JUDGMENT : Rajesh Mazumdar, J. We have heard the learned counsel, Mr. P. Surien, appearing for the petitioner, and we have also heard the learned Government Advocate, Ms. Inaholi. 2. Notice in this case was issued on 22.04.2026, requiring the Government Advocate to produce the records and also to file an affidavit. The affidavit on behalf of the State respondents has been filed, and the learned Government Advocate has produced the records. 3. In this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has assailed the detention imposed upon the petitioner by the order dated 27.02.2026, passed by the District Commissioner and Commissioner of Police, Dimapur, Nagaland, by invoking powers under the provisions of the National Security Act, 1980. 4. The facts as revealed from the records are that an FIR was lodged on 20.01.2026 with the Diphupar Police regarding a kidnapping, an attempt of illegal extortion and causing hurt and grievous hurt to the husband of the informant. Accordingly, Diphupar P.S. Case No. 04/2026 under Section 140 (2),(3)/351/308 (2)/131/127 (2)/3 (5) of BNS, read with 7/8 NSR was registered. The petitioner was arrested in connection with the aforesaid FIR on 24.01.2026. Later, Section 111 and Section 113 of the BNS and Section 16 and 18 of the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967 were also added by order dated 02.02.2026 on prayers made by the investigating authority. 5. The Deputy Commissioner of Police, Chumoukedima , Nagaland, acting as the Sponsoring Authority, had forwarded a proposal along with grounds to the District Commissioner, Dimapur, proposing appropriate action, imposing preventive detention of the petitioner herein, be passed under the National Security Act, 1980. The proposal dated 02.02.2026 was taken into consideration by the Commissioner of Police and District Magistrate, Dimapur, Nagaland (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Detaining Authority’) and the Detaining Authority had passed an order on 27.02.2026 directing that the petitioner should be detained and kept in Central Jail, Dimapur. The petitioner was served a copy of the aforesaid detention order along with the grounds of detention, accompanied by schedules/annexures appended thereto, and the receipt of the same was acknowledged by the petitioner on 28.02.2026, while he was still in custody. 6. The petitioner was served a copy of the aforesaid detention order along with the grounds of detention, accompanied by schedules/annexures appended thereto, and the receipt of the same was acknowledged by the petitioner on 28.02.2026, while he was still in custody. 6. Aggrieved by the order of detention, the petitioner filed a representation on 06.03.2026 to the Detaining Authority, through the Senior Superintendent of Central Jail, Dimapur, with copies of the representation marked to the Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Internal Security-II Division, Ministry of Home Affairs and other concerned authorities, whereby it was prayed to revoke/cancel the impugned detention order dated 27.02.2026. The Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, who was the approving authority, approved the detention of the petitioner by the order dated 10.03.2026, directing that the petitioner be detained and kept in Central Jail, Dimapur, for an initial period of 3 months with effect from the date of detention, that is, till 26.05.2026. It was further observed that the period of detention would be later reviewed as required under the provisions of the National Security Act, 1980. By an order dated 12.03.2026, the representation filed by the petitioner was rejected by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland. The representation forwarded to the Central Government was rejected by the order dated 23.03.2026. 7. Mr. P. Surien, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, has submitted that the impugned detention of the petitioner deserves an interference of this Court, in view of the fact that the provisions of the National Security Act, 1980, had been grossly violated in the present case. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the mandatory provision of Section 3(5) of the NSA, 1980, had not been complied with when the respondent authorities failed to communicate the order of detention and the approval of the State Government, together with the grounds on which the order had been made, to the Central Government within a period of seven days. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the mandatory provision of Section 10 of the NSA, 1980, had not been complied with by the Detaining Authority, when the grounds of detention had not been referred to the Advisory Board within a period of three weeks. 10. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the mandatory provision of Section 10 of the NSA, 1980, had not been complied with by the Detaining Authority, when the grounds of detention had not been referred to the Advisory Board within a period of three weeks. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the order of detention dated 27.02.2026 does not demonstrate that the Detaining Authority had the knowledge that the detenu was already under judicial custody and the said order did not reflect that there was a possibility of the petitioner being released on bail and that he would again indulge in activities prejudicial to the security of the nation or the state if not detained. