JUDGMENT : M. Zothankhuma, J. 1. Heard Mr. H.R.A. Choudhury, learned Sr. Counsel assisted by Mr. I.U. Chowdhury, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Ms. B. Bhuyan, learned Sr. Counsel and Addl. P.P, Assam assisted by Ms. R. Das, learned counsel for the State respondent. 2. This appeal has been filed against the impugned Judgment dated 04/12/2024, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Charaideo, Sonari, in Sessions (Cha) Case No.18/2019, by which the appellant has been convicted under Section 302 IPC, for having caused the death of his wife, by pouring kerosene over his wife and setting her on fire. 3. One ground of challenge made to the impugned judgment is that the deceased had told PW-6 that the appellant was innocent. The evidence of the independent witness (PW-6) is to the effect that he had gone to the hospital, where the deceased was undergoing treatment, wherein he was told by the deceased that the appellant was not guilty in relation to the deceased being set on fire. 4. The learned Sr. Counsel for the appellant also submits that though the evidence of the sister of the deceased (PW-2), in her examination-in-chief, is to the effect that the appellant husband had first strangulated the deceased and then poured oil and set her on fire, the same had been denied by her in her cross-examination. In the re-examination of PW-2, which had been done 4 ½ years later on 26/06/2024, with regard to the contradictory evidence given by PW-2 on 15/11/2019, PW-2 had stated that the appellant had poured kerosene on her deceased sister and set her on fire. The learned Sr. Counsel for the appellant submits that the above contradictory statements of PW-2 shows that PW-2 is not a credible witness and her evidence would have to be corroborated before her testimony can be relied upon. On the other hand, there is nothing to show that PW-6 was not a credible witness, as his evidence was not shaken or controverted during cross-examination. Thus, when there are two sets of evidence/views with regard to a particular fact, the evidence/view in favour of the accused would have to be accepted by the Court. 5. On the other hand, the learned Addl. Thus, when there are two sets of evidence/views with regard to a particular fact, the evidence/view in favour of the accused would have to be accepted by the Court. 5. On the other hand, the learned Addl. P.P submits that the evidence of PW-2 having clearly proved that the appellant had set the deceased on fire, there was no infirmity with the decision of the learned Trial Court in convicting the appellant under section 302 IPC. Further, the evidence of the witnesses showed that the relationship between the deceased and the appellant, who were a married couple, was not smooth and there were frequent quarrels between them. Thus, there was motive for the appellant to have killed his wife. The learned Addl. P.P further submits that the appellant has not discharged his burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act with regard to his knowledge, in relation to the death of the deceased. 6. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties. 7. The brief facts of the case is that the informant (PW-1), who is the brother of the deceased and the brother-in-law of the appellant, is to the effect that he submitted an FIR dated 08/09/2017 stating that the appellant and his deceased sister had married about 11 years ago. However, after about 2 years, the appellant began subjecting his sister to physical and mental torture over household issues. Around 10 pm on 31/08/2017, the appellant had slapped, kicked and punched his sister and also assaulted her with a bamboo stick. As a result, she sustained severe injuries. Moreover, the appellant poured kerosene oil on her body and set her on fire inside his house. Though his sister was taken to Assam Medical College and Hospital (AMCH), Dibrugarh, she breathed her last on 07/09/2017. He also stated that his younger sister (PW-2) also sustained injuries while trying to save the deceased. Pursuant to the FIR dated 08/09/ 2017, Sapekhati Police Station Case No. 78/2017 under section 302 IPC was registered. After charge sheet had been filed, the learned Trial Court framed charges under section 302 IPC against the appellant, to which the appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 8. The evidence of the informant (PW-1), who is the brother of his deceased sister, is to be effect that the appellant and the deceased were married around 11 years ago. 8. The evidence of the informant (PW-1), who is the brother of his deceased sister, is to be effect that the appellant and the deceased were married around 11 years ago. One day his younger sister (PW-2) informed him that the appellant had burned the deceased. As the deceased was taken to AMCH, Dibrugarh, he went there and saw severe burn injuries on the lower parts of the body of his sister. The informant then stated that the deceased had told him that on the previous night, she had a quarrel with the appellant, due to which the appellant had poured oil on her and burnt her. 9. In his cross examination, PW-1 stated that they used to visit the house of the appellant and that the appellant treated them