2026:JHHC:3015 -1 of 9- IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Arbitration Application No. 34 of 2025 M/s. P.K. Agarwala, a Partnership Firm having its principal place of business at Rakha Copper Projects, Jadugora, Jamshedpur, P.O. & P.S. Jadugora, Town Jamshedpur, District East Singhbhum-832106 (Jharkhand), through one of its partners, namely, Pradeep Kumar Agarwal, aged about 59 years, son of Baijnath Agarwal, resident of Village Matigada, Shwaspur, Rakha Copper Projects, P.O. & P.S. Shwaspur, District East Singhbhum-832106 (Jharkhand). ... ... ... Petitioner -Versus- 1. MECON Limited, through its Managing Director, having its office at Doranda Main Road, Vivekanand Chowk, Shyamali Colony, Doranda, P.O. and P.S. Doranda, Ranchi, Jharkhand 834002. 2. DGM I/c (UCIL, Procurements Division) MECON Limited, Doranda Main Road, Vivekanand Chowk, Shyamali Colony, Doranda, P.O. & P.S. DORANDA, DISTRICT Ranchi, Jharkhand 834002 3. Uranium Corporation of India Limited Through its Managing Director Having its Office at Jaduguda Mines P.O. & P.S-Jaduguda, District- East Singhbhum, Jharkhand-832102. ... Respondents --------- CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE --------- For the Petitioner: Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, Advocate For the MECON: Mr. Shresth Gautam, Advocate. For the UCIL: Mr. Sudarshan Shrivastava, Advocate --------- 07 /Dated: 04.02.2026 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. This is an application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the said Act) seeking appointment of an Arbitrator for adjudicating the disputes between the parties arising out of the agreement spelt out in the work order dated 14.09.2020 (Annexure-3). 3. Clause 15 of the agreement/work order dated 14.09.2020 contains the arbitration clause. 2026:JHHC:3015 -2 of 9- 4. Mr Sudarshan Shrivastava, learned counsel for the 3rd respondent, which is opposing this application, very fairly pointed out that the 3rd respondent was not disputing the existence of the arbitration clause. 5. However, Mr Shrivastava strenuously submitted that there was no surviving arbitrable dispute between the parties. By referring to the supplementary counter-affidavit filed by Sri Venkata Suresh Maruvada, the Chief Manager (Legal) of the Uranium Corporation of India (UCIL) submitted that the amended estimated cost of the works was Rs.14,85,99,374/-. The completion period was also extended up to 04.02.2023. Upon completion of the works, an amount of Rs.14,84,78,140.60 was paid to the petitioner. Upon such payment, the petitioner issued a “No Demand Certificate” dated 16.08.2024 and a “No Claim Certificate” dated 01.10.2024, thereby admitting that they have no further or additional claims. He pointed out that the two certificates were issued by the petitioner voluntarily and without any protest, and that the petitioner did not state that they were issued “without prejudice”. 6. Mr Shrivastava reiterated that, based on the above circumstances, no arbitrable dispute remained between the parties and, therefore, there was no question of appointing any arbitrator to adjudicate any disputes, which, according to him, did not even exist. He submitted that this is clearly a case of “accord and satisfaction” about which there can be no factual dispute. Even the two certificates dated 16.08.2024 and 01.10.2024 are annexed along with the supplementary counter-affidavit of Sri Venkata Suresh Maruvada. 7. Mr. Shrivastava specifically referred to the averment/contention at paragraph 11 of Sri Venkata Suresh Maruvada’s affidavit in support of his 2026:JHHC:3015 -3 of 9- contentions. Therefore, the contents of this paragraph are transcribed below for the convenience of reference:- “11. That the petitioner himself agreed and given no demand and no claim certificate. The petitioner, has submitted Invoices including final bill amount for Rs.14,84,77,332/- and UCIL has paid Rs.14,35,69,879/- after statutory deductions of Rs. 49,07,453/- towards Income Tax, CGST & SGST. Moreover, entire SDBG of Rs. 40,92,836/- were released on 11-03-2022 and thereafter BG for same amount were also released on 11-05-2023. Even 10% retention amount has also been released to the petitioner. All such payments were accepted by the petitioner without any objection. Despite the present case has been filed after supressing the materials facts. As the contract is concluded and the same cannot be open by way of Arbitration thus, the case may be dismissed.” 8. Per contra, Mr Sumeet Gadodia, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the scope of proceedings under Section 11(6) of the said Act is extremely limited and confined to examining the existence of the arbitration agreement. He submitted that, since the existence was not in dispute, any examination of aspects such as accord and satisfaction, waiver, acquiescence, concluded contract, or even the absence of surviving disputes would be entirely alien and should not be undertaken in these proceedings. He pointed out that a mere appointment of an arbitrator would not preclude the respondents from raising all such contentions before the arbitrator, but such disputes or contentions cannot be raised before this Court in these proceedings. He relied upon several decisions in support of his submission, and the most relevant of those would be considered in the course of this order. 