( 2026:HHC:20644 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CMPMO No. 244 of 2024 Reserved on: 18.05.2026 Decided on : 29th May, 2026 ____________________________________________________ Parshotam Kumar & another ...Petitioners. Versus Sanjeev Kumar & another ...Respondents. Coram Hon'ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the petitioners: Ms. Rekha Mahajan, Advocate. For the respondents: Mr. Ajay Sharma, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Athrav Sharma, Advocate, for respondent No.1. Respondent No.2 proceeded against ex-parte. __________________________________________________ Romesh Verma , Judge (oral) The present petition arises out of the order dated 26.03.2024, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P., whereby appeal preferred by the present petitioners/defendants has been dismissed and the order, dated 18.08.2023 as passed by learned Civil Judge (Jr. Div.), Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. has been affirmed, whereby an application filed by the respondents/plaintiffs under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC was partly allowed. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 ( 2026:HHC:20644 ) 2. The brief facts of the case are that the plaintiffs/ respondents filed a suit for declaration against the defendants/ petitioners. It was averred in the plaint that the predecessor-in- interest of the plaintiffs, defendants No. 1 and 2 and proforma defendants No. 3 to 6 migrated from Pakistan during partition and thereafter, they settled in Nurpur. Thereafter, they jointly purchased land vide sale certificate dated 16-07-1963 u/s 20 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954) by District Rent and Managing Officer Jalandhar in the sum of 650/- by adjustment of compensation due upon ₹ them in public auction on 13.02.1960 at Jalandhar. The parties were declared purchasers of the property on 16-07-1963. The spot verification was conducted by the authorities and the sale certificate was issued on 31.10.1963 in favour of Thuru Ram, S/o Sh. Dhani Ram for himself and for Banarsi Dass, Om Parkash and Chaman Lal. After the issuance of sale certificate, the possession was delivered to predecessor in interest of the parties jointly and they remained in joint possession of the suit property. 3. As per the claim of the plaintiffs, in the month of February 2023, defendant No. 1 started proclaiming himself to 3 ( 2026:HHC:20644 ) be an absolute owner of the suit property and asked the plaintiffs to remove their articles from the shop in his possession. Plaintiffs started inquiring the revenue record and came to know about the wrong done by the predecessor in interest of defendants No. 1 and 2. The plaintiffs applied for the revenue record and it transpired that the predecessor in interest of the defendants No. 1 and 2 vide order dated 28-03- 1987 passed in Missal No. 118/87 has got the entire suit land recorded in their ownership and possession, which is patently illegal and wrong. 4. As per the case of the plaintiff, the change of entries in the revenue record on the basis of order of the Settlement Officer, Dharamshala is without following due procedure and no opportunity of being heard was afforded to the predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs and proforma defendants No. 3 to 6. 5. It was further averred that the cause of action arose to the plaintiffs and against the defendants in the month of February, 2023 when defendant No. 1 started proclaiming himself to be an absolute owner of the property. Therefore, the suit for declaration was filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants to the extent that revenue entries, as incorporated 4 ( 2026:HHC:20644 ) in the Jamabandies are patently wrong, void ab initio, illegal, null and void and not binding upon the succession rights of the plaintiffs being the successor in interest of the Banarsi Dass to succeed his estate to the extent of 1/4th share, defendants No. 1 and 2 are owners to the extent of 1/4th share being successor in interest of Sh. Thuru Ram, further proforma defendants No. 3 and 4 are owners in possession to the extent of 1/4th share being successor in interest of Sh. Om Parkash and defendant No. 5 and 6 are in owners in possession to the extent of 1/4th share being successor in interest of Sh. Chaman Lal and thus the parties are joint owners in possession over the suit land and the entry showing defendants No. 1 and 2 as exclusive owners in possession is patently wrong, illegal, null and void. Further decree for permanent prohibitory injunction was also sought by restraining defendants No. 1 and 2 from interfering in the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs, forcibly dispossessing or raising any sort of construction over the suit land. 6. Alongwith the suit an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC was filed by the plaintiffs/respondents. In the application, it was prayed that during the pendency of the suit 5 ( 2026:HHC:20644 ) the defendants, their family members, agents, servants, attorneys etc. be restrained from interfering in the peaceful possession of the applicants/plaintiffs, forcibly dispossessing them from over the suit land and raising any sort of construction over the same and alienating/creating any sort of charge and lien over the suit land during the pendency of the suit. 7. The suit was contested by defendants No. 1 and 2 by filing written statement taking therein preliminary objections with regard to maintainability, limitation, locus standi and jon- joinder etc. were raised. 