J UDGMENT : Kaushik Goswami, J. Heard Mr. P. Deka, learned counsel appearing for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lalsawirema, respondent No. 1 appearing in person, and Mr. M. Smith, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 2 & 3. 2] This intra-court appeal is directed against the interim order dated 13.01.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(Crl.) No. 9/2025, whereby operation of the order dated 03.03.2025 passed by the learned XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai in Criminal Case No. 15/2025 came to be stayed. 3] The appellant, who was respondent No. 5 in the writ proceedings, is aggrieved by the said interim order and contends that the writ petition itself was constitutionally incompetent, the challenge therein being directed against a judicial order passed by a criminal court situated outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. 4] The facts giving rise to the present proceedings, shorn of unnecessary detail, are as follows: The appellant claims to be a victim of an online financial fraud of considerable magnitude. According to the appellant, he was induced through certain online platforms and WhatsApp groups purporting to be associated with investment and stock trading activities, pursuant whereto various sums aggregating to approximately Rs.5.34 crores were transferred to multiple bank accounts on the representation that such transfers were towards legitimate investment transactions. Upon subsequently suspecting that the entire arrangement was fraudulent, the appellant approached the competent cyber crime authorities in the State of Tamil Nadu. An FIR came to be registered as FIR No. 15/2025 under the relevant provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 read with applicable provisions of the Information Technology Act, and investigation was commenced by the State Cyber Crime Investigation authorities at Chennai. 5] During the course of investigation, the investigating agency claims to have traced portions of the allegedly defrauded funds through various banking channels. According to the appellant, one such money trail led to the bank account maintained by respondent No. 1 with HDFC Bank, Kolasib Branch, Mizoram. 6] It appears that acting in connection with the said investigation, the account in question came to be frozen. Thereafter, proceedings were placed before the learned XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai in connection with the said criminal case. 6] It appears that acting in connection with the said investigation, the account in question came to be frozen. Thereafter, proceedings were placed before the learned XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai in connection with the said criminal case. By order dated 03.03.2025 passed in the said proceedings, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate directed defreezing of the said account and further directed transfer of an amount of Rs.27,90,009/- lying therein to the appellant’s bank account. Another sum of Rs.2,50,000/- from a separate account appears also to have been directed to be transferred, which, according to the appellant, was in fact acted upon. 7] Respondent No. 1, whose account at Kolasib was the subject matter of the aforesaid order, disputes the legality of the said judicial direction. His case is that he was never afforded notice or opportunity of hearing before the order dated 03.03.2025 came to be passed; that the account in question was not reflected in the original FIR; and that deprivation of the funds standing to his credit without notice amounted to violation of principles of natural justice and infringement of his constitutional rights. 8] The record further reveals that respondent No. 1 also instituted civil proceedings before the competent civil court at Kolasib in relation to the said bank account, in which an interim order directing maintenance of status quo came to be passed restraining disposal of the amount pending consideration of the interlocutory proceedings. Certain other proceedings also appear to have been initiated touching the freezing of the account and actions of the bank authorities. However, those proceedings do not directly arise for adjudication in the present appeal except to the limited extent of background facts. 9] Be that as it may, respondent No. 1 thereafter instituted W.P.(Crl.) No. 9/2025 before the learned Single Judge of this Court invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 10] The writ petition expressly sought quashing of the judicial order dated 03.03.2025 passed by the XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai in Criminal Case No. 15/2025, primarily on the grounds that the same was passed in violation of principles of natural justice, Article 21, and Article 300A of the Constitution of India. 11] The learned Single Judge, upon hearing the writ petitioner, issued notice upon the respondents and by way of interim protection stayed operation of the impugned order dated 03.03.2025 pending further consideration. 11] The learned Single Judge, upon hearing the writ petitioner, issued notice upon the respondents and by way of interim protection stayed operation of the impugned order dated 03.03.2025 pending further consideration. Aggrieved thereby, the present intra-court appeal has been preferred. 12] Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the writ petition itself was wholly incompetent in law, the challenge being directed against a judicial order passed by a criminal court in the course of criminal proceedings arising from FIR No. 15/2025 registered in the State of Tamil Nadu. It is submitted that judicial orders passed by courts are not amenable to challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution and, therefore, the learned Single Judge ought not to have entertained the writ petition at all. In support of the aforesaid submission, reliance has been placed upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Radhey Shyam and Anr., v. Chhabi Nath and Anr ., reported in (2015) 5 SCC 423 . He further relied upon Neeta Singh and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 5761 , to contend that the same principle applies equally in the context of criminal judicial orders and that writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked as a substitute for remedies otherwise recognized in criminal law. 12.1] It is further submitted that even assuming that respondent No. 1 had a legal grievance against the order dated 03.03.2025, the remedy, if any, lay only before the jurisdictionally competent forum recognized by law and not before this Court. 