1 2026:CGHC:11792-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 256 of 2017 1 - Ku. Panchi Sahu D/o Shri Maniram Sahu, Aged About 21 Years R/o Village Dhaneli, Post Kolegaon, Thana Kunda, Tehsil Pandariya, District Kabirdham, Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant versus 1 - Sampat Ram Sahu S/o Shri Johan Sahu, Aged About 29 Years Village Torla Nayapara, Thana Kunda, District Kabirdham, Chhattisgarh. 2 - State of Chhattisgarh, Through: The Police Station Kunda, District Kabirdham, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Appellant : Mr. Ajit Singh, Advocate For Respondent No.1 : Mr. Vikram Pratap on behalf of Mr. Shikhar Sharma, Advocate For Respondent No.2/State : Ms. Shubha, Shrivastava, Panel Lawyer 2 Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey Hon’ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal Judgment on Board Per Rajani Dubey, J. 12.03.2026 1. The present appeal has been filed by the appellant challenging the judgment dated 06.04.2016 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Kabirdham (C.G.) in Sessions Case No. 52/2015 whereby the learned trial Court acquitted the respondent No.1 of the charge under Section 376 of the IPC. 2. In brief, the case of the prosecution is that the prosecutrix and the accused were in a love relationship for about three years prior to 03.06.2015 and the said relationship was known to her cousins, namely Jhaduram Sahu and Jethiyabai Sahu. It is alleged that on 03.06.2015, the accused, Sampatram Sahu, on the pretext of marriage, induced the prosecutrix and took her to his house situated at village Torla Navapara. It is further alleged that the accused kept the prosecutrix in a room in his house for the night and established physical relations with her. Thereafter, on 24.06.2015, when the prosecutrix asked the accused to marry her, he refused to do so. Consequently, the prosecutrix submitted a written report (Ex.P/1) at Police Station Kunda. On the basis of the said report, FIR bearing Crime No. 89/2015 was registered against the accused Sampatram Sahu for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. 3 During the course of investigation, the prosecutrix was medically examined with her consent and with the permission of the SDM, and the accused was also subjected to medical examination. The underwear of the prosecutrix and the vaginal slides prepared by the doctor were sent for FSL examination. The Patwari prepared the spot map of the place of occurrence. Statements of the witnesses were recorded and the statement of the prosecutrix was recorded under Section 164 of the CrPC before the Magistrate. After completion of the investigation and other formalities, the charge-sheet for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code was filed before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pandariya. Since the offence was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions, Kabirdham, and thereafter the matter was transferred to this Special Court for trial in accordance with law. Thereafter, the learned trial Court framed the charge against the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC, to which, the accused abjured his guilt and claimed to be tried. 3. So as to hold the accused/respondent guilty, the prosecution examined 7 witnesses. Statement of the accused/respondent was also recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. in which he denied the incriminating circumstances appearing against him and pleaded innocence and false implication in the case. Respondent/accused did not adduce any evidence in defence. 4 4. After appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, the learned trial Court acquitted the respondent of the charge under Section 376 of the IPC. Hence, this acquittal appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned Trial Court has failed to properly appreciate the statements of the prosecution witnesses, particularly P.W.1 (Appellant/Prosecutrix), P.W.2 (father of the prosecutrix), P.W.3 (brother of the prosecutrix) and P.W.4 (Dr. (Smt.) Usha Suryavanshi). A careful consideration of their testimonies clearly reveals the seriousness and gravity of the offence committed by the accused, which warranted conviction and imposition of maximum punishment upon him. It is further submitted that the learned Trial Court failed to take into consideration the settled principles of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Karthi @ Karthick vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, reported in AIR 2013 SC 2645, wherein it has been held that the offence stands constituted where the accused takes physical advantage of the prosecutrix to satisfy his own whims and desires. It is further contended that a perusal of the entire material available on record clearly establishes that the prosecution has successfully proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The oral as well as documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution, particularly the conduct of the respondent/accused, clearly points towards his culpability. In such circumstances, the learned Trial Court erred in granting benefit to the accused and recording an order of 5 acquittal. The impugned judgment, therefore, suffers from serious legal infirmities and is not sustainable in the eyes of law. Hence, the acquittal of the accused deserves to be set aside and the accused is liable to be convicted and appropriately sentenced in accordance with law. Reliance has been placed on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Anurag Soni Vs. State of Chhattisgarh reported in (2019) 13 SCC. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent No.1/accused submits that the learned Trial Court has rightly appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record and has correctly recorded the finding of acquittal. In such circumstances, the learned Trial Court has rightly granted the benefit of doubt to the accused and no interference with the impugned judgment of acquittal is warranted. Hence, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 7. Learned counsel for the State submits that the prosecution has successfully established its case beyond reasonable doubt and the conduct of the accused clearly reflects his culpability. It is contended that the learned Trial Court erred in extending the benefit of doubt and passing a judgment of acquittal. Hence, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside and the accused deserves to be convicted in accordance with law. 8. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 6 9. It is evident from the record of the learned Trial Court that a charge under Section 376 of the IPC was framed against the accused. However, after appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, the learned Trial Court acquitted respondent No. 1/accused of the said charge under Section 376 of the IPC. 10. In her examination-in-chief, prosecutrix (P.W.