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2026 DAILYLAW 10555 (GAU)

C. Lalremliana v. State of Mizoram

2026-04-30

Budi Habung, Rajesh Mazumdar

body2026
JUDGMENT : The criminal appeal arises from the order dated 27th March 2025,passed by the Presiding Officer, Fast-Track Special Court (Rape and Protection of Children from Sexual Offence) at Aizawl, Mizoram in SCNo. 108 of 2019, corresponding to Criminal TR No. 1746 of 2019, whereby the present appellant had been convicted of having committed offences under Section 6 of the POCSO Act 2012 and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of 20 years with fine amounting to Rs. 10,000 and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for a term of three months. 2. The records of the case reveal that a complaint was lodged by the mother of the victim on 10th of July 2019, before the appropriate police authorities, raising a grievance that her daughter was sexually assaulted multiple times since 2017, when she studied in Class 6, by the accused in a shop owned by the accused. After having registered the case, the appellant was taken into custody, and an investigation was carried out. On completion of the investigation, the final report was submitted on 21st of August 2019, levelling charges under Section 376 AB of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. 3. During the trial, the prosecution examined the mother of the victim as PW 1. The victim herself was examined as PW 2. The teacher to whom the victim had made the first complaint was thereafter examined as PW 3. PW 4, who was working as an outreach worker at District Child Protection, had assisted in the lodging of the FIR. PW 5 was the class teacher of the victim in her school when she studied in class 8. PW 8, was posted at Civil Hospital, Aizawl, during the year 2019, in the Casualty Department. He had carried out the medical examination of the accused. On receiving a requisition, PW 9 examined the victim on the same day, that is 10th July 2019, around 4:20 PM. PW 10 was the Chief Judicial Magistrate who had recorded the statement of the victim under section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973. PW11 was the Investigation Officer. The case was handed over to P.W. 12 after the transfer on promotion of the earlier Investigating Officer. PW 10 was the Chief Judicial Magistrate who had recorded the statement of the victim under section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973. PW11 was the Investigation Officer. The case was handed over to P.W. 12 after the transfer on promotion of the earlier Investigating Officer. From the materials collected, P.W. 12, on the grounds of a prima facie case, filed a chargesheet U/S 6 of the POCSO Act, R/W 376 AB IPC. 4. The accused, C. Lalremliana, in his statement recorded under the provisions of section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, had denied all the questions put to him. He had submitted that he would adduce evidence in his defence. 5. DW 1 is the daughter of the accused, who used to live with her father, the accused. The second daughter of the accused had adduced evidence as DW 2. The accused examined himself as the DW 3. 6. The defense had submitted written arguments in the matter on 18.2.2025, which, in the words of the learned Trial Court, were voluminous, and the learned APP had made oral arguments. 7. The accused appellant was convicted and sentenced by the order dated 27th March 2025, which is impugned herein. 8. Mr. Johny L. Tochhawng, learned Counsel for the appellant, Ms. Vanneihsiami, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, Mizoram, appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1, and Mr. Jordan Rohmingthanga, learned Legal Aid Counsel, appearing on behalf of PW No. 2/victim, have rendered valuable assistance. The Trial Court records have been received and perused. 9. The learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that Judgment and order suffers from a basic fallacy, in as much as, the learned trial court had initially framed charges under section 376 AB of the IPC read with section 6 of the POCSO act and at a later stage, while delivering the judgment, altered the charge to be one under section 6 of the POCSO Act only without giving a fair opportunity to the petitioner to contest the same. 10. The learned Counsel for the appellant has further submitted that the learned Trial Court had committed a grave error when it did not appreciate the fact that although the alleged incident, according to the victim, had occurred sometime in the year 2017, the FIR was lodged as late as on 10.7.2019. 10. The learned Counsel for the appellant has further submitted that the learned Trial Court had committed a grave error when it did not appreciate the fact that although the alleged incident, according to the victim, had occurred sometime in the year 2017, the FIR was lodged as late as on 10.7.2019. As per the learned counsel, the very delay in the lodging of the FIR in itself would be fatal to the case of the prosecution. 11. The learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that the learned Trial Court had erred in law in failing to consider the evidence projected by the witnesses in their proper perspective, and even in that view of the matter, the impugned judgment deserves an interference of this court. The learned counsel has submitted that the evidence tendered by the defense witnesses did not receive the attention of the learned Trial Court. He has submitted that the specific evidence of the defence witnesses, who had deposed that the accused appellant was assisted by his daughters to run the shop where the incidents had allegedly taken place, stood testimony to the fact that the accused/appellant was never alone in the shop to have committed the offences alleged. 