Judgment : S.K. Medhi , J. The extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court has been sought to be invoked by filing this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by putting to challenge the opinion rendered vide impugned order dated 07.05.2019 th passed by the learned Foreigners Tribunal No.10 ,Dhubri in FT- 10/FKJ/918/2018 (Reference: ‘D’ Voter Case No. 479/D/2008). By the impugned judgment, the petitioner, who was the proceedee before the learned Tribunal, has been declared to be a foreigner post 25.03.1971. 2. The facts of the case may be put in a nutshell as follows: (i) A reference was made by the Superintendent of Police (B), Dhubri District, against the petitioner giving rise to the aforesaid FT-10/FKJ/918/2018 (Reference: ‘D’ Voter Case No. 479/D/2008). (ii) As per requirement u/s 9 of the Foreigner’s Act, 1946 to prove that the proceedee is not a foreigner, the petitioner had filed the written statement on 13.09.2018 along with certain documents and had adduced evidence through 4 nos. of DWs. (iii) The learned Tribunal, after considering the facts and circumstances and taking into account of the provisions of Section 9 of the Foreigners’ Act, 1946 had come to a finding that the petitioner, as opposite party, had failed to discharge the burden cast upon her and accordingly, the opinion was rendered declaring the petitioner to be a foreign national post 25.03.1971. 3. We have heard Shri A.R. Sikdar, learned counsel for the petitioner. We have also heard Shri G. Sarma, learned Standing Counsel, Home Department & NRC; Shri P. Sarma, GA, Assam, Shri M. Islam, learned counsel (on behalf of Shri A.I. Ali, SC, ECI) and Ms. S. Baruah, learned CGC. We have also carefully examined the records which were requisitioned vide an order dated 13.03.2020. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner, at the outset has questioned the proceeding itself by contending that the report by the Local Verification Officer (LVO) was not completely filled up and the spot verification was not properly done. This argument has been advanced in the context of the petitioner being marked ‘D’ in the Voters List. He has submitted that at the relevant time, the petitioner was at her parental home and not at her matrimonial home. In this regard, he has relied upon the case of Lal Babu Hussain & Ors. vs. Electoral Registration Officer and Ors. This argument has been advanced in the context of the petitioner being marked ‘D’ in the Voters List. He has submitted that at the relevant time, the petitioner was at her parental home and not at her matrimonial home. In this regard, he has relied upon the case of Lal Babu Hussain & Ors. vs. Electoral Registration Officer and Ors. reported in (1995) 3 SCC 100 and the following observations have been pressed into service: “6. From the resume of the aforementioned provisions of the Constitution and the Citizenship Act, it becomes clear that whenever any authority is called upon to decide even for the limited purpose of another law, whether a person is or is not a citizen of India, the authority must carefully examine the question and the provisions of the Citizenship Act extracted herein before. In the instant case Article 325 of the Constitution provides for one general electoral roll for every territorial constituency; so does Section 15 of the 1950 Act. This has to be done under the superintendence, direction and control of the Election Commission as per the mandate of Article 324 of the Constitution. Section 16 of the 1950 Act in terms states that a person shall be disqualified for registration in an electoral roll if he is not a citizen of India. But positively a person must be a citizen of India to be entitled to inclusion in the electoral roll. Sub-sec. (2) of the said section empowers striking off the name of a person who incurs a disqualification set out in clause (1), (b) or (c) of sub-section (1) after his name is entered in the register of electoral rolls. Otherwise every person who is not less than 18 years of age on the qualifying date and is ordinarily resident in a given constituency is entitled to be registered. Section 22 empowers the Electoral Registration Officer for a constituency to delete any entry already made if on enquiry he is satisfied that it is erroneous or defective in any particular or needs to be transposed to another place in the roll or the concerned person has died or has ceased to be ordinarily resident in that constituency or that he is otherwise not entitled to be registered. Ofcourse before any such action is taken the person concerned except in the case of death, must be given an opportunity to be heard. Ofcourse before any such action is taken the person concerned except in the case of death, must be given an opportunity to be heard. Similar is the provision in Rule 21A of the 1960 Rules which empowers the registration officer before final publication of the roll to delete the name or names of any person or persons which have been entered owing to inadvertence or error if the person concerned is dead or has ceased to be ordinarily resident in that constituency or is otherwise not entitled to be registered. The procedure for exercise of the said power is set out therein and conforms to the requirements of the principles of natural justice. It is obvious from the above that two situations arise; the first where the name is to be entered on the rolls for the first time and the second where the name already entered is required to be deleted. In the first mentioned situation before the name is entered on the rolls, the concerned officer must be satisfied that the person seeking to have his name entered is not disqualified by reason of his not being a citizen of India. Therefore, he would be justified in requiring the concerned person to show evidence that he is a citizen of India. In the second situation, since the name is already