-1) stated that the accused works as a doctor and is related to her aunt, who resides in the village of Kishungarh. She stated that about three years ago, during the summer season, her aunt had fallen ill and during her summer vacation she had gone to visit her. At that time, the accused was treating her aunt. The accused had given her aunt a bottle of medicine at home and it was there that she first met the accused. She further stated that after their meeting, they developed feelings of love for each other. She stated that when she was staying at her aunt’s house, about two and a half years ago, the accused, who is the son of her maternal uncle, took her with him to his house, then took her to a room and established physical relations with her. Thereafter, he brought her back and left her at her aunt’s house. The next day, she returned to her own house in village Dhaneli. She further stated that after she returned to her house, about two to three months later, the accused came to her house and took her photograph on his mobile phone. While leaving, he 7 told her that he would marry her. Thereafter, he returned to his home. She further stated that the accused frequently called her on the phone and visited her house and forcibly established physical relations with her by claiming that she was his wife and on the pretext that he would marry her. She stated that on this pretext, the accused continued to have physical relations with her. However, later the accused refused to marry her, after which she lodged a written complaint, which was registered as Ex.P/1 and her consent for medical examination was obtained vide Ex.P/2. She further stated that her statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. was recorded before the learned Trial Court. Further, in her cross-examination, the prosecutrix denied the suggestion that she had been in a relationship with the accused for the past three years. In para 13, the prosecutrix stated that when the accused had taken her to his house along with Jhadu Ram and taken her to a room where he established physical relations with her, she did not inform Jhadu Ram about the incident. She further stated that Jhadu Ram was the son of her maternal aunt. She also admitted that even after returning to her aunt’s house, she did not disclose the incident to her aunt. She further admitted that she did not inform the parents of the accused or even her own parents about the physical relationship that had occurred three years earlier. 8 In para 15, she stated that,”……. मै ቏ኔिሪग से शामै 4:30 बजे चली गयी थी। ्ቚिሪशा्ቌण के िሪ अिሪयी्ሹ मैरे पासे फो! िሪकेयी तब मै# उसे बतयी िሪके मैरे ्ቚिሪशा्ቌण केयी%्ቅमै चली रेहा हा, िሪफोरे मै उसे फो! के( िሪके मै# ्ቚिሪशा्ቌण स्थीली मै* पाहा+,च गयी ” हा+, तब वहा ्ቚिሪशा्ቌण स्थीली मै* पाहा+,च थी। In para 16, she admitted that when the accused came to the training venue, she went with him on the motorcycle. In para 22, she stated that she used to call the accused and ask him to marry her. She further stated that since the accused repeatedly talked to her and established physical relations with her, she had asked him to marry her. 11. The father of the prosecutrix (P.W.-2) stated that he was informed by his wife that the accused had committed sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix. 12. Brother of the prosecutrix (P.W.-3) stated that on 03.06.2015 his sister had gone to Pandariya for training. When she did not return, he called her on her mobile phone, and she informed him that Sampat Sahu had taken her to his house and that she was there. He further stated that at about 11:00 p.m. he, along with his father, went to the house of Sampat Sahu and called out, upon which Sampat Sahu and his sister came out of the room together. He stated that he had asked the accused as to why he had brought her there, to which the accused replied that he had made her his wife. 9 He also stated that on 24.06.2015 the accused, along with his family members, came to their house and refused to marry his sister. 13. Dr. Usha Suryavanshi (P.W.-4) medically examined the prosecutrix and did not find any external or internal injuries. She further opined that no definite conclusion regarding sexual intercourse could be given. During the examination, she noted that the hymen of the prosecutrix was old and ruptured. 14. It is evident from the statement of the prosecutrix that she had been in a relationship with the accused for about three years prior to the lodging of the FIR dated 25.06.2015. She herself stated that she had asked the accused to marry her. She further deposed that since the accused repeatedly spoke with her and established physical relations with her, she had requested him to marry her. 15. In the matter of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar Vs. State of Maharashtra and another reported in (2019) 9 SCC 608, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in paras 16 and 18 as under:- “16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a "misconception of fact that vitiates the woman's "consent" On the other hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of 10 upholding his word at the time of giving it. The "consent" of a woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a "misconception of fact" where such misconception was the basis for her choosing to engage in the said act. In Deepak Gulati, this Court observed: (SCC pp. 682-84, paras 21 & 24) 21. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. 24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. 11 There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The "failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term "misconception of fact", the fact must have an immediate relevance". Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.” 18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the "consent" of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the "consent" was vitiated by a "misconception of fact" arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of 12 immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act.” 16. In light of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar (supra), it is necessary to establish that the promise of marriage was false from the very inception and that the accused had no intention to marry the prosecutrix at the time the promise was made. In the present case, there is no cogent evidence on record to show that at the very beginning the accused had made a false promise of marriage with the intention to deceive the prosecutrix. Therefore, considering the conduct of the parties, the delay in lodging the FIR, the admissions made by the prosecutrix in her cross-examination and the absence of medical evidence supporting forcible sexual intercourse, it cannot be conclusively held that the consent of the prosecutrix was obtained under a misconception of fact on account of a false promise of marriage. 17. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in its latest judgment dated 12.02.2024 in Criminal Appeal No. 1162 of 2011, passed in Mallappa and Others v. State of Karnataka, reported in (2024) AIR (SC) 1252, has held in paragraph 36 as under:- “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of 13 justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as:- “(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive-- inclusive of all evidence, oral and documentary; (ii Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally 14 plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal; (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re- appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.” 18. In view of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mallappa (supra), it is well settled that where two views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the view favouring the accused must ordinarily be adopted. Moreover, while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the scope of interference by the appellate court is 15 limited and unless the findings of the Trial Court are perverse or suffer from manifest illegality, the order of acquittal should not be disturbed. In the present case, the view taken by the learned Trial Court is a plausible and reasonable view based on the evidence available on record. No perversity, illegality or material error in appreciation of evidence has been demonstrated so as to warrant interference with the order of acquittal. Therefore, this Court finds no reason to interfere with the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court. 19. Accordingly, the acquittal appeal is hereby dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) (Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge Judge Ruchi RUCHI YADAV Digitally signed by RUCHI YADAV