12. The learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that when the assault had allegedly occurred in the year 2017, the learned Trial Court had committed a serious error when an enhanced penalty, as per an amendment effected in the year 2019, had been imposed upon the petitioner. 13. The learned APP has contested the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant. She has submitted that no prejudice has been caused to the appellant when the charge under Section 376AB had been discarded by the learned Trial Court and the charge under Section 6 of the POCSO Act had been taken into consideration at the time of judgment, since initially charges under Section 376AB of the IPC read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act had already been framed. She has submitted that in the absence of any prejudice on that count, the impugned judgment does not deserve any interference. 14. She has submitted that in the absence of any prejudice on that count, the impugned judgment does not deserve any interference. 14. The learned prosecutor has thereafter submitted that the incidents initially occurred in the year 2017, and the evidence on record displays that the victim had been subjected to penetrative sexual assault by not one person but by two different persons on different occasions. The learned Counsel has submitted that it is also a matter of record that the evidence of the teachers of the school was to the effect that the victim had been gradually losing her interest in studies, and there was a change in her behavior. The learned public prosecutor has submitted that it was only in the year 2019 that the victim could master the courage to disclose her ordeal to the substitute teacher, where upon immediate action was initiated. The Learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted that the delay in lodging the FIR in this particular case cannot prove to be fatal to the prosecution since the veracity of the allegations had been amply proved and the evidence of the minor victim remained unshaken even during cross-examination. In such a view of the matter, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor submits that the impugned judgment and order do not require any interference in this appeal. 15. The Learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted that the accused had been convicted and sentenced on the basis of the testimony of the minor victim. It is a settled position in law that the sole testimony of a victim of an incident of sexual assault could be enough to draw an inference of guilt against the accused. The learned Counsel for the State has submitted that it is also a settled position in law that when the facts are substantiated by evidence, the reverse burden of proof transfers to the accused under the POCSO Act. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted that the POCSO Act mandates a presumption of guilt upon the accused, and the burden would be upon the accused to rebut such presumption once the basic facts are proved. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted that the basic fact of the minor child having been exposed to sexual activity was established by the evidence of the doctor who had examined the minor victim. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted that the basic fact of the minor child having been exposed to sexual activity was established by the evidence of the doctor who had examined the minor victim. When the minor victim raised a finger of accusation on the appellant herein, the burden of proving the contrary would shift to the accused. The learned APP has submitted that, on the failure of the accused to discharge his burden, the finding of guilt of the accused, even if none of the witnesses other than the victim had been discussed, cannot be faulted. 16. The learned additional Public Prosecutor has further submitted that the unamended Act of 2012 had laid down a minimum punishment of ten years, which could have extended to life in cases of aggravated penetrative sexual assault on minors. She submits that in such circumstances, the trial court would also be entitled to impose a more severe punishment than the minimum. Therefore, the imposition of a sentence of 20 years upon the accused cannot be faulted. 17. The learned Amicus Curiae has supported the projections made by the learned APP and has prayed for dismissal of the appeal. 18. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. The arguments made by the learned counsel appearing for the contesting parties are substantial arguments that would have a very material impact on the outcome of the case. 19. This Court has minutely perused the judgment and order passed by the Learned Trial Court, and it is noticed that the Trial Court had, in its order, summarized the deposition of prosecution witnesses produced during the trial. The statements made by the prosecution witnesses during the examination in chief and the statements made in the cross-examination have been summarized in the form of paragraphs. Subsequent thereto, the learned Trial Court had recorded the fact of recording the statement of the accused under the provisions of section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 20. The learned Trial Court, thereafter, recorded that the arguments were heard on the 18th of February 2025 and had observed that the learned counsel for the appellant had submitted a voluminous written argument which had taken time to go through. 