JUDGEMENT : ROBIN PHUKAN, J. Heard Mr. K. Rahman, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. M.U. Mahmud, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. In this petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 115 of the CPC, the petitioner has challenged the judgment and order dated 12.11.2024, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Darrang at Mangaldai (appellate court hereinafter), in Misc. Appeal No. 14/2023. 3. It is to be noted here that vide impugned judgment and order dated 12.11.2024, the learned appellate court had affirmed the ad- interim temporary injunction order dated 02.11.2023, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) No. 1, Darrang at Mangaldai (trial court hereinafter), in Misc. (J) Case No. 25/2023. 4. It is also to be noted here that vide order dated 02.11.2023, the learned trial court had restrained the petitioner herein and its tenants from encroaching the Schedule A1, A2, A5 – A10 land and also from disturbing the possession of the respondents in any manner till final disposal of the suit. 5. The back ground facts, leading to filing of the present petition, are briefly stated as under:- “Kuaripukhuri High School A, represented by its Headmaster cum Member Secretary, the petitioner herein, was earlier a Madrassa institution, which was converted to a High School and it is covering an area about 6 Bighas 1 Katha 9 Lechas and since the petitioner school is running under the Directorate of Secondary Education, Government of Assam, the said property now becomes the Government property. Earlier one Dhepu Sheikh, was the owner of the said land and during his lifetime, he had orally gifted the said land in the name of Kuwari Pukhuri Kharejia Madrassa, which was, later on, converted to Kuwari Pukhuri High School A and out of the total land, the petitioner school had given a plot of land, measuring 5 Bighas, to several local people for cultivation in yearly 'thika' basis and the paddy received from the said cultivators was used for the development/management of the institution and after conversion, the petitioner school was provincialised on 15.08.1994, and thereafter, the said land was mutated in the name of the petitioner school in the year 1999. Then, in the year 2014, out of the said land, 2 Kathas 10 Lechas had been given to Galandi Hafizia for temporary settlement and the same has been functioning in the house constructed over the said land without interruption and 1 Bigha of the total land has also been developed and maintained as a cemetery for the public and around 3 Kathas of land in front of the Galandi Hafizia Madrassa was used by its students as a playground. Thereafter, in the year 2021, the respondent Nos. 1 – 4, along with one Akabar Ali and Sahamat Ali, illegally entered into the land and forcefully dispossessed them from the same and illegally constructed an „ekchalia house? over the same. In the meantime, the land has been mutated in the name of Kuwari Pukhuri High School A, vide Government order No. DSE/GIS/Amal/9/2021/127, dated 06.05.2022. Then, in the month of May, 2021, after the expiry of the thika period, the Kuwari Pukhuri High School „A? had taken over the possession of the land measuring 5 Bighas from respondent Nos. 5 – 8. Thereafter, on 22.12.2022, the School authority had arranged a public meeting and the 5 Bighas of land were once again given in thika basis, as per open tender No.1, in exchange of Rs. 25,000/-, for a period of 11 months and had requested the respondent Nos. 1 – 4 along with one Akabar and Sahamat Ali to vacate 3 Kathas of land immediately. But, they had refused and illegally applied for allotment of the said land by stating that they had been occupying the land under the permission of Kuwari Pukhuri High School A, in order to forcefully dispossess them from the same. Thereafter, the respondents have filed one title suit, being Title Suit No. 42/2023, with a prayer for declaration of right title and interest over the suit land. Along with the said title suit, they have also filed an application for temporary injunction, on the ground that the schedule lands are Government Khas land and they are in possession of the same for last 50 – 60 years without any interruption and they have applied for allotment of the suit land. Along with the said title suit, they have also filed an application for temporary injunction, on the ground that the schedule lands are Government Khas land and they are in possession of the same for last 50 – 60 years without any interruption and they have applied for allotment of the suit land. Thereafter, an inquiry was conducted by the Circle Officer, Dalgaon Revenue Circle and it was found that the Government of Assam has the absolute right, title and interest over the suit land and except the Government of Assam, no other persons have any right, title and interest over the suit land and none of them have the right to evict the respondents herein from the suit land and even the Government of Assam without following due procedure of law has no right or power to evict the respondents from the suit