entered, it must be presumed that before entering his name the concerned officer must have gone through the procedural requirements under the statute. This would be so even if we invoke Section 114(e) of the Evidence Act. But then possibilities of mistakes cannot be ruled out. These mistakes, if any, would have to be corrected. Even if we are to assume (without deciding) that the words "is otherwise not entitled to be registered in that roll" used in Section 22 of the 1950 Act or Rule 21A of the 1960 rules are wide enough to cover the question relating to citizenship, the issue would have to be decided after giving the concerned person a reasonable opportunity of being heard. If the opportunity of being heard before deletion of the name is to be a meaningful and purposive one, it goes without saying that the concerned person whose name is borne on the roll and is intended to be removed must be informed why a suspicion has arisen in regard to his status as a citizen of India so that he may be able to show that the basis for the suspicions is ill-founded. Unless the basis for the doubt is disclosed, it would not be possible for the concerned person to remove the doubt and explain any circumstance or circumstances responsible for the doubt.” 5. He has also relied upon the case of Rafika Bibi @ Rafika Khatun vs. Union of India & Ors. [WP(C)/3330/2020 disposed of 26.05.2025] and the following observations have been relied upon: “31. Having regards the materials available in record and in the light of the observations made in the case of Moslem Mondal (supra), we are of the view that, the proceeding initiated by the Tribunal cannot be sustained for the following reasons – a) There was no any specific finding by the Enquiring Authority that the petitioner is a foreigner migrated from the specific territory i.e. Bangladesh. b) Enquiring Authority specifically stated in the report that the petitioner was not available in her address as it was reported by their neighbor that she was working in a brick filed at the relevant time c) Even if the Referral Authority in spite of the finding of the Enquiring authority decides to refer it to the Tribunal, it must give cogent reasons to justify the reference on account of the specific finding recorded by the Enquiring Authority against the person concerned which we find to be totally missing in the present case. The reference was thus mechanically made and suffers from non-application of mind. d) Even if the reference has been made by the Referral Authority contrary to the finding by the Enquiring authority, it was incumbent upon the Tribunal to primafacie specify itself about the existence of the ground forbeing referred to it. The Tribunal cannot mechanically act upon any reference without examining the materials on record. The reference made by the referral authority cannot be mechanical as held by this Court in the case of Moslem Mondal (supra).” 6. The Tribunal cannot mechanically act upon any reference without examining the materials on record. The reference made by the referral authority cannot be mechanical as held by this Court in the case of Moslem Mondal (supra).” 6. He has submitted that the LVO report was mechanically prepared and therefore, the proceeding, as such would not be sustainable. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner could prove his case with cogent evidence and in view of the fact that there was no rebuttal evidence, the learned Tribunal should have accepted the said proof and accordingly hold the petitioner to be a citizen of India. In this regard, he has referred to the evidence adduced by 4 nos. of DWs and also the following documentary evidence. 1) Copy of School Leaving Certificate dated 26.11.2010; 2) Copy of registered Sale Deed dated 25.08.1964 3) Certified copy of voter list of 1966 4) Certified copy of voter list of 1970 5) Certified copy of voter list of 1979 6) Certified copy of voter list of 1985 7) Copy of Kecha Patta dated 20.09.1994. 8) Certified copy of voter list of 1997 9) Certified copy of voter list of 2005 10) Certified copy of voter list of 2011 11) Certified copy of voter list of 2017 12) Copy of Elector Photo Identity Card 13) Copy of Elector Photo Identity Card 14) Copy of PAN Card 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in the written statement, all material disclosures were made. Further, it is submitted that case was proved by 4 nos. of DWs and that the link has been established. It is submitted that the date of birth of the petitioner is 15.08.1986 and she had attended a School in which she read upto Class II. In this regard, the School Certificate dated 26.11.2010 (Ext. A) has been relied upon. The same has been proved by DW4, the Head Master. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon a Sale Deed dated 25.08.1964 regarding land purchased by the projected grandfather of the petitioner namely, Kanu Seikh (Ext. B). 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the Voters Lists of 1966 and 1970 (Ext. C & D) containing the names of the projected grandparents, uncles and aunt. B). 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the Voters Lists of 1966 and 1970 (Ext. C & D) containing the names of the projected grandparents, uncles and aunt. Reliance has also been placed on the Voters List of 1979 containing the names of the projected grandfather and parents followed by the voters list of 1985 containing the names of the projected parents and projected grandmother. The next Voters List of the year 1979 containing the names of the projected mother and sister. Subsequent Voters List of 2005 has been relied upon containing the names of the projected mother and siblings. Though Voters List of 2015 has been enclosed with the name of the petitioner, the same has not been exhibited. The subsequent Voters Lists of 2011 and 2017 have been relied upon containing the names of the petitioner with others.The petitioner has relied upon a kaccha patta (Ext. G) of the year 1994 in the name of Md. Ahmad Ali. 11. The learned counsel has submitted that the mother and the brother of the petitioner had adduced evidence as DW 2 and the DW 3 and the linkage has been established. He has also submitted that the strict rules of evidence are not required to be followed in a proceeding before a Foreigners Tribunal and in this regard, he has relied upon a judgment of this Court in the case of Idris Ali vs. Union of India & Ors. [WP(C)/4116/2019 disposed of 27.02.2020]. 