AVINASH KUMAR MEENA SON OF SH. SHIVRAM MEENA v. THE GENERAL MANAGER
CW/16735/2025 · 2026-07-14
Rekha Borana
body2026
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[ 2026 DAILYLAW 10515 (RAJ) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 10515 (RAJ) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
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[2026:RJ-JP:26565] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 16735/2025 URN: CW / 38112U / 2025 Avinash Kumar Meena Son Of Sh. Shivram Meena, Aged About 38 Years, Resident Of Village And Post Ancher, Tehsil Chouth Ka Barwada, District Sawaimadhopur, Rajasthan. ----Petitioner Versus
1. The General Manager, Network-II, State Bank Of India, Human Resources Department, Local Head Office, C- Scheme, Jaipur Rajasthan.
2. State Bank Of India, Appeals And Review Department, Corporate Centre, 8th Floor, State Bank Bhawan, Madma Cama Road, Mumbai-400021- India.
3. State Bank Of India, Through Regional Business Office-6, Man Town, Sawaimadhopur. ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Vikas Kabra Mr. Rohit Rajliwal For Respondent(s) : Mr. Vikram Pratap Singh Mr. Rajat Sharma HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE REKHA BORANA
Order 14/07/2026
1. The present writ petition has been filed aggrieved of order dated 03.05.2024 (Annexure-1) whereby the competent authority observed that because the petitioner failed to report for duty despite notice dated 19.01.2024 having been served upon him, the same would amount to voluntary vacation of employment w.e.f. 04.03.2024. Vide the said order, the petitioner was directed to pay three months emoluments within 15 days.
[2026:RJ-JP:26565] (2 of 7) [CW-16735/2025]
2.
Order dated 14.10.2024 (Annexure-2) whereby the appeal as preferred by the petitioner against order dated 03.05.2024 stood dismissed, is also under challenge in the present writ petition.
3. The case of the petitioner is that he applied for grant of Extraordinary Leave (EOL) soon after his absence from service but the same was never considered by the respondent Authorities.
4.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner remained absent from duty since 19.07.2023 and soon after, he applied for EOL on 30.07.2023. Subsequently, he again requested for grant of EOL and extension thereof vide continuous e-mails, but the same were never taken into consideration whereas the petitioner was entitled for EOL in terms of Rule 37 of the State Bank of India Officer’s Services Rules, 1992 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rules of 1992’). Counsel submits that as per the said rule, EOL for a maximum period of 720 days could have been granted. The same could have been granted even for more than a period of 90 days at one stretch, if sufficient reasons were reflected. Herein the petitioner specifically averred that because of his personal family issues, he could not join and hence his EOL ought to have been granted and extended.
5.
Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that it is not the case where the notices as served on the petitioner were not replied to. Rather notice dated 19.01.2024 was instantly replied on 02.02.2024 and vide the said reply, a request for grant of EOL was made. While relying upon proviso to Rule 40 of the Rules of 1992, counsel submits that even the Appellate Authority could have considered the submission made by the petitioner and
[2026:RJ-JP:26565] (3 of 7) [CW-16735/2025] could have directed for sanction of EOL for the period during he remained absent, as admittedly the said period was less than 720 days.
6.
Learned counsel lastly submits that the period of absence of the petitioner be directed to be converted to EOL and he be
directed to be reinstated. 7. Per contra Counsel for the respondent-Bank submits that the petitioner remained absent since 19.07.2023 without applying for any leave and without any information. Prior to that, he had already been transfered from Sawai Madhopur to Gangapur City vide order dated 15.07.2023. He was even relieved on 19.07.2023 but then, he never reported at Gangapur City and remained absent from duty. Various notices were served on the petitioner directing him to join but of no avail. 8. Counsel submits that the only reason assigned by the petitioner for his non-joining was some personal reason. The said reason was also not substantiated by any document. In that event, there was no reason available with the competent authority to grant him EOL. 9. Counsel further submits that no specific or extraordinary reason was pleaded by the petitioner even before the Appellate Authority so as to justify his case for grant of EOL. Hence, the appeal as preferred by the petitioner was also rightly rejected by the Appellate Authority. 10. Heard the counsels. Perused the record. 11. The following facts are admitted on record: (i) The petitioner remained absent from duty since 19.07.2023, without applying for any leave and without any prior information. [2026:RJ-JP:26565] (4 of 7) [CW-16735/2025] (ii) The first application through e-mail for grant of EOL was submitted by him on 23.07.2023. (iii) The first memo calling upon him to report on duty was served on 30.09.2023. (iv) All the applications as submitted by the petitioner through e- mail reflected only one reason for his absence i.e, some personal family reason, no specific cause was averred in any of the said applications. (v) Vide communication dated 20.10.2023 (Annexure-R/3) the petitioner was informed that his request for EOL has been rejected by the competent authority. (vi) Most of the notices calling upon the petitioner to join the duty were not only served but even responded to by the petitioner. (vii) Notice dated 19.01.2024 was served on the petitioner, to which he replied on 02.02.2024. (viii) Even after service of notice dated 19.01.2024, the petitioner did not report on duty within the stipulated period of 30 days. 12.