8. It was stated that neither the plaintiffs nor proforma defendants No. 3 to 6 or their predecessor-in-interest ever came in possession in the capacity of owners of the suit land, which was ‘abadi land’ and it is only the predecessor-in- interest of the defendants No. 1 and 2, who came in possession of the suit land. It was further stated that Thuru Ram, predecessor-in-interest of the defendants, built three shops in the suit land way back in the year 1960 and thereafter, he also built upper storey on two shops in the year 1980 after completing all the legal formalities. It was denied 6 ( 2026:HHC:20644 ) that in the year 1986-87 Sh. Thuru Ram, predecessor in interest of defendants, moved an application before the settlement department and got incorporated his name in an illegal manner. 9. It was averred by defendants that the officials of the Settlement Department inquired into the matter and carried out the necessary entries in the revenue record. It was stated that predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs and defendants No. 3 to 6 never claimed any right, title or interest over the suit land during their life time. Banarsi Dass predecessor in interest of plaintiffs was a tenant in one shop MC No.1019 of Thuru Ram on payment of rent of Rs. 10/-per month. It was claimed that the averments and assertions as made in the plaint are totally incorrect and it is Thuru Ram, who was the owner in possession of the suit property. Therefore, being an absolute owner, the construction as raised by the predecessor-in-interest of the defendant late Sh. Thuru Ram, was carried out in the presence of the plaintiffs and defendants No. 3 to 6 and they never claimed any right of ownership over the same. It was prayed that the suit being devoid of merit deserves to be dismissed. 7 ( 2026:HHC:20644 ) 10. The defendants contested the application filed by the plaintiff under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC and prayed for the dismissal of the same. 11. The learned trial Court vide its impugned order dated 18.08.2023 partly allowed the application filed by the plaintiff and parties were directed to maintain status quo qua possession, raising any sort of construction, alienating/ creating any sort of charge and lien over the land suit property till the disposal of the suit. 12. Feeling dissatisfied, defendants preferred an appeal in the Court of learned Additional District Judge, Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. The learned First Appellate Court vide its judgment dated 26.03.2024 dismissed the appeal as preferred by the defendants and the findings as returned by the learned trial Court were affirmed. 13. Still feeling aggrieved the defendants are before this Court by filing the instant petition under Article 227 of Constitution of India. 14. It is contended by Ms. Rekha Mahajan, learned counsel for the petitioners that the impugned order and judgment as passed by the learned Courts below are 8 ( 2026:HHC:20644 ) erroneous and liable to be quashed and set-aside. She submits that the order of status quo which has been passed by the learned trial Court and affirmed by learned First Appellate Court deserves to be quashed and set-aside and after accepting the present petition the injunction application filed by the respondents/plaintiffs deserves to be rejected. In support of her contention she has relied upon the judgments in the following manner:- 1. In Civil Appeal No.13232 of 1996, titled Sri Hanumanthappa vs Sri Muninarayanappa, decided on 07.10.1996. 2. In Civil Revision No.3720 of 2005, titled M/s DCM Shriram Consolidated Ltd vs Jai Singh, decided on 15.02.2006. 3. In RSA No.1510 of 1998 (O &M), titled Surinder Singh and another vs Mehru (since deceased), decided on 25.07.2024 4. In CR No.1414 of 2024 (O&M), titled as Sapna and another versus Phool Kumar and others, decided on 06.03.2024 5. In C.M.P(M) No.22523 of 1995, titled Mahmood versus Civil Judge, Ballia & Ors, decided on 04.09.1995. 6. In Civil Miscellaneous Petition (Main) No.39 of 2015, titled Karam Chand and others vs Manjeet Singh and another, decided on 30.12.2016. 7. In Regular Second Appeal No.127 of 1992, titled Ram Parkash vs Geeta Devi, decided on 05.08.1998. 9 ( 2026:HHC:20644 ) 8. In Regular Second Appeal No.141 of 1994, titled Suresh Chand and ors vs Gurdas Ram and Ors., decided on 11.11.2003. 9. In Civil Appeal Nos.5127-5128 of 2009, titled ECE Industries Limited vs S.P Real Estate Developers P.Ltd & Anr. Decided on 06.08.2009. 10. In C.R. No.3159 of 2005, titled Kanakadhara Constructions vs Smt. K. Jhansi Lakshmi Bai & Ors, decided on 13.09.2005. 15. On the other hand, Mr. Ajay Sharma, learned Senior Advocate with Mr. Athrav Sharma, Advocate, for the respondents has defended the impugned judgment and order and he submits that while invoking the provisions of Article 227 of Constitution of India, this Court will not interfere in the concurrent findings as returned by the Courts below. He submits that Courts below have rightly appreciated the point in controversy and interim protection has rightly been granted in favour of plaintiffs and against the defendants after coming to the conclusion that the defendants are raising the construction and interfering in the suit land. 16. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the case file. 17. The case set up by the respondents/plaintiffs is that the predecessors-in-interest of the parties purchased the suit 10 ( 2026:HHC:20644 ) land/property in a public auction held on 03.02.1960, in equal shares, by paying a sale consideration of Rs. 650/-. Thereafter, they were declared purchasers of the suit property with effect from 16.07.1963 under Section 20 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. A sale certificate dated 31.10.1963 was issued in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of the parties. It is the case of the plaintiffs that the parties are owners in possession of the suit property to the extent of 1/4th share each. However, Thuru Ram, in connivance with the revenue officials, incorporated his name in the revenue record exclusively to be owner in possession of the suit property, which entry is illegal, wrong, null and void. 18. On the other hand, it is the case of the defendants that, on the basis of the entries incorporated by the Settlement Authority, the plaintiffs and proforma defendants are strangers to the suit property, and it is only the predecessor-in-interest of defendants No. 1 & 2, who was the owner in possession of the suit property. 