Judgment & Order : (S.K. Medhi, J.) The extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court has been sought to be invoked by filing this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by putting to challenge the opinion rendered vide impugned order dated 17.11.2018 passed by the learned Member, Foreigners Tribunal III, Barpeta in F.T. Case No.1192(III) of 2013 declaring the petitioner as a foreigner u/s 2 (a) of the Foreigners’ Act, 1946. By the impugned judgment, the petitioner, who was the proceedee before the learned Tribunal, has been declared to be a foreigner post 25.03.1971. 2. The facts of the case may be put in a nutshell as follows: (i) A reference was made by the Superintendent of Police (B), Barpeta District, against the petitioner giving rise to the aforesaid F.T. Case No. 1192 (III)/2013. (ii) As per requirement u/s 9 of the Foreigner’s Act, 1946 to prove that the proceedee is not a foreigner, the petitioner had filed the written statement on 23.03.2018 along with certain documents and adduced evidence through 5 nos. of DWs. (iii) The learned Tribunal, after considering the facts and circumstances and taking into account of the provisions of Section 9 of the Foreigners’ Act, 1946 had come to a finding that the petitioner, as opposite party, had failed to discharge the burden cast upon her and accordingly, the opinion was rendered declaring the petitioner to be a foreign national post 25.03.1971. 3. We have heard Shri P. A. Ahmed, learned counsel for the petitioner. We have also heard Ms. A. Verma, learned Standing Counsel, Home Department; Shri G. Sarma, learned Standing Counsel, NRC; Shri P. Sarma, learned GA, Assam, Shri N. Kalita, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Shri A. I. Ali, learned Standing Counsel, Election Commission of India and Shri S. S. Roy, learned CGC. We have also carefully examined the records which were requisitioned vide order dated 30.10.2019. 4. Shri Ahmed, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner could prove her case with cogent evidence and in view of the fact that there was no rebuttal evidence, the learned Tribunal should have accepted the said proof and accordingly hold the petitioner to be a citizen of India. In this regard, he has referred to the evidence of the 5 nos. of DWs and also the following documentary evidence. (i) Ext-A – Certified copy of voter list 1966. In this regard, he has referred to the evidence of the 5 nos. of DWs and also the following documentary evidence. (i) Ext-A – Certified copy of voter list 1966. (ii) Ext-B – Certified copy of voter list 1970. (iii) Ext-C - Certified copy of voter list 1985. (iv) Ext-D – Certified copy of voter list 1989. (v) Ext-E – Certified copy of voter list 1997. (vi) Ext-F – Elector Photo Identity Card of 2013. (vii) Ext-G – Gaonburah Certificate. (viii) Ext.-H – Gaon Panchayat Certificate. (ix) Ext. I – Affidavit. (ix) Ext.-J – Elector Photo Identity Card of 2013. (x) Annexure-1 – Copy of NRC details of 1951 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in the written statement, all material disclosures were made. He has submitted that the petitioner was born in the year 1960 and her marriage was in the year 1994. He has referred to the Voters List of 1966 containing the name of her father as Mowab Ali. He has also referred to the Voters List of the year 1970 containing the names of her parents and grandmother. It is submitted that due to river erosion, the family had to shift to village Kaltoli and in the Voters List of 1985, the names of the father and two siblings had appeared under village Kaltoli. 6. The next voters list is of the year 1989 containing the names of the parents, one brother and sister-in-law followed by the Voters List of 1997 wherein there is an addition of another brother and a different sister-in-law. Reference is also made to the Voters List of 1994 with the name of the petitioner. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the Gaonburah Certificate dated 10.05.2017 read with the deposition by the Gaonburah as DW 5. It is highlighted that the DW 5 had deposed that he has been the Gaonburah since 1975 and since the certificate had disclosed the link with the father, the petitioner had discharged her burden. Similar submission had also been made in respect of the certificate of the Gaon Panchayat dated 10.06.2015 read with the evidence of the Panchayat Secretary as DW 4. 8. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the following decisions: i. AIR 1959 SC 914 (Dol Gobinda Paricha Vs. Nimai Charan Misra and Ors.) ii. 8. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the following decisions: i. AIR 1959 SC 914 (Dol Gobinda Paricha Vs. Nimai Charan Misra and Ors.) ii. (2008) 4 SCC 75 (Bant Singh and Anr. Vs Niranjan Singh (Dead) by LRS. And Anr.) iii. (2019) 5 SCC 534 (Sirajul Hoque Vs. State of Assam and Ors.) iv. 2021 (4) GLT 664 (Sujab Ali (Md) Vs. Union of India & Ors.) v. 2021 (3) GLT 85 (Haidar Ali Vs. Union of India & Ors.) 9. The cases of Dol Gobinda (supra) and Bant Singh (supra) have been cited in the context of the evidence adduced by the DW 2 (mother) and DW 3 (brother) and has submitted that evidence of family members on the relationship cannot be discarded. The case of Sujab Ali (supra) is on the same subject. The case of Haider Ali (supra) is on the aspect of the presentation of the written statement and also evidence to be adduced by a proceedee. The case of Sirajul Hoque (supra) has been cited in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court had held that minor inconsistencies in the Voters Lists can be ignored. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner accordingly submits that in view of the availability of the aforesaid materials, the impugned opinion could not have been rendered against the petitioner and therefore, the same requires interference. 