1 2026:CGHC:436 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 367 of 2018 Uttam Kumar S/o Dayaram Kamde Aged About 45 Years R/o Behind Santoshi Mandir, Village Kolihamar, Police Station And Tahsil Gurur, District Balod Chhattisgarh ( Defendant No. 1 ), District : Balod, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant Versus Urmila Bai W/o Shobharam Chandrakar (died) R/o Hathidabari, Abadipara Chhandkhuri, Tahsil And District Durg Chhattisgarh. through Legal Representative 1. Hemlata, W/o Manoj Chandrakar (D/o Shobharam), Aged About 36 Years, 2 - Jitendra S/o Late Shobharam Chandrakar Aged About 30 Years Both are R/o Sardar Villabhbhai Patel, Ward No. 18, Krishna Nagar Raipur, District- Raipur Chhattisgarh. 3 - Kamlesh S/o Late Shobharam Chandrakar Aged About 33 Years R/o Chandrakhuri, Tahsil And District Durg Chhattisgarh Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Mr. R.S. Patel, Advocate For Respondent(s) : RAHUL JHA Digitally signed by RAHUL JHA Date: 2026.01.05 17:44:29 +0530 2 Hon'ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru Judgment on Board 05/01/2026 1. The present Second Appeal has been filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, assailing the judgment and decree dated 12.04.2018 passed in Civil Appeal No. 17-A/2014 (Uttam Kumar v. Urmila [since deceased, through her legal representatives]) by the learned District Judge, Balod, whereby the First Appellate Court affirmed the judgment and decree dated 18.04.2013 passed in Civil Suit No. 17-A/2012 (Urmila v. Uttam Kumar) by the learned Trial Court. The present appeal has been preferred by the defendant, who is the appellant herein. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall hereinafter be referred to as per their status before the Trial Court. 2. The original plaintiff instituted a civil suit seeking vacant possession of the suit house and recovery of arrears of rent, pleading that the defendant was her tenant and that the tenancy had been validly terminated by notice. The defendant contested the suit by denying the relationship of landlord and tenant and by claiming ownership over the suit property on the basis of an alleged sale dated 01.08.2007. Upon due appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence on record, the learned Trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff, holding that the defendant failed to prove his plea of ownership and that the plaintiff had established the tenancy and its lawful termination. Aggrieved thereby, the defendant preferred a First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of 3 Civil Procedure. The learned First Appellate Court, on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, affirmed the findings recorded by the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal, concurring with the conclusion that the defendant had not established any valid transfer of title in his favour and that the decree for eviction and arrears of rent was rightly passed. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant/defendant has been heard on the question of admission, and the impugned judgments and decrees passed by both the courts below have been carefully examined. 4. The scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law. 5. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellant/defendant failed to establish his plea of ownership and that the respondent/plaintiff successfully proved the relationship of landlord and tenant along with valid termination of tenancy. The appellant has failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded. 6. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any 4 substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 7. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding. 8. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. 9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case and in view of the above settled legal proposition, I find absolutely no merit in this appeal, involving no question of law much less substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the CPC. In my view, the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts appear to be just, proper and legal. The findings recorded are based on proper appreciation of evidence available on record and there is no illegality or perversity in the same and they does not call for any interference. 10. Consequently, the Second Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed in limine resulting in upholding of the judgment and decree of the trial Court as well as the Appellate Court. Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Sourabh/Rahul