JUDGMENT : SUSMITA PHUKAN KHAUND, J. 1. Heard learned legal Aid counsel Ms. P.B. Bordoloi for the petitioner and learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mr. B. Sarma for the State of Assam. 2. The petitioner is aggrieved by the Judgment and Order dated 22.08.2023 passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Golaghat in Sessions Case No. 216/2022 convicting the petitioner under Sections 341/326/307 of the Indian Penal Code (‘IPC’ for short) and sentencing him to undergo simple imprisonment for 20 days, rigorous imprisonment for five years and a fine of Rs.1500/- and rigorous imprisonment for seven years and the fine of Rs.1500/- respectively under the aforementioned sections of law. The sentences are to run concurrently and default stipulation has been imposed against each fine sentence. The petitioner is also aggrieved by the Judgment and Order dated 24.07.2025 passed by the learned Sessions Judge Golaghat in Criminal Appeal No. 25/ 2023, dismissing the appeal preferred by the petitioner, Ananta Tanti. 3. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that no intention is discernible. Without intention or knowledge, the petitioner cannot be convicted of an offence under Section 307 IPC. There are no ingredients to prove the offence u/s 307 IPC. The evidence of the medical officer clearly depicts that this is not the case under Section 326 IPC. The weapon of offence has been described as ‘Kalam Kotari’ by PW1 and PW2, whereas it has been described as dao by PW-3, 4 and 5. ‘Dao’ and ‘Kalam Kotari’ are different types of instruments or appliances used for cutting. It is submitted that there is no direct evidence or evidence of eyewitnesses. The learned trial court has mechanically held the petitioner to be guilty of offence under Sections 341/326/307 IPC on the basis of hearsay evidence. 4. It is further contended that the evidence of the I.O, clearly depicts that he had not produced the extract copy of the GD entry. Contradiction surfaces relating to the place of occurrence. PW1 has referred to a place of occurrence which has been contradicted by the other witnesses. There was a delay in lodging the FIR which is a material discrepancy. Contradiction surfaces relating to the place of occurrence. PW1 has referred to a place of occurrence which has been contradicted by the other witnesses. There was a delay in lodging the FIR which is a material discrepancy. Material contradictions could be elicited through the cross-examination of the witnesses, vis-a-vis the cross- examination of the I.O. It is further submitted that the evidence of the I.O clearly reveals that he has admitted that the weapon of offence was not seized from the accused/petitioner. It is further submitted that the people residing around the place of occurrence have not been examined as witnesses. The cross-examination of the witnesses clearly reveal that the adjoining neighbours were not examined, which casts a shadow of doubt over the veracity of evidence. 5. Per contra, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor laid stress in his argument that the victim is the star witness and he would not go to falsely implicate another person who has not caused the injury. He has sustained grievous injuries on his neck and through elaborate discussions of the evidence of PW2 i.e. the victim, it is apparent that the PW2 is suffering from restricted neck movements. 6. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Adalat Yadav vs. The State of Bihar in connection with Criminal Appeal Nos. 1788-1789 of 2019, (order dated 22.04.2026), reported in 2026 INSC 403 . It is submitted that the fact that the petitioner used a dao and had dealt several blows with the dao and incidentally, the victim sustained injuries on his neck clearly reveals that the petitioner had every intention to eliminate the victim. It is submitted that the neck is a vital part of the body and the dao injury on the neck is nothing but a grievous injury caused by a dangerous weapon. 7. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions at the Bar. 8. As this is a revision against the concurrent judgments of two courts, the legality and propriety of the judgments is to be ascertained. The evidence has been discussed in detail by the trial court and has been reassessed by the appellate court. 7. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions at the Bar. 8. As this is a revision against the concurrent judgments of two courts, the legality and propriety of the judgments is to be ascertained. The evidence has been discussed in detail by the trial court and has been reassessed by the appellate court. In this case, the evidence of the victim, i.e. PW2, Keshab Karmakar @ Babatu clearly reveals that the petitioner attacked him with a ‘kalam katari’ on his neck and he sustained a deep cut injury with profuse bleeding on his neck. He deposed that on 30.09.2022 at about 6:30 to 6:40 p.m. at Mohima Tea Estate, in front of Shiva Temple, he was proceeding to buy ‘bounce biscuits’. When he returned back to his bike, the accused person called him from behind as ‘Babu’ ‘. When he looked back, immediately the petitioner struck him with a Kalam Kotari, which landed on the left side of his neck. He sustained a deep cut injury with profuse bleeding. He fled from the place of occurrence (PO for short) and took shelter in the shop of Smti Dulumoni Kool. The petitioner attacked him again and dealt several blows with intent to hit him with his dao, but Smti Dulumoni pushed back the accused and rescued him. She brought him out and meanwhile, people assembled at the PO. He was unconscious by the impact and he came to his senses while his cut injury was being stitched at Golaghat Civil Hospital. He was taken to the Jorhat Medical College and he was admitted in the ICU for 3 to 4 days. Thereafter, he was shifted to the ENT ward where he had to stay for about 10 days. This case was lodged by his father. He has also testified that although the injury has healed, he cannot move his neck sideways and he presently suffers from severe pain, especially in the mornings. The discharge certificate was issued by Dr. Rahana Akhtara and he has proved the same as, Ext. P-3 /PW2. 