12. The learned counsel accordingly submits that in view of the availability of the aforesaid materials, the impugned opinion could not have been rendered against the petitioner and therefore, the same requires interference. 13. Per contra, Shri Sarma, the learned Standing Counsel, Home Department has categorically refuted the stand taken on behalf of the petitioner. On the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner questioning the LVO Report, the learned Standing Counsel has contended that the issue has already been settled by the Division Bench in the judgment dated 29.07.2019 passed in WA/170/2019 (Sayam Uddin vs Union of India & Ors.) and the said view has been reiterated in subsequent decision. 14. He submits that a proceeding under the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 relates to determination as to whether the proceedee is a foreigner or not. 14. He submits that a proceeding under the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 relates to determination as to whether the proceedee is a foreigner or not. Therefore, the relevant facts are especially within the knowledge of the proceedee and accordingly, the burden of proving citizenship rests absolutely upon the proceedee, notwithstanding anything contained in the Evidence Act, 1872 and this is mandated under Section 9 of the aforesaid Act, 1946. However, in the instant case, the petitioner utterly failed to discharge the burden. It is also submitted that rebuttal evidence is not mandatory in every case and would be given only if necessary. He further submits that the evidence of a proceedee has to be cogent, relevant, which inspire confidence and acceptable and only thereafter, the question of adducing rebuttal evidence may come in. 15. The learned Standing Counsel has further submitted that the written statement is the basic document which is supposed to lay down the foundation of the case of the proceeding and the written statement in the instant case is vague. In this connection, he has relied upon the following observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal vs. Union of India reported in (2005) 5 SCC 665 . “17. There is good and sound reason for placing the burden of proof upon the person concerned who asserts to be a citizen of a particular country. In order to establish one's citizenship, normally he may be required to give evidence of (i) his date of birth (ii) place of birth (iii) name of his parents (iv) their place of birth and citizenship. Some times the place of birth of his grandparents may also be relevant like under Section 6-A(1) (d) of the Citizenship Act. All these facts would necessarily be within the personal knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of the State. After he has given evidence on these points, the State authorities can verify the facts and can then lead evidence in rebuttal, if necessary. If the State authorities dispute the claim of citizenship by a person and assert that he is a foreigner, it will not only be difficult but almost impossible for them to first lead evidence on the aforesaid points. If the State authorities dispute the claim of citizenship by a person and assert that he is a foreigner, it will not only be difficult but almost impossible for them to first lead evidence on the aforesaid points. This is in accordance with the underlying policy of Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.” 16. He has submitted that the records would reveal that the Reference was against one Chamiran Nessa whereas the documents sought to be relied upon belong to one Samiya Khatun. By drawing the attention to the School Certificate (Ext. A), the learned Standing Counsel has submitted that the certificate has been given in the name of Samiya Khatun, daughter of ‘late’ Ahmad Ali and in 1991, she had left the school. However, in paragraph 14 of the evidence of DW1, she had stated on oath that her father had expired in 1995. He has also highlighted that the Head Master who had deposed as DW 4 had clarified in his cross examination that the counterfoil of the certificate was in the name of Samiya Begum. He has also submitted that apart from the unauthorized use of the National Emblem on the said certificate, the same was issued after an inordinate delay of about 20 years without any explanation. 17. He has also submitted that the residence of the petitioner has been stated to be Degdowa whereas the Voters List is of Balodmari and there is no documentary evidence on shifting. He has also submitted that mere reference to a Voters List containing a name will not be a conclusive proof of one’s citizenship and in this regard, he has relied upon the case of Aziz Miya @ Md. Aziz Mia vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in 2023 (4) GLT 246 and the following observations have been pressed into service: “14. We are constrained to observe that a mere claim by a suspected person by referring to a voters’ list claiming a person therein to be his father is not a conclusive proof and that by doing so, the person has discharged the burden that he is not a foreigner. We are constrained to observe that a mere claim by a suspected person by referring to a voters’ list claiming a person therein to be his father is not a conclusive proof and that by doing so, the person has discharged the burden that he