11. Per contra, Ms. Verma, the learned Standing Counsel, Home Department has categorically refuted the stand taken on behalf of the petitioner. He submits that a proceeding under the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 relates to determination as to whether the proceedee is a foreigner or not. Therefore, the relevant facts are especially within the knowledge of the proceedee and accordingly, the burden of proving citizenship rests absolutely upon the proceedee, notwithstanding anything contained in the Evidence Act, 1872 and this is mandated under Section 9 of the aforesaid Act, 1946. However, in the instant case, the petitioner utterly failed to discharge the burden. It is also submitted that rebuttal evidence is not mandatory in every case and would be given only if necessary. She further submits that the evidence of a proceedee has to be cogent, relevant, which inspire confidence and acceptable and only thereafter, the question of adducing rebuttal evidence may come in. 12. It is also submitted that rebuttal evidence is not mandatory in every case and would be given only if necessary. She further submits that the evidence of a proceedee has to be cogent, relevant, which inspire confidence and acceptable and only thereafter, the question of adducing rebuttal evidence may come in. 12. The learning Standing Counsel has further submitted that the written statement is the basic document which is supposed to lay down the foundation of the case of the proceeding and the written statement in the instant case lacks details and is totally vague. There is no date or year of the birth of the petitioner and the date of her marriage. There are no details of the family members. In this connection, she has relied upon the following observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal vs. Union of India reported in (2005) 5 SCC 665 : “17. There is good and sound reason for placing the burden of proof upon the person concerned who asserts to be a citizen of a particular country. In order to establish one's citizenship, normally he may be required to give evidence of (i) his date of birth (ii) place of birth (iii) name of his parents (iv) their place of birth and citizenship. Sometimes the place of birth of his grandparents may also be relevant like under Section 6-A(1) (d) of the Citizenship Act. All these facts would necessarily be within the personal knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of the State. After he has given evidence on these points, the State authorities can verify the facts and can then lead evidence in rebuttal, if necessary. If the State authorities dispute the claim of citizenship by a person and assert that he is a foreigner, it will not only be difficult but almost impossible for them to first lead evidence on the aforesaid points. This is in accordance with the underlying policy of Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.” 13 . She has submitted that since it can be deduced that the year of birth of the petitioner was about 1960, there should have been a Voters List containing her name in the year about 1981. She has submitted that since it can be deduced that the year of birth of the petitioner was about 1960, there should have been a Voters List containing her name in the year about 1981. She has further submitted that in the Voters List of 1966 relied upon, the mother’s name is missing which raises a serious doubt on the relationship claimed. From 1970 to 1985 quo the Voters lists produced, there is a long gap which is unexplained. In the written statement, there is name of only one brother whereas it appears from other materials that there are three brothers and two sisters. She has submitted that the Voters List relied upon are not relevant by which the petitioner has discharged her burden. So far as the Gaonburah Certificate is concerned, she has submitted that admittedly, the same has been issued on the basis of a Voters List of the year 1997 furnished by the petitioner and that the petitioner had shifted to that village only in the year 1985. It is also submitted that the Gaon Panchayat Certificate is not relevant. She has pointed out that there is a disclaimer at the foot of the certificate itself that the same was issued only for the purpose of NRC. She has submitted that the oral evidence of the projected brother and mother without any documentary support would not be relevant, as have been held by a number of decisions of this Court. 14 . In support of her submission that a certificate has to be proved from contemporaneous records, the learned Standing Counsel has relied upon the judgment passed in the case of Romila Khatun vs. Union of India reported in 2018 (4) GLT 373 and the following observations have been pressed into service. “ 20. It is trite that documentary evidence would have to be proved on the basis of the record and the contemporaneous record must substantiate and prove the contents of the document. Proof of document is one thing and proof of contents is another. Not only the document would have to be proved but its contents would also have to be proved. That apart, the truthfulness of the contents of the document would also have to be established from the record. A document or the contents of the document cannot be proved on the basis of personal knowledge.…” 15 . Not only the document would have to be proved but its contents would also have to be proved. That apart, the truthfulness of the contents of the document would also have to be established from the record. A document or the contents of the document cannot be proved on the basis of personal knowledge.