he is not a foreigner is upon such a person. In Union of India v. Ghaus Mohd. the Chief Commissioner of Delhi served an order on Ghaus Mohammad to leave India within three days as he was a Pakistani national. He challenged the order before the High Court which set aside the order by observing that there must be prima facie material on the basis of which the authority can proceed to pass an order under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act, 1946. In appeal the Constitution Bench reversed the judgment of the High Court holding that onus of showing that he is not a foreigner was upon the respondent.” 19 . Before embarking to adjudicate the issue involved vis-a-vis the submissions and the materials on record, we are reminded that a Writ Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would confine its powers to examine the decision making process only. Further, the present case pertains to a proceeding of a Tribunal which has given its findings based on the facts. It is trite law that findings of facts are not liable to be interfered with by a Writ Court under its certiorari jurisdiction. 20 . Law is well settled in this field. Further, the present case pertains to a proceeding of a Tribunal which has given its findings based on the facts. It is trite law that findings of facts are not liable to be interfered with by a Writ Court under its certiorari jurisdiction. 20 . Law is well settled in this field. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, after discussing the previous case laws on the jurisdiction of a Writ Court qua the writ of certiorari, in the recent decision of Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences and Anr. Vs. Bikartan Das & Ors [Civil Appeal No. 3339 of 2023] has laid down as follows: “49. Before we close this matter, we would like to observe something important in the aforesaid context: Two cardinal principles of law governing exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution more particularly when it comes to issue of writ of certiorari. 50. The first cardinal principle of law that governs the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, more particularly when it comes to the issue of a writ of certiorari is that in granting such a writ, the High Court does not exercise the powers of Appellate Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal. The writ of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is apparent on the face of the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ, should not be issued on mere asking. 51. The second cardinal principle of exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is that in a given case, even if some action or order challenged in the writ petition is found to be illegal and invalid, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction thereunder can refuse to upset it with a view to doing substantial justice between the parties. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this flexible power to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity projects. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this flexible power to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity projects. The legal formulations cannot be enforced divorced from the realities of the fact situation of the case. While administering law, it is to be tempered with equity and if the equitable situation demands after setting right the legal formulations, not to take it to the logical end, the High Court would be failing in its duty if it does not notice equitable consideration and mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. Any other approach would render the High Court a normal court of appeal which it is not.” 21 . In the instant case, the written statement is absolutely vague and apparently, has not met the requirements, as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal (supra). There is a requirement to disclose the following: (i) date of birth, (ii) place of birth, (iii) name of the parents, (iv) their place of birth and citizenship. Further, there may be a requirement to give the details of the grandparents. It has been stated that all these facts would necessarily be within the personal knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of the State. 22 . So far as the Voters Lists of 1965 and 1970 are concerned, there is a change of the address. That apart, the name of the projected mother has changed from Joymon Nessa to Jamela Nessa. What is more astonishing is that the age of the projected mother in 1970 is 35 years whereas the age of the elder brother of the petitioner is 25 years which is an absurd projection. So far as the Voters List of the year 1989 is concerned, the same is of another address. Even assuming that the change in address was on account of the marriage of the petitioner, there is one name of Basiron Nessa in the said Voters List which is not explained properly. So far as the Voters list of the year 1997 is concerned, there is again a change of address from (Ka) Bhaluki / (Kha) Shalmara to (Kha) Amguri. The name of the projected husband changes from Iyachin to Yasin Ali. So far as the Voters list of the year 1997 is concerned, there is again a change of address from (Ka) Bhaluki / (Kha) Shalmara to (Kha) Amguri. The name of the projected husband changes from Iyachin to Yasin Ali. The name of Basiron Nessa which was there in the Voters List of 1989 goes missing. 23 . So far as the oral evidence is concerned, it is trite law that in matters of determination of foreigners, oral evidence without any documentary support would not be admissible. The duty cast upon a proceedee under Section 9 of the Act cannot be discharged by merely adducing oral evidence as the issue is of grave public importance involving the security of the nation. 24 . So far as the contention that the evidence of DW 3 has not been taken into consideration, though as a matter of fact, the said contention may be correct, a bare perusal of the aforesaid evidence would show that the same is simply an oral assertion without any documentary support. We have also noted that DW 3 in his cross examination had admitted that there is not a single Voters List of him along with the projected parents. The age disclosed of the DW 3 on the date of deposition is 66 years and therefore it was incumbent to prove any Voters List having his name along with his parents. Further it is not divulged regarding the death of the parents if the same had occurred. We are of the view that the evidence of DW 3 would not make any material difference in the opinion render by the learned Tribunal. 25 . We find force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Home Department that a proceedee cannot be allowed to take as a defense any inconsistencies in the Voters List and we endorse the views expressed in the case of Basiron Bibi (supra) which have been extracted above. We are of the view that the petitioner as proceedee had failed to discharge her burden to prove her citizenship. 26. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that the impugned order dated 20.05.2019 passed by the learned Foreigners Tribunal No. 11, Barpeta, Sorbhog in F.T. Case No. 878/16 (Reference No.92/14) does not call for any interference. 27. The writ petition accordingly stands dismissed. 26. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that the impugned order dated 20.05.2019 passed by the learned Foreigners Tribunal No. 11, Barpeta, Sorbhog in F.T. Case No. 878/16 (Reference No.92/14) does not call for any interference. 27. The writ petition accordingly stands dismissed. Interim order passed earlier stands vacated. The actions consequent upon the opinion rendered by the learned Tribunal would follow in accordance with law. 28 . The records of the learned Tribunal be returned forthwith, along with a copy of this order.