land. Then, after hearing both the parties, the learned trial court, vide order dated 02.11.2023, found the prima-facie case in favour of the respondents herein and also found the balance of convenience and irreparable loss in their favour and thereafter, allowed the petition for ad-interim temporary injunction and thereby, restrained the petitioner herein from encroaching upon the Schedule A1, A2, A5 – A10 land and also from disturbing the possession of the respondents, in any manner, till final disposal of the suit. Thereafter, being aggrieved, the petitioner herein filed an appeal, before the learned appellate court, upon which the Misc. Appeal No. 14/2023, had been registered and after hearing both the parties and also considering the facts and circumstances on the record, the learned appellate court had affirmed the order, dated 02.11.2023, passed by the learned trial court.” Being aggrieved, the petitioner herein has approached this Court, by filing the present petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, on several grounds. 6. Mr. Rahman, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order passed by the learned trial court as well as by the learned appellate court, suffers from manifest illegality. He has pointed out that the land in question, in fact belongs to a Madrassa, which was converted to a High School and the said school was provincialised in the year 1994 and with such provincialisation, the land became the property of the Government. 6.1. Mr. He has pointed out that the land in question, in fact belongs to a Madrassa, which was converted to a High School and the said school was provincialised in the year 1994 and with such provincialisation, the land became the property of the Government. 6.1. Mr. Rahman further submits that Section 3(6) of the Assam (Temporarily Settled Areas) Tenancy Act, 1971 (1971 Act hereinafter), defines that „land? means agricultural land and „agricultural land? means land used for agricultural purpose or purposes subservient thereto and Section 3 (17) of the 1971 Act provides that a person who cultivates or holds land immediately under the State Government is not a tenant within the meaning of this definition and that as the petitioner school is running under Government of Assam, the land belonging to the school is also come under the Government of Assam. Mr. Rahman also submits that as per definition provided under Section 3(17) of the 1971 Act, the respondents herein are not even tenants and as such, raising of claim of possessory right over the suit land is illegal and arbitrary and no cause of action also arises thereon and on such count, impugned order of the learned trial court granting a temporary injunction and affirming same by the learned appellate court suffers from manifest illegality. 6.2. Mr. 6.2. Mr. Rahman, referring to Annexures of the petition, submits that the Annexure No. 1 is a Chitha for Surveyed Villages, wherein suit land has shown to be muted in the name of the school; Annexure No. 2 is a certificate issued by the Circle Officer, Dalgaon Revenue Circle and the same indicates that the suit land belongs to Kuaripukhuri Senior Madrassa; Annexure No. 3 is a notification issued by the Government of Assam, which indicates that Kuaripukhuri Title Madrassa was converted to Kuaripukhuri High School A; Annexure No. 4 is another notification issued by the Department of Secondary Education, which indicates that Kuaripukhuri High School and Kuari Pukhuri Siddique ME Madrssa were amalgamated and became Kuaripukhuri High School A; and Anneuxre No. 5 is an order of a Coordinate Bench of this Court, dated 23.06.2023, passed in WP(C) No. 7469/2022, which was preferred by the respondents herein for issuing a direction to the respondents therein for allotment of the land, measuring 6 Bighas 1 Katha 9 Lechas and vide said order, the Coordinate Bench of this Court had disposed of the petition, granting liberty to the petitioners therein to approach the competent authority for allotment of the land under their occupation and also to approach the competent forum for resolving the land dispute between the parties. 6.3. Further, Mr. Rahman submits that after the passing of the order dated 23.06.2023, the respondents herein had instituted the Title Suit No. 42/2023 for a declaration of possessory right, title and interest over the suit land. 6.4. Mr. Rahman also submits that since the land belongs to the school and the name of the school is mutated in the revenue record and since the respondents herein are not tenants as defined under Section 3(17) of the 1971 Act, the findings, so recorded by the learned courts below, suffer from serious infirmity and the same requires interference of this Court. He further submits that the suit land is a public property, and Article 51A (i) of the Constitution of India provided that it shall be the duty of every citizens of India "to safeguard public property and to abjure violence”. But instead of exercising fundamental duty, the respondents have instituted the case against a Public School with a view to grab the land. Under such circumstances Mr. Rahman has contended to allow this petition. 