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Longlem Phom Vs. State of Nagaland & Ors. reported in 2017 (2) GLT 506 and on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kamarunnissa Vs. Union of India reported in (1991) 1 SCC 128 and on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Binod Singh Vs. District Magistrate, Dhanbad, Bihar reported in (1986) 4 SCC 416 to submit that when the order of the Detaining Authority did not record that he was aware that the petitioner was already in custody and that there was a probability of the petitioner being released on bail and that there was a further probability of the petitioner indulging in acts prejudicial to the security of the state and the nation, the detention order cannot stand the scrutiny of law and the continued detention of the petitioner deserves interference. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that it is a settled position in law that the violation of the provisions of the NSA by the respondent authorities while detaining a citizen would amount to a violation of the rights of the petitioner under Article 21 and Article 22 of the Constitution of India. He has further submitted that there is an apparent violation of the provisions of the NSA, 1980, as well as non- compliance with the law laid down by the Apex Court. He therefore submits that the continued detention of the petitioner deserves the interference of this Court. 12. He has further submitted that there is an apparent violation of the provisions of the NSA, 1980, as well as non- compliance with the law laid down by the Apex Court. He therefore submits that the continued detention of the petitioner deserves the interference of this Court. 12. He has accordingly prayed that the writ petition be allowed, by quashing and setting aside the impugned detention order dated 27.02.2026, the impugned approval of the detention order passed on 10.03.2026 by the Chief Secretary of the Government of Nagaland, and the impugned rejection order dated 06.03.2026 passed by the Chief Secretary of the Government of Nagaland and the order dated 23.03.2026 passed by the Central Government. 13. Ms. Inaholi, learned Government Advocate appearing for the State of Nagaland, has referred to the contents of the affidavit-in-opposition and submitted that it was in the knowledge of the Detaining Authority that the petitioner was in custody and had filed an application for bail on 25.02.2026, and this fact was taken into account when the impugned detention order dated 27.02.2026 was issued by the Detaining Authority. 14. The learned Government Advocate has further submitted that after receipt of the proposal of the Sponsoring Authority, the Detaining Authority had collected all relevant facts that would be necessary to decide the requirement or otherwise for detaining the petitioner under the provisions of the NSA, 1980 and the fact remains that the petitioner also had knowledge of the aforesaid facts, since he was supplied with all the relevant documents along with the copy of the detention order dated 27.02.2026, on 28.02.2026, while he was still in custody and the petitioner has acknowledged the receipt of the detention order and all its enclosures. 15. The learned Government Advocate has submitted that the perusal of the records would reveal that not only was the Detaining Authority aware that the detenu was in judicial custody, but that the Detaining Authority was also convinced that in the event the detenu was granted bail, he would continue to indulge in similar prejudicial activities. She has further submitted that the order dated 27.02.2026 had been forwarded to the State Government on 27.02.2026 itself for approval. She has further submitted that the order dated 27.02.2026 had been forwarded to the State Government on 27.02.2026 itself for approval. She has further submitted that the records would also reveal that the approval was given by the Government on 10.03.2026, and the same had been forwarded by the State Government to the Central Government on the same day itself through fax and by e-mail on 11.03.2026. 16. The learned Government Advocate has further submitted that the case of the detention of the petitioner had been forwarded to the Advisory Board constituted under the provisions of the NSA, 1980, on 16.03.2026, and the Advisory Board had approved the detention by order dated 13.04.2026. The learned Government Advocate has submitted that the grounds taken by the petitioner regarding non-compliance of the provisions of the NSA, 1980, are belied, and the present writ petition does not deserve any further consideration of this Court and is required to be dismissed. 