is not a foreigner. This is because there is also a further requirement to prove that the person who is reflected in the voters’ list relied upon is actually the father of the person who makes the claim the claim will have to be substantiated with further material/materials acceptable in law.” 18. He has also submitted that the oral evidence adduced by the projected mother and brother as DW 2 & 3 cannot be construed as relevant in matters covering the present subject of detection and deportation of foreigners. In this regard, he has relied upon the case of Nur Begum vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in 2020 (3) GLT 347 19. In support of his submission that a certificate has to be proved from contemporaneous records, the learned Standing Counsel has relied upon the judgment passed in the case of Romila Khatun vs. Union of India reported in 2018 (4) GLT 373 and the following observations have been pressed into service. “20.It is trite that documentary evidence would have to be proved on the basis of the record and the contemporaneous record must substantiate and prove the contents of the document. Proof of document is one thing and proof of contents is another. Not only the document would have to be proved but its contents would also have to be proved. That apart, the truthfulness of the contents of the document would also have to be established from the record. A document or the contents of the document cannot be proved on the basis of personal knowledge. …” 20. He has also drawn the attention of this Court to the case of Nur Begum (supra) wherein certain observations regarding exercise of Certiorari jurisdiction have been made which reads as follows: “9. On the available materials, we find that the Tribunal rendered opinion/order upon due appreciation of the entire facts, evidence and documents brought on record. We find no infirmity in the findings and opinion recorded by the Tribunal. On the available materials, we find that the Tribunal rendered opinion/order upon due appreciation of the entire facts, evidence and documents brought on record. We find no infirmity in the findings and opinion recorded by the Tribunal. We would observe that the certiorari jurisdiction of the writ court being supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction, this Court would refrain from reviewing the findings of facts reached by the Tribunal. No case is made out that the impugned opinion/order was rendered without affording opportunity of hearing or in violation of the principles of natural justice and/or that it suffers from illegality on any ground of having been passed by placing reliance on evidence which is legally impermissible in law and/or that the Tribunal refused to admit admissible evidence and/or that the findings finds no support by any evidence at all. In other words, the petitioner has not been able to make out any case demonstrating any errors apparent on the face of the record to warrant interference of the impugned opinion.” 21. He has also relied upon the case of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rupjan Begum vs. Union of India reported in (2018) 1 SCC 579 , wherein it has been laid down that a certificate has to be proved on two aspects, firstly, the authenticity of the same and secondly, the authenticity of the contents. 22. The learned Standing Counsel has accordingly submitted that the writ petition be dismissed and the interim order be vacated. 23. The learned counsel for the other respondents have supported the submissions advanced by the learned Standing Counsel, Home Deptt. & NRC and have prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.They have submitted that this Court in exercise of its Certiorari jurisdiction does not act as an Appellate Court and it is only the decision making process which can be the subject matter of scrutiny. It is submitted that there is no procedural impropriety or illegality in the decision making process and therefore, the instant petition is liable to be dismissed. 24. The rival submissions made have been duly considered and the materials placed before this Court including the records of the Tribunal have been carefully perused. 25. It is submitted that there is no procedural impropriety or illegality in the decision making process and therefore, the instant petition is liable to be dismissed. 24. The rival submissions made have been duly considered and the materials placed before this Court including the records of the Tribunal have been carefully perused. 25. With regard to the aspect of burden of proof as laid down in Section 9 of the Act of 1946, the law is well settled that the burden of proof that a proceedee is an Indian citizen is always on the said proceedee and never shifts. In the said Section, there is non-obstante clause that the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act would not be applicable. For ready reference, Section 9 is extracted hereinbelow- “9. Burden of proof.—If in any case not falling under Section 8 any question arises with reference to this Act or any order made or direction given thereunder, whether any person is or is not a foreigner or is or is not a foreigner of a particular class or description the onus of proving that such person is not a foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class or description, as the case may be, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), lie upon such person.” 