well. He also stated that no case had been lodged by them in respect of the incident of harassment of his sister. He also stated that he did not tell the Police that prior to her death, the deceased sister had told him that the appellant had burned her by pouring oil. In his evidence, PW-1 also stated that the appellant had tried to save the deceased by providing treatment and that his sister had died on the way home after being discharged from hospital. He also stated that it was true that his sister died by committing suicide. However, he stated that it was not true that the appellant did not commit any offense. PW-1 also stated that no one had attended the funeral of his sister 10. The evidence of PW-2, who is the sister of the deceased and the sister- in-law of the appellant, is to the effect that she was at her sister's house at the time of incident, which occurred around 9.30 am. A quarrel had taken place between her sister and the appellant, which led to the appellant strangulating her sister. Thereafter, when her sister started taking her meal, the appellant threw away her plate. The appellant then poured oil on her sister and set her on fire. PW-2 states that she tried to save her sister due to which she sustained burn injury. Her sister was then taken to AMCH, Dibrugarh, where she stayed for 7 (seven) days and subsequently died. The appellant then poured oil on her sister and set her on fire. PW-2 states that she tried to save her sister due to which she sustained burn injury. Her sister was then taken to AMCH, Dibrugarh, where she stayed for 7 (seven) days and subsequently died. In her cross examination, PW-2 stated that she did not say anything about the incident to anybody, as her sister told her that a stove had burst and as she had been threatened. Further, her sister did not tell anyone anything. PW-2 further stated that prior to lodging the FIR, she did not tell anything to anyone. She also denied the suggestion that she did not tell the Police that the appellant threw the plate of her sister while she was having her meal and that the appellant tried to take her sister to Sivasagar hospital. In her cross examination, PW-2 also stated that the appellant had not poured oil on her sister and set her on fire. PW-2 also stated that no one had attended the funeral of her sister. 11. As the deposition of PW-2, which was held on 15/11/2019, was contradictory, inasmuch as, she had stated that the appellant had poured oil on her sister and set her on fire, PW-2 had stated the same to be not true in her cross examination. Due to the above contradiction, PW-2 was again called for re-examination on 26/06/2024 wherein she was asked to clarify the contradiction in her evidence given 4½ years earlier. The PW-2 in her evidence given on 26/06/2024, clarified that the appellant had poured kerosene on her sister and set her on fire. 12. The evidence of PW-3, who is the brother of the informant, is to effect that he was informed by PW-2 and PW-1 that the appellant had set the deceased on fire. PW-3 stated that the deceased was unable to talk. In his cross examination, PW-3 stated that the appellant also tried to save the deceased. 13. The evidence of PW-4, who is another brother of the informant, was to the effect that PW-2 had informed him that a quarrel had taken place between the deceased and the appellant. When the deceased went to have a meal, the appellant threw it away. After that the appellant set the deceased on fire. 13. The evidence of PW-4, who is another brother of the informant, was to the effect that PW-2 had informed him that a quarrel had taken place between the deceased and the appellant. When the deceased went to have a meal, the appellant threw it away. After that the appellant set the deceased on fire. Thereafter, PW-4 and his mother went to AMCH, Dibrugarh, to meet the deceased, who was being treated there. On meeting her, PW-4 stated that the deceased was able to talk slowly, wherein she told him that the appellant had poured kerosene on her and set her on fire. In her cross examination, PW-4 stated that they did not lodge any case as they had been prevented by the appellant. He also stated that they did not attend the funeral of his sister. 14. The evidence of PW-5, who is a villager, is to the effect that he had heard that the deceased had caught fire and that the appellant had extinguished it. On hearing about the incident, he had gone to the house of the appellant and saw the deceased who was being taken to hospital. In his cross examination, PW-5 stated that the hand of the appellant was burnt while trying to douse the fire on the deceased. 