…” 15 . She has also drawn the attention of this Court to the case of Nur Begum vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in 2020 (3) GLT 347 wherein certain observations regarding exercise of certiorari jurisdiction have been made which read as follows: “9. On the available materials, we find that the Tribunal rendered opinion/order upon due appreciation of the entire facts, evidence and documents brought on record. We find no infirmity in the findings and opinion recorded by the Tribunal. We would observe that the certiorari jurisdiction of the writ court being supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction, this Court would refrain from reviewing the findings of facts reached by the Tribunal. No case is made out that the impugned opinion/order was rendered without affording opportunity of hearing or in violation of the principles of natural justice and/or that it suffers from illegality on any ground of having been passed by placing reliance on evidence which is legally impermissible in law and/or that the Tribunal refused to admit admissible evidence and/or that the findings finds no support by any evidence at all. In other words, the petitioner has not been able to make out any case demonstrating any errors apparent on the face of the record to warrant interference of the impugned opinion.” 16. She has also relied upon the case of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rupajan Begum vs. Union of India reported in (2018) 1 SCC 579 , wherein it has been laid down that a certificate has to be proved on two aspects, firstly, the authenticity of the same and secondly, the authenticity of the contents. 17 . The learned Standing Counsel has accordingly submitted that the writ petition be dismissed and the interim order be vacated. 18 . The learned counsel for the other respondents have supported the submissions advanced on behalf of the Home Deptt. & NRC and have prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 17 . The learned Standing Counsel has accordingly submitted that the writ petition be dismissed and the interim order be vacated. 18 . The learned counsel for the other respondents have supported the submissions advanced on behalf of the Home Deptt. & NRC and have prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. They have submitted that this Court in exercise of its Certiorari jurisdiction does not act as an Appellate Court and it is only the decision making process which can be the subject matter of scrutiny. It is submitted that there is no procedural impropriety or illegality in the decision making process and therefore, the instant petition is liable to be dismissed. They have further submitted that the procedure adopted for adjudication of a reference by a Foreigners Tribunal is summary in nature and there is also a time frame for completion. It is also submitted that there is a question of national security by the unabated influx of foreign nationals and before any action is taken, the proceedee is given an opportunity whereby he or she is required to prove the citizenship. 19 . The rival submissions made have been duly considered and the materials placed before this Court including the records of the Tribunal have been carefully perused. 20 . With regard to the aspect of burden of proof as laid down in Section 9 of the Act of 1946, the law is well settled that the burden of proof that a proceedee is an Indian citizen is always on the said proceedee and never shifts. In the said Section, there is non-obstante clause that the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act would not be applicable. For ready reference, Section 9 is extracted hereinbelow- “9. Burden of proof.—If in any case not falling under Section 8 any question arises with reference to this Act or any order made or direction given thereunder, whether any person is or is not a foreigner or is or is not a foreigner of a particular class or description the onus of proving that such person is not a foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class or description, as the case may be, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), lie upon such person.” 21 . In this connection, the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Fateh Mohd. Vs. In this connection, the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Fateh Mohd. Vs. Delhi Administration [ AIR 1963 SC 1035 ] which followed the principles laid down by the Constitutional Bench in the case of Ghaus Mohammad Vs. Union of India [ AIR 1961 SC 1526 ] in the context of Foreigners Act, 1946 would be relevant which is extracted hereinbelow- “22. This Act confers wide ranging powers to deal with all foreigners or with respect to any particular foreigner or any prescribed class or description of foreigner for prohibiting, regulating or restricting their or his entry into India or their presence or continued presence including their arrest, detention and confinement. The most important provision is Section 9 which casts the burden of proving that a person is not a foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class or description, as the case may be, shall lie upon such person. Therefore, where an order made under the Foreigners Act is challenged and a question arises whether the person against whom the order has been made is a foreigner or not, the burden of proving that he is not a foreigner is upon such a person. In Union of India v. Ghaus Mohd. the Chief Commissioner of Delhi served an order on Ghaus Mohammad to leave India within three days as he was a Pakistani national. He challenged the order before the High Court which set aside the order by observing that there must be prima facie material on the basis of which the authority can proceed to pass an order under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act, 1946. In appeal the Constitution Bench reversed the judgment of the High Court holding that onus of showing that he is not a foreigner was upon the respondent.” 