Judgment : S.K. Medhi , J. The extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court has been sought to be invoked by filing this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by putting to challenge the opinion rendered vide impugned order dated 12.09.2019 passed by the learned Foreigners’ Tribunal No. 1st , Barpeta, Assam in F.T. Case No.82/2018. By the impugned judgment, the petitioner, who was the proceedee before the learned Tribunal, has been declared to be a foreigner post 25.03.1971. 2. The facts of the case may be put in a nutshell as follows: (i) A reference was made by the Superintendent of Police (B), Barpeta District, against the petitioner giving rise to the aforesaid F.T. Case No.No.82/2018. (ii) As per requirement u/s 9 of the Foreigner’s Act, 1946 to prove that the proceedee is not a foreigner, the petitioner had filed the written statement on 20.10.2018 along with certain documents and adduced evidence through 3 DWs. (iii) The learned Tribunal, after considering the facts and circumstances and taking into account of the provisions of Section 9 of the Foreigners’ Act, 1946 had come to a finding that the petitioner, as opposite party, had failed to discharge the burden cast upon him and accordingly, the opinion was rendered declaring the petitioner to be a foreign national post 25.03.1971. 3. We have heard Shri J. Ahmed, learned counsel for the petitioner. We have also heard Shri G. Sarma, learned Standing Counsel, Home Department& NRC; Ms. R.B. Bora, learned GA, Assam, Shri N. Kalita, learned counsel appearing on instructions of A.I. Ali, learned Standing Counsel, Election Commission of India and Shri B. Deka, learned CGC. We have also carefully examined the records which were requisitioned vide an order dated 16.03.2020. 4. Shri Ahmed, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner could prove his case with cogent evidence and in view of the fact that there was no rebuttal evidence, the learned Tribunal should have accepted the said proof and accordingly hold the petitioner to be a citizen of India. In this regard, he has referred to the following documentary evidence. In this regard, he has referred to the following documentary evidence. (i) Ext-A is the certified copy of voter list of 1966, (ii) Ext-B is the certified copy of voter list of 1970, (iii) Ext-C is the certified copy of voter list of 1993, (iv) Ext-D is the voter list of 1997, (v) Ext-E is the Jamabandi Copy, (vi) Ext-F is the Gaonburah Certificate. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in the notice issued by the Tribunal, the name was mentioned as Fazal Haque son of Gatu Mia and there was also a mention of the voters list of 1966 in the ERO report wherein the name has been mentioned as Fayzal Haque. It is submitted that there was discrepancy with regard to the name in the notice itself and actually, the name of the petitioner is Fazar Ali. It is submitted that the names of his parents appear in the voters lists of 1966 and 1970 as Ghatu Seikh and Sajemon Nessa. There is, however, a slight change in the name of the father in the voters list of 1970 as Ghutu Seikh. The voters list of 1993 has been relied upon wherein the father’s name is written as Gatu Miya and mother’s name as Sajemon Nessa along with that of the petitioner and some others. The name of the petitioner has, however, been written as Fazar Ali. The next voters list is of the year 1997 wherein the name of the petitioner is missing. It is submitted that in 1997, the petitioner was marked ‘D’ in the voters list. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a Jamabandi of 1958- 65 in which, it appears that the name of Fazal Haque has been inserted. He has also submitted that a certificate was issued by the Gaonburah which however could not be annexed to the writ petition. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the case was established by the petitioner through 3 nos. of witnesses, namely, the petitioner as DW1, one projected brother Mainul Hoque as DW2 and the Gaonburah as DW3. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that an application was made for correcting the evidence in chief of DW2 which was rejected by the Tribunal and the said rejection is also criticized. 9. of witnesses, namely, the petitioner as DW1, one projected brother Mainul Hoque as DW2 and the Gaonburah as DW3. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that an application was made for correcting the evidence in chief of DW2 which was rejected by the Tribunal and the said rejection is also criticized. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that the evidence of the witnesses, especially of the projected brother was not rebutted and therefore, the same have to be considered. In this connection, reliance has been made upon the case of Sujab Ali (Md.) Vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in 2021 (4) GLT 664 wherein, it has been laid down that a definite finding is to be given upon evidence rendered by family members. 10. The learned counsel accordingly submits that in view of the availability of the aforesaid materials, the impugned opinion could not have been rendered against the petitioner and therefore, the same requires interference. 