17. Responding to the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the contents of the detention order, the learned Government Advocate has submitted that a perusal of the records would show that the petitioner was supplied several other documents along with the order of detention. She submits that the petitioner did not furnish the full set of documents served upon him while filing the writ petition. The said documents, which are otherwise available in the Government records, and which contain the signature of acknowledgement of receipt by the detenu, would go to show that the Detaining Authority was wholly conscious of the fact that the detenu was at that point of time under judicial custody at Central Jail, Dimapur and that he had also preferred a petition seeking bail on 25.02.2026. The grounds of detention also reflect that the Detaining Authority was of the firm opinion that, in the event the petitioner is not detained, he was likely to indulge in similar prejudicial activities. In such a view of the matter, the learned Government Advocate has submitted that even the said ground projected on behalf of the petitioner does not require further consideration of the Court. 18. In such a view of the matter, the learned Government Advocate has submitted that even the said ground projected on behalf of the petitioner does not require further consideration of the Court. 18. The learned Government Advocate has further submitted that it is a settled position in law, as reflected even in the judgments referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner, that in the case of a person in custody, a detention order can be validly passed if the authority passing the order was aware of the fact that he is actually in custody, and if he had a reason to believe that there is a possibility of release on bail and that on being released, the detenu would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activities and further, if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. 19. The learned Government Advocate has referred to the case of Huidrom Konungjao Singh Vs. State of Manipur & Ors reported in (2012) 7 SCC 181 , to submit that the Apex Court had held that in the event a detention order is challenged, the Detaining Authority has to satisfy the Court of the following facts:- (1) The authority was fully aware of the fact that the detenu was actually in custody. (2) There was a reliable material before the said authority on the basis of which he could have reasons to believe that there was a real possibility of his release on bail, and further on being released, he would probably indulge in activities which are prejudicial to public order. (3) In view of the above, the authority felt it necessary to prevent him from indulging in such activities and therefore, a detention order was necessary.” She has accordingly prayed for a dismissal of the writ petition. 20. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, and we have also considered the authorities relied upon by them. 21. Since the petitioner has alleged violation of the provisions of Section 3 (5) and Section 10 of the National Security Act, 1980, the same are reproduced below for ease of reference:- “ 3. 20. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, and we have also considered the authorities relied upon by them. 21. Since the petitioner has alleged violation of the provisions of Section 3 (5) and Section 10 of the National Security Act, 1980, the same are reproduced below for ease of reference:- “ 3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons.- (5) When any order is made or approved by the State Government under this section, the State Government shall, within seven days, report the fact to the Central Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in the opinion of the State Government, have a bearing on the necessity for the order. 10. Reference to Advisory Boards. —Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, in every case where a detention order has been made under this Act, the appropriate Government shall, within three weeks from the date of detention of a person under the order, place before the Advisory Board constituted by it under section 9, the grounds on which the order has been made and the representation, if any, made by the person affected by the order, and in case where the order has been made by an officer mentioned in sub-section (3) of section 3, also the report by such officer under sub-section (4) of that section.” 22. A perusal of the records reveals that the stand taken by the State respondent in the affidavit-in-opposition, that the timelines mandated by the aforesaid provisions of the NSA, 1980, were duly adhered to, is supported by the materials available on records. While perusing the records, this Court had the occasion to peruse the report of the Advisory Board, Nagaland, constituted under the National Security Act, where the Board had taken the pain to tabulate the timeline of the actions taken in the present case. 23. This Court finds it prudent to reflect the tabulation formulated by the Advisory Board since the same would provide necessary assistance in putting to rest the apprehensions put forward by the petitioner regarding non-adherence to the timeline laid down by the Act. The tabulation is reflected below:- 24. In view of the above, we do not find substance in the allegation of the petitioner that there had been a violation of the mandatory provisions of the National Security Act. 25. The tabulation is reflected below:- 24. In view of the above, we do not find substance in the allegation of the petitioner that there had been a violation of the mandatory provisions of the National Security Act. 25. The submission made on behalf of the petitioner that the impugned order dated 27.02.2026 suffered an inherent flaw, inasmuch as, it did not contain any disclosure by the Detaining authority that he was aware that the petitioner was in custody and that there was a probability of the petitioner being released on bail and that there was a further probability of the petitioner indulging in acts prejudicial to the security of the state and the nation, is taken up next for consideration. 