22 . Before embarking to adjudicate the issue involved vis-a-vis the submissions and the materials on record, we are reminded that a Writ Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would confine its powers to examine the decision making process only. Further, the present case pertains to a proceeding of a Tribunal which has given its findings based on the facts. It is trite law that findings of facts are not liable to be interfered with by a Writ Court under its certiorari jurisdiction. 23 . Law is well settled in this field. Further, the present case pertains to a proceeding of a Tribunal which has given its findings based on the facts. It is trite law that findings of facts are not liable to be interfered with by a Writ Court under its certiorari jurisdiction. 23 . Law is well settled in this field. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, after discussing the previous case laws on the jurisdiction of a Writ Court qua the writ of certiorari, in the recent decision of Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences and Anr. Vs. Bikartan Das & Ors [Civil Appeal No. 3339 of 2023] has laid down as follows: “49. Before we close this matter, we would like to observe something important in the aforesaid context: Two cardinal principles of law governing exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution more particularly when it comes to issue of writ of certiorari. 50. The first cardinal principle of law that governs the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, more particularly when it comes to the issue of a writ of certiorari is that in granting such a writ, the High Court does not exercise the powers of Appellate Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal. The writ of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is apparent on the face of the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ, should not be issued on mere asking. 51. The second cardinal principle of exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is that in a given case, even if some action or order challenged in the writ petition is found to be illegal and invalid, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction thereunder can refuse to upset it with a view to doing substantial justice between the parties. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this flexible power to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity projects. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this flexible power to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity projects. The legal formulations cannot be enforced divorced from the realities of the fact situation of the case. While administering law, it is to be tempered with equity and if the equitable situation demands after setting right the legal formulations, not to take it to the logical end, the High Court would be failing in its duty if it does not notice equitable consideration and mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. Any other approach would render the High Court a normal court of appeal which it is not.” 24 . In the instant case, the written statement is vague and apparently, has not met the requirements, as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal (supra). There is a requirement to disclose the following: (i) date of birth, (ii) place of birth, (iii) name of the parents, (iv) their place of birth and citizenship. Further, there may be a requirement to give the details of the grandparents. It has been stated that all these facts would necessarily be within the personal knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of the State. 25 . So far as the Voters Lists are concerned, there are numerous inconsistencies both in the names and age. While the name of the projected father in the Voters Lists of 1966 and 1970 was Mowab Ali, in the Voters List of 1985, the name is Nobab Ali Mia. The age of the father in 1970 was stated as 39 years whereas in the year 1985 it is 65 years which is inconsistent. 26 . There is not even a single Voters List of the petitioner with her projected parents or siblings despite the fact that the petitioner claims to have been born in the year 1960. We also find that Voters Lists are selectively produced before the learned Tribunal and there is no regularity or continuity. It may be mentioned that after the Voters List of 1970, the next Voters List is of the year 1985. Similarly, there is a long gap between the Voters Lists of 1989 and 1997. We also find that Voters Lists are selectively produced before the learned Tribunal and there is no regularity or continuity. It may be mentioned that after the Voters List of 1970, the next Voters List is of the year 1985. Similarly, there is a long gap between the Voters Lists of 1989 and 1997. There is no explanation with regard to the disappearance of existing names in the Voters Lists and entry of new names. The Voters List of 1994 is not relevant as the same is not even a certified copy. 27 . So far as the Gaonburah Certificate dated 10.05.2017 is concerned though the same was sought to be proved by the DW 5, he had clearly stated that the same was issued on the basis of a Voters List of 1997 produced by the petitioner. It also reveals that neither the issue register nor the contemporaneous records were produced and proved. Similarly, so far as the certificate dated 10.06.2015 by the Gaon Panchayat was concerned, DW 4, the Secretary of the Gaon Panchayat had deposed that the certificate was issued by the earlier Secretary, who had retired. No issue register or contemporaneous records were proved in connection with the said certificate. It is settled law that certificates of the aforesaid nature are required to be proved by contemporaneous records as the issue is of immense public importance touching upon the national security. 