( 2026:HHC:19745 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA CMPMO No. 119 of 2026. Decided on : 22 nd May, 2026. Manoj Kumari & Ors. .....Petitioners. Versus Rasila Ram ....Respondent. Coram: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the Petitioners: Mr. Dheeraj K. Vashisht, Advocate (through V.C.) and Mr. Peeyush Agnihotri, Advocate. For the Respondent: Mr. N. K. Thakur, Senior Advocate with Mr. Divya Raj Singh, Advocate. Romesh Verma, Judge (Oral). The present petition arises out of the order as passed by learned Senior Civil Judge, Amb, District Una, H.P. dated 12.01.2026, whereby application filed by the petitioners/defendants under Order 7 Rules 11 of the CPC was rejected. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff/respondent filed a suit for recovery of Rs.4,00,000/- on 1 Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 ( 2026:HHC:19745 ) account of malicious prosecution against the petitioners/defendants. As per the averments, as made in the plaint, the plaintiff is a senior citizen and he retired from the Government of India. He has two sons and four daughters and all are married in very reputed families. He noticed that various persons of his locality as well as some members of the Gram Panchayat Dangoh Khas were involved in various type of corruption and were misappropriating and misusing the government funds by way of preparing forged and fabricated documents. The plaintiff could not tolerate such corruption in his area. Therefore, he filed complaints before the authorities for inquiring into the matters and take the same to their logical end. Defendants No.1 to 3 are related to each other. They are inimical towards the plaintiff and his family due to the reason that he had filed complaints against them. 3. As per the plaintiff, the defendants with malafide purpose and to take revenge, they hatched criminal conspiracy and lodged a false, frivolous and fictitious FIR No.136, dated 22.09.2016 in Police Station Gagret, Tehsil Ghnari, District Una, 3 ( 2026:HHC:19745 ) H.P. under Sections 354, 506 and 504 of the IPC levelling false and frivolous allegations through Smt. Manoj Kumari defendant No.1 and alleging that on 22.09.2016, she was coming from her fields and when she reached near the water tank of temple in Village Dangoh at about 7.00 P.M., the plaintiff caught her from her arms and pressed her breast and tried to commit rape with her. As per the case of the plaintiff, police prepared and presented the frivolous challan under Sections 354, 506 and 504 of the IPC against the plaintiff in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Amb. The plaintiff faced the criminal trial in case No. 199-1- 16/18-11/18, which was instituted in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, Amb and the said Court acquitted the plaintiff from all the charges under Sections 354, 504 and 506 of the IPC on 21.11.2018. Under such circumstances, the plaintiff filed the suit for damages on account of malicious prosecution seeking recovery of Rs.4,00,000/- against the defendants. 4. The suit has been resisted and contested by the defendants by raising various preliminary objections. On merits, all the averments as made in the plaint were refuted and denied. 4 ( 2026:HHC:19745 ) 5. The defendants/petitioners filed an application under the provisions of Order 7, Rule 11 of the CPC for rejection of the plaint as filed by the respondent/plaintiff. It has been averred in the application that after acquittal of the respondent/plaintiff, the State of Himachal Pradesh has filed criminal appeal under Section 378 of the Cr.P.C. before the learned Sessions Judge, Una and the same is still pending before the said Court and fixed for service of the plaintiff. It is further averred that on that count, the suit filed by the plaintiff for malicious prosecution is premature until and unless he is acquitted in the criminal case by the competent Court of law. 6. The said application was resisted and contested by the plaintiff/respondent by filing reply. It has been stated in the reply that the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Amb acquitted the plaintiff vide its judgment dated 21.11.2018. It was further stated in the reply that though the State has preferred the criminal appeal, which is pending before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Una, however, cause of action arose to the plaintiff to file suit from the date when he was acquitted from the charges, 5 ( 2026:HHC:19745 ) therefore, suit is very much maintainable. The plaintiff sought the dismissal of the application as filed by the defendants. 6. Learned trial Court vide its order dated 12.01.2026, dismissed the application filed by the petitioners/defendants. 7. Feeling dissatisfied, the defendants/petitioners have approached this Court by filing the instant petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 8. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order is erroneous and is liable to be quashed and set aside. He further submits that the application filed by the defendants for rejection of the plaint deserves to be allowed. 9. On the other hand, Mr. Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff has defended the impugned order and submits that learned Court below has rightly exercised the jurisdiction and passed the impugned order which does not call for any interference that too in a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the entire material placed on record carefully. 6 ( 2026:HHC:19745 ) 11. Plaintiff/respondent filed the suit for damages on account of malicious prosecution against the present petitioners/defendants. It is the case of the plaintiff that the FIR No. 136 dated 22.09.2016 was registered against him in Police Station Gagret, Tehsil Ghanari, District Una, H.P., under Sections 354, 506 and 504 of the IPC by levelling certain false and frivolous allegations. It is also the case of the plaintiff that the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Amb vide its judgment dated 21.11.2018 exonerated honourably the plaintiff from the said charges. Therefore, on that count he is entitled to recovery of Rs.4,00,000/- on account of malicious prosecution. The provisions of Order 7, Rule 11 of the CPC read as under:- “11. Rejection of plaint. The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases: (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action; (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is returned upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the 7 ( 2026:HHC:19745 ) requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law; (e) where it is not filed in duplicate; (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9: Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature from correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp- paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.” 12. The only contention as raised by the present petitioner is that on account of pendency of criminal appeal before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Una, the suit as filed by the plaintiff/respondent is premature. On this, Mr. Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff submits that the said submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners/defendants is incorrect as the criminal appeal stands already dismissed. Though, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that against the judgment dismissing the appeal, criminal revision 8 ( 2026:HHC:19745 ) has been preferred before this Court. The learned counsel for the petitioners has not been able to convince this Court that under which clause of Order 7, Rule 11, his case falls. The only submission which has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that since against the judgment of acquittal, the proceedings are yet pending, therefore, the suit as filed by the plaintiff/respondent could not have been instituted. This Court is of the considered opinion that the said submission is in conflict to the provisions of Order 7, Rule 11 of the CPC. The mere pendency of criminal appeal or criminal revision cannot prevent or debar the plaintiff from instituting the suit, whereas cause of action arose to the plaintiff from the date when he was acquitted by the Judicial Magistrate. Merely pendency of criminal revision before this Court, will not debar the plaintiff from instituting the civil suit. 13. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff that cause of action to institute the suit arises to the plaintiff from the date of acquittal i.e. on 21.11.2018 and within one year he has instituted the same. Therefore, the application which has been filed by the 9 ( 2026:HHC:19745 ) defendants/petitioners does not fullfil the parameters of provisions of Order 7, Rule 11 of the CPC and in the considered opinion of this Court, there is no jurisdictional error committed by the learned trial Court. 14. The Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that the scope of interference in a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is very limited. The Hon’ble Apex in case titled as Shri Digant vs M/s P.D.T. Trading Co. & others, Civil Appeal No(s).13801 of 2025, has discussed the scope of interference while exercising the power of Article 227 of Constitution of India. The relevant paragraphs thereof read as under:- “22. The scope of High Court’s jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 fell for consideration before a threeJudge Bench of this Court in Radhey Shyam & another v. Chhabi Nath & Ors. 1 This Court held that judicial orders of civil courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article 226, though they may be questioned in the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. The power may be exercised in cases occasioning grave injustice or failure of justice such as when (i) the court or tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have, (ii) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have, 10 ( 2026:HHC:19745 ) such failure occasioning a failure of justice, and (iii) the jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a manner which tantamounts to overstepping the limits of jurisdiction.” 23. In the case on hand, the appellate court had considered whether the proceeding in detail the issue as to court was justified in trial with the case, without further notice to the defendants, after submission of pursis (Exh.42) by defendants’ counsel, claiming no instructions. After a threadbare analysis and taking into consideration surrounding circumstances, the appellate court held that the trial court had committed no wrong proceeding with the matter court representing with noticed the the that defendants matter. The appellate Court noticed tht the advocate representing the defndants had claimed no instructions but not sought withdrawal of his Vakalatnama and the matter thereafter remained pending for over three months till it was decided in March 2015. In between no effort was made by the defendants to engage another lawyer. Moreover, the defendants did not come up with a case that their lawyer’s notice was not served on them therefore, they could not engage another counsel Besides that, the record also indicated that the intention of the defendants was to delay the proceedings because earlier also the suit had proceeded ex parte against them though, later, those orders were recalled. Therefore, in our view, once the appellate court took into consideration all relevant aspects including the fact that pursis (Exh.42) did not seek withdrawal of the Vakalatnama, and withdrawal was not even permitted, there was no such jurisdictional error which warranted exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court without any justification procedure went consider the procedure prescribed for withdrawal Vakalatnama when neither withdrawal of Vakalatnama was permitted by the Trial Court nor the pursis prayed for its withdrawal. In such circumstances, the entire exercise of the High Court was misconceived. More so, when the view taken by the appellate Court that defendant cannot take advantage of his own 11 ( 2026:HHC:19745 ) wrong was a plausible view based on materials available on record. Hence, in our view, appellate court’s order was not amenable to interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court clearly exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 2278 of the Constitution in interfering with well reasoned order of the appellate Court.” 15. Similar law point was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case titled as Garment Craft vs. Prakash Chand Goel, (2022) 4 SCC 181, wherein in paras 15 and 16, it has been held as under: “15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that 12 ( 2026:HHC:19745 ) no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice. 16. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227, this Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd. has observed:- "6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in a number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do the duty expected or required of them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of 13 ( 2026:HHC:19745 ) facts of an inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal has come to." 19. The factum that the counsel for the appellant had applied for the certified copy would show that the counsel for the appellant was aware that the ex-parte decree had been passed on the account of failure to lead defence evidence. This would not, however, be a good ground and reason to set aside and substitute the opinion formed by the trial court that the appellant being incarcerated was unable to lead evidence and another chance should be given to the appellant to lead defence evidence. The discretion exercised by the trial court in granting relief, did not suffer from an error apparent on the face of the record or was not a finding so perverse that it was unsupported by evidence to justify it. There could be some justification for the respondent to argue that the appellant was possibly aware of the ex-parte decree and therefore the submission that the appellant came to know of the ex-parte decree only on release from jail on 6th May 2017 is incorrect, but this would not affect the factually correct explanation of the appellant that he was incarcerated and could not attend the civil suit proceedings from 6th October 2015 to 6th May 2017. If it was felt 30 that the application for setting aside the exparte decree was filed belatedly, the court could have given an opportunity to the appellant to file an application for condonation of delay and costs could have been imposed. 14 ( 2026:HHC:19745 ) The facts as known, equally apply as grounds for condonation of delay. It is always important to take a holistic and overall view and not get influenced by aspects which can be explained. Thus, the reasoned decision of the trial court on elaborate consideration of the relevant facts did not warrant interference in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution.” 16. Therefore, the scope of interference while invoking the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution is very limited and narrow. Consequently, this Court sees no infirmity in the impugned order and there is no jurisdictional error committed by the learned Court below. 17. In view of above discussions, there is no merit in the instant petition and the same is dismissed accordingly. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. (Romesh Verma) Judge 22nd May, 2026. (jai)