9. It is pertinent to mention that no contradictions as per Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872, qua 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (‘CrPC’ for short) could be elicited through the cross-examination of PW2. The discharge certificate was issued by Dr. Rahana Akhtara and he has proved the same as, Ext. P-3 /PW2. 9. It is pertinent to mention that no contradictions as per Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872, qua 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (‘CrPC’ for short) could be elicited through the cross-examination of PW2. The only contradiction that could be elicited through the cross examination of PW2 vis-a- vis the cross-examination of the I.O, Subhash Sonar, PW8 is that he did not mention in his earlier statement that the petitioner dealt several blows as he tried to attack him with a dao numerous times, after he had taken shelter in Dulumoni Kool's shop. He has also not mentioned in his initial statement before the I.O that Dulumoni pushed the petitioner away. The deposition of PW2 that the petitioner dealt a dao blow on his neck could not be contradicted through the cross-examination of PW2, vis-à-vis the cross-examination of the I/O. 10. The learned trial court and the learned appellate court has correctly held that the evidence of PW2 has been substantiated by the evidence of informant PW1, Bhabesh Karmakar who deposed that the accident occurred on 30.09.2022 at about 6 to 7 p.m. near Shiva temple. He further testified that he was at home and he did not witness the incident. The petitioner attacked his son with a dao. His elder son, Durna Karmakar saw his injured son and he returned home and informed him that his son Babatu was attacked by the petitioner. He along with his wife and other family members, went to the place of occurrence (PO for short) and saw his son seated outside the shop. He noticed profuse bleeding from the injury and people were wiping the blood. His eldest son brought their car, and they immediately took their injured son to Golaghat Civil Hospital. The injuries were stitched by the doctor, and his son was referred to Jorhat Medical College and he was admitted in the ICU for 4 days. He underwent treatment and had to stay as an indoor patient for 10 days . He has admitted that he learnt about the incident from his son Keshab Karmakar and after 3-4 days, he lodged the ejahar (FIR). 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner laid stress in her argument that there was a delay in the lodgment of the FIR. He underwent treatment and had to stay as an indoor patient for 10 days . He has admitted that he learnt about the incident from his son Keshab Karmakar and after 3-4 days, he lodged the ejahar (FIR). 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner laid stress in her argument that there was a delay in the lodgment of the FIR. In this case, the delay does not defeat the prosecution case. The injured victim was admitted in the ICU and he was an indoor patient for 14 (Fourteen) days. 12. It has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Adalat Yadav (supra) that:- “9. The next argument is that there is a delay in filing the FIR which leads to the doubt of suppression of the original version. Delay in lodging FIR (i) A three judge bench of this Court in State of H.P. v. Gian Chand, held: “12. Delay in lodging the FIR cannot be used as a ritualistic formula for doubting the prosecution case and discarding the same solely on the ground of delay in lodging the first information report. Delay has the effect of putting the court on its guard to search if any explanation has been offered for the delay, and if offered, whether it is satisfactory or not. If the prosecution fails to satisfactorily explain the delay and there is a possibility of embellishment in the prosecution version on account of such delay, the delay would be fatal to the prosecution. However, if the delay is explained to the satisfaction of the court, the delay cannot by itself be a ground for disbelieving and discarding the entire prosecution case…” (ii) In Ravinder Kumar v. State of Punjab, it was observed: “14. When there is criticism on the ground that FIR in a case was delayed the court has to look at the reason why there was such a delay. There can be a variety of genuine causes for FIR lodgment to get delayed. Rural people might be ignorant of the need for informing the police of a crime without any lapse of time. This kind of unconversantness is not too uncommon among urban people also. They might not immediately think of going to the police station. Another possibility is due to lack of adequate