15. The evidence of PW-6, who is a Mason, is to the effect that on hearing a hue and cry, he went to the house of the appellant and saw the deceased on fire. He also stated that he heard that the deceased had set herself on fire by pouring oil. PW-6 also stated that he went to AMCH while the deceased was undergoing treatment, wherein the deceased told him that the appellant was not guilty and that she had set herself on fire. He also stated that the family members of the deceased were present. In his cross-examination, PW-6 stated that the appellant had taken the deceased for treatment and burnt his hand while trying to save her life. 16. The evidence of PW-7, who is a carpenter, is to the effect that he did not know how the deceased had caught fire. 17. The evidence of PW-8, who is the Doctor who conducted post-mortem examination over the dead body of the deceased, is to the effect that there was burn injury of 72% on the body of the deceased. The evidence of PW-7, who is a carpenter, is to the effect that he did not know how the deceased had caught fire. 17. The evidence of PW-8, who is the Doctor who conducted post-mortem examination over the dead body of the deceased, is to the effect that there was burn injury of 72% on the body of the deceased. In his opinion, the cause of death was due to syncope, as a result of massive burn. 18. The evidence of PW-9, who is the Investigating Officer, is to the effect that he took charge of the investigation and recorded the statement of the witnesses. He also stated that PW-2 did not state during investigation that the appellant had thrown away the plate of her deceased sister while she was having her meal. Further, PW-2 did not tell him that the appellant tried to take her deceased sister to the hospital at Sivasagar. Further, the deceased had died after being discharged from the hospital on 07/09/2017 and that the deceased had been admitted to AMCH, Dibrugarh on 03/09/2017. 19. The examination of the appellant under section 313 Cr.P.C. is to the effect that the evidence that he had burnt his wife, was false. 20. The facts of the case, as can be culled out from the evidence of the witnesses shows that the incident had occurred on 31/08/2017. The injured deceased was then taken to AMCH, Dibrugarh. In the evidence of PW-9 (IO), she was taken to hospital on 03/09/2017. The deceased was then discharged from hospital on 07/09/2017 and died on the way home. 21. The issues that have to be decided is as to whether the appellant had set the deceased on fire. While PW-2 had stated that she saw the appellant pouring kerosene on her sister and setting her on fire, the evidence of PW-4 is to the effect that when he went to meet his sister in AMCH, Dibrugarh, the deceased told him that the appellant had poured kerosene on her and set her on fire. On the other hand, the evidence of the independent witness, PW-6, is to the effect that the deceased told him in the hospital that the appellant was not guilty and she had set herself on fire. On the other hand, the evidence of the independent witness, PW-6, is to the effect that the deceased told him in the hospital that the appellant was not guilty and she had set herself on fire. On a consideration of whether the evidence of PW-1 and PW-4 are to be believed, keeping in view the contradictory evidence given by PW-6, we find that nothing to that effect has been mentioned in the FIR submitted by PW-1. If we are to assume that PW-1 & 4 were told by the deceased in the hospital that the appellant set her on fire, there was no reason not to have mentioned the same in the FIR, while the deceased was undergoing treatment in the hospital, where she spent 8 days prior to discharge. The reason for the delay in filing the FIR is also not explained. 22. We find that PW-2 cannot be said to be a credible witness, inasmuch as, she has given contradictory evidence. While she has stated in her examination- in- chief and re-examination that the appellant had set her sister on fire by pouring kerosene oil upon her, she has stated the opposite in her cross- examination, where she stated that the deceased had told her that a stove had burst and that the appellant had not poured oil on her sister or set her on fire. 23. In the case of Rai Sandeep alias Deepu Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2012) 8 SCC 21 , the Supreme Court has held that conviction can rest on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, which should be of sterling quality. It also held that the statement of a prosecutrix should be consistent, natural and free from material contradictions. The stand of the sterling witness should be consistent from the very beginning till the very end, besides the witness being able to withstand any questions put to him or her. 24. The other issue is that PW-4, in his examination-in-chief, had stated that he had gone to meet his injured sister who was completely burnt, in the hospital. She was able to talk slowly and she told him that the appellant had poured kerosene and set her on fire. PW-4 has not clarified as to whether it was PW-2 or the deceased who had told him that the appellant had poured kerosene and set the deceased on fire. She was able to talk slowly and she told him that the appellant had poured kerosene and set her on fire. PW-4 has not clarified as to whether it was PW-2 or the deceased who had told him that the appellant had poured kerosene and set the deceased on fire. Even if we are to assume that PW-4 had been talking about the deceased, with regard to the above statement made by the deceased that the appellant was guilty, we have to remember that PW-2 and PW-4 are the sister and brother of the deceased. Though the relationship of a Prosecution witness to the deceased itself is not sufficient for disbelieving the testimony of a relative