JUDGMENT : M. ZOTHANKHUMA, J. Heard Mr. A. Ahmed, learned counsel for the appellant and Ms. A. Begum, learned Addl. PP for the State. Also heard Mr. A. Thakuria, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 (informant). 2. The appellant has put to challenge the impugned Judgment dated 20.12.2023, passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Bilasipara in Sessions Case No. 55/2011, by which the appellant has been convicted under Sections 447/326/302 of the IPC. He has accordingly been sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for 1 month under Section 447 of the IPC and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 7 years with a fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default, simple imprisonment for 1 month under Section 326 of the IPC. The appellant has also been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life under Section 302 of the IPC and to pay fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for 2 months. All the sentences are to run concurrently. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the fact that the appellant had hit the deceased with a wooden baton is not in dispute. However, the act of the appellant had been done in a sudden fight without any premeditation and in the heat of passion, which erupted from a sudden quarrel between the appellant on one side and the deceased and his brother (PW-8) on the other side, over a dispute regarding the ownership of a betel nut garden. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that Clause Thirdly in Section 300 of the IPC is not attracted, because the prosecution failed to prove that the injury caused by the appellant on the deceased would result in death in the ordinary course of nature. Further, as Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC was applicable to the facts of the case, the appellant’s act of culpable homicide did not amount to murder. He further submits that if the deceased had been immediately taken to a hospital and given treatment in the hospital, after being hit on the head with the wooden baton by the appellant, the deceased would have in all probability survived the assault, as the doctor’s report nowhere stated that the injury caused to the deceased would, in the ordinary course of nature, lead to the death of the deceased. 5. 5. The appellant’s counsel also submits that the hitting of the deceased on the head by the appellant with a wooden baton, did not amount to the appellant acting in a cruel manner, as the same had occurred due to a sudden fight in the heat of passion and without any premeditation or intention to kill the deceased. He accordingly submits that the charge under Section 302 of the IPC should be altered to Section 304 Part-II of the IPC, as at best, the appellant could be convicted under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC only. 6. In support of his submissions, Mr. Ahmed has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Anbazhagan Vs. State represented by the Inspector of Police , reported in AIR 2023 Supreme Court 3660 and the decision of this Court in the case of Rajen Boro @ Gobla vs. State of Assam (Crl. App.(J) 61/2017). 7. Ms. A. Begum, learned Addl. PP submits that the evidence of PW Nos. 7 & 8 proved that there was intention on the part of the appellant to kill the deceased, inasmuch as, the appellant had gone home after the quarrel and returned with a wooden baton, with which he hit the head of the deceased. Thus, Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC was not attracted, as the appellant had gone to his house, after the quarrel had ended. This proved that the appellant had the intention to kill the deceased, knowing fully well that the injury caused by the wooden baton on the head would be fatal. 8. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 2, Mr. A. Thakuria, submits that there was previous enmity between the appellant on one side and the deceased and PW-8 on the other side, as the issue regarding the ownership of the betel nut garden had been lingering between the parties for some time. He submits that the evidence recorded by the learned Trial Court shows that besides there being a quarrel, there was no provocation on the part of the deceased and PW-8 against the appellant. He thus submits that Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC was not attracted to the facts of the case. 9. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties. 10. He thus submits that Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC was not attracted to the facts of the case. 9. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties. 10. The issue that has to be decided is as to whether any of the clauses Firstly to Fourthly of Section 300 and Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC are attracted to the facts of the case. 11. Section 300 and Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC are reproduced hereinbelow as follows:- “ 300 . Murder— Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or— (Secondly) — If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or— (Thirdly) — If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or— (Fourthly) — If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. Exception 4— Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Explanation.— It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault.” 12. As can be seen from the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant, there is no dispute with regard to the fact that the appellant hit the deceased on the head with a wooden baton, which was approximately 6-7 feet long, which led to the death of the deceased. It is also not in dispute that there was a property dispute between the appellant on the one side, and the deceased and his brother PW-8 on the other side. It is also not in dispute that there was a property dispute between the appellant on the one side, and the deceased and his brother PW-8 on the other side. The evidence adduced by the prosecution witnesses shows that while PW-4 was plucking betel nuts from the betel nut garden of PW-8, the appellant came to the garden and told PW-4 not to pluck the betel nuts from the trees. On PW-4 reporting the matter to PW-8, a quarrel ensued between PW-8 and the appellant. PW-4 then told PW-8 and the appellant not to quarrel. PW-4 then went home. However, PW-4 came to learn that the appellant had assaulted the deceased, who was the brother of PW-8 and the deceased had died as a result of the injuries sustained. 