26. In this connection, the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Fateh Mohd. Vs. Delhi Administration [ AIR 1963 SC 1035 ] which followed the principles laid down by the Constitutional Bench in the case of Ghaus Mohammad Vs. Union of India [ AIR 1961 SC 1526 ] in the context of Foreigners Act, 1946 would be relevant which is extracted hereinbelow- “22. This Act confers wide ranging powers to deal with all foreigners or with respect to any particular foreigner or any prescribed class or description of foreigner for prohibiting, regulating or restricting their or his entry into India or their presence or continued presence including their arrest, detention and confinement. The most important provision is Section 9 which casts the burden of proving that a person is not a foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class or description, as the case may be, shall lie upon such person. The most important provision is Section 9 which casts the burden of proving that a person is not a foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class or description, as the case may be, shall lie upon such person. Therefore, where an order made under the Foreigners Act is challenged and a question arises whether the person against whom the order has been made is a foreigner or not, the burden of proving that he is not a foreigner is upon such a person. In Union of India v. Ghaus Mohd. the Chief Commissioner of Delhi served an order on Ghaus Mohammad to leave India within three days as he was a Pakistani national. He challenged the order before the High Court which set aside the order by observing that there must be prima facie material on the basis of which the authority can proceed to pass an order under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act, 1946. In appeal the Constitution Bench reversed the judgment of the High Court holding that onus of showing that he is not a foreigner was upon the respondent.” 27. Before embarking to adjudicate the issue involved vis-a-vis the submissions and the materials on record, we are reminded that a Writ Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would confine its powers to examine the decision making process only. Further, the present case pertains to a proceeding of a Tribunal which has given its findings based on the facts. It is trite law that findings of facts are not liable to be interfered with by a Writ Court under its certiorari jurisdiction. 28. Law is well settled in this field. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, after discussing the previous case laws on the jurisdiction of a Writ Court qua the writ of certiorari, in the recent decision of Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences and Anr. Vs. Bikartan Das & Ors [Civil Appeal No. 3339 of 2023] has laid down as follows: “49. Before we close this matter, we would like to observe something important in the aforesaid context: Two cardinal principles of law governing exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution more particularly when it comes to issue of writ of certiorari. 50. Bikartan Das & Ors [Civil Appeal No. 3339 of 2023] has laid down as follows: “49. Before we close this matter, we would like to observe something important in the aforesaid context: Two cardinal principles of law governing exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution more particularly when it comes to issue of writ of certiorari. 50. The first cardinal principle of law that governs the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, more particularly when it comes to the issue of a writ of certiorari is that in granting such a writ, the High Court does not exercise the powers of Appellate Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal. The writ of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is apparent on the face of the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ, should not be issued on mere asking. 51. The second cardinal principle of exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is that in a given case, even if some action or order challenged in the writ petition is found to be illegal and invalid, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction thereunder can refuse to upset it with a view to doing substantial justice between the parties. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this flexible power to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity projects. The legal formulations cannot be enforced divorced from the realities of the fact situation of the case. While administering law, it is to be tempered with equity and if the equitable situation demands after setting right the legal formulations, not to take it to the logical end, the High Court would be failing in its duty if it does not notice equitable consideration and mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. Any other approach would render the High Court a normal court of appeal which it is not.” 29. Any other approach would render the High Court a normal court of appeal which it is not.” 29. With regard to the submissions advanced on the LVO report, the issue is no longer res integra. In fact, the entire facet has been discussed and answered in details by this Court in the case of Sayam Uddin vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in 2019(4) GLT 456 which has also been upheld by the Hon’ble Division Bench in WA/170/2019 vide judgment and order dated 29.07.2019. The relevant observations are extracted herein below: “11. In the year 1997, Election Commission of India had undertaken an intensive revision of electoral rolls in the State of Assam as apprehensions were expressed from various quarters that the electoral rolls were infested with the names of foreigners/illegal migrants. In the course of this exercise citizenship status of as many as 3,13,046 persons whose names were in the draft voters lists were found to be doubtful and accordingly they were marked as doubtful “D” voters in the electoral rolls after local verification. 12. Legality of this exercise was challenged before this Court in HRA Choudhury Vs Election Commission of India, reported in 2002 (1) GLT 1. The challenge made was rejected by a Division Bench of this Court. In HRA Choudhury (supra) this Court examined the guidelines dated 17.07.1997 of the Election Commission of India laying down the procedure to carry out the exercise. 