unless motive is alleged and proved, the Court would have to be careful with the evidence of a relative if there are some other factors which may go against the prosecution case. In the present case, the major contradictions in the evidence of PW-2 and the delay in lodging the FIR, despite the alleged disclosure made by the deceased to PW-1 and PW-4 that the appellant had set her on fire, creates a doubt as to whether the testimonies of PW-1, 2 and 4 are truthful. In the case of Shiv Ram Vs. State of U.P reported in (1998) 1 SCC 149 , the Supreme Court has held that the evidence of a witness cannot be discredited on the ground that they are close relatives of the deceased person, but what is required is that the Court must scrutinize the evidence with utmost care and caution. 25. In the present case, PW-6 has categorically stated in his evidence as a Prosecution witness that the deceased had told him that the appellant was innocent and that she had burnt herself. PW-6 has also not been declared a hostile witness and the evidence given by him had not been subjected to any cross-examination. The evidence of PW-6 is also to the effect that the appellant took his burnt wife for treatment and burnt his hand while trying to save her. Though the learned Trial Court in Para 44 of the impugned judgment has held that PW-6 had not made any such statement to the police regarding what had been told to PW-6 by the deceased in his 161 Cr.P.C statement, PW-6 has not been confronted with his Section 161 Cr.P.C. statement, to discredit his testimony. Though the learned Trial Court in Para 44 of the impugned judgment has held that PW-6 had not made any such statement to the police regarding what had been told to PW-6 by the deceased in his 161 Cr.P.C statement, PW-6 has not been confronted with his Section 161 Cr.P.C. statement, to discredit his testimony. As such, we would have to consider the evidence of PW-6 as uncontroverted. 26. The learned Trial Court in paragraph 36.4 and 37 of the impugned judgment has come to a finding that the deceased was able to talk prior to her death and that the deceased gave a dying declaration, which proved that the appellant had set fire to her. Interestingly, the learned Trial Court has not discussed about the evidence of PW-6, except by stating that in the statement of PW-6 made under Section 161 Cr.P.C, there was nothing to the effect that the deceased had stated that the appellant was innocent. 27. It is interesting to note that the learned Trial Court has, however, forgotten to take into consideration the evidence of PW-5, who stated that the appellant had extinguished the fire which had engulfed the victim. 28. The learned Trial Court has also found the appellant to be guilty on the ground that the couple used to quarrel. With regard to the above, we find nothing abnormal with regard to couples quarrelling. Marriage makes couples learn to compromise and quarrelling doesn't imply that the marriage is doomed or on the rocks. The learned Trial Court should have understood that there can be a bad quarrel, or there could be a quarrel for resolution of differences, inasmuch as, different people have different points of view. As couples get to know each other, there is bound to be some aspects that a couple might like or dislike in respect of the other person. There can be healthy fights where parties vocalize their disagreements. It can be productive, and it can be non-productive too. No discussion having been made by the learned Trial Court as to whether the quarrels between the couple was abnormal or a bad quarrel which ended in physical beatings or otherwise, does not allow us to speculate or come to a finding that the couple had bad quarrels. The fact that also cannot be lost sight of is that the couple had been married for 11 years. 29. The fact that also cannot be lost sight of is that the couple had been married for 11 years. 29. The FIR submitted by PW-1 is to the effect that the appellant had slapped, kicked and punched the deceased, besides assaulting her with a bamboo stick. Thereafter, the appellant was alleged to have poured kerosene oil on her body and set her on fire. This slapping, kicking, punching and assaulting the deceased with a bamboo stick is however, completely absent in the evidence of PWs-1, 2, 3 & 4. None of the Prosecution witnesses have stated that the appellant had beaten up the deceased. This leads us to believe that the contents of the FIR submitted by PW-1 which had been made on the basis of the information received by him from PW-2 was not correct. Thus, we are not inclined to believe the evidence of PW-2 who is the alleged sole eyewitness to the alleged crime. Besides, the deceased had apparently told PW-6 that the appellant was innocent and that she had burned herself. Though the learned Trial Court has held that the deceased could talk and that she had made a dying declaration at the time PW-1 and PW-4 along with their mother were present in the hospital, PW-1 has not stated in his evidence that the deceased had given a dying declaration. In fact, except for PW-4, none of the Prosecution witnesses have stated that the deceased had given a dying declaration, pointing to the guilt of the appellant as the person who had set the deceased on fire. 30. In view of the above reasons, we have two contradictory evidence and as such, two views as to whether the appellant was the perpetrator of the crime or not. 31. In the case of Kali Ram Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh , reported in (1973) 2 SCC 808 , the Supreme Court has held that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in a case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. Thus, when a reasonable doubt arises regarding the guilt of the accused, the benefit of that doubt cannot be withheld from the accused. 