transport facilities for the informers to reach the police station. This kind of unconversantness is not too uncommon among urban people also. They might not immediately think of going to the police station. Another possibility is due to lack of adequate transport facilities for the informers to reach the police station. The third, which is a quite common bearing, is that the kith and kin of the deceased might take some appreciable time to regain a certain level of tranquillity of mind or sedativeness of temper for moving to the police station for the purpose of furnishing the requisite information. Yet another cause is, the persons who are supposed to give such information themselves could be so physically impaired that the police had to reach them on getting some nebulous information about the incident.” (iii) In Ramdas v. State of Maharashtra, “24. …The proposition is too broadly stated to merit acceptance. It is no doubt true that mere delay in lodging the first information report is not necessarily fatal to the case of the prosecution. However, the fact that the report was lodged belatedly is a relevant fact of which the court must take notice. This fact has to be considered in the light of other facts and circumstances of the case, and in a given case the court may be satisfied that the delay in lodging the report has been sufficiently explained. In the light of the totality of the evidence, the court of fact has to consider whether the delay in lodging the report adversely affects the case of the prosecution. That is a matter of appreciation of evidence. There may be cases where there is direct evidence to explain the delay. Even in the absence of direct explanation there may be circumstances appearing on record which provide a reasonable explanation for the delay. There are cases where much time is consumed in taking the injured to the hospital for medical aid and, therefore, the witnesses find no time to lodge the report promptly. There may also be cases where on account of fear and threats, witnesses may avoid going to the police station immediately. The time of occurrence, the distance to the police station, mode of conveyance available, are all factors which have a bearing on the question of delay in lodging of the report. There may also be cases where on account of fear and threats, witnesses may avoid going to the police station immediately. The time of occurrence, the distance to the police station, mode of conveyance available, are all factors which have a bearing on the question of delay in lodging of the report. It is also possible to conceive of cases where the victim and the members of his or her family belong to such a strata of society that they may not even be aware of their right to report the matter to the police and seek legal action, nor was any such advice available to them. …In the ultimate analysis, what is the effect of delay in lodging the report with the police is a matter of appreciation of evidence, and the court must consider the delay in the background of the facts and circumstances of each case. Different cases have different facts and it is the totality of evidence and the impact that it has on the mind of the court that is important. No straitjacket formula can be evolved in such matters, and each case must rest on its own facts. It is settled law that however similar the circumstances, facts in one case cannot be used as a precedent to determine the conclusion on the facts in another. (See Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad, (1955) 1 SCR 1083 : AIR 1955 SC 216 ]. Thus mere delay in lodging of the report may not by itself be fatal to the case of the prosecution, but the delay has to be considered in the background of the facts and circumstances in each case and is a matter of appreciation of evidence by the court of fact.” (iv) Ashok Kumar Chaudhary v. State of Bihar: “16. It is trite that mere delay in lodging the first information report is not by itself fatal to the case of the prosecution. Nevertheless, it is a relevant factor of which the court is obliged to take notice and examine whether any explanation for the delay has been offered and if offered, whether it is satisfactory or not. If no satisfactory explanation is forthcoming, an adverse inference may be drawn against the prosecution. However, in the event, the delay is properly and satisfactorily explained; the prosecution case cannot be thrown out merely on the ground of delay in lodging the FIR. If no satisfactory explanation is forthcoming, an adverse inference may be drawn against the prosecution. However, in the event, the delay is properly and satisfactorily explained; the prosecution case cannot be thrown out merely on the ground of delay in lodging the FIR. Obviously, the explanation has to be considered in the light of the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case.” 10. Keeping in view the above judgments, no fault can be found in the impugned judgment on the count of reliance on a single witness. The alleged delay in FIR as contended by the appellant-convicts, too, would not weaken the prosecution case.” 13. Reverting back to this case, it is held that the evidence reflects that PW-2 was in the ICU for four days. All the family members were busy attending to him. No variation in the evidence of the witnesses is detected. Therefore in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Adalat Yadav (Supra) it is held that the delay in lodgment of the FIR does not defeat the prosecution case. 14. The injury is described by the PW1 and PW2 as a cut injury on the neck. 15. The Medical Officer, Dr. Dilip Ch. Deka deposed as PW-7 that on 30.09.2022, he was posted at S.K.K. Civil Hospital, Golaghat as SDM &HO. On that day, at about 8.00 PM, he examined Keshab Karmakar and found the following injuries:- “One incised wound over left side of the neck, measuring 4X 1½ X 1 inches. The injury was caused by a sharp weapon and the age of the injury was recent.” He referred the victim to the Jorhat Medical College at about 9.00 PM. He has proved the medical examination report as Exhibit P-4/PW7 and his signature on the report as P-4(1)/PW7. 