12.2] Learned counsel further submits that Article 226(2) has no application in the facts of the present case. According to him, the mere situs of the bank account at Kolasib or the fact that respondent No. 1 resides within the territorial limits of this Court cannot confer jurisdiction where the order sought to be challenged is a judicial order passed by a criminal court in Chennai. It is contended that the FIR was registered in Tamil Nadu; the investigation was conducted there; the judicial proceedings arose there; and the impugned order was passed there. Mere consequential impact within Mizoram, according to the appellant, is insufficient to confer territorial jurisdiction. It has also been submitted that Article 227 is wholly inapplicable, the XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet being a criminal court constitutionally subordinate to the Madras High Court and not to this Court. Mere consequential impact within Mizoram, according to the appellant, is insufficient to confer territorial jurisdiction. It has also been submitted that Article 227 is wholly inapplicable, the XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet being a criminal court constitutionally subordinate to the Madras High Court and not to this Court. 13] Per contra, respondent No. 1 appearing in person has sought to justify maintainability by contending that the impugned order directly operated upon his bank account maintained at Kolasib within Mizoram and caused immediate civil consequences within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. According to him, part of the cause of action clearly arose within Mizoram and therefore this Court was fully justified in entertaining the writ petition under Article 226(2) of the Constitution. In support of the aforesaid submission, reliance has been placed upon the decisions of the Apex Court in Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2000) 7 SCC 640 and Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India reported in (2004) 6 SCC 254 13.1] It has further been urged that the order dated 03.03.2025 was passed without notice and in complete violation of principles of natural justice, thereby resulting in unconstitutional deprivation of property and infringement of Articles 21 and 300A of the Constitution. According to respondent No. 1, once such constitutional injury was shown to have occurred within Mizoram, this Court was justified in exercising jurisdiction to protect his rights. 14] We have heard learned counsel for the appellant, respondent No. 1 appearing in person, and learned counsel appearing for the respondent Bank. We have also perused the materials placed on record and also considered the case laws cited at the Bar. 15] In the backdrop of the rival submissions, the principal question which falls for determination is whether the writ petition itself was maintainable before this Court. 16] The issue which falls for determination is one of jurisdictional competence at the threshold. The question is not whether respondent No. 1 may have a grievance against the order dated 03.03.2025, nor whether the said order is legally sustainable on merits. The anterior question is whether the writ petition itself, as instituted before the learned Single Judge, was maintainable in law. 17] The answer to that question must necessarily be found by examining the true nature of the impugned action. The anterior question is whether the writ petition itself, as instituted before the learned Single Judge, was maintainable in law. 17] The answer to that question must necessarily be found by examining the true nature of the impugned action. 18] The writ petition before the learned Single Judge expressly sought quashing of the order dated 03.03.2025 passed by the XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai in criminal proceedings arising from FIR No. 15/2025. 19] The challenge, therefore, was not directed against any independent executive or administrative action. It was not a challenge to any detached act of the investigating agency simpliciter. Nor was it directed against any quasi-judicial determination of a statutory authority. The challenge was squarely to a judicial order passed by a criminal court acting in exercise of judicial power. This distinction is constitutionally decisive. 20] Article 226 undoubtedly confers wide powers upon the High Courts. However, the amplitude of the jurisdiction does not obliterate constitutional structure or transform the High Court into a general appellate forum over all judicial determinations. 21] Writ jurisdiction is intended for constitutional control over State action and such other situations recognized by law; it is not conceived as a parallel appellate or corrective jurisdiction against judicial orders passed by courts of competent jurisdiction. 22] The legal position on this issue now admits of no ambiguity. 23] In Radhey Shyam (supra) , the Apex Court authoritatively held that judicial orders of courts are not amenable to challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court clarified that judicial orders stand on a fundamentally different footing from administrative or quasi- judicial determinations and that correction of judicial orders must be sought through remedies recognized within the judicial hierarchy established by law. 24] The principle underlying Radhey Shyam (supra) is not dependent upon the subject-matter of the proceedings in which the judicial order arose, but upon the constitutional character of judicial adjudication itself. A court acting judicially is not to be treated as though it were merely another “authority” against whom writ certiorari may routinely be invoked. 