J UDGMENT & O RDER : KAUSHIK GOSWAMI, J. Heard Mr. Lalruatpuia Sailo, learned counsel appearing for the appellant. Also heard Mr. K. Remruatfela, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 2] This Regular First Appeal, preferred under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 read with Section 17(2)(b) of the Mizoram Civil Courts Act, 2005, calls in question the judgment and decree dated 12.06.2024 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Aizawl Judicial District, Aizawl (hereinafter referred to as the “trial Court”), in Civil Suit No.47 of 2021. 3] The case of the respondent/plaintiff, in brief, is that during the period 2017–2020, certain relatives of the appellant/defendant No. 1 were tenants in her building and, in that backdrop, cordial relations developed between the parties. According to the respondent/plaintiff, the appellant/defendant No. 1 represented himself as a person possessing influence in political and official circles, including proximity to persons connected with the Railway establishment, thereby gaining the confidence of the respondent/plaintiff and her husband. 4] It is the specific pleaded case of the respondent/plaintiff that in the year 2017, the appellant/defendant No. 1 promised to secure appointment of her husband, who was then serving as Superintendent Engineer in the Power & Electricity Department, Government of Mizoram, to the post of General Manager (Technical Branch) under the Human Resource Department. According to the respondent/plaintiff, the appellant/defendant No. 1 represented that for such appointment, a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- was required to be paid, coupled with an assurance that in the event the appointment did not materialize, the amount would be refunded. 5] The respondent/plaintiff further pleaded that acting upon such representation, she paid Rs.8,00,000/- in cash, followed by a further sum of Rs.30,000/-, aggregating Rs.8,30,000/-. It was additionally alleged that the appellant/defendant No. 1 also represented himself as being engaged in sandalwood business and induced the respondent/plaintiff to part with further sums, pursuant whereto Rs.2,00,000/- was allegedly paid by cheque and Rs.3,00,000/- deposited in the account of defendant No. 2. On such basis, the respondent/plaintiff claimed that a total sum of Rs.13,30,000/- stood paid to the defendants. 6 ] Since the promised appointment was allegedly not secured and the amounts were not refunded despite repeated demands and issuance of legal notice, the respondent/plaintiff instituted Civil Suit No. 47 of 2021 seeking recovery of the said amount together with consequential reliefs. On such basis, the respondent/plaintiff claimed that a total sum of Rs.13,30,000/- stood paid to the defendants. 6 ] Since the promised appointment was allegedly not secured and the amounts were not refunded despite repeated demands and issuance of legal notice, the respondent/plaintiff instituted Civil Suit No. 47 of 2021 seeking recovery of the said amount together with consequential reliefs. 7] The appellant/defendant No. 1 contested the suit by filing written statement denying the material allegations. The stand taken was that no monies, as alleged, were received by him save and except the admitted cheque transaction of Rs.2,00,000/-, which according to him was directly credited to defendant No. 2. The appellant denied having made any promise to secure appointment for the respondent’s husband. 8] On the basis of the pleadings, the learned trial court framed the following issues: “1) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form and style or not? 2) Whether the plaintiff has locus standi to file the present case or not? 3) Whether the defendant No.1 deceived the plaintiff in the name of the defendant No.2 by offering the post of General Manager at Technical Branch under Human Resource Department to her husband? If so, as to whether the plaintiff has paid Rs.13,30,000/- to the defendant No.1 for the same? 4) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs claimed or not? If so, to what extent?” 9] In support of her case, the respondent/plaintiff examined herself and her husband as plaintiff witnesses and also exhibited documentary materials. The appellant/defendant No. 1 examined himself as defence witness and produced documentary evidence. 10] Upon conclusion of trial, the learned trial court decreed the suit by directing appellant/defendant No. 1 to pay Rs.10,30,000/- to the respondent/plaintiff and defendant No.2 to pay Rs.3,00,000/-. 11] Assailing the impugned judgment, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the decree is wholly unsustainable both on facts and in law. It is contended that the respondent’s own pleaded case demonstrates that the principal payment of Rs.10,00,000/- was allegedly made for securing a public appointment for her husband through the appellant’s influence. Such a transaction, it is submitted, is ex facie opposed to law and public policy and cannot be enforced through a civil court. It is contended that the respondent’s own pleaded case demonstrates that the principal payment of Rs.10,00,000/- was allegedly made for securing a public appointment for her husband through the appellant’s influence. Such a transaction, it is submitted, is ex facie opposed to law and public policy and cannot be enforced through a civil court. It is further argued that even otherwise, the alleged payments, particularly the substantial cash component, remain unsupported by reliable documentary evidence and the findings of the learned trial court are therefore perverse. Reliance is placed upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Goa State Cooperative Bank Limited vs. Krishna Nath A. (Dead) Through Legal Representatives and Others , reported in (2019) 20 SCC 38 , and the decision of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Engkunga vs. R.L. Dinpuia , reported in (2014) 4 GLR 354. 12] Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff submits that the respondent was deceived by false representations made by the appellant and that the payments were made under inducement and upon an assurance of refund. It is contended that the transaction cannot be equated with illegal gratification and that the learned trial court rightly appreciated the oral evidence in decreeing the suit. 13] I have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties, perused the pleadings, evidence and materials on record, and examined the authorities cited at the Bar. 14] The points for determination in the present appeal are as follows: (i) Whether the findings of the learned trial court on Issue Nos. 3 and 4 are sustainable in law and on the evidence on record? (ii) Whether a suit for recovery founded upon payment allegedly made for securing a public appointment is legally maintainable and enforceable? (iii) To what relief, if any, is the appellant entitled? 15] Since the appeal assails both the factual findings recorded by the learned trial court and the legal sustainability of the decree, the evidence on record requires independent reappreciation in the manner expected of a first appellate court. 16] The respondent/plaintiff, both in her pleadings and oral evidence, has consistently asserted that the principal payment was made upon the representation of the appellant/defendant No. 1 that he would secure appointment of her husband to the post of General Manager (Technical Branch) under the Human Resource Department. 16] The respondent/plaintiff, both in her pleadings and oral evidence, has consistently asserted that the principal payment was made upon the representation of the appellant/defendant No. 1 that he would secure appointment of her husband to the post of General Manager (Technical Branch) under the Human Resource Department. Her husband, examined as PW-2, substantially reiterated the same version. 17] In her cross-examination, the respondent/plaintiff admitted that she had not independently verified whether the appellant in fact held the position or influence he claimed to possess. She further admitted that there was no documentary proof in support of the substantial cash payments allegedly made by her and that the alleged understanding between the parties was entirely oral. 18] More significantly, PW-2, namely the husband of the respondent/plaintiff, in his cross-examination expressly stated that he believed that by depositing Rs.10,00,000/- with the appellant, he could obtain the post of General Manager (Technical Branch). Such evidence leaves no ambiguity as to the dominant purpose and character of the principal transaction pleaded by the respondent. 19] It is therefore evident from the respondent’s own case that the foundational and principal claim arises out of the alleged payment of Rs.10,00,000/- for securing appointment of her husband to a public post through the appellant’s intervention. The alleged assurance of refund was merely ancillary to that arrangement. 20] Though the pleadings also contain allegations regarding certain further payments allegedly made in connection with a sandalwood business transaction, those assertions stand on an entirely different footing. The pleadings in that regard are vague and lacking in specificity, and the evidentiary foundation is equally deficient. 21] Apart from the admitted cheque transaction of Rs.2,00,000/- and the deposit of Rs.3,00,000/- in defendant No. 2’s account, there is no cogent material demonstrating the precise legal nature of the alleged sandalwood arrangement, the terms thereof, or the basis upon which such claim could independently sustain a decree in recovery. 22] The learned trial court, however, appears to have approached the matter primarily as a question whether oral evidence was sufficient to prove payment, without first examining the legality of the underlying cause of action. 23] Such an approach, in the considered opinion of this Court, suffers from a fundamental infirmity. Even where factual proof of payment is assumed, the court must still determine whether the claim itself is one recognised and enforceable in law. 23] Such an approach, in the considered opinion of this Court, suffers from a fundamental infirmity. Even where factual proof of payment is assumed, the court must still determine whether the claim itself is one recognised and enforceable in law. 24] In Engkunga (supra) , a coordinate Bench of this Court dealt with a materially similar situation where money was alleged to have been paid for securing appointment to a public post. The Court unequivocally held that no legal action can be maintained for enforcing or giving effect to a transaction founded upon illegality. 