JUDGEMENT : YARENJUNGLA LONGKUMER, J. The instant Appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 has been filed against the judgment and award dated 24.01.2023 passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Tuensang, Nagaland, in MAC Case No. 03/2021 by which the appellant was directed to pay an amount of Rs.59,07,081/- along with interest at 7.5% per annum from the date of filing the claim petition. The appellant herein is the Cholamandalam MS General Insurance Company Limited. 2. Before going into the merit of the case, the facts leading to the claim of the respondents/claimant is set out in brief. On 10.01.2020 while the deceased was waiting on the road side of NH 15 near Sonapur High School, the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AS-07-AC/6442 being driven at high speed and in a reckless manner coming from North Lakhimpur side towards Laluk knocked down the standing deceased with great force. Resultantly, the deceased sustained grievous injuries and succumed to his injuries on 11.01.2020 while taking treatment at Dibrugarh. The wife and children of the deceased filed the claim petition against the respondents claiming compensation jointly and severally. 3. The insurer/appellant was impleaded as respondent No. 3 and contested the claim petition, denying the liability to pay the compensation. To establish the cause of the accident as rash and negligent driving, the claimants deposed before the learned tribunal and exhibited the chargesheet with regard to the accident that occurred on 10.01.2020. The appellant did not examine any witness. The tribunal on consideration of the entire matter and finding all relevant documents pertaining to the offending vehicle to be valid at the time of the accident granted compensation as stated hereinabove. 4. Heard Mr. Taka Kichu, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. B.N. Sarmah, learned counsel for the claimant/respondents. 5. Before this Court, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that all the sons of the deceased had attained majority as they are 38 years, 35 years and 20 years respectively, and as such, the deduction of 1/3 should have been made while calculating the compensation. Another ground which the appellant had taken is that the I.O of the case was not examined and therefore, the rash and negligent driving of the driver of offending vehicle was not proved. Another ground which the appellant had taken is that the I.O of the case was not examined and therefore, the rash and negligent driving of the driver of offending vehicle was not proved. The learned counsel submits that the Tribunal should have at least considered the average income basing on the salary slip of the deceased. In view of the above submissions, the learned counsel prays that the impugned judgment and order dated 24.01.2023 passed in MAC Case No. 03/2021 should be quashed and set aside and/or be remanded back to the learned tribunal for a fresh determination of the compensation amount 6. Refuting the arguments of the appellant, the learned counsel for the claimant/respondents, Mr. B.N. Sarmah submits that the instant appeal is not maintainable as no steps were taken by the appellant under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicle Act before the Tribunal in order to enable the appellant to assail the judgment of the tribunal on all grounds as raised in the instant appeal. In the absence of an order under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicle Act, the appellant can be confined only to the statutory defenses as provided under Section 149 (2) of the MV Act/ new Section 150(2). To support his submissions, reliance was placed on National Insurance Company Ltd, Chandigarh -versus- Nicolletta Rohtagi & Ors’ (2002) 7 SCC 456 7. Learned counsel also submits that the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the offending vehicle has been established by the evidence of PW-2 & PW-3 and also by the chargesheet which was exhibited before the tribunal. He has submitted that the non-examination of the I.O is not fatal as the other evidence adduced by the claimants has already proved the factum of accident and the fact regarding the rash and negligent act of the driver. 8. Another argument which the learned counsel for the respondents/claimant has made is that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of S. Thangaraj -VS- National Insurance Co.Ltd, (2018) 3 SCC 605 , upheld the interest of 9% per annum, and interest at 9% per annum was also upheld in the case of Bhartiban Nayabha Ker & Ors -VS- Sidabha Pethabha Manke & Ors in A.I.R 2018 SC 2728 . The learned counsel for the respondent/claimant has further submitted that the sons and widow of the deceased are the class-1 legal heirs of the deceased and as such, they are entitled to claim compensation upon the death of their father/husband. Learned counsel therefore submits that in light of the aforementioned facts and circumstances, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed. 9. Having considered the opposing arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, and having perused the trial court records placed before this Court, the only question that falls for consideration before this Court is: - i) Whether the present appeal is maintainable without an order under Section 170 of the MV, Act to enable the appellant to raise grounds beyond those prescribed under Section 149 (2) of the MV, Act. 10. In order to understand the matter in its correct perspective, it is essential to extract the provisions of Section 170 of the MV, Act 1988: - “ 170. Impleading insurer in certain cases. ––Where in the course of any inquiry, the Claims Tribunal is satisfied that–– (a) there is collusion between the person making the claim and the person against whom the claim is made, or (b) the person against whom the claim is made has failed to contest the claim, it may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct that the insurer who may be liable in respect of such claim, shall be impleaded as a party to the proceeding and the insurer so impleaded shall thereupon have, without prejudice to the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of section 149, the right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the person against whom the claim has been made.” 11. While considering the ambit of the provisions of Sections 147, 149, 170 and 173 of the MV, Act, 1988, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Nicolletta Rohtagi (supra), held that : - “25. We have earlier noticed that motor vehicle accident claim is a tortious claim directed against tortfeasors who are the insured and the driver of the vehicle and the insurer comes to the scene as a result of statutory liability created under the Motor Vehicles Act. The legislature has ensured by enacting Section 149 of the Act that the victims of motor vehicle are fully compensated and protected. The legislature has ensured by enacting Section 149 of the Act that the victims of motor vehicle are fully compensated and protected. It is for that reason the insurer cannot escape from its liability to pay compensation on any exclusionary clause in the insurance policy except those specified in Section 149(2) of the Act or where the condition precedent specified in Section 170 is satisfied. 