( 2026:HHC:20643 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA RSA No. 106 of 2026 Date of Decision:20.05.2026 __________________________________________________ Smt. Purna Devi ...Appellant. Versus Sanjay Kumar ...Respondent Coram The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? For the appellant: Mr. Vinod Chauhan, Advocate. For the respondent: Nemo. 4._ ________________________________________________ Romesh Verma , Judge The present appeal arises out of the order dated 27.02.2026, as passed by learned District Judge, Kullu, District Kullu, H.P. whereby an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for condonation of delay in filing the appeal against the judgment and decree dated 04.01.2010, as passed by learned Civil Judge (Jr. Div.), Manali, Distt. Kullu, H.P., whereby the suit of the plaintiff was decreed, has been dismissed being without any merit. 2. Brief facts of the case are the respondent/plaintiff Sanjay Kumar had filed a suit for possession by way of specific performance of contract against the present appellant 2 ( 2026:HHC:20643 ) before the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Manali, Kullu, H.P on 13.03.2009. 3. As per the case of the plaintiff, the defendant is the owner-in-possession of the land measuring 0-03-09 hectares, being 2724/81720 share out of the total land measuring 0-92-78 hectare comprised in Khasra, Kitta 18, Khata/Khatauni No.41 min/61, entered in Jamabandi for the year 2002-2003 situated in Muhal Phati Sajla, Kothi, Barshai, Tehsil Manali, District Kullu, H.P. 4. As per the case of the plaintiff, the defendant appellant entered into an agreement to sell the share in the suit land measuring 0-03-09 hectares for total sale consideration of Rs.1,20,000/- and agreement dated 16.04.2008 was also executed on this behalf. As per the terms and conditions of the agreement, the sale deed was to be executed between the parties on or before 15th July 2008. On 15.07.2008, the defendant was informed to come to Tehsil Manali and to execute the sale deed with respect to the suit land in favour of the plaintiff. 5. The plaintiff remained present in Tehsil compound Manali from 10:00 AM to 5:00 PM till evening with sufficient 3 ( 2026:HHC:20643 ) funds in order to meet expenses of execution and registration of sale deed with respect to the suit land but the defendant failed to execute the Sale Deed in favour of the plaintiff. That he was ready and willing to perform his part of contract and still he is ready and willing to do so. The defendant was requested time and again to admit the claim of the plaintiff, however, on one pretext or the other, defendant refused to accede to the request of the plaintiff. Therefore, respondent/ plaintiff filed a suit for possession by way of specific performance of contract with a prayer to execute and register the sale deed with respect to the suit land against the petitioner/defendant on the basis of the agreement as entered between the parties on 16.04.2008. 6. The Court issued notices to the petitioner/defendant, however, despite being duly served on 04.04.2009 she failed to put in appearance before the learned trial court and consequently she was proceeded exparte on 04.04.2008. 7. The learned Trial Court directed the plaintiff to adduce evidence in support of his contentions and after examining the evidence on behalf of the plaintiff, the learned 4 ( 2026:HHC:20643 ) trial Court vide its judgment and decree dated 04.01.2010 decreed the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent by directing the defendant to execute the sale deed. Therefore, the suit filed by the plaintiff was decreed, by way of specific performance of agreement, qua the suit land measuring 0-03- 09 hect. being 2724/81720 shares out of the total land measuring 0-92-78 hect. Comprised in Khasra Kitta 18, Khata/Khatauni No. 41 min/61, situated in Muhal and Phati Sajla, Kothi Barshai, Tehsil Manali, District Kullu, H.P. in terms of the agreement dated 16.04.2008 Ex.PW4/A. 8. It is an admitted fact that the plaintiff being decree holder in pursuance to the passing of the decree filed an execution petition before the learned trial Court and the same was allowed on 16.04.2011 and the possession of the suit land has been handed over to the present plaintiff/ respondent. 9. In order to frustrate the decree as passed by the learned Trial Court in favour of the plaintiff, the defendant filed an appeal in the Court of learned District Judge, Kullu, District Kullu, H.P. after the lapse of more than 15 years. Along with the appeal, an application Under Section 5 of the 5 ( 2026:HHC:20643 ) Limitation Act was filed for condonation of delay, wherein it was averred that the suit, which was filed by the plaintiff for specific performance of the agreement before the learned trial Court, the same was compromised outside the Court with the intervention of the respectable persons of the area. It has been averred in the application that as per the terms & conditions of the compromise, it was agreed that the present appellant will pay back sale consideration of Rs.1,20,000/- to the plaintiff/respondent and that he shall surrender his right to purchase the proposed suit land. It is the case of the present appellant in the application that applicant was under the impression that on account of the compromise which was affected between the parties, the respondent will withdraw the suit from the learned trial Court. It was submitted that the respondent did not withdrew the suit and on account of the non-appearance of the present appellant, the learned trial Court passed ex-parte judgment and decree behind her back. 10. It was further submitted that the respondent got executed sale deed in his favour through Court in the year 2011. The applicant/appellant came to know in the month of June 2025 through the Revenue Patwari that the 6 ( 2026:HHC:20643 ) present respondent has got registered the sale deed executed and registered in his favour, thereafter, the appellant/defendant contacted her counsel to advise her. The counsel asked her to apply certified copies of exparte judgment and decree, and as such, the applicant applied the certified copy of the exparte judgment and decree dated 04.01.2010, which was received by her on 09.06.2025. It was averred that in the month of June, 2025, the son of appellant expired and as such, she could not contact her counsel for filing the present appeal. Therefore, the delay in filing the appeal was sought to be condoned. 11 The learned District Judge, Kullu, vide its order dated 27.02.2026 dismissed the application as filed by the present appellant under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and feeling aggrieved by the same the present appellant has approached this Court by filing the instant regular second appeal. 