2026:HHC:20400 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 798 of 2025 Reserved on: 06.04.2026 Date of Decision: 29.05.2026. Balwinder Singh & others ...Petitioners Versus State of H.P. and another ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioners : Mr Mohit Thakur, Advocate. For Respondent No.1/State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. For Respondent No.2 : Mr Sanjeev Mankotia, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 82 of 2017, dated 09.06.2017, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 363, 366, 212 and 120-B IPC at Police Station Fatehpur, District Kangra, H.P. and consequential proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R. based on the compromise effected between the parties. 2. The statement of informant Julfkar Ali was recorded on 26.11.2025, in which he stated that he had entered into a 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:20400 compromise with the petitioner/accused voluntarily without any influence from any person, and he does not want to proceed with the matter after the compromise. 3. The police filed a status report asserting that the victim was found missing on 08.06.2017. The search was made for her, but she could not be traced. Gurpreet had kidnapped her with the promise to marry her. The police investigated the matter. Her date of birth was found to be 03.12.1990, and she was aged 17½ years on the date of the incident. The police could not find the victim and Gurpreet Singh. 4. I have heard Mr Mohit Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No.1/State and Mr Sanjeev Mankotia, Advocate, for respondent No.2. 5. Mr Mohit Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the parties have entered into a compromise and no fruitful purpose would be served by continuing with the proceedings; hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed, F.I.R. and proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R. be quashed. He relied upon the following judgments in support of his submissions: - 3 2026:HHC:20400 i. Naushey Ali & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr 2025: INSC 182; ii. Madhukar & ors. vs. The State of Maharashtra & anr. along with connected matter 2025 INSC:819 iii. Mafat Lal & Anr vs. The state of Rajasthan in SLP No(s).1806 of 2021 iv. Paramjeet Kumar vs. State of H.P. & anr. 2024: HHC:7190; v. Madan Lal @ Vipan Kumar vs State of H.P. & another 2024: HHC:8446; and vi. Rishab Sharma vs State of H.P. in Cr.MMO No. 826 of 2022, decided on 17.04.2023; vii. Ranjeet Kumar vs. State of H.P. & Ors. Cr.MMO No. 648 of 2023, decided on 08.12.2023. 6. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No.1, submitted that the offences alleged against the petitioners are heinous. The main accused has not been traced; and the F.I.R. should not be quashed. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. Mr Sanjeev Mankotia, learned counsel for respondent No.2, submitted that he has no objection to the quashing of F.I.R. and proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R. 8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court examined the power of the Court to quash the FIR based on the compromise in Narender Singh versus State of Punjab, 2014 (6) SCC 466 and held that the 4 2026:HHC:20400 heinous offences like murder, rape, etc, cannot be quashed based on a compromise effected between the parties. It was observed: - “29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings: 29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 29.2. When the parties have settled, and on that basis, a petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power, the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, the offences alleged to have been committed under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that 5 2026:HHC:20400 capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of a compromise between the victim and the offender. 29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationships or family disputes, should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. 29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak, and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice, and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. 29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crimes against society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine whether the incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or if the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which, if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of the injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, the nature of weapons used, etc. Medical reports in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case, it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings, whereas in the latter case, it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the 6 2026:HHC:20400 plea compounding the offence based on a complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them, which may improve their future relationship. 29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, the timings of settlement play a crucial role. In those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of an offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is for this reason that at this stage the investigation is still on, and even the chargesheet has not been filed. Likewise, in those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start, or the evidence is still at the infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after a prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same, resulting in the acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here, the charge is proved under Section 307 IPC, and a conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime; therefore, there is no 7 2026:HHC:20400 question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.” (Emphasis supplied) 10. This question was again considered in Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641: (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 1: 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1189 and it was held that the heinous offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc, cannot be quashed based on a compromise between the parties. It was observed: “16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject may be summarised in the following propositions: 16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court. 16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable. 16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power. 8 2026:HHC:20400 16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude, it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court. 16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case, and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated. 16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed, though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences. 16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned. 16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may, in appropriate situations, fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute. 16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if, in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and 9 2026:HHC:20400 16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in proposition 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well- being of the State have implications that lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.” (Emphasis supplied) 11. Similar principles were laid down in State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 706: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 320, and it was observed: “15. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under: 15.1. That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised, having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationships or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves; 15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. 15.3. Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences 10 2026:HHC:20400 committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender; 15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act, etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crimes against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act, etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine whether the incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or if the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which, if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of the injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, the nature of weapons used, etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected, after investigation, the chargesheet is filed/the charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paras 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466: (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54 should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove; 15.5. While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect 11 2026:HHC:20400 of non-compoundable offences, which are private and do not have a serious impact on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise, etc.” (Emphasis supplied) 12. It was laid down in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 769 that heinous and serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., cannot be quashed based on the compromise, and only offences which are predominantly civil in nature can be compromised. It was observed: 61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR, or complaint in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation, but it has to be exercised in accordance with the guideline engrafted in such power, viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, and no category can be prescribed. However, before the exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., cannot be 12 2026:HHC:20400 fittingly quashed even though the victim or the victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc., cannot provide any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominately civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from a commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.” 13 2026:HHC:20400 13. In the present case, the victim and the main accused are missing. The victim is a minor and was aged 17 years and six months on the date of the incident. The informant specifically asserted that the victim was kidnapped with the intent to marry her. Thus, the nature of the offences is heinous and cannot be compromised as per the judgments noticed above. 14. In Paramjeet Kumar (supra), the victim was recovered. She had married the accused voluntarily and was residing with her children. In Madan Lal (supra), the victim and the accused loved each other. The victim had solemnised the marriage with the accused. Similarly, in Rishab Sharma (supra), the victim had herself appeared and stated that the F.I.R. was lodged due to some mis-understanding. In Mafat Lal (supra), the victim and the accused were in love with each other, and the victim had left him voluntarily. In Ranjeet Kumar (supra), the Court held that the accused and victim had married, and the F.I.R. can be quashed based on the compromise. In Naushey Ali & Ors (supra), the Court was concerned with the commission of an offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC, but had held that heinous offences cannot be quashed under the inherent jurisdiction. In Madhukar & ors (supra), the accused and the victim had settled the matter 14 2026:HHC:20400 amicably, and the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the F.I.R. might be a reactionary step. 15. Thus, the facts in the cited judgments are different from the present case, and no assistance can be derived from the cited judgments. 16. Considering the nature of the offence and that the victim is still missing, it is impermissible to quash the FIR. Consequently, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 17. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 29th May, 2026 (ravinder)