21. 20. The learned Trial Court, thereafter, recorded that the arguments were heard on the 18th of February 2025 and had observed that the learned counsel for the appellant had submitted a voluminous written argument which had taken time to go through. 21. In the immediately succeeding paragraph, the Learned Trial Court proceeded to examine the charges framed against the accused, and by discussing the alleged misunderstanding of the police officer, concluded that since the victim was already 13 years of age on the date of registration of Aizawl Police Station case no. 241 of 2019, ingredients of section 376AB, IPC were not found and therefore, the Learned Trial Court canceled the said charge and a fresh charge under section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 was framed afresh in its place. It appears to this Court that the learned Trial Court overlooked the fact that the allegations leveled by the FIR lodged in the year 2019 related to incidents which had allegedly occurred in the year 2017, and the petitioner, being aged 13 years in 2019, would have been aged below 12 years in the year 2017. 22. This Court further notices that immediately thereafter, the learned Trial Court had quoted the provisions of Section 3 of the POCSO Act 2012. In the very next paragraph the Learned Trial Court held that, in view of the statement of the victim recorded by the Investigation Officer, it appeared that the accused had committed an offense of aggravated penetrative sexual assault against the victim multiple times in view of clause(l) of section 5 of the POCSO Act, 2012, which is punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012. In the very next paragraph, the learned Trial Court found itself constrained to convict the accused of having committed an offense of aggravated penetrative sexual assault against the victim in accordance with the charge framed against him afresh on that day itself. Accordingly, he was convicted. 23. In the very next paragraph, the learned Trial Court found itself constrained to convict the accused of having committed an offense of aggravated penetrative sexual assault against the victim in accordance with the charge framed against him afresh on that day itself. Accordingly, he was convicted. 23. The manner in which the learned Trial Court had reproduced the statements of the prosecution witnesses only, had converted the charges framed against the accused on the basis of a presumed misunderstanding of the investigation officer and the manner in which the learned Trial Court, without any reference or discussions on the evidence adduced by the prosecution witnesses and the defense witnesses or the stand taken by the accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C, had recorded the conviction of the accused, and the manner in which the conviction was handed down by relying upon a statement made by the victim before the investigation officer, which obviously had to be made during the period of investigation, cannot receive the approval of this Court. In fact, the finding of guilt of the appellant was based solely on the statement made by the victim before the Investigating Officer. 24. The records of the Trial Court reveal that the evidence of three defense witnesses had been recorded, one of them being the accused himself. The judgment and order of the learned Trial Court does not refer to the defense set up by the accused in the entire judgment. The learned Trial Court had recorded that the written arguments placed by counsel for the accused were voluminous. Still, unfortunately, none of the arguments found any place in the judgment and order of the learned Trial Court. The Learned Trial Court may have found the evidence adduced by the defense witnesses and the arguments placed by the Learned Counsel for the accused before it to be irrelevant or to be devoid of merit. However, there is no such reflection in the judgment and order assailed in the appeal. In the absence of any reasoning or observations on the manner in which the learned Trial Court had appreciated the judgment or had decided to reject some of the evidence and accept the others, the judgment and order do not deserve to be sustained. 25. However, there is no such reflection in the judgment and order assailed in the appeal. In the absence of any reasoning or observations on the manner in which the learned Trial Court had appreciated the judgment or had decided to reject some of the evidence and accept the others, the judgment and order do not deserve to be sustained. 25. The Apex Court in the case of Bibi Parwana Khatoon @ Parwana Khatoon and another Versus State of Bihar, reported in (2017) 6 SCC 792 , has held as follows: “11. We have gone through the judgment and order passed by the trial court (copy Annexure P-9) in which the trial court has mentioned the name of defence witnesses but not discussed as to why their testimony as to the fact that married sister-in-law (of the deceased) and her husband used to live in village Sabutar, is not believed. The High Court has also committed the same error.” 26. It is observed that three defence witnesses, namely the DW 1 and DW2, who are daughters, which means that they were related to the accused himself, and the accused himself as DW 3 had deposed in defence. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Laltu Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, (2019) 15 SCC 344 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 275:2019 SCC OnLine SC 2 that a related witness is not an interested witness at all times and his testimony cannot be rejected on the ground of interestedness. It was observed: & quot;12. As regards the contention that he eyewitnesses are close relatives of the deceased, it is by now well-settled that a related witness cannot be said to be an “interested” witness merely by virtue of being a relative of the victim.” On this line, non- appreciation of the defence witnesses in this case can be termed as a blatant error. 27. In the present case, the learned Trial Court had taken the pain to elaborately reproduce the evidence of the Prosecution witness. In contrast, the evidence led by the defence does not find any reference. The evidence led by the prosecution also failed to attract any discussion. This Court does not find any semblance of discussion or appreciation of the evidence on record, or indicating or providing any logical narrative as to how the evidence so recorded establishes the guilt of the accused. The evidence led by the prosecution also failed to attract any discussion. This Court does not find any semblance of discussion or appreciation of the evidence on record, or indicating or providing any logical narrative as to how the evidence so recorded establishes the guilt of the accused. This Court, in its order dated 19.11.2025, passed in Crl. Appl no 11/2025 has held as follows: “11. It hardly needs to be emphasized that a Court of law deciding the rights of parties are duly bound to assign reasons for their decisions. In a case of the present nature entailing such severe penal consequences, it is imperative that cogent and sufficient reasons are assigned by the learned trial Court, with reference to the evidence on record, before holding that person guilty of the offence with which he is charged. In fact, the same is necessary even in case the Court is of the view that the accused deserves an acquittal but we are anguished to note that the learned trial Court has miserably failed in its duty to adhere to the most basic principles of deciding a case, the observance of which must necessarily find reflection in the judgment, by which the decision of the Court is conveyed to the accused and as well as to the victim and the public at a large.” 28. This Court has noticed another glaring aspect of the matter. 29. Section 354 Cr.P.C reads as follows:- “354. Language and contents of judgment.—(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided by this Code, every judgment referred to in section 353,— (a) shall be written in the language of the Court; (b) shall contain the point or points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision; (c) shall specify the offence (if any) of which, and the section of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or other law under which, the accused is convicted and the punishment to which he is sentenced; (d) if it be a judgment of acquittal, shall state the offence of which the accused is acquitted and direct that he be set at liberty.” 30. A perusal of the Judgment would reveal that no point or points for determination was/were formulated by the learned Trial Court. 31. A perusal of the Judgment would reveal that no point or points for determination was/were formulated by the learned Trial Court. 31. It is also noticed that the impugned judgment and order failed to assign reasons for handing down a sentence in accordance with the amendment provisions of the POCSO Act, 2012, when such amendments had come into effect after the alleged incidents of assault had taken place and, in fact, had come into force after the FIR had been lodged regarding the incident. Pertinent to state that the FIR had been lodged on the 10th of July 2019, alleging incidents prior to the said date and the amendment to Section 6 was effectuated on 16th of August 2019. The learned Trial Court overlooked the protection granted by Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India. 32. In view of the above findings, which malign the very foundation of the judgment and order dated 27.3.2025 passed by the learned Trial Court, this Court has no option but to set aside the aforesaid judgment. This order, however, should not be taken to indicate that this Court has appreciated the evidence tendered in the case by the contesting parties. The learned Trial Court had failed to record proper and decipherable reasons for coming to a conclusion of guilt of the accused/appellant. In the absence of a point or points for determination being formulated and in the complete absence of any discussion on the evidence available before the learned Trial Court, and since the culpability of the accused has been decided only on the basis of a statement made by the victim before the Investigating Officer, the impugned judgment and order are hereby interfered with and accordingly set at naught. 33. The matter shall now stand remanded back to the Learned Trial Court for proceeding afresh from the point of conclusion of defense evidence. The learned Trial Court shall hear the arguments afresh and pass a reasoned judgment by formulating points for determination and assigning cogent reasons for the decision in conformity with Section 354 Cr.P.C. 34. The appellant shall be at liberty to apply for bail during the pendency of the trial, and if so applied, the same shall be considered on its own merits. 35. The appeal stands allowed with the aforesaid directions.