7. Per-contra, Mr. But instead of exercising fundamental duty, the respondents have instituted the case against a Public School with a view to grab the land. Under such circumstances Mr. Rahman has contended to allow this petition. 7. Per-contra, Mr. Mahmud, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the respondents have been occupying the land for the last 50 – 60 years and they have been cultivating the same and residing in the said plot of land by constructing their dwelling house, and now, if they are evicted from the land, where they will go as they have no place to reside. Mr. Mahmud further submits that they have acquired possessory right and also applied to the Government for allotment of the same to them, and that the learned trial court as well as the learned appellate court had rightly appreciated the fact and thereafter granted a temporary injunction in favour of the respondents, by restraining the petitioner herein from interfering with the possession of the respondents and on such count, the impugned order suffers from no infirmity or illegality requiring any interference of this Court and therefore, Mr. Mahmud has contended to dismiss the petition. 7.1. In support of his submission Mr. Mahmud has referred to a decision of a Coordinate Bench of this Court passed in Suresh Kr. Dhanuka vs. Kedar Nath Dhanuka , reported in 2004 GAULT 1 210 8. Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for both the parties, I have carefully gone through the petition as well as the documents placed on record, and also perused the impugned judgment and order dated 12.11.2024, passed by the learned appellate court and also the order dated 02.11.2023, passed by the learned trial court. 9. It is no more res-integra that in order to grant temporary injunction, the party applying for the same has to satisfy three golden principles. This aspect has elaborately been dealt with by Hon?ble Supreme Court in the case of Dalpat Kumar vs. Prahlad Singh, reported in (1992) 1 SCC 719 , while dealing with Order 39 Rule 1(C) CPC, Hon?ble Supreme Court has held as under: “4. ……… It is settled law that the grant of injunction is a discretionary relief. This aspect has elaborately been dealt with by Hon?ble Supreme Court in the case of Dalpat Kumar vs. Prahlad Singh, reported in (1992) 1 SCC 719 , while dealing with Order 39 Rule 1(C) CPC, Hon?ble Supreme Court has held as under: “4. ……… It is settled law that the grant of injunction is a discretionary relief. The exercise thereof is subject to the court satisfying that (1) there is a serious disputed question to be tried in the suit and that an act, on the facts before the court, there is probability of his being entitled to the relief asked for by the plaintiff/defendant; (2) the court's interference is necessary to protect the party from the species of injury. In other words, irreparable injury or damage would ensue before the legal right would be established at trial; and (3) that the comparative hardship or mischief or inconvenience which is likely to occur from withholding the injunction will be greater than that would be likely to arise from granting it. 5. Therefore, the burden is on the plaintiff by evidence aliunde by affidavit or otherwise that there is “a prima facie case” in his favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established, on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the Court would result in “irreparable injury” to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition also is that “the balance of convenience” must be in favou r of granting injunction. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition also is that “the balance of convenience” must be in favou r of granting injunction. The Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that which is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Court considers that pending the suit, the subject matter should be maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus the Court has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit. 9.1. Again, in the case of Seema Arshad Zaheer vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, reported in (2006) 5 SCC 282, same principles are reiterated as under: - “30. The discretion of the court is exercised to grant a temporary injunction only when the following requirements are made out by the plaintiff: ( i ) existence of a prima facie case as pleaded, necessitating protection of the plaintiff's rights by issue of a temporary injunction; ( ii ) when the need for protection of the plaintiff's rights is compared with or weighed against the need for protection of the defendant's rights or likely infringement of the defendant's rights, the balance of convenience tilting in favour of the plaintiff; and ( iii ) clear possibility of irreparable injury being caused to the plaintiff if the temporary injunction is not granted. In addition, temporary injunction being an equitable relief, the discretion to grant such relief will be exercised only when the plaintiff's conduct is free from blame