26. We have perused the impugned order and the records placed before us. An inspection of the records, which contained the grounds for passing the order of detention, revealed that the report of the sponsoring authority, which was the genesis of the detention proceedings, had clearly stated that the petitioner had been taken into custody on 24.01.2026 and that he had been detained in judicial custody since then. The detaining authority, in the grounds supplied to the petitioner along with the detention order, had recorded and referred to the fact that the petitioner had filed an application seeking bail before the competent court on 25.2.2026. The detaining authority had also recorded, in the grounds supplied, its satisfaction regarding the necessity of imposing preventive detention upon the petitioner. 27. It may therefore appear at first blush that it was reasonably demonstrated by the State, through production of records, that the before passing of the order dated 27.2.2026, the detaining authority had conscious knowledge of the fact that the petitioner was in judicial custody, that he had preferred an application seeking bail and that on being released on bail, he would probably indulge in activities which are prejudicial to public order and that in view of the above, the authority felt it necessary to prevent him from indulging in such activities by passing the detention order. A closer inspection would, however, reveal the contrary. 28. A perusal of the grounds recorded by the detaining authority reveals that it had knowledge that the petitioner had made an application for the grant of bail on 25.02.2026. A closer inspection would, however, reveal the contrary. 28. A perusal of the grounds recorded by the detaining authority reveals that it had knowledge that the petitioner had made an application for the grant of bail on 25.02.2026. In this context, a reference to the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Rekha Vs. State of Tamil Nadu through Secretary to Govt. & Anr. reported in (2011) 5 SCC 244, would be relevant, where it was held as follows:- “In our opinion, if details are given by the respondent authority about the alleged bail orders in similar cases mentioning the date of the orders, the bail application number, whether the bail order was passed in respect of the co-accused in the same case, and whether the case of the co- accused was on the same footing as the case of the petitioner, then, of course, it could be argued that there is likelihood of the accused being released on bail, because it is the normal practice of most courts that if a co-accused has been granted bail and his case is on the same footing as that of the petitioner, then the petitioner is ordinarily granted bail……. A mere ipse dixit statement in the grounds of detention cannot sustain the detention order and has to be ignored…… In our opinion, there is a real possibility of release of a person on bail who is already in custody provided he has moved a bail application which is pending. (emphasis added).” 29. In humble agreement to the above opinion, we are of the considered view that the presence of a pending bail application in the present case may have been “reliable material” for the detaining authority to believe that there is a real possibility of release of the petitioner. 30. On a perusal of the records produced by the learned Government Advocate, which contain the grounds of detention supplied to the petitioner, it is seen that the detaining authority had relied upon the report submitted by the sponsoring authority. The detaining authority has recorded that the investigation of the case in which the petitioner had been arrested was at that point of time at the initial stage, the prime accused of the instant case was still absconding and that the Special Investigation Team was actively making efforts to apprehend all persons involved in the commission of the offence. The detaining authority has recorded that the investigation of the case in which the petitioner had been arrested was at that point of time at the initial stage, the prime accused of the instant case was still absconding and that the Special Investigation Team was actively making efforts to apprehend all persons involved in the commission of the offence. It is reflected in the schedule attached to the “ground of detention” supplied to the petitioner that his preventive detention was considered necessary at that juncture in order to prevent the accused from hampering or interfering with the ongoing investigation and to ensure effective apprehension of the absconding accused. 