16. In his cross examination too, he has admitted that apart from the injury on his neck, he did not detect any other injuries on any part of the victim’s body. Thus, the evidence of PW7 supports and corroborates the evidence of PW1 and PW-2. 17. Both the injured person and the informant have categorically stated that the victim sustained one cut injury on his neck. Thus, the evidence of PW7 supports and corroborates the evidence of PW1 and PW-2. 17. Both the injured person and the informant have categorically stated that the victim sustained one cut injury on his neck. This injury was of a grave nature as neck is a vital part of the human body and the injury measuring 4X 1½ X 1 inches on the neck, clearly proves the gravity of the injury, which appears to be life threatening. 18. It true that PW1, PW4 and PW5 have identified the weapon of offence as a dao whereas the PW2 and PW3 have stated that the weapon of offence is a kolamkotari. The fact that the weapon of offence has been identified with different nomenclature, does not thwart the evidence. A dao as well as a kolamkotari are similar weapons or appliances, which can also be described as a machete kind of a weapon or appliance, whose length and breadth may vary to some extent. 19. The IO testified that the dao with which the petitioner attacked the victim was handed over to him by the informant. 20. Learned Legal Aid Counsel for the petitioner laid stress in her argument that the weapon of offence was not recovered from the possession of the petitioner but the complainant handed over the weapon of offence to the IO from the PO. This fact however, does not cause a dent in the evidence. It has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner had attacked the victim with a dao. Apart from the evidence of the family members, the evidence of independent witnesses also substantiates the evidence of PW1 and PW2. 21. PW3 Sri Pranadhar Karmakar @ Pintu deposed that on 30.09.2022 at about 6.30 PM, in front of Shiva Temple at Mohima Chariali, while he was at a shop near the PO, he heard Dulumoni Kool raising alarm that Keshab Karmakar has been attacked by the petitioner. He went to her shop and he saw the petitioner swinging the dao at the victim, who had taken shelter in Dulumoni Kool’s shop. He somehow managed to grab the kolamkotari dao from the petitioner and hid it nearby and took away the petitioner. Later, he returned to rescue the victim. The people nearby gathered and the ambulance was called. The victim’s parents and brothers were also called. 22. He somehow managed to grab the kolamkotari dao from the petitioner and hid it nearby and took away the petitioner. Later, he returned to rescue the victim. The people nearby gathered and the ambulance was called. The victim’s parents and brothers were also called. 22. In sync with the evidence of PW1, PW2, and PW3, another important witness, Smt.Dulumoni Kool deposed as PW4 that on 30.09.2022 at about 6.30 to 7 p.m., while she was inside her shop at Mohima Chariali, Keshab Karmakar came running. She noticed blood all over his body and Keshab informed her that the petitioner had attacked him.The victim Keshab Karmakar, took shelter in her shop. Meanwhile, the petitioner reached with a kolamkotari dao in his hands and he dealt several blows with intent to hit the victim with the dao, but she stood between them and tried to push away the petitioner. She too raised alarm and the villagers arrived. 23. PW5, Sri Ajoy Kool is not a witness to the incident, but he heard about the incident. He deposed that Bhabesh Karmakar (PW1) handed over the dao to the police, who seized the same. 24. The IO took his signature on the seizure list and he proved Exhibit P- 2(2)/PW5 as his signature. He has identified the dao as M.Ext.1, and as the weapon of offence. This fact was not contradicted by the defence through his cross-examination. 25. The evidence of Sri Suren Karmakar as PW6 also substantiates the fact that the victim was taken to the Golagat Hospital and thereafter, to Johar Medical College for treatment. No contradictions could be elicited through the cross-examination of PW5 and PW6 and PW7 vis-a-vis the cross-examination of the IO. The evidence of PW1 has remained uncontradicted and uncontroverted. PW2, 3 and 4 have also stated in sync with PW1 that the PO is near a shop. 26. The contradictions elicited through the evidence of PW3 and PW4 does not cause a dent in the evidence and does not dispel the fact that PW2 has sustained a deep cut injury on his neck and it was inflicted by the petitioner. 27. The decision of the Supreme Court in Adalat Yadav (supra) can be gainfully referred to as submitted by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor relating to the quality of the evidence of a victim. It has been held that:- “7. 