12. It is contended by Sh. Vinod Chauhan, learned counsel for the appellant that the impugned order as passed by the learned District Judge is erroneous and liable to be quashed and set-aside. He submits that plausible reasons 7 ( 2026:HHC:20643 ) and explanation have been given in the application,, therefore, on that account, the application as filed by the present appellant has to be allowed. 13. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record. 14. Generally, the Courts have adopted liberal approach in construing the phrase “sufficient cause” used in Section 5 of Limitation Act in order to condone the delay to enable the courts to do substantial justice and to apply law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice. Notwithstanding the above, howsoever liberal approach is adopted in condoning the delay the existence of sufficient cause for not filing the appeal in time is a condition precedent for exercising the discretionary power to condone the delay . 15. The phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and cause for the advancement of ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It must always be borne in mind that while construing ‘sufficient cause’ in deciding application under 8 ( 2026:HHC:20643 ) Section 5 of the Limitation Act, that on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal, substantive right in favour of a decree-holder accrues and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed. 16. The Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that even after sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not filing an appeal within time, the said party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as excusing the delay is the discretionary jurisdiction vested with the court. The court, despite establishment of a ‘sufficient cause’ for various reasons, may refuse to condone the delay depending upon the bona fides of the party. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The concept of ‘liberal approach’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. It is a well settled principle of law that the limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. 17. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. Where a case has been 9 ( 2026:HHC:20643 ) presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. 18. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy (died) by LRs. & others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA), Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.31248 of 2018, has laid down the parameters for condonation of delay in following manner: “12. In view of the above provision, the appeal which is preferred after the expiry of the limitation is liable to be dismissed. The use of the word ‘shall’ in the aforesaid provision connotes that the dismissal is mandatory subject to the exceptions. Section 3 of the Act is peremptory and had to be given effect to even though no objection regarding limitation is taken by the other side or referred to in the pleadings. In other words, it casts an obligation upon the court to dismiss an appeal which is presented beyond limitation. This is the general law of limitation. The exceptions are carved out under Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act but we are concerned only with the exception contained in Section 5 which empowers the courts to admit an appeal even if it is preferred after the prescribed period provided the proposed appellant gives ‘sufficient cause’ for not preferring the appeal within the period prescribed. In other words, the courts are conferred with discretionary powers to admit an appeal even after the expiry of the prescribed period provided the proposed appellant is able to establish ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing it within time. The said power to condone the delay or to admit the appeal preferred after the expiry of time 10 ( 2026:HHC:20643 ) is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is shown based upon host of other factors such as negligence, failure to exercise due diligence etc. 13. It is very elementary and well understood that courts should not adopt an injustice- oriented approach in dealing with the applications for condonation of the delay in filing appeals and rather follow a pragmatic line to advance substantial justice. 14 to 20 xx xx xx xx 21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.6, where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. 22. xx xx xx 11 23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer8, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds. 24. It would be beneficial to quote paragraph 12 of the aforesaid decision which clinches the issue of the manner in which equilibrium has to be maintained between adopting liberal approach and in implementing the statute as it stands, Paragraph 12 reads as under: “12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a 11 ( 2026:HHC:20643 ) statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.” 19. In view of the exposition of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the present case does not fall in the parameters, whereby it can be said that the present appellant has been able to make out the case for the condonation of delay. This case seems to be gross abuse of process of law, wherein judgment and decree was passed in favor of the respondent way back on 04.01.2010 and after the lapse of more than 15 years, on one fine morning, the appellant got up and filed the appeal, along with application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, just to frustrate and defeat the rights, which have accrued to the decree holder in the present case. The explanation in the application with respect to the delay is totally cryptic and not plausible or reasonable. No sufficient reasons have been assigned in the application what prevented her to inquire either from the court or from a counsel from the date, when she was duly served. She slept 12 ( 2026:HHC:20643 ) over the matter for considerable period and now in order to harass and prejudice the rights of the respondent, the appeal was preferred before the learned District Judge, that was hopelessly time barred, that too, for about more than 15 years. 20. The Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that the right, which has accrued in favor of the decree holder, cannot be allowed to be frustrated by such persons who have not approached the court with clean hands. In the present case also no reasons have been assigned, which shows that there are reasonable or plausible grounds for the condonation of the delay. 21. In view of the aforesaid discussion and for the reasons stated here-in-above, the instant appeal being devoid of any merit is dismissed with cost of Rs. 10,000/-. Pending miscellaneous application (s), if any, shall also stand disposed off. (Romesh Verma) Judge 20th May, 2026 (Nisha)