12.1. As per paragraph 3.8 of the guidelines the Electoral Registration Officer was required to consider the verification report received from the Local Verification Officer. If he was satisfied on such report and such other material/information as may be available about the eligibility of a person, he should allow his name to continue on the electoral roll. Where, however, he was not so satisfied and had reasonable doubt about the citizenship of any person, he was required to refer such doubtful cases to the competent authority under the then Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983 or the Foreigners Act, 1946 as the case may be. For convenience of the Electoral Registration Officers, Election Commission devised proformas. 12.2. As per paragraph 3.9, after the case of a person was referred by the Electoral Registration Officer to the competent authority, he should wait for the decision of the relevant Tribunal in relation to that person and act according to such decision. 12.3. For convenience of the Electoral Registration Officers, Election Commission devised proformas. 12.2. As per paragraph 3.9, after the case of a person was referred by the Electoral Registration Officer to the competent authority, he should wait for the decision of the relevant Tribunal in relation to that person and act according to such decision. 12.3. As per paragraph 3.10, where the relevant Tribunal decided that any such person was not a citizen of India, Electoral Registration Officer should proceed under Rule 21 A of the Registration of Electors Rolls, 1960 to have the name of such person deleted from the electoral roll before it was finally published. 12.4. This Court in HRA Choudhury (supra) held that such guidelines and decision of the Election Commission were in accordance with Article 324 of the Constitution of India besides conforming to the principles of natural justice. It was held that such guidelines cannot be held to be arbitrary or vitiated by mala fide or partiality. 13. At this stage, it may be mentioned that the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983 is no longer in existence, the same having been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Sarbananda Sonowal Vs Union of India reported in (2005) 5 SCC 665 . Therefore, in so far paragraph 3.8 of the guidelines dated 17.07.1997 is concerned, the reference would be under the Foreigners Act, 1946. 14. The above exercise was repeated in the year 2005 with the Election Commission of India again going for intensive revision of electoral rolls in the State of Assam taking 01.01.2005 as the qualifying date. In this connection, guidelines dated 17.06.2004 were issued by the Election Commission of India. Paragraph 2.2 of the guidelines dealt with “D” voters. It was mentioned that the guidelines issued in 1997 would be followed while dealing with such category of persons. Paragraph 8 dealt with verification by Electoral Registration Officers. It laid down the procedure while carrying out such verification including verification by Local Verification Officer. As per paragraph 8.6, Local Verification Officer would conduct the verification by making an on the spot visit and the person concerned could adduce any one or more of the documents mentioned therein in support of his claim as a citizen of India. After due verification, the Local Verification Officer was required to submit his report in the prescribed format. As per paragraph 8.6, Local Verification Officer would conduct the verification by making an on the spot visit and the person concerned could adduce any one or more of the documents mentioned therein in support of his claim as a citizen of India. After due verification, the Local Verification Officer was required to submit his report in the prescribed format. Under paragraph 8.8, Electoral Registration Officer on receipt of the verification report from the Local Verification Officer should consider the same. Where he was satisfied about the eligibility of a person, he should allow the name of such person to continue on the electoral roll but where he was not so satisfied and had reasonable doubt about the citizenship of any person he should refer such doubtful cases to the competent authority under the then Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983 or the Foreigners Act, 1946 in a prepared format (Annexure-B to the guidelines dated 17.06.2004) to the competent authority for making reference to the Tribunal and await the decision of such Tribunal. 15. As pointed out by Mr. Barua, in Mameja Khatun (supra) a Single Bench of this Court directed that “D” voters should not be allowed to cast their votes with the clarification that “D” voters would include persons whose names were included in the electoral rolls but their citizenship was doubted or disputed and also those whose cases were pending before the Foreigners Tribunals. This decision of the learned Single Bench was confirmed by the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No. 114/2011 (State Vs Mameja Khatun). By the judgment and order dated 13.10.2015, the Division Bench directed Election Commission of India and other authorities to implement the directions of the Single Bench in letter and spirit. 16. At this stage, it may also be mentioned that in WP(C) No. 274/2009 filed by Assam Public Works which is pending before the Supreme Court of India wherein NRC updation exercise in the State of Assam is being monitored by the Supreme Court of India, on 25.10.2013, Supreme Court clarified that as far as persons in the “D” list are concerned, undoubtedly they were doubtful voters and therefore their names could not be included unless the NRC is updated and unless the Foreigners Tribunals declared them to be Indian citizens. 17. 