27. The decision of the Supreme Court in Adalat Yadav (supra) can be gainfully referred to as submitted by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor relating to the quality of the evidence of a victim. It has been held that:- “7. In light of the submissions, we now proceed to examine the matter. Out of the manifold contentions advanced by the appellant - convicts, the fact that four PWs have been discounted by the High Court is a major factor. This cannot be faulted since convictions on the basis of the testimony of a singular eyewitness is also permissible. After all, evidence on record is to be measured for quality, not on the basis of quantity. If the testimony is of ‘sterling quality’ resting a conviction thereon would be entirely permissible. Although this position is well settled, we may for ready reference reiterate the same as follows: Evidence to be weighed not counted (i) In Lallu Manjhi v. State of Jharkhand, this Court observed: “10. The law of evidence does not require any particular number of witnesses to be examined in proof of a given fact. However, faced with the testimony of a single witness, the court may classify the oral testimony into three categories, namely, (i) wholly reliable, (ii) wholly unreliable, and (iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In the first two categories there may be no difficulty in accepting or discarding the testimony of the single witness. The difficulty arises in the third category of cases. The court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial, before acting upon the testimony of a single witness. [See: Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 614 : 1957 Cri. L.J. 1000].” (ii) A bench of three judges in Amar Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), held: “16. …As a general rule the court can and may act on the testimony of single eyewitness provided he is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872. But if there are doubts about the testimony, the courts will insist on corroboration. It is not the number, the quantity but quality that is material. The time-honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872. But if there are doubts about the testimony, the courts will insist on corroboration. It is not the number, the quantity but quality that is material. The time-honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. On this principle stands the edifice of Section 134 of the Evidence Act. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy or otherwise [See Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2003) 11 SCC 367 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1055].” 28. In the light of the decision of the Supreme Court, in Adalat Yadav (supra), it is held that the evidence of the injured victim is sufficient as he is the best person to describe the entire incident, in the manner by which he was attacked, and he has identified his assailant. 29. The learned Trial Court has spelt out sound reasonings while holding the petitioner guilty of offence under Sections 341/326/307 IPC. However, it is true that no ingredients of offence under section 341 IPC could be proved to hold the petitioner guilty of wrongfully restraining the victim. The petitioner called out the victim and the evidence depicts that the petitioner called out the victim from behind and thereafter he attacked the victim. There is no instance of any wrongful restraint by the petitioner. 30. Although the neck injury appears to be a grave injury, no opinion was given by the medical officer relating to the nature of injury. The injury was on a vital part of the body and the victim had to undergo treatment as indoor patient for 10 (Ten) days in the ENT department and he was in the ICU for 4 (four) days. A deep cut injury or even a simple cut injury on the neck endangers human life. The eighthly limb of Section 320 under grievous hurt reads:- “Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits.” 31. In view of my foregoing discussions, it is thereby held that no illegality or impropriety is evident in the decision of the learned Trial Court as well as the decision of the learned Appellate Court. 32. In view of my foregoing discussions, it is thereby held that no illegality or impropriety is evident in the decision of the learned Trial Court as well as the decision of the learned Appellate Court. 32. I have considered the fact that the accused person has served 1/3rd of his sentence. A submission has been made for a lenient view. 33. Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, the decision of the learned Appellate Court dated 24.07.2025 in Criminal Appeal No. 25/2023 and the learned trial Court dated 22.08.2023 in Sessions Case No. 216/2022, is modified. 34. The conviction and sentence under sections 326/307 IPC is upheld and the petitioner is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 4 years on each Court. The fine sentences in both the sections of law are upheld. The petitioner is sentenced under Section 326 of the IPC to undergo R.I. for 4 years with fine and under Section 307 of the IPC to undergo R.I. for 4 years with fine. Both the sentences will run concurrently. 35. Send back the Trial Court Records as well as the Appellate Court Records. 36. In terms of the above observation, this petition stands disposed of.