JUDGMENT : Arun Dev Choudhury, J. 1. The present intra-court appeal is directed against the order dated 06.09.2024, passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the Writ Petition being WP(C) No.3949/2023. 2. By the said writ petition, the petitioner assailed the order dated 19.06.2023, by which he was released from contractual service, on the ground that the contract entered into between the petitioner and the employer had expired on 30.11.2022. 3. The brief facts necessary for adjudication of the present appeal are that, pursuant to an advertisement issued in 2002 by the authorities of the Axom Sarba Siksha Abhiyan Mission, the appellant/petitioner was appointed to the post of Finance & Accounts Officer. The appointment was purely contractual and governed by the terms of the agreement executed by the parties. Initially, the agreement was for a period of 1 year, which was thereafter renewed from time to time, enabling the appellant/petitioner to continue in service. The last agreement between the appellant/petitioner and the authorities of Axom Sarba Siksha Abhiyan Mission was executed on 01.02.2022 and covered the period from 01.01.2022 to 30.11.2022. 4. It is not in dispute that, after 30.11.2022, no further agreement was executed, and the contractual tenure of service of the appellant/petitioner ended by efflux of time, though he continued to serve. 5. Subsequently, on an allegation of an excess payment being debited from the employer's account, allegedly involving the accountant of Axom Sarba Siksha Abhiyan Mission, Dibrugarh, and the appellant/petitioner, an FIR was lodged on 04.05.2023 and registered as Dibrugarh PS Case No.255/2023, under sections 406/409 IPC. The accountant was arrested and later released on bail. The appellant/petitioner was also arrested and was enlarged on bail by the Jurisdictional Magistrate under an order dated 12.05.2023. 6. On 05.05.2023, the appellant/petitioner was directed to submit his clarification regarding the missing RIDF files, to which he responded with a reply dated 22.05.2023. Thereafter, a show-cause notice dated 31.05.2023 was issued, which was also duly replied to by the appellant/petitioner. 7. Eventually, by order dated 19.06.2023, the appellant/petitioner was released from contractual engagement on the ground that his contract had expired on 30.11.2022. Aggrieved, the appellant/petitioner approached this court by filing WPC 3949/2023. 8. The learned single Judge, upon consideration of the pleadings and submissions, dismissed the written petition, holding that the release order was non-stigmatic and was referable solely to the expiry of the contractual tenure. 9. Aggrieved, the appellant/petitioner approached this court by filing WPC 3949/2023. 8. The learned single Judge, upon consideration of the pleadings and submissions, dismissed the written petition, holding that the release order was non-stigmatic and was referable solely to the expiry of the contractual tenure. 9. Assailing the said judgment, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has contended that though the impugned order is innocuous in form, it is in substance punitive, having regard to the pendency of the criminal case, issuance of notices, and allegations of misappropriation. It is urged that the order is a camouflage and is adopted to dispense with the appellant’s services without holding a departmental inquiry, in violation of principles of natural justice. 10. We are unable to accept the aforesaid contention. 11. At the outset, it should be noted that the appellant/petitioner was a contractual employee and did not hold a civil post. His engagement was governed entirely by the terms of the contract. 12. Upon expiry of the contractual tenure on 30-11-2022, no vested or enforceable right accrued in favour of the appellant/petitioner to seek continuation or renewal of the contract. The employer was legally entitled to release the appellant/petitioner upon completion of the contractual period. 13. Law is well settled that judicial review in matters of contractual employment is limited and confined to examining whether the action complained of is vitiated by illegality, arbitrariness, malafides, or colourable exercise of power. Courts cannot compel the renewal of a contract, nor can they confer continuity contrary to the expressed terms of engagement. 14. Coming to the argument on the foundation of the impugned order, the distinction between motive and foundation in service jurisprudence is well settled. 15. Motive refers to the background or inducing factors which may have prompted the employer to act, such as suspicion or pending allegation, but which are not themselves adjudicated or made the basis of the decision. 16. Foundation, on the other hand, denotes the substantive basis of the action, in which allegations of misconduct have been examined and culminated in a finding, expressed or implicit, leading to the adverse order. 17. If misconduct is merely the motive, the action remains innocuous. If it constitutes the foundation, the action assumes a punitive character, attracting the requirement of due process. 18. 17. If misconduct is merely the motive, the action remains innocuous. If it constitutes the foundation, the action assumes a punitive character, attracting the requirement of due process. 18. Equally well settled is the distinction between the motive for an administrative action and the foundation of the impugned order. 