26. For the aforesaid reasons, an insurer if aggrieved against an award, may file an appeal only on those grounds and no other. However, by virtue of Section 170 of the 1988 Act, where in course of an enquiry the Claims Tribunal is satisfied that (a) there is a collusion between the person making a claim and the person against whom the claim has been made, or (b) the person against whom the claim has been made has failed to contest the claim, the Tribunal may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, implead the insurer and in that case it is permissible for the insurer to contest the claim also on the grounds which are available to the insured or to the person against whom the claim has been made. Thus, unless an order is passed by the Tribunal permitting the insurer to avail the grounds available to an insured or any other person against whom a claim has been made on being satisfied of the two conditions specified in Section 170 of the Act, it is not permissible to the insurer to contest the claim on the grounds which are available to the insured or to a person against whom a claim has been made. Thus, where conditions precedent embodied in Section 170 are satisfied and award is adverse to the interest of the insurer, the insurer has a right to file an appeal challenging the quantum of compensation or negligence or contributory negligence of the offending vehicle even if the insured has not filed any appeal against the quantum of compensation. Sections 149, 170 and 173 are part of one scheme and if we give any different interpretation to Section 173 of the 1988 Act, the same would go contrary to the scheme and object of the Act." 12. It was further observed by the Supreme Court that Section 149 (7) of the MV Act, clearly indicates the manner in which Section 149(2) is to be interpreted. It was further observed by the Supreme Court that Section 149 (7) of the MV Act, clearly indicates the manner in which Section 149(2) is to be interpreted. An insurer can avoid its liability only in accordance with what has been provided for in section 149 (2). In other words, an insurer cannot avoid its liability on any other grounds except those mentioned in Sub-Section 2 of Section 149 of the MV, Act. The Apex Court was also of the view that the legislature by enacting Section 149 of the MV Act insured that the victims of Motor Vehicle Accidents are fully compensated and protected and compulsory insurance of Motor Vehicle was not to promote the business interest of the insurer but, to protect the interest of the driving public or those using the roads from the risk upon the user of Motor Vehicle on the roads. If law would have provided only for compensation to dependents of victims of the Motor Vehicle Accident, that would not have sufficed, unless there was a guarantee that compensation awarded to an injured or dependent of the victim of a motor accident could be recoverable from the person held liable, for the consequences of the accident. It is for that reason the insurer cannot escape from its liability to pay compensation from any exclusionary clause in the insurance policy, except those specified in Section 149 (2) of the Act or where the conditions specified in Section 170 of the Motor Vehicle Act is satisfied. Thus, if the insurer is aggrieved by an award, they may file an appeal on those grounds and not any other, unless an order is passed by the tribunal under Section 170 of the MV Act permitting the insurer to avail the grounds available to an insured or any other person against whom claim has been made, on being satisfied of the 2 (two) conditions specified in Section 170 of the Act. The Supreme Court therefore concluded that unless the conditions specified in Section 170 of the MV Act are satisfied, an Insurance Company has no right to file an appeal challenging the award on merit. It is not permissible for an insurer to file an appeal questioning the quantum of compensation as well as the findings regarding negligence or contributory negligence of the offending vehicle. 13. It is not permissible for an insurer to file an appeal questioning the quantum of compensation as well as the findings regarding negligence or contributory negligence of the offending vehicle. 13. Thus, the law is well settled that where there is no specific order of the tribunal under Section 170 of the MV Act, the grounds for appeal are to be confined to the parameters prescribed in Section 149(2) of the MV Act. 14. In the present case a perusal of the trial court records shows that an application under Section 170 of the MV Act was filed by the appellant before the learned tribunal. However, the order sheets of the learned tribunal bears no indication of any order passed under Section 170 of the MV Act. Be that as it may, the application under Section 170 could not have been allowed by the Tribunal as the owner/insured had appeared and genuinely contested the case. 15. In view of the discussion hereinabove, this Court is of the view that the present appeal is not maintainable in the absence of a specific order of the tribunal under Section 170 of the MV Act, allowing the appellant to raise all grounds in appeal. 16. The records show that the appellant had deposited 50% of the awarded amount before the Registry of this Court which has been withdrawn by the claimant/ respondent on 30.01.2025. The appellant shall therefore deposit the balance amount of the compensation before the learned Tribunal within a period of 2 (two) months from the date of this order. 17. The Impugned Judgment & Award dated 24.01.2023 passed in MAC Appeal No.3/2021 by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Tuensang, is accordingly upheld. 18. The appeal is disposed of. No order as to costs. The Registry shall send back the TCR to the learned MACT, Tuensang forthwith.