13. The evidence of PW-1, who is the informant is to the effect that while he was ploughing his field on 21/02/2008 at about 10/10.30 a.m, he heard cries from his village and noticed people running towards the house of his uncle (deceased). On reaching the place of occurrence, he was told that there was a quarrel going on in the house of his uncle (deceased). When he went into the house, he saw his uncle lying senseless on the ground. He was taken to hospital where he expired. PW-1 further states that he subsequently came to know that a quarrel had taken place between his uncle and the appellant and scuffling had also taken place. 14. The evidence of PW-2 is that he saw the appellant quarrelling with the deceased and PW-8. He also saw the appellant hitting the deceased on his head with a wooden baton. On being hit, the deceased immediately fell to the ground and became senseless, with blood and food coming out from the nose and the mouth of the deceased. PW-2 and PW-8 along with one Belal Ali then took the deceased to the Sapatgram Police Station by a thela. The police then sent the deceased to Sapatgram SHC for treatment. The deceased was thereafter referred to Dhubri Civil Hospital. PW-2 then heard that the deceased had died due to his injuries in Dhubri Civil Hospital. 15. The evidence of PW-3 is to the effect that the appellant assaulted her husband, PW-8. The police then sent the deceased to Sapatgram SHC for treatment. The deceased was thereafter referred to Dhubri Civil Hospital. PW-2 then heard that the deceased had died due to his injuries in Dhubri Civil Hospital. 15. The evidence of PW-3 is to the effect that the appellant assaulted her husband, PW-8. When the deceased came to the spot, the appellant hit the deceased with a wooden baton on his head, due to which the deceased fell down on the ground and became senseless, with blood and food coming out from the nose and mouth of the deceased. Further, PW-3 was informed at around 2.30 pm that the deceased had died in Dhubri Civil Hospital. 16. The evidence of PW-4 is to the effect that he was told by the appellant not to pluck betel nuts from the betel nut garden of PW-8. On reporting the matter to PW-8, a quarrel took place between PW-8 and the appellant. After PW-4 telling them to stop their quarrel, PW-4 went home. Later he heard that the appellant had assaulted the deceased, who was the younger brother of PW-8 and had died due to the assault. 17. The evidence of PW-5 is that he heard about the incident wherein the appellant had assaulted the deceased, due to which the deceased died. 18. The evidence of PW-6 is to the effect that he had been engaged to pluck betel nuts from the garden of the deceased. The appellant thereafter restrained PW-6 from plucking the betel nuts on the ground that the appellant was the owner of the garden. The matter was reported to PW-8, due to which a quarrel ensued between PW-8 and the appellant. PW-6 then left the place and heard later that the appellant had hit the head of the deceased due to which the deceased had died. 19. The evidence of PW-7, who is an eyewitness to the assault, is to the effect that PW-8 had sold his betel nuts to some buyers. However, the appellant restrained PW-8 from plucking the betel nuts from the trees, claiming that the betel nut trees belonged to him. PW-7 then advised the appellant and PW-8 not to quarrel and to settle the dispute between them. The appellant thereafter left the betel nut garden. Hearing about the incident, the deceased, who was the brother of PW-8, came to the garden. PW-7 then advised the appellant and PW-8 not to quarrel and to settle the dispute between them. The appellant thereafter left the betel nut garden. Hearing about the incident, the deceased, who was the brother of PW-8, came to the garden. After some time, the appellant came to the place of occurrence with a piece of wood and hit the deceased on his head, which led to his death. 20. PW-8 has also given a similar testimony, stating that after an altercation took place between PW-8 and the appellant, one Mahar dispersed the fight and PW-8 and the appellant went back to their respective houses. The deceased then came to the garden, whereupon the appellant brought a wooden baton from his house and assaulted the deceased, which led to the death of the deceased. 21. The evidence of PWs - 9 and 10 is that they heard about the incident regarding the assault made on the deceased by the appellant. 22. The evidence of PW-11 is to the effect that a fight had taken place between the appellant and the deceased over the issue of betel nuts. The appellant had then hit the deceased on the head with a piece of wood. PW-11 stated that he was a witness to the incident. 23. The evidence of PW-12, who is also an eyewitness to the incident, stated that there was a fight between the appellant and the deceased over betel nuts. The appellant then hit the deceased with a wooden baton on the head due to which the deceased died. 24. The evidence of PW-13, who is the wife of the deceased, is to the effect that the appellant hit the deceased on the head with a wooden baton and that he died due to the said incident. In her cross-examination, PW-13 stated that there was a fight between the appellant and themselves over ownership of betel nut trees as both parties claimed the betel nut trees to be their own. She also stated that there had been a fight earlier also. 25. The evidence of PW-14, who is a housewife, is to the effect that there was a fight over ownership of betel nut trees and the plucking of betel nuts between the appellant and PW-8. After the fight between them was over, the deceased arrived at the place of occurrence. 