11. Per contra, Shri Sarma, the learned Standing Counsel, Home Department has categorically refuted the stand taken on behalf of the petitioner. He submits that a proceeding under the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 relates to determination as to whether the proceedee is a foreigner or not. Therefore, the relevant facts are especially within the knowledge of the proceedee and accordingly, the burden of proving citizenship rests absolutely upon the proceedee, notwithstanding anything contained in the Evidence Act, 1872 and this is mandated under Section 9 of the aforesaid Act, 1946. However, in the instant case, the petitioner utterly failed to discharge the burden. It is also submitted that rebuttal evidence is not mandatory in every case and would be given only if necessary. He further submits that the evidence of a proceedee has to be cogent, relevant, which inspire confidence and acceptable and only thereafter, the question of adducing rebuttal evidence may come in. 12. The learning Standing Counsel has further submitted that the written statement is the basic document which is supposed to lay down the foundation of the case of the proceeding and the written statement in the instant case is vague and the relevant facts have not been stated. There is no date or year of the birth of the petitioner and there are inconsistencies with the members of the family. There is no date or year of the birth of the petitioner and there are inconsistencies with the members of the family. In this connection, he has relied upon the following observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal vs. Union of India ,reported in (2005) 5 SCC 665 . “17. There is good and sound reason for placing the burden of proof upon the person concerned who asserts to be a citizen of a particular country. In order to establish one's citizenship, normally he may be required to give evidence of (i) his date of birth (ii) place of birth (iii) name of his parents (iv) their place of birth and citizenship. Sometimes the place of birth of his grand parents may also be relevant like under Section 6-A(1)(d) of the Citizenship Act. All these facts would necessarily be within the personal knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of the State. After he has given evidence on these points, the State authorities can verify the facts and can then lead evidence in rebuttal, if necessary. If the State authorities dispute the claim of citizenship by a person and assert that he is a foreigner, it will not only be difficult but almost impossible for them to first lead evidence on the aforesaid points. This is in accordance with the underlying policy of Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.” 13. He has submitted that there is not a single voters list of the petitioner and the name, Fazar Ali appearing in the voters list of 1993 cannot be the name of the petitioner which is Fazal Haque. Further, the projected brother as DW2 had deposed in his cross-examination that in 1993, the petitioner was marked ‘D’ and the petitioner as DW1 had stated on oath that he had not voted even once. He has further submitted that no link could be established with the projected father and the certificate issued by the Gaonburah, by no means, could be deemed as a proof of citizenship, more so in absence of any contemporaneous records. He has submitted that DW3 in clear terms had stated that he did not bring the Register Book to the Court. He has submitted that DW3 in clear terms had stated that he did not bring the Register Book to the Court. He has also submitted that use of National Emblem on such certificate is unauthorized. In this regard, he has relied upon the case of Khudeja Khatoon Vs. Union of India & Ors. , reported 2018 (3) GLT 347 and the following observations have been pressed into service: “13. Ext. B is a certificate dated 13.2.2016 issued by the Gaonburah certifying that Khudeja Khatoon was the wife of A. Matalib. This certificate also has got the State Emblem of India embossed on it and that too not as per the statutory format. For the reasons mentioned above, this certificate is also liable to be discarded. However, notwithstanding the same, even if we accept this certificate at its face value, it only certifies that Khudeja Khatoon was the wife of A. Matalib; thus no linkage is established with Jonab Ali; whom the petitioner claimed to be her father. 14. Ext. C is a certificate dated 13.2.2015 of the Gaonburah of Durabandhi village certifying that Khudeja Khatoon was the daughter of Lt. Jonab Ali. For the reasons mentioned above, this certificate was also not proved. Mere filing of a document or marking of a document as exhibit is not enough. The certificate as well as the contents thereof would have to be proved, so also the truthfulness thereof, in accordance with law.” 14. In support of his submission that a certificate has to be proved from contemporaneous records, the learned Standing Counsel has relied upon the judgment passed in the case of Romila Khatun vs. Union of India , reported in 2018 (4) GLT 373 and the following observations have been pressed into service. “20. It is trite that documentary evidence would have to be proved on the basis of the record and the contemporaneous record must substantiate and prove the contents of the document. Proof of document is one thing and proof of contents is another. Not only the document would have to be proved but its contents would also have to be proved. That apart, the truthfulness of the contents of the document would also have to be established from the record. A document or the contents of the document cannot be proved on the basis of personal knowledge.