11 ( 2026:HHC:20644 ) 19. It is the case of the defendants that the plaintiffs have filed the instant suit without any right, title or interest. Therefore, the suit as well as the application under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 deserve to be rejected. 20. The case file reveals that order dated 30.08.1954 has been placed on record, at running page 180 of the paper book. As per the same, it has been held that Thuru Ram, son of Dhani Ram, filed a claim with respect to a house, a shop and a haveli, marked as Exts. P1 to P3, situated in Village Ahmalpur, Tehsil and District Sialkot, valued at Rs. 650/-, Rs. 1,000/- and Rs. 2,000/- respectively. It has been observed in the order that, from the statements of claimants Thuru Ram and Kaka Ram, it stood proved that the properties belonged to the claimant along with his brothers, namely Banarsi Dass, Om Prakash and Chaman Lal. The order clearly indicate that the properties belonged to Thuru Ram along with his brothers. 21. After spot verification by the authorities, a sale certificate dated 31.10.1963 was issued, which forms part of the present petition at running page 149 of the paper book. It shows that Thuru Ram, son of Dhani Ram, for himself and on behalf of Banarsi Dass, Om Prakash and Chaman Lal, 12 ( 2026:HHC:20644 ) shopkeepers, having given the highest bid at a sale by public auction held in pursuance to the powers conferred under Section 20 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 on the 13th day of February, 1960, was declared as purchaser. It further shows that the name of Thuru Ram has been mentioned along with Banarsi Dass, Om Prakash and Chaman Lal. 22. The said sale certificate was issued in the year 1963. Therefore, when order dated 30.08.1954 is read in conjunction with the sale certificate dated 31.10.1963, it depicts that the predecessor-in-interest of the present petitioners, namely Thuru Ram, was owner along with the predecessors-in- interest of the respondents, namely Banarsi Dass, Om Prakash and Chaman Lal. 23. Defendants No. 1 and 2 have laid stress upon office order dated 28.03.1987 passed by the Settlement Officer, Dharamshala, whereby, on the left portion of the same, it has been stated that the possessor obtained the suit land through a sale deed. In the said order, only name of Thuru Ram has been inserted as the possessor (KABIZ). The names of the other brothers are missing therefrom. 13 ( 2026:HHC:20644 ) 24. It is contended by Sh. Ajay Sharma, learned Senior Counsel, that the entire edifice of the claim set up by the defendants No.1 and 2 is based upon the order passed by the Settlement Officer, on the basis whereof the revenue entries were incorporated in favour of Thuru Ram. He submits that the basic documents placed on record, i.e. order dated 30.08.1954 and sale certificate dated 31.10.1963, show that the suit property was purchased by Thuru Ram along with his brothers, namely Banarsi Dass, Om Prakash and Chaman Lal. He further submits that the order passed by the Settlement Officer, behind the back of the plaintiffs or their predecessors- in-interest, is illegal, erroneous, null and void. 25. The record shows that the suit property was purchased by the predecessors-in-interest of the parties, namely Thuru Ram, Banarsi Dass, Om Prakash and Chaman Lal. However, subsequently, in the year 1987, the Settlement Officer passed an order holding that the possessor (KABIZ), namely Thuru Ram, had stated that the said land had been obtained through a sale deed. The order of the Settlement Officer does not show that the present respondents were arrayed as parties therein. 14 ( 2026:HHC:20644 ) 26. It is also not decipherable from the said order that the predecessors-in-interest of the parties/plaintiffs were afforded an opportunity of being heard therein. Prima facie, the plaintiffs have made out a case for the grant of interim injunction. The balance of convenience also lies in their favour. In case defendants No. 1 and 2 are not injuncted from raising construction over the suit property, it is the plaintiffs who would suffer irreparable loss. 27. The Courts below have rightly come to the conclusion that, in order to preserve the suit property, the injunction order has been passed in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. Once the plaintiffs have been able to establish a prima facie case in their favour, along with balance of convenience and irreparable loss, no infirmity has been committed by the Courts below in directing the parties to maintain status quo qua the nature and possession of the suit property. 