17. The Foreigners Act, 1946 is an act to confer upon the Central Government certain powers in respect of foreigners. This Act provides for the exercise of certain powers by the Central Government in respect of the entry of foreigners into India; their presence in India and their departure therefrom. Section 2 (a) defines a “foreigner” to mean a person who is not a citizen of India. Section 3 confers power to the Central Government to make orders making provision either generally or with respect to all foreigners or with respect to any particular foreigner or any prescribed class or description of foreigners, for prohibiting, regulating or restricting the entry of foreigners into India or their departure therefrom or their presence or their continued presence therein. 17.1. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, Central Government made the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964. As per order 2 (1), the Central Government may by order refer the question as to whether a person is or is not a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act, 1946 to a Tribunal to be constituted for the purpose for its opinion. 18. Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India had issued notification dated 19.04.1958 in exercise of powers conferred by Clause-(1) of Article 258 of the Constitution of India whereby the President with the consent of the State Government concerned entrusted to the Governments of each of the States mentioned therein including the State of Assam the functions of the Central Government in making orders of the nature specified in Section 3 of the Foreigners Act, 1946. Another notification dated 17.02.1976 was issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs in the exercise of the powers conferred by Article 258 (1) of the Constitution entrusting the Superintendents of Police and Deputy Commissioners (In-charge of Police) under the Government of Assam the functions of the Central Government in making orders of the nature specified in Section 3 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 within their respective jurisdictions subject to the conditions mentioned therein which included the condition that exercise of such functions would be in respect of nationals of Bangladesh and that while exercising such functions, Superintendents of Police and Deputy Commissioners (In-charge of Police) shall comply with such general or special directions as the Government of Assam or the Central Government may issue from time to time. 19. Article 258 of the Constitution deals with power of the Union to confer powers etc on States in certain cases. Clause (1) of Article 258 starts with a non obstante clause. It says that notwithstanding anything in the Constitution, President may with the consent of the Government of a State entrust either conditionally or unconditionally to that Government or to its officers, functions in relation to any matter to which the executive power of the Union extends. Clause (3) provides for making of payment by the Government of India to the State concerned such sum as may be agreed upon or in default of agreement through arbitration in respect of any extra-cost of administration incurred by the State in connection with the exercise of powers and duties of the Government of India conferred or imposed upon a State Government. 20. Thus, under the Central Government notifications dated 19.04.1958 and 17.02.1976, Government of Assam, Superintendents of Police and Deputy Commissioners (Incharge of Police) have been delegated the power to make reference to the Foreigners Tribunal under order 2 (1) of the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 to seek opinion as to whether the proceedee is a foreigner or not within the meaning of the Foreigners Act, 1946. 21. Thus from the above, what transpires is that there are two categories of “D” voters:- (i). those who were marked as “D” voters in the electoral roll by the Electoral Registration Officer following enquiry by Local Verification Officer; and (ii). those whose references are pending before the Foreigners Tribunals. 22. 21. Thus from the above, what transpires is that there are two categories of “D” voters:- (i). those who were marked as “D” voters in the electoral roll by the Electoral Registration Officer following enquiry by Local Verification Officer; and (ii). those whose references are pending before the Foreigners Tribunals. 22. In so far Electoral Registration Officer is concerned the exercise undertaken by him while marking a person as a “D” voter in the electoral roll is a quasi judicial exercise. If he holds the view after examining the enquiry report of the Local Verification Officer that the concerned person is not a citizen of India he is required to forward the case of that person to the competent authority i.e., the Superintendent of Police. If it is so forwarded by the Electoral Registration Officer, the jurisdictional Superintendent of Police has to make a reference to the competent Foreigners Tribunals under order 2(1) of the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 based on the report received from the Electoral Registration Officer. Question of making further enquiry by the Superintendent of Police in such a case would not arise because enquiry has already been made by the Electoral Registration Officer by exercising quasi judicial powers and the Superintendent of Police cannot sit over such decision of the Electoral Registration Officer. He has to forward the same by making the reference to the competent Foreigners Tribunal for its opinion. 22) Therefore, the challenge to the proceeding before the learned Foreigners Tribunal on the ground that certain paragraphs and/or columns of the Local Verification Officer’s (LVO) Report, as forwarded by the Electoral Registration Officer (ERO) were left blank, is held to be not maintainable on facts and in law more fully referred to herein before. The point of determination no. (i) is answered accordingly.” 