24] The principle underlying Radhey Shyam (supra) is not dependent upon the subject-matter of the proceedings in which the judicial order arose, but upon the constitutional character of judicial adjudication itself. A court acting judicially is not to be treated as though it were merely another “authority” against whom writ certiorari may routinely be invoked. The matter stands placed even beyond debate in the context of criminal proceedings by the subsequent decision of the Apex Court in Neeta Singh (supra) 25] In Neeta Singh (supra) , the Apex Court reiterated, in the context of criminal court proceedings, that judicial orders are not to be assailed in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 as a substitute for remedies otherwise known to law. Thus, the respondent’s attempt to distinguish between civil judicial orders and criminal judicial orders is of no assistance. 26] The principle emerging from the aforesaid authorities is clear: a judicial order does not become amenable to writ jurisdiction merely because the aggrieved party alleges error, illegality, want of jurisdiction, violation of statutory procedure, or breach of natural justice. 27] Such allegations may, depending upon the governing legal framework, furnish grounds for challenge before a competent forum recognized by law. But they do not alter the constitutional character of the order itself. 28] Learned respondent has emphasized that the order dated 03.03.2025 was passed behind his back and without notice. Even assuming such contention to be correct for purposes of argument, the same does not assist him on the question of maintainability. A judicial order does not cease to be a judicial order merely because it is alleged to be ex parte, procedurally irregular, or legally erroneous. Mere allegation of violation of natural justice cannot convert a judicial determination into an administrative act so as to attract writ certiorari under Article 226. The distinction between existence of legal infirmity and existence of jurisdiction to examine that infirmity must be scrupulously maintained. 29] If the respondent’s submission were accepted, every ex parte summoning order, remand order, attachment order, seizure order, freezing direction, custody order, transfer direction, or other judicial determination passed by a criminal court could be directly assailed under Article 226 merely by characterizing the grievance as one of procedural unfairness. That would fundamentally distort the constitutional distribution of judicial remedies. 29] If the respondent’s submission were accepted, every ex parte summoning order, remand order, attachment order, seizure order, freezing direction, custody order, transfer direction, or other judicial determination passed by a criminal court could be directly assailed under Article 226 merely by characterizing the grievance as one of procedural unfairness. That would fundamentally distort the constitutional distribution of judicial remedies. 30] It was also urged that since the respondent’s grievance is framed in terms of infringement of Articles 21 and 300A, constitutional jurisdiction must necessarily remain available. We are unable to accept such submission. 31] Invocation of constitutional language does not alter the essential nature of the challenge. Where the impugned action is a judicial order passed by a criminal court, the constitutional characterization of the grievance does not create a remedy under Article 226 contrary to settled law. Constitutional rights are unquestionably important; however, their vindication must occur through constitutionally competent forums. 32] The respondent cannot bypass the legal structure governing judicial correction merely by recasting the grievance in constitutional terminology. In the present case, the writ petition before the learned Single Judge was directed squarely against a judicial order passed by a criminal court. Such a proceeding was, in view of the law laid down in Radhey Shyam (supra) and reiterated in Neeta Singh (supra) , fundamentally not maintainable under Article 226. Once that position is accepted, the respondent’s reliance upon territorial consequences under Article 226(2) substantially loses force. 33] Nevertheless, since elaborate submissions were advanced on territorial jurisdiction and constitutional competence, we proceed to examine the same. 34] We now turn to the respondent’s contention founded upon Article 226(2), Article 227, and the alleged territorial nexus with this Court. 35] Learned respondent has, however, sought to sustain maintainability by invoking Article 226(2) of the Constitution, contending that the impugned judicial order directly operated upon his bank account maintained at Kolasib within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and that the legal injury was suffered here. 36] The submission, though attractive at first blush, does not withstand closer scrutiny. Article 226(2) undoubtedly enlarges territorial jurisdiction by providing that a High Court may exercise jurisdiction if the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the authority against whom relief is sought is situated elsewhere. Article 226(2) undoubtedly enlarges territorial jurisdiction by providing that a High Court may exercise jurisdiction if the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the authority against whom relief is sought is situated elsewhere. The expression “cause of action”, however, cannot be understood in an abstract or over-expansive manner detached from the true nature of the lis. 37] It is well settled that the facts constituting cause of action must be material, essential, and integral facts giving rise to the right asserted and the relief claimed. 38] In the present case, the lis before the learned Single Judge was not a general challenge to some executive freezing action simpliciter. The direct and express challenge was to a judicial order dated 03.03.2025 passed by the XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai in criminal proceedings arising from FIR No. 15/2025. 