28 In the attending facts and circumstances of the present case, especially, the order dated 30.08.1954 and sale certificate dated 31.10.1963 the present petitioners have failed 15 ( 2026:HHC:20644 ) to make out the case for interference. The judgments as relied by learned counsel for the petitioners do not help them. 29. Even otherwise the Hon’ble Apex Court in 2009 (10) SCC 388, titled Zenit Mataplast (P) Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra, dated 11.09.2009, has held that object of interlocutory injunction is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his right for which he could not be compensated in damages recoverable in the action, if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. It has been held that there may be situation wherein the defendant may be use the suit property in such a manner and the situation may comes irretrievable. In such a fact, interim relief should be granted grant of temporary injunction is governed by three basic principles i.e. prima facie, balance of convenience and irreparable loss which have required to be considered in a proper perspective in each and every case. The relevant paras of this judgment reads as under:- “30. Interim order is passed on the basis of prima facie findings, which are tentative. Such order is passed as a temporary arrangement to preserve the status quo till the matter is decided finally, to ensure that the matter does not become either infructuous or a fait accompli before the final hearing. The object of the interlocutory injunction is, to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his right for which he could not be 16 ( 2026:HHC:20644 ) adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. (vide Anand Prasad Agarwalla v. State of Assam vs. Tarkeshwar Prasad & Ors. AIR 2001 SC 2367; and Barak Upatyaka D.U. Karmachari Sanstha (2009) 5 SCC 694). 37. Thus, the law on the issue emerges to the effect that interim injunction should be granted by the Court after considering all the pros and cons of the case in a given set of facts involved therein on the risk and responsibility of the party or, in case he looses the case, he cannot take any advantage of the same. The order can be passed on settled principles taking into account the three basic grounds i.e. prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss. The delay in approaching the Court is of course a good ground for refusal of interim relief, but in exceptional circumstances, where the case of a party is based on fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution and there is an apprehension that suit property may be developed in a manner that it acquires irretrievable situation, the Court may grant relief even at a belated stage provided the court is satisfied that the applicant has not been negligent in pursuing the case.” 30. To the similar extent, in Shiv Ram vs. Nuratta 2006 (1) SLC 97, decided on 02.08.2005, it has been held as follows: 8. In the present case the main dispute is as to who is in actual possession of the suit land. The plaintiffs claim to be in possession as joint owners. The defendant asserts that he is in actual possession. The revenue record is in favour of the plaintiff. The findings of the trial Court are based mainly on the revenue record. The defendant may or may not be able to prove that the revenue record does not reflect the factual position. This is a question which has to be decided when the appeal is heard and disposed of on merits. In the meantime, the interest of both the parties must be secured by an appropriate interim order. 17 ( 2026:HHC:20644 ) (9.) I have purposely not gone into the merits of the present case since whatever this Court may observe may prejudice the findings of the lower appellate Court. Therefore, without entering into any discussion as to who is in actual possession, it is ordered that both the parties are directed to maintain status quo qua nature and possession of the property in dispute pending disposal of the appeal before the learned District Judge, Bilaspur. Since the suit in the present case was filed in the year 1996, it would be in the interest of the parties to have the appeal decided at the earliest. The learned District Judge is requested to decide the case as early as possible and in any event not later than 31st December, 2005.” 31. Therefore, in order to preserve the property, the Courts below have rightly passed the interim injunction by directing the parties to maintain status quo, and there is no infirmity, illegality or jurisdictional error in the orders passed by the Courts below. In case the defendants are not injuncted from raising construction, the plaintiffs shall suffer huge irreparable loss, which cannot be compensated in terms of money. 32. The Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that the scope of interference while invoking the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution of India by the High Court is very limited and narrow. The Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.2072 of 2022, Ibrat Faizan vs. Omaxe Buildhome Private Limited has held as follows: 18 ( 2026:HHC:20644 ) 14. In view of the above, in the present case, the High Court has not committed any error in entertaining the writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the order passed by the National Commission which has been passed in an appeal under Section 58(1)(a) (iii) of the 2019 Act. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. However, at the same time, it goes without saying that while exercising the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court subjects itself to the rigour of Article 227 of the Constitution and the High Court has to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 227 within the parameters within which such jurisdiction is required to be exercised. 