…” 15. Not only the document would have to be proved but its contents would also have to be proved. That apart, the truthfulness of the contents of the document would also have to be established from the record. A document or the contents of the document cannot be proved on the basis of personal knowledge.…” 15. He has also drawn the attention of this Court to the case of Nur Begum vs. Union of India and Ors. , reported in 2020 (3) GLT 347 wherein certain observations regarding exercise of Certiorari jurisdiction have been made which read as follows: “9. On the available materials, we find that the Tribunal rendered opinion/order upon due appreciation of the entire facts, evidence and documents brought on record. We find no infirmity in the findings and opinion recorded by the Tribunal. We would observe that the certiorari jurisdiction of the writ court being supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction, this Court would refrain from reviewing the findings of facts reached by the Tribunal. No case is made out that the impugned opinion/order was rendered without affording opportunity of hearing or in violation of the principles of natural justice and/or that it suffers from illegality on any ground of having been passed by placing reliance on evidence which is legally impermissible in law and/or that the Tribunal refused to admit admissible evidence and/or that the findings finds no support by any evidence at all. In other words, the petitioner has not been able to make out any case demonstrating any errors apparent on the face of the record to warrant interference of the impugned opinion.” 16. He has also relied upon the case of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rupjan Begum vs. Union of India , reported in (2018) 1 SCC 579 wherein it has been laid down that a certificate has to be proved on two aspects, firstly, the authenticity of the same and secondly, the authenticity of the contents. 17. The learned Standing Counsel has accordingly submitted that the writ petition be dismissed and the interim order be vacated. 18. The learned counsel for the other respondents have supported the submissions made on behalf of the Home Deptt. & NRC and have prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 17. The learned Standing Counsel has accordingly submitted that the writ petition be dismissed and the interim order be vacated. 18. The learned counsel for the other respondents have supported the submissions made on behalf of the Home Deptt. & NRC and have prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. They have submitted that this Court in exercise of its Certiorari jurisdiction does not act as an Appellate Court and it is only the decision making process which can be the subject matter of scrutiny. They have submitted that there is no procedural impropriety or illegality in the decision making process and therefore, the instant petition is liable to be dismissed. They have further submitted that the procedure adopted for adjudication of a reference by a Foreigners Tribunal is summary in nature and there is also a time frame for completion. He has submitted that there is an issue of national security by the unabated influx of foreign nationals and before any action is taken, the proceedee is given an opportunity whereby he or she is required to prove the citizenship. 19. The rival submissions made have been duly considered and the materials placed before this Court including the records of the Tribunal have been carefully perused. 20. With regard to the aspect of burden of proof as laid down in Section 9 of the Act of 1946, the law is well settled that the burden of proof that a proceedee is an Indian citizen is always on the said proceedee and never shifts. In the said Section, there is non-obstante clause that the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act would not be applicable. For ready reference, Section 9 is extracted hereinbelow: - “9. Burden of proof.—If in any case not falling under Section 8 any question arises with reference to this Act or any order made or directiongiven thereunder, whether any person is or is not a foreigner or is or is not a foreigner of a particular class or description the onus of proving that such person is not a foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class or description, as the case may be, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), lie upon such person.” 