32. Thus, when a reasonable doubt arises regarding the guilt of the accused, the benefit of that doubt cannot be withheld from the accused. 32. Though the learned Trial Court has taken the view that the deceased, during her stay in hospital, could talk and that she made a dying declaration to PWs 1, 4 & 6, we are of the view that the alleged information given by the deceased to the above Prosecution Witnesses cannot be said to be a dying declaration, inasmuch as, there is nothing to show that the deceased was on the verge of death. Further, if the deceased was going to die, but had been able to speak at different times, the Doctor and the Police could have been called and the dying declaration recorded. No doubt, an oral dying declaration of a person suffering from serious burn injuries, which is free from tutoring and found reliable by the Court, can form a basis for conviction of person, as held in the case of State of M.P. Vs. Dal Singh reported in (2013) 14 SCC 159 . However, as stated above, the deceased could not be said to have given a dying declaration and as such, the same cannot be used as evidence against the appellant, especially when a different statement has been given to PW-6. 33. In the case of Purshottam Chopra & Anr. Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [Crl. Appeal Nos. 194-195 of 2012] , which was disposed of on 07/01/2020, the Supreme Court in para 21 of the said judgment, summed up some of the principles relating to recording of a dying declaration, its admissibility and its reliability, which are as follows :- “i) A dying declaration could be the sole basis of conviction even without corroboration, if it inspires confidence of the Court. ii) The Court should be satisfied that the declarant was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement; and that it was a voluntary statement, which was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. iii) Where a dying declaration is suspicious or is suffering from any infirmity such as want of fit state of mind of the declarant or of like nature, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. iii) Where a dying declaration is suspicious or is suffering from any infirmity such as want of fit state of mind of the declarant or of like nature, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. iv) When the eye-witnesses affirm that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the statement, the medical opinion cannot prevail. v) The law does not provide as to who could record dying declaration nor there is any prescribed format or procedure for the same but the person recording dying declaration must be satisfied that the maker is in a fit state of mind and is capable of making the statement vi) Although presence of a Magistrate is not absolutely necessary for recording of a dying declaration but to ensure authenticity and credibility, it is expected that a Magistrate be requested to record such dying declaration and/or attestation be obtained from other persons present at the time of recording the dying declaration. vii) As regards a burns case, the percentage and degree of burns would not, by itself, be decisive of the credibility of dying declaration; and the decisive factor would be the quality of evidence about the fit and conscious state of the declarant to make the statement. viii) If after careful scrutiny, the Court finds the statement placed as dying declaration to be voluntary and also finds it coherent and consistent, there is no legal impediment in recording conviction on its basis even without corroboration.” 34. In the case of Parbin Ali and another Vs. State of Assam reported in (2013) 2 SCC 81 , the Supreme Court has held that the constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Laxman Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2002) 6 SCC 710 had held that a dying declaration can be oral. In the case of Laxman (Supra) , the Supreme Court held that a dying declaration can be oral or in writing and any adequate method of communication, whether by words or by sign or otherwise will suffice, provided the indication is positive and definite. In the case of Laxman (Supra) , the Supreme Court held that a dying declaration can be oral or in writing and any adequate method of communication, whether by words or by sign or otherwise will suffice, provided the indication is positive and definite. The Supreme Court in Laxman (Supra) further held that the acceptability of a dying declaration is that the same is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every hope of the world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the man is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak only the truth. It further held that notwithstanding the same, great caution must be exercised in considering the weight to be given to this species of evidence, on account of the existence of many circumstances which may affect their truth. 