14.1 The scope and ambit of jurisdiction of Article 227 of the Constitution has been explained by this Court in the case of Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97, which has been consistently followed by this Court (see the recent decision of this Court in the case of Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, 2022 SCC Online SC 29). Therefore, while exercising the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court has to act within the parameters to exercise the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. It goes without saying that even while considering the grant of interim stay/relief in a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court has to bear in mind the limited jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. Therefore, while granting any interim stay/relief in a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution against an order passed by the National Commission, the same shall always be subject to the rigour of the powers to be exercised under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Similarly, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.2226 of 2010, titled State of Haryana & Ors vs. Manoj Kumar, has held that jurisdiction conferred under Article 227 is not by any means appellate in its nature for correcting errors in the decisions of subordinate courts or tribunals but is merely a power of superintendence to be used to keep them within the bounds of their authority. It has been held that The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts 19 ( 2026:HHC:20644 ) under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited "to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority," and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less an error of law. It has further been held that the High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the subordinate court or the tribunal while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227. The Apex Court held that this Court over 50 years has been consistently observing that limited jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 cannot be exercised by interfering with the findings of fact and set aside the judgments of the courts below on merit. The Apex Court held as follows: 23. More than half a century ago, the Constitution Bench of this court in Nagendra Nath Bora and Another v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam & Others AIR 1958 SC 398 settled that power under Article 227 is limited to seeing that the courts below function within the limit of its authority or 13 2026:HHC:19773 jurisdiction. 24. This court placed reliance on Nagendra Nath’s case in a subsequent judgment in Nibaran Chandra Bag v. Mahendra Nath Ghughu AIR 1963 SC 1895. The court observed that jurisdiction conferred under Article 227 is not by any means appellate in its nature for correcting errors in the decisions of subordinate courts or tribunals but is merely a power of superintendence to be used to keep them within the bounds of their authority. 25. This court had an occasion to examine this aspect of the matter in the case of Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim & Others (1983) 4 SCC 566 . The court observed as under:- “The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited "to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority," and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less an error of law. for this case there was, in our opinion, no error of law much less an error apparent on the face of the record. There was no failure on the part of the learned Subordinate Judge to exercise jurisdiction nor 20 ( 2026:HHC:20644 ) did he act in disregard of principles of natural justice. Nor was the procedure adopted by him not in consonance with the procedure established by law. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or Tribunal. It will not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior court or tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the decision.” 26. This court again clearly reiterated the legal position in Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani & Another v. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi (1995) 6 SCC 576. 14 2026:HHC:19773 The court again cautioned that the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. It must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice, where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes. 27. A three-Judge Bench of this court in Rena Drego (Mrs.) v. Lalchand Soni & Others (1998) 3 SCC 341 again abundantly made it clear that the High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the subordinate court or the tribunal while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227. Its function is limited to seeing that the subordinate court or the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. It cannot correct mere errors of fact by examining the evidence and re-appreciating it. 28. In Virendra Kashinath Ravat & Another v. Vinayak N. Joshi & Others (1999) 1 SCC 47 this court held that the limited power under Article 227 cannot be invoked except for ensuring that the subordinate courts function within its limits. 29. This court over 50 years has been consistently observing that limited jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 cannot be exercised by interfering with the findings of fact and set aside the judgments of the courts below on merit.” 21 ( 2026:HHC:20644 ) 33. Therefore, this court is of the considered opinion that there is no illegality or infirmity in the judgment and order as passed by learned courts below. Consequently the present petition being devoid of any merit deserves to dismissed. 34. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of, accordingly. 35. Before parting, it is made clear that any observation made here-in-above shall not be taken as an expression of opinion on the merits of the main case and the same shall be adjudicated upon uninfluenced by any observation made here- in-above, which are only for the purpose of the instant petition. Records be sent back henceforth. (Romesh Verma) Judge May 29, 2026(Nisha)