and he approaches the court with clean hands.” Public Interest, the Fourth Dimension: - 9.2. In addition, temporary injunction being an equitable relief, the discretion to grant such relief will be exercised only when the plaintiff's conduct is free from blame and he approaches the court with clean hands.” Public Interest, the Fourth Dimension: - 9.2. It is also to be mentioned here that in the case of Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke and Others vs. Pune Municipal Corporation and Another, reported in (1995) 3 SCC 33 , Hon?ble Supreme Court has held additionally that public interest is one of the material and relevant considerations in either exercising or refusing to grant ad interim injunction. Finding of the Trial Court: - 10. In the instant case, while examining the existence of a prima- facie case in favour of the respondents herein, the learned trial court has observed that the respondents herein have asserted their possessory right over 10 different plots of land described in 10 different schedules, which have allegedly been in their possession for the last 50 – 60 years. It is also observed that 5 Bighas of the land were given to the respondents herein for permissive occupation on a yearly „ thika ’ basis since the year 1960 and they had run the Kuari Pukhuri Kharejia Madrassa, which is converted to Kuwari Pukhuri High School „A?, from the payment received from those permissive occupiers. It is further observed that it is not clear as to which of the parties? involved has any subsisting legal claim over the disputed plots of land and these facts shall be addressed and taken up during the course of the trial, where each party will be given an opportunity to put forth all necessary evidence to prove their stances. Thereafter, it is recorded that prima facie case does exist and there are certain rights and liabilities of each party that need to be adjudicated upon and will be decided at the end of the trial of the main suit. 10.1. In respect of the balance of convenience and irreparable loss, the learned trial court has held that the respondents herein are in possession of the suit land and the same has not been denied by the petitioner herein, who has simply alleged that they were permissive occupiers only and as such, they do not have any right to apply for allotment of the plots of land included in the total land described in Schedule „A? of the petition and that they have asserted that the suit land is no longer Government land, as it was mutated in favour of the Kuwari Pukhuri High School „A? in the year 1999. However, the petitioner herein has not submitted any documents in support of its contention, while the respondents herein have submitted the photo copies of several documents, which show that different plots of land, described under Schedule A1 – A10, have been under their possession for a long time and that only the nature of its possession over the said suit land is under dispute in the main suit. Thereafter, the learned trial court has observed that the respondents herein are currently in possession of the Schedule A1 – A10 suit land and whether or not their possession is legal is a matter of evidence that shall be considered in the trial of the main suit. 10.2. Thereafter, it is observed that if the respondents herein are forced out of the Schedule A1 – A10 suit land, during the pendency of the suit, without giving them a fair opportunity to prove their claim over it, they will suffer irreparable loss and the same cannot be compensated by monetary relief. Further, the learned trial court has observed that the balance of convenience tilts in favour of the respondents herein, as the extent of loss that would be suffered by them if they are dispossessed of the Schedule A land, during the pendency of the trial, would be far greater as compared to such loss, if any, suffered by the petitioner herein, if the situations were left untouched. Finding of the Appellate Court:- 11. Further, from the perusal of the impugned order, so passed by the learned appellate court, it appears that the respondents herein have claimed their possession over the Schedule A1 – A10 land and on the other hand, the petitioner herein has denied the claim of the respondents herein, over the Schedule land and pleaded that the land measuring 5 Bighas, out of total land measuring 6 Bighas 1 Katha 9 Lechas, has been given on seasonal thika basis, in exchange of Rs. 5,000/- per bigha, to the respondents herein Nos. 5 – 8 and run the Kuwari Pukhuri High School „A? from the payment received from those permissive occupiers. 11.1. 5,000/- per bigha, to the respondents herein Nos. 5 – 8 and run the Kuwari Pukhuri High School „A? from the payment received from those permissive occupiers. 