39] The FIR was registered in Tamil Nadu. The investigation was undertaken by the cyber crime authorities in Tamil Nadu. The investigative material was placed before the criminal court at Chennai. The judicial adjudication took place there. The impugned order originated entirely within that criminal process. These are the foundational and integral facts constituting the legal controversy. The fact that the bank account affected by the order is maintained at Kolasib, or that the respondent resides within Mizoram, may represent consequential circumstances, but they do not alter the situs of the judicial proceedings giving rise to the impugned order. 40] If the respondent’s argument were accepted, every judicial order touching property, bank accounts, assets, or persons located beyond the territorial limits of the court passing such order could be challenged before the High Court within whose territory the consequence is felt. Such a proposition would create a regime of fragmented constitutional review and competing judicial oversight over orders passed by courts situated in different States. 41] A criminal court in one State may legitimately pass orders affecting assets or accounts traceable across jurisdictions in the course of investigation or adjudication. If each territorial consequence were treated as generating an independent constitutional forum, multiple High Courts could simultaneously be invited to pronounce upon the legality of the same judicial order. Such a consequence would be plainly incompatible with constitutional discipline and judicial coherence. If each territorial consequence were treated as generating an independent constitutional forum, multiple High Courts could simultaneously be invited to pronounce upon the legality of the same judicial order. Such a consequence would be plainly incompatible with constitutional discipline and judicial coherence. 42] Reliance was placed by the respondent upon Navinchandra N. Majithia (supra) , and Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. (supra) . In our considered view, neither decision advances the respondent’s case. Navinchandra N. Majithia (supra) dealt with territorial jurisdiction in the context of criminal investigative consequences and executive action. Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. (supra) explained the amplitude of Article 226(2) in the context of legal injury arising from State action and clarified that even part of the cause of action may suffice. 43] Neither decision lays down that a judicial order passed by a competent criminal court in one State becomes amenable to challenge under Article 226 before another High Court merely because its consequences are experienced elsewhere. More fundamentally, Article 226(2) addresses territorial jurisdiction; it does not create substantive maintainability where none exists. Thus, where the impugned action is itself a judicial order not amenable to challenge under Article 226, territorial nexus, however articulated, cannot be invoked to overcome that foundational bar. 44] Learned respondent also attempted to suggest that even if Article 226 were unavailable, the challenge may be understood in a broader constitutional sense akin to supervisory jurisdiction. The contention is equally untenable. 45] Article 227 confers upon every High Court power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. The territorial limitation is inherent in the constitutional text itself. The power is supervisory, not universal. Article 227 of the Constitution of India is reproduced hereunder for ready reference: - “ 227. Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court (1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories interrelation to which it exercises jurisdiction. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions, the High Court may- (a)call for returns from such courts; (b)make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts; and (c)prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such courts. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions, the High Court may- (a)call for returns from such courts; (b)make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts; and (c)prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such courts. (3) The High Court may also settle tables of fees to be allowed to the sheriff and all clerks and officers of such courts and to attorneys, advocates and pleaders practising therein: Provided that any rules made, forms prescribed or tables settled under clause (2) or clause (3) shall not be inconsistent with the provision or any law for the time being in force, and shall require the previous approval of the Governor. (4) Nothing in this article shall be deemed to confer on a High Court powers of superintendence over any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.” 46] The XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai is a criminal court functioning within the State of Tamil Nadu and is constitutionally subordinate, for purposes of superintendence, to the High Court exercising jurisdiction over that territory, namely the Madras High Court. It is not subordinate to this Court. This Court cannot assume supervisory jurisdiction over a criminal court situated outside its constitutional territorial hierarchy. 47] To hold otherwise would amount to one High Court exercising constitutional superintendence over courts answerable to another High Court, a position wholly alien to the federal judicial structure contemplated by the Constitution. 48] It was then suggested that if the respondent has no efficacious statutory remedy before this Court, constitutional jurisdiction should remain available. The submission proceeds on an erroneous premise. Absence of a remedy before a particular forum does not create jurisdiction in that forum. Jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution and statute; it does not arise from inconvenience, hardship, or perceived remedial vacuum. If a statutory criminal remedy exists against the impugned judicial order, whether by way of revision, inherent jurisdiction, or any other legally recognized corrective process, such remedy must necessarily be pursued before the jurisdictionally competent forum having control over the criminal proceedings from which the order arose. 49] The situs of the respondent’s bank account in Mizoram cannot relocate the forum for judicial correction of a criminal judicial order passed in Chennai. 