2026:JHHC:3015 -4 of 9- 9. Mr Shresth Gautam, the learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd respondents, submitted that an Arbitrator could be appointed in this matter by leaving all contentions of the parties, including those now raised by and on behalf of the 3rd respondent, open to be decided by the arbitral tribunal. He referred to the provisions of Section 11(6-A) to submit that this Court, while considering an application under Section 11(6) shall, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court, confine to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement. He pointed out that although subsection (6-A) was omitted by the Amendment Act 33 of 2019, the amendment has not yet been notified. Therefore, he submitted that Section 11(6-A) remains on the statute book and must be given effect to. He referred to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Stamp Act, 1899 In RE, (2024) 6 SCC 1 (para 163). 10. The rival contentions now fall for determination. 11. At the outset, there can be no dispute as to the existence of the arbitration clause. Very fairly, Mr Shrivastava, learned counsel for the 3rd respondent did not dispute the existence of an arbitration clause. The only objection was that no surviving arbitrable dispute remained after the petitioner accepted all amounts found due under the contract and issued the “No Demand Certificate” dated 16.08.2024 and the “No Claim Certificate” dated 01.10.2024. Mr Shrivastava pointed out that such amounts were accepted and a certificate issued without lodging any protest or ever stating that the same were being issued “without prejudice”. In effect, therefore, this application for the appointment of an 2026:JHHC:3015 -5 of 9- Arbitrator was resisted on the ground that there was accord and satisfaction. 12. The issue of whether the referral court should consider whether there was accord and satisfaction, or whether this aspect must be left to the Arbitrator once appointed, has been the subject of several judicial proceedings. Several such precedents were considered and digested in SBI General Insurance Company Limited Vs Krish Spinning, (2024) 12 SCC 1. In this case, it has been held that the scope of examination under Section 11(6-A) is confined to the existence of an arbitration agreement based upon Section 7 of the said Act. The examination of the validity of the arbitration agreement is also limited to formal requirements, such as the requirement that the agreement be in writing. The use of the term “examination” under Section 11(6-A) as distinguished from the use of the term “rule” under Section 16 implies that the scope of enquiry under Section 11(6-A) is limited to a prima facie scrutiny of the existence of the arbitration agreement, and does not include contested or laborious enquiry, which is left for the Arbitral Tribunal to “rule” under Section 16. The Referral Court's prima facie view on the existence of the arbitration agreement does not bind either the Arbitral Tribunal or the Court enforcing the arbitral award. 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court noted that the aforesaid approach serves a twofold purpose—firstly, it allows the Referral Court to weed out non-existent arbitration agreements, and secondly, it protects the jurisdictional competence of the Arbitral Tribunal to rule on the issue of the existence of the arbitration agreement in depth. The Court further held that the dispute pertaining to the “accord and satisfaction” of claims is not 2026:JHHC:3015 -6 of 9- one that attacks or questions the existence of the arbitration agreement in any way. The arbitration agreement, being separate and independent from the underlying substantive contract in which it is contained, continues to remain in existence even after the original contract stands discharged by “accord and satisfaction”. The question of “accord and satisfaction”, being a mixed question of law and fact, comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal, if not otherwise agreed upon between the parties. Thus, the negative effect of competence- competence would require that the matter falling within the exclusive domain of the Arbitral Tribunal should not be looked into by the Referral Court, even for a prima facie determination, before the Arbitral Tribunal has had the opportunity of looking into it. 14. The Court clarified that, by referring disputes to arbitration and appointing an Arbitrator under Section 11, it exercises its powers. The referral court upholds and gives effect to the original understanding of the contracting parties that the specified disputes shall be resolved by arbitration. Mere appointment of the arbitral Tribunal does not in any way mean that the referral court is diluting the sanctity of “accord and satisfaction” or is allowing the claimant to walk back on its contractual undertaking. On the contrary, it ensures that the principle of arbitral autonomy is upheld and that the legislative intent to minimize judicial interference in arbitral proceedings is given full effect. Once the arbitral tribunal is constituted, it is always open for the defendant to raise the issue of “accord and satisfaction” before it, and only after such an objection is rejected by the arbitral tribunal can the claims raised by the claimant be adjudicated. 