11.1. The learned appellate court had further observed that there is a dispute regarding the rights of the parties over the Schedule land. It had also observed that the petitioner herein has denied the entire claim of the respondents herein including their possession over the Schedule „A? land at any point of time claimed its continuous possession over the disputed land. It was also observed that the law is well settled that mutation neither confer any right, title and interest nor extinguishes any title. But, the basic fact remains that there is a dispute regarding legal claim over the suit land and both sides are claiming the same and apparently, the fact of claim of rights over the suit land, by both sides, shows that there are some questions, which have to be decided at the time of trial and this fact is sufficient to hold that there is a dispute regarding right and possession over the suit land and accordingly, there is a prima-facie case for proceeding to the trial and thereafter, it had recorded concurrence with the findings of the learned trial court. 11.2. In respect of the balance of convenience, the learned appellate court had recorded a finding that the learned trial court had dealt with this matter in details. The respondents are claiming to have their possession over the Schedule A1 – A10 land and the respondents are still in possession of the Schedule plots of land, and as such, the balance of convenience lies in favour of them. It had also recorded that the respondents are in possession of their part and appellant (petitioner herein) has created trouble in their possession by claiming the land in dispute. Thereafter, it was found that the balance of convenience is in favour of the respondents and in the event of restraining the appellant (petitioner herein) from disturbing the possession of the respondents; the appellant (petitioner herein) is not going to suffer any inconvenience. 11.3. Thereafter, it was found that the balance of convenience is in favour of the respondents and in the event of restraining the appellant (petitioner herein) from disturbing the possession of the respondents; the appellant (petitioner herein) is not going to suffer any inconvenience. 11.3. In respect of irreparable loss, the learned appellate court had held that the respondents are in possession of the suit land and they have the right to protect their property and enjoy the benefit of the same and nobody can be allowed to evict them by using force. Any sort of unlawful dispossession will certainly cause irreparable loss and injuries to the respondents and thereafter, it had affirmed the finding so recorded by the learned trial court in respect of irreparable loss. Consideration of Submissions of the Parties: - 12. While the submissions of learned Advocates for both the parties are examined in the light of given facts and circumstances on the record, and also in the light of legal framework and also in the light of the precedents, presently occupying the field, I find substance in the submission of Mr. K. Rahman, learned counsel for the petitioner. 13. Having examined the findings, so recorded by the learned courts below, in respect of a prima-facie case, this Court is unable to agree with the same. A prima-facie case requires showing a serious triable issue on merit at the interim stage. The prima-facie case under Order 39 CPC for temporary injunctions means the plaintiff demonstrates a bona fide dispute or substantial question needing full trial, based on pleadings and documents without deep factual probe. 13.1. In the instant case the respondent herein are in possession of the suit land. But, it appears that they are the permissive occupiers under the petitioner herein. Further, it appears that they are also not tenants as described under the 1971 Act. Mr. Rahman has rightly pointed this out. And that being so, they cannot claim any right over the suit land. 13.2. It also appears that the suit land was originally belonged to one Dhepu Sheikh, who had donated the same to Kuwari Pukhuri Kharejia Madrassa and thereafter, the said Madrassa was converted to Kuaripukhuri High School „A?. Mr. Rahman has rightly pointed this out. And that being so, they cannot claim any right over the suit land. 13.2. It also appears that the suit land was originally belonged to one Dhepu Sheikh, who had donated the same to Kuwari Pukhuri Kharejia Madrassa and thereafter, the said Madrassa was converted to Kuaripukhuri High School „A?. And later on, it was provincialised by the Government of Assam and since the school was provincialised, the land in question has become the property of the Government and as such, the same cannot be allotted to the respondents herein. The Annexure No. 1 indicates that the land in question is mutated in the name of the school and also the certificate issued by the Circle Officer, Dalgaon, Annexure No. 2, indicates that the Kuaripukhuri Senior Madrassa is situated on the land measuring 3 Bighas 4 Kathas 1 Lecha under Dag No. 83 & 84 and 6 Bighas 1 Katha 9 Lechas under Dag No. 44. 13.3. In view of those documents and also under the given facts and circumstances on record, the finding so recorded by the learned trial court that there exists a prima-facie case in favour of the respondents herein, cannot be said to have withstood the legal scrutiny. 