25. The evidence of PW-14, who is a housewife, is to the effect that there was a fight over ownership of betel nut trees and the plucking of betel nuts between the appellant and PW-8. After the fight between them was over, the deceased arrived at the place of occurrence. As soon as the deceased arrived at the place of occurrence, the appellant hit him on the head with a wooden baton, as a result of which, the deceased fell down on the ground. Though PW-14 stated in her examination in chief that she witnessed the incident, she denied the same in her cross-examination. 26. The evidence of the Doctor (PW-15), who conducted post-mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased, is to the following effect:- “An average built male dead body of 60 years of age is examined. Rigor mortis is present on the dead body. Eyes and mouths are found closed. There was lacerated injury on the vault of the skull with hemotoma of size 5 inch x 5 inch. No other injury is found. Skull bone was found fractured involving both the parietal and occipital bones. And inside the skull cavity membrane were found lacerated and massive extra dural and sub-dural haemotowa in the occipital and parital region. Head injury involving parital and occipital bones are anti mortem in nature. So the opinion of the cause of death is due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of head injury sustained. Ext. 3 is PM report [under objection as it is a carbon copy). Ext. 3(1) is my signature.” 27. The evidence of PW-16, who was the Investigating Officer, is to the effect that he submitted a charge sheet against the appellant under section 447/323/302/34 IPC. 28. The evidence of PW-17, who is a villager, is to the effect she did not know how the deceased died. She was also declared a hostile witness and was cross-examined by the Prosecution. In her cross-examination by the Prosecution, PW-17 stated that an altercation took place between the appellant and PW-8 in respect of the plucking of betel nuts. Thereafter, the brother of the appellant also entered into the quarrel. The deceased also entered the scene and rebuked the appellant and his brother Amzad. In her cross-examination by the Prosecution, PW-17 stated that an altercation took place between the appellant and PW-8 in respect of the plucking of betel nuts. Thereafter, the brother of the appellant also entered into the quarrel. The deceased also entered the scene and rebuked the appellant and his brother Amzad. PW-17 stated that thereafter the appellant picked up a wooden baton from the courtyard and hit the head of the deceased, due to which the deceased fell down on the ground. 29. The evidence of PW-18 is that he had examined PW-3, who had an abrasion on her left arm. 30. As can be seen from the above testimony of the witnesses, there was a quarrel and fight between the appellant and PW-8. Thereafter, they both went home, as had been advised to them by others. When the brother of PW-8 arrived at the garden, the appellant came out of his house and hit the head of the deceased with a wooden baton. The injury sustained by the deceased, as has been mentioned in the evidence of PW-15, shows that the injury was serious, which implied that great force had been used, while being hit by the baton on the head. 31. With regard to the stand of the appellant that the death of the deceased was not done with the intention of causing death or bodily injury, sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, it would be profitable to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttarakhand Vs. Sachendra Singh Rawat reported in (2022) 7 SCC 227 . In the above case, the Supreme Court considered the observations and decision made in another of it’s case, i.e. Pulicherla Nagaraju Vs. Sachendra Singh Rawat reported in (2022) 7 SCC 227 . In the above case, the Supreme Court considered the observations and decision made in another of it’s case, i.e. Pulicherla Nagaraju Vs. State of A.P., reported in (2006) 11 SCC 444 , wherein it had held that the factors to be considered for deciding whether there was intention to cause death or bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course to cause death, would be as follows :- “(i) nature of the weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body; (iv) the amount of force employed in causing injury; (v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any premeditation; (vii) whether there was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger; (viii) whether there was any grave and sudden provocation and if so, the cause for such provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of passion; (x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual manner; (xi) whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows.” 32. On considering the fact that the appellant had hit the head of the deceased with a thick wooden stick, with great force, we are of the view that clauses Thirdly and Fourthly of Section 300 IPC are attracted. 33. With regard to the other ground taken by the appellant that the act of the appellant was culpable homicide not amounting to murder, as the case attracted Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC, we find that all the ingredients of Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC are present in this case. Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC provides that culpable homicide is not murder, if it is committed without premeditation, in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. In the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC provides that culpable homicide is not murder, if it is committed without premeditation, in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. In the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Leela Ram reported in (2019) 13 SCC 131 , the Supreme Court held that under Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC, culpable homicide is not murder if the stipulations contained in that provision are fulfilled. They are: (i) that the act was committed without premeditation; (ii) that there was a sudden fight; (iii) the act must be in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel; and (iv) the offender should not have taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. 34. In the case of Anbazhagan (supra) , the Supreme Court has held that when a Court is confronted with a question as to whether the offence of murder has been made out, the true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as described in Clause 1 to 4 of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a single injury was caused. The Supreme Court has further held that even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall within Clauses Firstly to Fourthly of Section 300 of the IPC, the act of the accused, which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused’s case attracts any of the five Exceptions enumerated in that Section. 35. In the case of Gurmail Singh & Another VS State of Uttar Pradesh & Another , reported in (2022) 10 SCC 684 , the Apex Court has held that in order to make culpable homicide as murder, the act by which death is caused should fall not only under any one or more of the clauses Firstly to Fourthly under Section 300, IPC but they should also not fall under any of the five Exceptions to Section 300, IPC. As such, in order to make the present case culpable homicide not amounting to murder, we have to see whether the case falls under any of the Exceptions 1 to 5 to Section 300 IPC. 36. In the present case, it is clear that there had been enmity between the parties due to the dispute over ownership of the Betel Nut trees. It is also clear that there was provocation from both the sides, as a quarrel had erupted due to picking of the Betel Nuts by the persons associated with PW-8. It is also clear that a weapon had been picked up from the courtyard of the appellant and a single injury resulted from the blow given by the appellant to the deceased. The blow was aimed at a vital part of the body. Though, there was no premeditation or intention to use a weapon against the deceased at a prior point of time, the blow given on the head of the victim can be said to have been made due to a sudden fight in the heat of passion. The question to be decided is whether there is anything to show that the deceased or PW-8 had tried to resort to any physical force against the appellant. The physical act thus far, has apparently been done on the part of the appellant and against the deceased. 37. In the present case, there was a quarrel between the parties and the evidence shows that there was a sudden fight between the deceased and the appellant, as per the evidence of PW-11, PW-12 and PW-13. In fact, there was a fight earlier also In the case of Dhirajbgai Gorakhbhai Nayak Vs. State of Gujarat reported in (2003) 9 SCC 322 , the Supreme Court has observed on the applicability of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC in para 11, as follows :- "11. The Fourth Exception of Section 300 IPC covers acts done in a sudden fight. The said Exception deals with a case of prosecution (sic provocation) not covered by the first exception, after which its place would have been more appropriate. The Exception is founded upon the same principle, for in both there is absence of premeditation. The Fourth Exception of Section 300 IPC covers acts done in a sudden fight. The said Exception deals with a case of prosecution (sic provocation) not covered by the first exception, after which its place would have been more appropriate. The Exception is founded upon the same principle, for in both there is absence of premeditation. But, while in the case of Exception 1 there is total deprivation of self-control, in case of Exception 4, there is only that heat of passion which clouds men's sober reason and urges them to deeds which they would not otherwise do. There is provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception 1, but the injury done is not the direct consequence of that provocation. In fact, Exception 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding that a blow may have been struck, or some provocation given in the origin of the dispute or in whatever way the quarrel may have originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties puts them in respect of guilt upon an equal footing. A "sudden fight" implies mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation, nor could in such cases the whole blame be placed on one side. For if it were so, the Exception more appropriately applicable would be Exception 1. There is no previous deliberation or determination to fight. A fight suddenly takes place, for which both parties are more or less to be blamed. It may be that one of them starts it, but if the other had not aggravated it by his own conduct it would not have taken the serious turn it did. There is then mutual provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult to apportion the share of blame which attaches to each fighter. The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused: (a) without premeditation, (b) in a sudden fight, (c) without the offenders having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner, and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the "fight" occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in IPC. It takes two to make a fight. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the "fight" occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in IPC. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two and more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. The expression "undue advantage" as used in the provision means "unfair advantage"." 38. In the present case, we find that the single injury inflicted upon the deceased was intentional and was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, even though it has not been mentioned in the post-mortem report by the doctor PW- 15 that the injury inflicted was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. However, we find that Exception 4 to section 300 IPC is attracted to the case in hand. There was a single blow to the head of the deceased upon a quarrel that had ensued firstly between the appellant and the PW-8. A fight had also apparently ensued between PW-8 and the appellant. Thereafter, the deceased entered the scene and there was another quarrel and fight between the appellant and the deceased, as per the testimony of PW-11 to 14. As a fight had occurred in the heat of passion, the appellant took up a wooden baton, which was lying in the courtyard and gave a single blow to the head of the deceased. The enmity that might have been there between the parties appears to have lingered for a long period of time. As a fight had occurred in the heat of passion, the appellant took up a wooden baton, which was lying in the courtyard and gave a single blow to the head of the deceased. The enmity that might have been there between the parties appears to have lingered for a long period of time. However, it appears that on the fateful day, the events took a turn for the worse, though there is nothing to show that there was any pre-meditation on the part of the appellant to cause the death of the deceased in the first instance. 39. The post-mortem report regarding the injury to the scalp, skull, membrane and spinal cord of the deceased states as follows:- “1. Scalp, Skull, Vertebrae: Skull is found to be factured involvving both parietal & occipital bone. 2. Membrane: Lacerated. 3. Brain and Spinal Cord: There is massive extradural and subdural haematoma in the occiptal & parietal region of skull.” 40. In the opinion of PW-15, the death was due to shock and haemorrhage, as a result of head injury sustained by the deceased. Further, there is no suggestion put to the doctor by the appellant as to whether the injury would have caused death in the ordinary course of nature. However, on perusing the injury report of the deceased and the post-mortem report, we find that the injury is a serious injury on the head, which, in the ordinary course of nature, could lead to death. 41. In the case of Rajen Boro @ Gobla (supra) , the Division Bench of this Court was seized of a matter, where the victim and his wife had gone to the house of the accused appellant, where an altercation took place. The accused appellant, in the course of such altercation, brought a hammer from inside the house and hit the victim on his head and left the place. This Court, on considering the above circumstances in the above case, held that as the accused appellant was unarmed and it was the victim, who had gone to the house of the accused appellant and picked up a quarrel, the bringing of the hammer from his house by the accused appellant and giving a blow with the same on the victim, brings the action of the accused appellant within the sweep of Section 4 to Section 300 of the IPC. The accused appellant having caused the injury on the victim without any premeditation and in the course of a sudden quarrel in the heat of passion and without having taken any undue advantage, he could not have been convicted under Section 302 of the IPC. The conviction and sentence under Section 302 of the IPC was set aside and he was instead convicted under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC, as there was no intention to cause death or such bodily injury as was likely to cause death. We are of the view that the decision of this Court in Rajen Boro @ Gobla (Supra) , is also applicable to the facts of this case. Further, we also find the stipulations stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Leela Ram (Supra) , where Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC also requires the existence of a sudden fight, is present in the present case. As stated earlier, the evidence of PW-11 to 14 shows that a sudden fight had erupted between the parties pursuant to a quarrel. 42. All the above facts show that Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC is attracted to the case in hand. As such, we find that the act of the appellant which killed the deceased amounts to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Thus, section 302 IPC is not attracted to the facts of this case. Though, we find that the present case is not a case of murder, we find that the case comes within the provision of section 304 Part-I IPC. The use of a wooden baton on the head of the deceased leading to the death of the deceased leaves us with no doubt that the appellant had the intention to kill the deceased. 43. In view of the reasons stated above, we modify the conviction from section 302 IPC to section 304 Part-I IPC. 44. In view of the above reasons, we convict the appellant under section 304 Part-I IPC and sentence him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of 10 years with a fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for 3 (three) months. 45. 44. In view of the above reasons, we convict the appellant under section 304 Part-I IPC and sentence him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of 10 years with a fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for 3 (three) months. 45. Accordingly, the impugned judgement dated 20/12/2023 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bilasipara, in Sessions Case No. 55/2011 and the sentence to be undergone by the appellant, in terms of the impugned judgement, are hereby modified to the extent indicated above. 47. The appeal is accordingly disposed of. 48. Send back the TCR.