28 . In the case of Sufia Khatun Vs Union of India [WP(C)/3961/2019 disposed of 16.09.2019] the following observations have been made by a Coordinate Bench in the context of a Gaonburah Certificate and evidence adduced, which we respectfully endorse: “6. ...Therefore, the entries made in the Gaonbura’s Certificate appears to be based on faulty knowledge of the DW-3 and not based on any public records maintained by his office in regular course of duty attached to his office. The Executive Instructions appended to the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886, does not cast any duty to the Gaonbura to maintain record of citizens born in the Lot under his charge or register containing names of females in Lot under his charge who are married to persons outside the Lot under his charge.” 29 . The petitioner as DW 1 had replied to the question put by the learned Tribunal that names of the siblings were not stated in the written statement. The petitioner as DW 1 had replied to the question put by the learned Tribunal that names of the siblings were not stated in the written statement. Similarly, DW 2, the projected uncle had responded to the Tribunal that the names of the three sons and three daughters were not mentioned in the chief examination. Further, DW 3, the projected brother had admitted that though they were three brothers and three sisters, he had mentioned only one brother’s name in his affidavit. 30 . So far as the case law relied upon by the petitioner, the cases of Dol Gobinda (supra) and Bant Singh (supra) of the Hon’ble Supreme Court were in the context of Section 50 of the Indian Evidence Act. The subject matter of those two cases was entirely different from the present subject matter which is on the determination of foreigners. As discussed above in details, the burden of proof in a case of the present nature is on the proceedee and Section 9 starts with a non obstante clause vis-à-vis the Indian Evidence Act. 31 . So far as the case of Haider Ali (supra) is concerned, the observations made therein appear to be not in consonance with the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal (supra). The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in clear terms has laid down the necessity of putting up the defense by a proceedee which has to be understood to be in the form of a written statement followed by credible and acceptable evidence and the requirement of rebuttal evidence would come only when necessary. The case of Sirajul Hoque (supra) is clearly distinguishable on facts and in fact the Hon’ble Supreme Court had made an observation that all other aspects were consistent except the name of the grandfather of the proceedee which varied from “Kematullah” to “Kefatullah”. 32 . In the case of Momin Ali vs Union of India reported in 2017 (2) GLT 1076 , a Coordinate Bench had made the following observations which we endorse: “12. This written statement of the petitioner was wholly inadequate and did not disclose any material facts. As noticed above, it was the allegation of the State that petitioner was a foreigner. In the case of Momin Ali vs Union of India reported in 2017 (2) GLT 1076 , a Coordinate Bench had made the following observations which we endorse: “12. This written statement of the petitioner was wholly inadequate and did not disclose any material facts. As noticed above, it was the allegation of the State that petitioner was a foreigner. Therefore, as per mandate of Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, it was the bounden duty of the petitioner to have disclosed all material facts which were specifically within his knowledge in the written statement but he did not do so. Petitioner neither mentioned his date of birth nor his age. He was silent regarding the name of his mother and identity of his grandparents - both paternal and maternal. He did not mention anything about his brothers and sisters or about his marital status. On the basis of such a written statement, it cannot be said that petitioner had stated anything substantial to show that he was not a foreigner but a citizen of India. 13. It is a settled proposition of law that where a party fails to set up a case in his pleadings, he would be debarred from adducing evidence in his support at the stage of trial. As a matter of principle, variance between pleading and proof is not permissible.” 33 . In the case of Bijoy Das vs UOI reported in 2018 (3) GLT 118, this Court has laid down that in proceedings of this nature, oral evidence alone would not be enough and such evidence is required to be supported and corroborated by documentary evidence and contemporaneous records. However, in this case, the same has not been able to be done by the petitioner. We are of the view that the petitioner as proceedee had failed to discharge her burden to prove her citizenship. 34. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that the impugned order dated 17.11.2018 passed by the learned Foreigners Tribunal III, Barpeta in F.T. Case No. 1192 (III) of 2013 does not call for any interference. 35. The writ petition accordingly stands dismissed. Interim order passed earlier stands vacated. The actions consequent upon the opinion rendered by the learned Tribunal would follow in accordance with law. 36 . 35. The writ petition accordingly stands dismissed. Interim order passed earlier stands vacated. The actions consequent upon the opinion rendered by the learned Tribunal would follow in accordance with law. 36 . The records of the learned Tribunal be returned forthwith, along with a copy of this order.