14. Further, though the respondents herein are in possession of the suit land, yet, they, having been found to be just permissive occupier, cannot claim any right over the suit land. Though they claimed, having been in possession for about 50/60 years, yet no supporting documents could be placed on record. And that being so, the balance of convenience, cannot be found in their favour. 15. It is a fact that the respondents herein will suffer loss, if they are evicted from the suit land, as they are occupying and cultivating over the same. And as such, irreparable loss will be caused to them. But, the respondents herein can be adequately compensated for the loss caused to them by award of damages in the event of them succeeding in the suit. Even if it is assumed that the loss, the respondents would suffer cannot be compensated, then also, in view of non-existence of a prima-facie case and balance of convenience in their favour, even if the irreparable loss is found in their favour, the injunction cannot be granted in favour of the respondents herein. 16. Even if it is assumed that the loss, the respondents would suffer cannot be compensated, then also, in view of non-existence of a prima-facie case and balance of convenience in their favour, even if the irreparable loss is found in their favour, the injunction cannot be granted in favour of the respondents herein. 16. Further, it is not in dispute that the suit land, over which Kuaripukhuri High School „A? is presently standing, becomes the property of the Government after the same being provincialised. It is a public institution now. And public interest is involved therein and if the claims of the respondents herein are allowed, then the public interest will suffer. But, this aspect eschewed consideration of both the learned courts below. 17. In that view of the matter the order passed by the learned trial court, dated 02.11.2023, granting temporary injunction in favour of the respondents herein and impugned order dated 12.11.2024, passed by the learned appellate court, affirming the temporary injunction order passed by the learned trial court, fails to withstands the legal scrutiny and accordingly, the same stands interfered with. 18. This Court has also considered the submissions of Mr. Mahmud, learned counsel for the respondents herein and also gone through the decisions referred by him and finds that the fact of the case relied upon by him is different from the present case and as such, this Court is unable to record concurrence to the submissions of Mr. Mahmud, learned counsel for the respondents. 19. It is well settled in the case of Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Company , reported in (1995) 5 SCC 545 , that an order of interlocutory or temporary injunction is purely equitable and, therefore, the Court, on being approached, will, apart from other considerations, also look to the conduct of the party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court. Relevant paragraph is extracted herein below:- “47. …………… …………. Under Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure, jurisdiction of the Court to interfere with an order of interlocutory or temporary injunction is purely equitable and, therefore, the Court, on being approached, will, apart from other considerations, also look to the conduct of the party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court, and may refuse to interfere unless his conduct was free from blame. Since the relief is wholly equitable in nature, the party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court has to show that he himself was not at fault and that he himself was not responsible for bringing about the state of things complained of and that he was not unfair or inequitable in his dealings with the party against whom he was seeking relief. His conduct should be fair and honest. These considerations will arise not only in respect of the person who seeks an order of injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 or Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but also in respect of the party approaching the Court for vacating the ad interim or temporary injunction order already granted in the pending suit or proceedings. 20. As submitted by Mr. Rahman, the suit land belongs to the petitioner School and the same is a public property. And Article 51A (i) of the Constitution of India casts a duty upon every citizens of India "to safeguard public property and to abjure violence”. But instead of exercising fundamental duty, the respondents herein instituted the case against a Public School with a view to grab the land. Looking to their conduct, in invoking the jurisdiction of the Court, it cannot be said that their conduct was free from blame. Being the relief is wholly equitable in nature, the respondents, invoking the jurisdiction of the Court, have failed to demonstrate that they are not at fault and that they are not unfair or inequitable in their dealings with the party against whom they were seeking relief. Thus, in equity, they are not entitled to the relief. 21. In the result, this Court finds sufficient merit in this petition and accordingly, the same stands allowed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.