21. In this connection, the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Fateh Mohd. Vs. In this connection, the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Fateh Mohd. Vs. Delhi Administration [ AIR 1963 SC 1035 ] which followed the principles laid down by the Constitutional Bench in the case of Ghaus Mohammad Vs. Union of India [ AIR 1961 SC 1526 ] in the context of Foreigners Act, 1946 would be relevant which is extracted hereinbelow- “22. This Act confers wide ranging powers to deal with all foreigners or with respect to any particular foreigner or any prescribed class or description of foreigner for prohibiting, regulating or restricting their or his entry into India or their presence or continued presence including their arrest, detention and confinement. The most important provision is Section 9 which casts the burden of proving that a person is not a foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class or description, as the case may be, shall lie upon such person. Therefore, where an order made under the Foreigners Act is challenged and a question arises whether the person against whom the order has been made is a foreigner or not, the burden of proving that he is not a foreigner is upon such a person. In Union of India v. Ghaus Mohd. the Chief Commissioner of Delhi served an order on Ghaus Mohammad to leave India within three days as he was a Pakistani national. He challenged the order before the High Court which set aside the order by observing that there must be prima facie material on the basis of which the authority can proceed to pass an order under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act, 1946. In appeal the Constitution Bench reversed the judgment of the High Court holding that onus of showing that he is not a foreigner was upon the respondent.” 22. Before embarking to adjudicate the issue involved vis-a-vis the submissions and the materials on record, we are reminded that a Writ Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would confine its powers to examine the decision making process only. Further, the present case pertains to a proceeding of a Tribunal which has given its findings based on the facts. It is trite law that findings of facts are not liable to be interfered with by a Writ Court under its certiorari jurisdiction. 23. Law is well settled in this field. Further, the present case pertains to a proceeding of a Tribunal which has given its findings based on the facts. It is trite law that findings of facts are not liable to be interfered with by a Writ Court under its certiorari jurisdiction. 23. Law is well settled in this field. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, after discussing the previous case laws on the jurisdiction of a Writ Court qua the writ of certiorari, in the recent decision of Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences and Anr. Vs. Bikartan Das & Ors. [Civil Appeal No. 3339 of 2023] has laid down as follows: - “49. Before we close this matter, we would like to observe something important in the aforesaid context: Two cardinal principles of law governing exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution more particularly when it comes to issue of writ of certiorari. 50. The first cardinal principle of law that governs the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, more particularly when it comes to the issue of a writ of certiorari is that in granting such a writ, the High Court does not exercise the powers of Appellate Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal. The writ of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is apparent on the face of the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ, should not be issued on mere asking. 51. The second cardinal principle of exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is that in a given case, even if some action or order challenged in the writ petition is found to be illegal and invalid, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction thereunder can refuse to upset it with a view to doing substantial justice between the parties. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this flexible power to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity projects. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this flexible power to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity projects. The legal formulations cannot be enforced divorced from the realities of the fact situation of the case. While administering law, it is to be tempered with equity and if the equitable situation demands after setting right the legal formulations, not to take it to the logical end, the High Court would be failing in its duty if it does not notice equitable consideration and mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. Any other approach would render the High Court a normal court of appeal which it is not.” 24. In the instant case, the written statement is vague and apparently, has not met the requirement, as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal (supra). There is a requirement to disclose the following: (i) his date of birth; (ii) place of birth (iii) name of his parents (iv) their place of birth and citizenship Further, there may be a requirement to give the details of the grandparents. It has been stated that all these facts would necessarily be within the personal knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of the State. 25. So far as the voters lists are concerned, those of the years 1966 and 1970 appear to be more or less consistent with slight change in the name of the projected father as Ghatu and Ghutu. However, after 1970, the next voters list is of the year 1993 i.e. after long an inordinate 23 years. There is no explanation at all with regard to the fact as to why voters list of previous years have not been produced and proved. Furthermore, in the voters list of 1993, the name of the projected father becomes Gatu Miya and in the same, the petitioner claims that his name is also there which is, however, Fazar Ali. As mentioned above, the reference is against Fazal Haque and not against Fazar Ali. The voters list of 1997 does not come to the aid of the petitioner as his name is not there. 