35. As the deceased had apparently blamed the appellant as the cause for being set on fire to PWs 1 & 4, at the time she was in hospital, the same does not ipso facto mean that she was at the point of death when she made the statement. Similarly, the information given to PW-6 by the deceased, that the appellant was not to blame for her being on fire, also cannot be said to be a dying declaration. The Supreme Court in the case of Laxman (Supra) has held that a dying declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and every hope of the world is gone, every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the man is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak only the truth. On the other hand, in this case, there is no evidence to the effect that the deceased was at the point of death, at the time when she made the contradictory statements to PWs-1, 4 & 6, regarding the role of the appellant in the deceased being set on fire. In fact, the witnesses have also not stated that the deceased had given a dying declaration. Further the deceased had been discharged from hospital 8 days after the incident and had died on the way home. As such, it cannot be said that the deceased had given any dying declaration to PW-1, PW-4 or PW-6. 36. In fact, the witnesses have also not stated that the deceased had given a dying declaration. Further the deceased had been discharged from hospital 8 days after the incident and had died on the way home. As such, it cannot be said that the deceased had given any dying declaration to PW-1, PW-4 or PW-6. 36. The above being said, it is settled law that in a criminal case, when two views are possible, the view favouring the accused should be accepted. In view of the above, we hold that the evidence of PWs-1 and 4, to the effect that the deceased had told them that the appellant had set her on fire cannot be accepted, when there is the uncontroverted evidence of PW-6. As such, it cannot be said that it was proved beyond all reasonable doubt, that the appellant was guilty of having set fire to his wife. 37. Another aspect of the case is that the incident occurred on 31/08/2017 and the deceased died on 07/09/2017, after being discharged from hospital. The FIR was however been filed only on 08/09/2017. If the family members of the deceased were sure that the appellant had been the perpetrator of the crime, as PW-1 & PW-4 had stated that they were told of the same in the hospital by the deceased, there was no justifiable reason for the FIR to be filed only after the death of the deceased, i.e., 8 days after the incident on 08/09/2017, while the incident occurred on 31/08/2017. It could have been filed at any prior time, especially during the initial period of the crime. This delay in filing the FIR, in our view, does not support the case of the Prosecution, as there is no reason given by any of the family members to have filed a delayed FIR. 38. In the case of Hariprasad alias Kishan Sahu Vs. State of Chattisgarh, reported in (2024) 2 SCC 557 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the delay in lodging an FIR, by itself cannot be regarded as sufficient ground to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution case, nor could it be treated to be fatal to the case of prosecution. The Court has to ascertain the causes for the delay, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. The Court has to ascertain the causes for the delay, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. If the causes are not attributable to any effort to concoct a version, mere delay by itself would not be fatal to the case of the prosecution. 39. On considering all the above facts, we are of the view that the Prosecution has not been able to prove the guilt of the appellant as being the perpetrator of the death of the deceased beyond all reasonable doubt. The delay in lodging the FIR has not been explained and as such, we find the same to be fatal to case of the Prosecution, as there was enough time to make embellishments to the case and concoct a false case for the death of the deceased, especially when the eyewitness (PW-2) had also stated in her cross- examination that the stove had burst. Further, some of the Prosecution witnesses have testified that the appellant tried to save the deceased. Besides, we are not fully convinced with the truthfulness of the Prosecution case and the testimonies of the witnesses due to the FIR not being filed earlier. Accordingly, we acquit the appellant from the charge under Section 302 IPC, by giving him the benefit of doubt. Consequently, the impugned Judgment dated 04/12/2024, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Charaideo, Sonari is hereby set aside. 40. The respondents are directed to release the appellant from judicial custody immediately, if not required in some other case. 41. The appeal is accordingly disposed of. 42. Send back the TCR.