25] The principle underlying the said decision is well settled. Courts cannot lend their aid to enforce claims which arise directly out of arrangements opposed to law or public policy. 26] Learned counsel for the respondent sought to contend that the respondent was herself deceived and that the payment should therefore be viewed as arising out of inducement rather than illegality. The submission cannot be accepted in the present factual matrix. 27] The respondent’s own pleaded case is not that she entered into an otherwise lawful commercial or lending transaction which was later dishonestly breached. Her case, plainly stated, is that the principal payment was made because she believed the appellant could secure a public appointment for her husband through influence and intervention. 28] A public appointment is necessarily governed by lawful recruitment procedures and institutional norms. Any arrangement whereby appointment is purportedly procured through private payment, influence, or extra-legal intervention is wholly incompatible with law and public policy. 29] Whether the appellant actually possessed such influence, or whether the respondent was misled into believing so, does not alter the essential legal character of the transaction as pleaded. 30] Insofar as the alleged sandalwood-related transactions are concerned, apart from being unsupported by satisfactory evidence, they are neither pleaded nor established with sufficient clarity so as to independently sustain the decree once the principal foundation of the suit is found to be legally unenforceable. 31] The learned trial court therefore fell into manifest error in treating the matter as a conventional money recovery claim without addressing the legal character of the cause of action itself. 32] Having independently reappreciated the pleadings, evidence and the legal position applicable to the present case, this Court is unable to sustain the findings recorded by the learned trial court. 32] Having independently reappreciated the pleadings, evidence and the legal position applicable to the present case, this Court is unable to sustain the findings recorded by the learned trial court. 33] A first appellate court is under an obligation to examine both facts and law independently. Upon such examination, it becomes evident that the learned trial court confined itself substantially to the question whether the respondent/plaintiff had adduced sufficient oral evidence to establish payment, while failing to address the anterior and determinative question whether the cause of action itself was legally enforceable. 34] That omission goes to the very root of the matter. 35] Even assuming, arguendo, that the respondent’s version regarding payment of the principal sum of Rs.10,00,000/- were to be accepted, the suit would nevertheless fail, since the respondent’s own pleaded case makes it clear that such payment was allegedly made for securing appointment of her husband to a public post through the appellant’s intervention. 36] A civil court cannot enforce recovery arising out of such a transaction. To do so would amount to judicial recognition of an arrangement fundamentally opposed to public policy and the rule of law. 37] Public employment cannot be the subject matter of private bargain or pecuniary negotiation. Any claim founded upon such an arrangement is inherently unenforceable. 38] The attempt made on behalf of the respondent to characterize the matter purely as one of deception does not carry the case any further. The question is not whether the respondent may have been misled, but whether the civil claim as framed is founded upon a legally cognizable cause of action. On the respondent’s own showing, the answer must be in the negative. 39] Insofar as the additional allegations relating to sandalwood business transactions are concerned, this Court finds that such allegations are too vague and insufficiently established to independently sustain the decree, particularly once the principal and dominant foundation of the suit is found to be legally untenable. 40] The findings recorded by the learned trial court on Issue Nos. 3 and 4 are therefore unsustainable both in law and on proper judicial scrutiny of the record. 41] Consequently, the impugned judgment and decree dated 12.06.2024 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Aizawl Judicial District, Aizawl, in Civil Suit No. 47 of 2021 are liable to be set aside. 42] The Regular First Appeal is allowed. 3 and 4 are therefore unsustainable both in law and on proper judicial scrutiny of the record. 41] Consequently, the impugned judgment and decree dated 12.06.2024 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Aizawl Judicial District, Aizawl, in Civil Suit No. 47 of 2021 are liable to be set aside. 42] The Regular First Appeal is allowed. 43] The judgment and decree dated 12.06.2024 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Aizawl Judicial District, Aizawl, in Civil Suit No. 47 of 2021 are hereby set aside and quashed. 44] Resultantly, Civil Suit No. 47 of 2021 stands dismissed. 45] Parties shall bear their own costs. 46] Let the records of the learned trial court be returned forthwith.