2026:JHHC:3015 -7 of 9- 15. The Court further held that the tests like the “eye of the needle” and “ex-facie meritless”, although try to minimise the extent of judicial interference, yet they require the referral court to examine contested facts and appreciate prima facie evidence (however limited the scope of enquiry may be) and thus are not in conformity with the principles of modern arbitration which place arbitral autonomy and judicial non- interference on the highest pedestal. Appointment of an arbitral tribunal at the stage of Section 11 petition also does not mean that the referring courts forego any scope of judicial review of the adjudication done by the arbitral tribunal. The said Act vests the national courts with the power of subsequent review, by which an award rendered by an arbitrator may be challenged by any party to the arbitration. 16. The aforesaid ruling of the Hon’ble Supreme Court affords the complete answer to the objections now raised on behalf of the 3rd respondent. Once the existence of an arbitration agreement is not in dispute or doubt, aspects like the alleged non-survival of any arbitrable disputes on account of “accord and satisfaction” or such other issues which really go to the merits of the rival claims cannot be gone into when deciding an application under Section 11 of the said Act. Several decisions in which the Court had entered into such disputes were held not to be in conformity with the provisions of the said Act or with other binding precedents on the subject. Some of the decisions had proceeded on the premise that Section 11(6-A) was omitted from the statute book, without realising that the amendment by which such omission was purported to have been brought about was never notified. 2026:JHHC:3015 -8 of 9- 17. In the case of Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to one such decision in Vidya Drolia and others Vs. Durga Trading Corporation, (2021) 2 SCC 1 and observed that this decision proceeded on the presumption that Section 11(6-A) of the Act was effectively omitted from the statute books by the 2019 Amendment Act. The Court further noted that the omission was never notified and therefore, Section 11(6-A) of the said Act continues to remain in force, and it was incumbent upon the Courts to give true effect to the legislative intent. 18. For all the above reasons, the objection now raised by and on behalf of the 3rd respondent is overruled. However, such overruling does not mean that Mr Shrivastava’s contention about “accord and satisfaction” or about there being no surviving arbitrable dispute is rejected on the merits. Overruling only implies the inability of this Court to consider such a contention in proceedings under Section 11(6) of the said Act. Therefore, even after the arbitral Tribunal is constituted, it will be open to the 3rd respondent or any of the respondents to raise all permissible defences, including the defence based upon “accord and satisfaction” or about the absence of any arbitrable dispute. This position is clarified at this stage, lest any contrary argument be made before the arbitral Tribunal; Therefore, if the respondents raise such disputes, they must be decided by the arbitral Tribunal in accordance with the law and on its own merits. 19. Accordingly, Mr Justice Dilip Kumar Sinha, Former Judge of this Court, residing at D/4001, Green Residency, Nalanda Colony, Budha Vihar, Tetar Toli, Bariatu, Ranchi, is hereby appointed as an Arbitrator to arbitrate the dispute between the parties. His fees shall be in accordance 2026:JHHC:3015 -9 of 9- with the Fourth Schedule to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. They shall be equally borne by all the parties. 20. All contentions of the parties are left to be decided by the learned Arbitrator. 21. Learned Arbitrator would endeavour to conclude the proceedings expeditiously by having regard to the mandate of the Legislature under Section 29-A of the said Act. 22. This Arbitration Application is disposed of in the above terms without any order for costs. Pending I.A., if any, stands disposed of. 23. The Registry is directed to intimate the learned Arbitrator so appointed to take up the arbitration proceedings and shall also provide photocopies of the entire pleadings, along with copies of the entire order-sheets, to the learned Arbitrator. This exercise must be completed within 15 days of the uploading of this order. (M.S. Sonak, C.J.) 04.02.2026 N.A.F.R. APK/VK Uploaded on 12.02.2026