Rule 40(3) of the Rules of 1992 reads as under:
"Where an officer who has not submitted an application for leave or where an officer having submitted his application was refused sanction of leave, absents himself for a period of 90 or more consecutive days or overstays the sanctioned leave by 90 or more consecutive days notwithstanding the provisions of sub-rule(2), the Bank may at any time thereafter give a notice to the officer at his last known address available with the bank calling upon him to report for duty within 30 days of the notice. If the officer does not report for duty within the stipulated period, he may, by an order of the Appointing Authority, be deemed to have voluntarily vacated his employment on the expiry of the said period set out in the notice. In such cases the officer shall also be
[2026:RJ-JP:26565] (5 of 7) [CW-16735/2025] liable to pay to the Bank such notice monies as are payable in case of resignation as if he has been permitted to pay the emoluments in lieu of notice. Provided, however, that an officer may appeal to the competent authority within a period of three years from the date of order recording voluntary vacation under the aforesaid rule. The Competent Authority shall consider such appeal to treat the said order as rescinded if it is satisfied that the officer was prevented by any sickness incapacitating him from reporting for duty within the prescribed time or for any other sufficient cause, and pass such orders as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case."
13. As per the above provision, if an Officer absents himself for a period of 90 or more consecutive days, the only requirement is that a notice of 30 days is to be served on him.
The provision specifically provides that if the Officer does not report for duty within the stipulated period, it would be deemed that he has voluntarily vacated his employment on the expiry of the period set out in the notice. 14. Admittedly, the notice in terms of Rule 40(3) was served on the petitioner. The petitioner having not reported on duty within the period of 30 days stipulated in notice dated 19.01.2024, the action taken thereupon in terms of Rule 40(3) of the Rules of 1992 cannot be termed to be in contravention of any law. The order impugned dated 03.05.2024 hence, was rightly passed in terms of Rule 40(3) of the Rules of 1992. 15. So far as the ground raised by Counsel for the petitioner to the effect that the complete period of absence of the petitioner could have been and ought to have been converted to EOL is concerned, Rule 37 of the Rules of 1992, provides as under:
[2026:RJ-JP:26565] (6 of 7) [CW-16735/2025]
"37.(1) An officer shall be eligible for extraordinary leave on loss of pay for not more than 360 days during the entire period of service. Such leave may not be availed of except for sufficient reasons not more than 90 days at a time. Provided that in very special circumstances, the competent authority may grant extraordinary leave on loss of pay to an officer upto a total period of 720 days. … … … … … … 37.(2) Subject to any other rule, extraordinary leave may be granted in combination with or in continuation of any kind of leave and the competent authority may commute retrospectively periods of absence without leave into extraordinary leave."
16. A bare perusal of the above provision reflects that no EOL can be granted for more than 90 days at one stretch to any Officer. It is only for sufficient reasons that the same can be granted. Evidently, in the present matter no reason, whatsoever, was specified by the petitioner as to why he remained absent from duty and was unable to join. A mere averment of some personal reason cannot by any stretch of imagination be termed to be a sufficient reason.
Further, it is the discretion of the Competent Authority to conclude whether the reason assigned would qualify as a sufficient reason or not. 17. Herein, it is an admitted fact that the request for EOL by the petitioner was rejected at the very first instance and he was duly informed of the same. Despite the same, he did not report on duty, rather continued to pray for extension of the EOL. In the specific opinion of this Court, when the request for EOL had been
[2026:RJ-JP:26565] (7 of 7) [CW-16735/2025] rejected at the very first instance, there was no question of extension. 18. Further, without any sufficient reason been assigned, the EOL even otherwise could not have been granted for more than a period of 90 days at one stretch. 19. One more relevant aspect which deserves consideration is that earlier too, the petitioner remained on unauthorized leave for a period of 76 days commencing from the month of September, 2022 which was sanctioned by the Competent Authority and permitted to be converted to EOL. 20. The most relevant aspect which also requires consideration is that despite the petitioner having remained absent from duty since 19.07.2023, he was given an opportunity to report/rejoin vide notice dated 19.01.2024 i.e., after a period of more than six months. Had the petitioner intended to report on duty, he definitely would have rejoined within a period of 30 days, but he refrained from doing so and again requested for extension of EOL, that too, without any specific or sufficient reason. 21. In view of the above overall facts and analysis, orders impugned deserve no interference by this Court and the writ petition is hence, dismissed. 22. Stay application and pending application(s), if any, stand
disposed of.
(REKHA BORANA),J 97/RASHMI