26. As mentioned above, the reference is against Fazal Haque and not against Fazar Ali. The voters list of 1997 does not come to the aid of the petitioner as his name is not there. 26. As regards the Jamabandi, it is seen that the name Fazal Haque has been inserted vide an order dated 28.01.2005. The same also reveals that there are certain other names, like Mainul Haque, Jainob Khatun, Moina Khatun and Mohila Khatun as legal heirs of Gatu Miya and there is no material or explanation to show how these persons are connected to the petitioner. In any case, a Jamabandi, cannot by itself be a conclusive determination of one’s citizenship. 27. So far as the submission made on behalf of the petitioner that there is a mention of the of the voter list of 1966 in the ERO report is concerned, on a careful verification, the said voter list does not contain the name of the petitioner. 28. It is trite that in a matter of the present nature, oral evidence by itself would not be sufficient and there would be necessity to support the same with documentary evidence. The petitioner as DW1 in his cross-examination has made a categorical statement that he did not even vote once. Further, the projected brother, in his cross-examination as DW2 has stated that in the year 1993 itself, the petitioner was marked ‘D’ in the voter list. Under such deposition, it further becomes clear that the name Fazar Ali appearing in the voters list of 1993 proved by the petitioner is of another person. 29. Though the certificate issued by the Gaonburah has not been enclosed in the writ petition, we have gone through the records and found that the certificate dated 18.01.2018 is available in page 52 which was marked as Ext-5. The Gaonburah as DW3 has, however, submitted that he did not bring the Register Book to the Tribunal though it was maintained. It is settled position of law that a certificate issued by a Gaonburah has to be proved by producing the contemporaneous records so as to render it as a relevant piece of evidence. 30. With regard to the rejection of the petition for correcting the evidence-in- chief of DW2, the projected brother, we are of the opinion that there is hardly any scope of making correction in the evidence recorded that too, by another person. 30. With regard to the rejection of the petition for correcting the evidence-in- chief of DW2, the projected brother, we are of the opinion that there is hardly any scope of making correction in the evidence recorded that too, by another person. We have also verified from the TCRs that the case was heard on 03.08.2019 by the learned Tribunal and 12.09.2019 was fixed for judgment and the petition was filed on 11.09.2019 i.e. just one day before the pronouncement of the judgment. We are of the opinion that the approach of the learned Tribunal was not only justified but also apt inasmuch as, the petition clearly appears to be a dilatory tactic to delay the proceedings and there was total lack of bona fide. It may be mentioned that the proceeding traces way back to 1998 and the reference was registered in the year 2018. 31. The reliance upon the case of Md. Sujab Ali (supra) is misplaced. In the instant case, there is not documentary evidence to connect the DW2-the projected brother with the proceedee, namely, Fazal Haque. As mentioned above, in the 1993 voters list, the name of one Fazar Ali appears whom the petitioner claims to be him. Further, DW2 has clearly stated that in the year 1993, the petitioner was marked ‘D’ in the voters list. 32. There is another important aspect of the matter which has been indicated above. The proceeding was against one Fazal Haque which would be evident from the reference order as well as notices issued by the Tribunal. On the other hand, the proceedee has tried to rely upon certain documents having the name Fazar Ali. There is no documentary evidence at all to connect the two names. It is also apparent from the evidence, more particularly of the petitioner himself as DW1 and his projected brother as DW2 that the name Fazar Ali appearing in the voters list of 1993 cannot be that of the proceedee. The adjudication process is regarding one Fazal Haque and not of Fazar Ali. 33. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that the impugned order dated 12.09.2019 passed by the learned Foreigners’ st Tribunal No. 1 , Barpeta, Assam in F.T. Case No.82/2018 does not call for any interference. 34. The writ petition accordingly stands dismissed. Interim order passed earlier stands vacated. 33. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that the impugned order dated 12.09.2019 passed by the learned Foreigners’ st Tribunal No. 1 , Barpeta, Assam in F.T. Case No.82/2018 does not call for any interference. 34. The writ petition accordingly stands dismissed. Interim order passed earlier stands vacated. The actions consequent upon the opinion rendered by the learned Tribunal would follow in accordance with law. 35. The records of the aforesaid F.T. Case No.82/2018 be returned to the concerned Foreigners Tribunal forthwith, along with a copy of this order.