49] The situs of the respondent’s bank account in Mizoram cannot relocate the forum for judicial correction of a criminal judicial order passed in Chennai. A litigant cannot create jurisdiction by relying upon territorial consequences while disregarding the situs of the criminal proceedings themselves. 50] The question is not whether the respondent may have a grievance. The question is whether this Court is the constitutionally competent forum to examine that grievance. The answer, in our considered view, must be in the negative. 51] We therefore have no hesitation in holding that neither Article 226(2), nor Article 227, nor any perceived absence of local statutory remedy can sustain the maintainability of the writ proceedings before this Court. 52] The respondent’s challenge, if otherwise legally maintainable, lies only before the forum competent in law to entertain such challenge. 53] We now turn to the respondent’s submission founded upon alleged violation of natural justice and constitutional injury. Considerable emphasis was placed by the respondent upon the contention that the order dated 03.03.2025 was passed behind his back, without notice, and in complete violation of principles of natural justice. 54] It was urged that the respondent’s bank account was directly affected, that the funds standing to his credit were ordered to be transferred without affording him any opportunity of hearing, and that such action resulted in unconstitutional deprivation of property and infringement of Articles 21 and 300A of the Constitution. 55] We do not propose, in the present proceedings, to pronounce upon the factual correctness or legal sustainability of those allegations on merits. 56] The reason is straightforward. Even assuming, for purposes of argument, that the respondent’s grievance possesses legal substance, the existence of such grievance does not answer the anterior question of jurisdiction. The existence of an alleged legal infirmity in an order and the existence of jurisdiction in a particular court to examine that infirmity are distinct matters. The former cannot be permitted to create the latter. 57] A judicial order does not lose its essential character merely because it is alleged to be procedurally irregular, legally erroneous, contrary to statutory procedure, or inconsistent with settled principles of natural justice. Nor does invocation of Articles 21 or 300A automatically confer jurisdiction upon a forum otherwise lacking constitutional competence. Constitutional rights are undoubtedly of the highest importance. Equally, however, their vindication must occur through constitutionally competent forums recognized by law. Nor does invocation of Articles 21 or 300A automatically confer jurisdiction upon a forum otherwise lacking constitutional competence. Constitutional rights are undoubtedly of the highest importance. Equally, however, their vindication must occur through constitutionally competent forums recognized by law. 58] The respondent’s argument, reduced to its essence, is that because he alleges denial of hearing and constitutional injury within Mizoram, this Court must assume jurisdiction notwithstanding the nature and situs of the impugned judicial order. 59] We are unable to accept such a proposition. If accepted, any litigant dissatisfied with a judicial order could bypass the ordinary judicial structure merely by alleging denial of natural justice and identifying some territorial consequence elsewhere. Such a proposition would fundamentally unsettle the constitutional architecture governing judicial review. The legal system does not permit forum creation by characterization of grievance. 60] Whether the respondent ought to have been heard; whether the material before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate justified the order passed; whether the account in question bore sufficient nexus to the alleged offence; whether the procedure adopted was legally sustainable—these are all questions which may, if legally maintainable, fall for consideration before the competent forum. They do not, however, justify assumption of jurisdiction by this Court in proceedings fundamentally incompetent in law. 61] For all the reasons recorded above, we are of the considered view that the writ petition instituted before the learned Single Judge, seeking quashing of the judicial order dated 03.03.2025 passed by the XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai in criminal proceedings arising within the State of Tamil Nadu, was constitutionally not maintainable before this Court. 62] Once the foundational proceedings themselves were not maintainable, the interim order passed therein cannot be permitted to survive. The question is not whether the respondent is remediless in law. The question is whether this Court is the constitutionally competent forum to entertain the challenge laid by him. The answer, in our considered view, must be in the negative. 63] For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal is allowed. 64] The interim order dated 13.01.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(Crl.) No. 9/2025 is set aside. 65] We have held that the writ petition, insofar as it seeks to assail the judicial order dated 03.03.2025 passed by the XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai in criminal proceedings arising within the State of Tamil Nadu, is constitutionally not maintainable before this Court. 65] We have held that the writ petition, insofar as it seeks to assail the judicial order dated 03.03.2025 passed by the XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai in criminal proceedings arising within the State of Tamil Nadu, is constitutionally not maintainable before this Court. Since the writ petition is pending on the file of the learned Single Judge and a formal order would be required to be recorded therein, let a copy of this judgment be placed before the learned Single Judge for passing appropriate consequential orders in accordance with law. 66] It shall, however, remain open to respondent No. 1 to pursue such remedies as may be available in law before the forum competent to entertain the same. 67] Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.