30. The aforesaid views have been endorsed and reiterated by a Coordinate Bench in the subsequent case of Shukurjan Nessa @ Sukurjan vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in 2025 (2) GLT 1058 . We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid decision and accordingly hold that the contention of the petitioner is not sustainable. 31. The aforesaid views have been endorsed and reiterated by a Coordinate Bench in the subsequent case of Shukurjan Nessa @ Sukurjan vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in 2025 (2) GLT 1058 . We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid decision and accordingly hold that the contention of the petitioner is not sustainable. 31. In the instant case, the written statement is also vague and apparently, has not met the requirements, as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal (supra).There is a requirement to disclose the following: (i) his date of birth; (ii) place of birth (iii) name of his parents (iv) their place of birth and citizenship Further, there may be a requirement to give the details of the grandparents. It has been stated that all these facts would necessarily be within the personal knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of the State. 32. So far as the School Certificate Ext. A is concerned, a bare perusal of the same would reveal that the certificate was issued after a long and inordinate period of about 20 years. The certificate clearly reveals that the petitioner had left the school in December, 1991 and the certificate has been issued on 26.11.2010. There is no plausible or acceptable reasons for such delay. The DW4 who had proved the certificate also had categorically stated that he is working in the school since September, 2010 and on 15.11.2010, the petitioner has made an application for the certificate. He had also brought the counterfoil where the name of the pupil is recorded at Sl. No. 205 dated 05.01.1990. In the cross-examination however, he had disclosed that against the aforesaid serial number, the name recorded is Samia Begum, daughter of Ahmad Ali. What is also more intriguing is that the counter signature of the BEEO is dated 07.08.2018. We are in agreement with the learned Tribunal which had discarded the said certificate. 33. So far as the Ext. B (Sale Deed) is concerned, the same will not serve as any linkage of the petitioner with her father or grandfather. In this connection, we find force in the contention advanced by the learned Standing Counsel who has relied upon the case of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rupjan Begum (supra). 34. 33. So far as the Ext. B (Sale Deed) is concerned, the same will not serve as any linkage of the petitioner with her father or grandfather. In this connection, we find force in the contention advanced by the learned Standing Counsel who has relied upon the case of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rupjan Begum (supra). 34. So far as the Voters List are concerned which have been sought to be relied upon to establish a linkage, the Voters Lists of 1966 and 1970 contain the names of the projected grandparents, uncles and aunt. However, in the Voters List of 1979, where the name of the projected parents appear, the names of the other family members except the projected grandfather go missing. In the next Voters List of 1985, the name of the projected grandmother is there along with the projected parents and there are no other family members. The next Voters List is after a gap of 12 years containing the names of the projected mother and a sister. It may be mentioned that there is a change in the name of the mother also. As mentioned above, the Voters List of 2015 was not exhibited. It may however be noted that the name of the petitioner has been recorded as Chamiron Nessa, wife of Anowar, aged about 29 years. Apart from the discrepancy in the name, there is no explanation whatsoever as to why there is no Voters List of an earlier period in spite of the fact that the petitioner had attained the age of voting. In the Voters List of 2011, the name has been reflected as Samiya Khatun, aged 25 years followed by the Voters List of 2017 where the name of the petitioner has been projected to be enlisted with her mother and siblings where her age has been shown to be 29 years and the name is Samiya Khatun. It would be evident that the Reference is against one Chamiran Nessa whereas the documents of one Samiya Khatun have been sought to be projected. 35. So far as Ext. G (Kaccha Patta) is concerned, the same would not be construed to be a link document which otherwise is of the post 1971 period. 36. It would be evident that the Reference is against one Chamiran Nessa whereas the documents of one Samiya Khatun have been sought to be projected. 35. So far as Ext. G (Kaccha Patta) is concerned, the same would not be construed to be a link document which otherwise is of the post 1971 period. 36. In the case of Bijoy Das vs UOI reported in 2018 (3) GLT 118, this Court has laid down that in proceedings of this nature, oral evidence alone would not be enough and such evidence is required to be supported and corroborated by documentary evidence and contemporaneous records. However, in this case, the same has not been able to be done by the petitioner. 37. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that the impugned order dated 07.05.2019 passed by the learned Foreigners th Tribunal no. 10 , Dhubri in FT-10/FKJ/918/2018 (Reference: ‘D’ Voter Case No. 479/D/2008) does not call for any interference. 38. The writ petition accordingly stands dismissed. Interim order passed earlier stands vacated. The actions consequent upon the opinion rendered by the learned Tribunal would follow, in accordance with law. 39. The records be returned to the concerned Foreigners Tribunal forthwith, along with a copy of this order.