19. The Allegations of misconduct, the pendency of a criminal case, or the issuance of notices may constitute the background or motive. Unless such allegations form the foundation of the order and are reflected therein, either expressly or by necessary implication, the order cannot be characterised as punitive or stigmatic. 20. Tested on the above principle, the impugned action cannot be construed as punitive. The order of discontinuation is ex facie innocuous and does not impose any civil consequences on the appellant/petitioner beyond those inherent in the contractual stipulation itself. 21. Mere existence of an FIR or the issuance of a show cause notice, which did not fructify into any proceeding or culminated in any finding, remains in the realm of motive and does not elevate the action to one founded on misconduct. To hold otherwise would be to read into the order what it does not state and treat an unproven allegation as determinative. 22. In these circumstances, the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the impugned action constitutes a simpliciter non-renewal of a contractual engagement calls for no interference. 23. In the present case, a plain reading of the order dated 19.06.2023 makes it evident that the appellant/petitioner was released solely on the ground that the contractual engagement had expired. The order does not refer to the FIR, does not advert to the alleged misappropriation, does not record any findings of misconduct, and does not cast any stigma upon the petitioner. 24. The order is expressly innocuous and referable only to the contractual terms. The submission that the issuance of a notice and the submission of a reply obligate the employer to hold a full-fledged disciplinary inquiry cannot be accepted. 25. The plea of colourable exercise of power or camouflage termination also deserves rejection. If the employer intended to terminate the petitioner on the basis of alleged misappropriation, nothing prevented them from expressly invoking such allegations and initiating disciplinary proceedings. The employer consciously refrained from doing so and confined the order strictly to the expiry of the contractual tenure. 25. The plea of colourable exercise of power or camouflage termination also deserves rejection. If the employer intended to terminate the petitioner on the basis of alleged misappropriation, nothing prevented them from expressly invoking such allegations and initiating disciplinary proceedings. The employer consciously refrained from doing so and confined the order strictly to the expiry of the contractual tenure. Judicial review does not permit the court to speculate on hidden motives. 26. We also find no merit in the claim for reinstatement. Reinstatement after expiry of a contractual tenure is legally impermissible. Even otherwise, reinstatement is not a natural or automatic consequence in cases of contractual employment. 27. The arguments of the appellants regarding non-adherence to the procedure for discontinuation prescribed under the Service Regulation and the Financial Regulation 2003 of the Axom Sarba Siksha Abhiyan Mission also do not find favour with us. 28. The relevant regulation provides that any person engaged on contract service for a specific period under an agreement shall be liable to be discharged or released if he/she fails to discharge his/her duties satisfactorily and in accordance with the terms of the contract. Such a prescription thus cannot support the case of the appellant inasmuch as the appellant is not discharged for any unsatisfactory performance but for the reason that the terms of the contract were over. 29. The other regulation relied on relates to the continuance of an employee on deputation and attachment, and to the further engagement of employees on contract, and prescribes that any deviation from the prescribed process of continuation, in any form, is to be reported to the Executive Committee. Therefore, in the face of such regulation, the same is relatable to continuance beyond the contract period dehors the prescription, and not to an action for release of an employee after expiry of the contract period. 30. The learned single Judge has correctly appreciated the facts and has applied the settled principles of law governing contractual employment and the scope of judicial review. 31. The appellant has demonstrated no perversity, illegality, or jurisdictional error warranting this court's interference with the exercise of its intra-court appellate jurisdiction. 32. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the intra-court appeal is found to be devoid of any merit and is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to cost. 33. 31. The appellant has demonstrated no perversity, illegality, or jurisdictional error warranting this court's interference with the exercise of its intra-court appellate jurisdiction. 32. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the intra-court appeal is found to be devoid of any merit and is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to cost. 33. While parting with the record, it is clarified that dismissal of the present appeal shall not in any manner affect the pending criminal proceeding arising out of Dibrugarh P.S. Case No.255/2023. The said proceeding is to be decided independently and strictly on its own merit, uninfluenced by any observation made in the present order.