31. There is no quarrel with the proposition that if an authority passes an order of detention after satisfying itself regarding the necessity of passing such an order, the same would not require any interference merely on the ground that the proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail. However, the authority should arrive at a satisfaction prior to the passing of the order, and such satisfaction has to be recorded in the order imposing the detention. The Apex Court in the case of Kamarunnissa versus Union of India and others reported in (1991) 1 SCC 128 ; held as follows; “13. From the catena of decisions referred to above it seems clear to us that even in the case of a person in custody, a detention order can validly be passed (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail, and (b) that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction in this behalf, such an order cannot be struck down on the ground that the proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition to question it before a higher Court. If the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction in this behalf, such an order cannot be struck down on the ground that the proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition to question it before a higher Court. What this court stated in the case of Ramesh Yadav, ( AIR 1986 SC 315 ) (supra) was that ordinarily a detention order should not be passed merely to pre-empt or circumvent enlargement on bail in cases which are essentially criminal in nature and can be dealt with under the ordinary law. It seems to us well settled that even in a case where a person is in custody, if the facts and circumstances of the case so demand, resort can be had to the law of preventive detention.” (emphasis supplied) 32. In Longkumer Phom (supra), this Court had held as follows: “From the principle of law enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court which still holds the field till today, it is very clear that while considering the detention of a person who is already in custody in connection with other cases or case, the District Magistrate who is passing the detention order must first acknowledge and reflect the same in his order the fact that the person intended to be detained under NSA is under custody and there are reasonable and cogent reasons to believe that he is likely to be released on bail, and if he is released he is likely to disturb public order, peace and tranquillity of the State because of his illegal activities in the approximate past. In this case, as stated above, the District Magistrate in his order did not mention that he was aware of the fact that the detenue was already in judicial custody. He also did not mention that he has reason or reasons to apprehend that the detenue is likely to be released on bail and if released, he is in all probability likely to disturb public order, peace and tranquility of the State. He also did not mention that he has reason or reasons to apprehend that the detenue is likely to be released on bail and if released, he is in all probability likely to disturb public order, peace and tranquility of the State. Viewing the detention order and the orders that followed in this case through the principle of law settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court it is clearly seen that they have fallen short of the requirement of law therefore, they are liable to be set aside.” Accordingly, the detention order, the approval order and the confirming order in that case were set aside, requiring the respondent to release the detainee forthwith, if not required in any other case. 33. In the present case, fact remains that the detaining authority did not acknowledge and reflect in his order that the person intended to be detained under the provisions of the NSA is under custody and there are reasonable and cogent reasons to believe that he is likely to be released on bail, and if he is released, he is likely to disturb public order, peace and tranquillity of the State because of his illegal activities in the proximate past. When the order dated 27.02.2026 does not reflect the requirements as mandated in law, we are of the considered opinion that the detention order and orders passed subsequently, either approving or confirming the detention of the petitioner, cannot sustain scrutiny of law and are required to be set aside. Accordingly, the order dated 27.2.2026 passed by the District Magistrate and Commissioner of Police, Dimapur and all consequential and subsequent orders approving such detention are hereby set aside and quashed. 34. The order of detention has been interfered with by this Court on a technical ground, and the merit or otherwise of the requirement to impose preventive detention upon the petitioner was not argued and therefore has not been answered. It is clarified that this order has dealt only with the order dated 27.2.2026 passed by the Detaining authority. This order shall not affect any other/further proceedings, if initiated, in accordance with the provisions of the National Security Act, 1980, and nothing in this order shall influence any proceedings involving a prayer for regular bail by the petitioner in connection with Diphupar PS case no 4/2026. Such prayers, if any, shall be decided on their own merits without reference to this order. Such prayers, if any, shall be decided on their own merits without reference to this order. 35. The records be returned to Ms. Inaholi, learned Government Advocate, by obtaining an acknowledgement.