1 2026:HHC:20653 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA FAO (MVA) No. : 407 of 2018 Reserved on : 07.05.2026 Decided on : 30.05.2026 Reliance General Insurance Company …Appellant Versus Rinka Devi and Ors. …..Respondents Coram: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 ____________________________________________________________ For the Appellant : Mr. Jagdish Thakur, Advocate. For the Respondents : Mr. Sumit Sharma, Advocate for respondents No.1 to 4. Mr. Varun Chauhan, Advocate, for respondent No.5. __________________________________________________________ Virender Singh, Judge (Oral): AppellantReliance General Insurance Company Limited has filed the present appeal, under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, (hereinafter referred to as the ‘M.V. Act’), against the award dated 04.05.2018, passed by learned Motor Accident Claims TribunalII, Kinnaur at Rampur Bushehar, H.P., (hereinafter referred to as the ‘learned Tribunal’), in R.B.T. No.102R/2 of 2016, titled as Rinka Devi and others versus Joginder Singh & another. 1Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 2026:HHC:20653 2. By way of award dated 04.05.2018, the learned Tribunal has allowed the claim petition, filed by the respondents No.1 to 4 and awarded a sum of Rs.29,30,000/ along with interest @ 9% per annum. However, the ultimate liability to pay the amount of compensation along with interest has been fastened upon the Insurance Company (appellant). Brief Facts: 3. For the sake of convenience, parties to the present appeal, are hereinafter referred to, in the same manner, in which, they were referred to by the learned Tribunal. 4. Necessary facts, as borne out from the record, may be summed up, as under: 4.1. The petitioners, being widow, children and and mother of Manoj Kumar had filed the claim petition, under Section 166 of M.V. Act, before the learned Tribunal. They have sought the compensation on account of death of Manoj Kumar, in a road side accident, involving Vehicle No.HP01K5100, owned and driven by respondent No.1 and insured with respondent No.2. 4.2. According to the petitioners, age of Manoj Kumar, at the time of his death, was 38 years and he was earning Rs.50,000/per month, by way of pursuing the 3 2026:HHC:20653 agriculture and horticulture pursuits. The accident had taken place on 28.05.2015 at about 7:00 PM, at Kotgali near village Kotlu. 4.3. Elaborating their stand, it has been pleaded that the accident in question had taken place, due to rash and negligent driving of respondent No.1, as he drove the offending vehicle in a rash and negligent manner and could not control the same, due to which, the offending vehicle went off the road and had fallen into deep gorge. Manoj Kumar died on the spot. Postmortem examination of the dead body was conducted by the Medical Officer, CHC, Anni District Kullu H.P. 4.4. The matter was also reported to the police of Police Station, Karsog, where, FIR No.75 of 2015, dated 29.05.2015 has been registered. 4.5. According to the petitioners, Manoj Kumar was an agriculturist and horticulturist and as such, he was earning Rs.50,000/. 4.6. The petitioners have also pleaded about their bright past and bleak future. 4.7. Since the accident in question has solely been attributed to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the offending vehicle, as such, it has been prayed that the amount 4 2026:HHC:20653 of compensation of Rs.60,00,000/, along with interest @9% be awarded to them. Stand of the respondents before the learned Tribunal 5. When, put to notice, the claim petition has been contested by the respondents. 5.1. Respondent No.1/ownercumdriver, has filed reply, by taking the preliminary objections that the claim petition is not maintainable. According to him, he was neither rash, nor, negligent, however, the accident had taken place due to sudden mechanical defect, which occurred, in the offending vehicle. In this regard, respondent No.1, has relied upon the cancellation report, submitted by the police of Police Station Karsog, before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Karsog, in FIR No.75 of 2015, dated 29.05.2015, registered under Sections 279, 337, 304A IPC. Another preliminary objections have been taken that the petitioners have not approached the Court with clean hands and the learned Tribunal has no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. 5.2. On merits, the contents of the claim petition have been denied, on the basis of the preliminary objections. 5.3. Reliance General Insurance Companyinsurer of the offending vehicle has filed its separate reply, by taking the 5 2026:HHC:20653 preliminary objections, that the claim petition is not maintainable; the petitioners have no locusstandi to file the claim petition; the offending vehicle was being plied, in violation of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy; Respondent No.1, i.e. driver of the vehicle was not having a valid and effective license, at the time of accident and the deceased was travelling in the vehicle, as unauthorized/gratuitous passenger at the time of accident. 5.4. On merits, the contents of the claim petition have been denied mainly for want of knowledge. 6. Thus, the respondents have prayed for dismissal of the claim petition. 7. From the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed by the learned Tribunal, vide order dated 16.12.2016: 1) Whether deceased Manoj Kumar died on 28.05.2015, at about 7:00 PM, at Kotgali near village Kotlu due of rash and negligent driving of respondent No.1, who has driving the vehicle bearing HP01K5100? ..OPP. 2) If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative, to what amount of compensation, the petitioner are entitled and from whom? ...OPP. 3). Whether the petition is not maintainable in the present form? OPR1&2. 4) Whether the petitioner has no locusstandi to file the present petition? OPR2. 6 2026:HHC:20653 5) Whether the vehicle was plied in contravention of terms and conditions of insurance policy? OPR2. 6) Whether driver of the offending vehicle was not having a valid driving license at the time of accident? OPR2. 7) Whether the petition is filed in collusion with respect No.1? ..OPR2. 8) Whether the deceased Manoj Kumar was unauthorized passenger on the offending vehicle? OPR2. 9) Whether the petitioners have concealed material facts from the Tribunal? OPR1. 10) Relief. 8. Thereafter, parties to the lis were directed to adduce evidence. After closure of the evidence, the learned Tribunal, upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, has allowed the claim petition of the petitioners, by way of the award which is impugned herein. Contentions of the appellant (InsurerCompany) 9. AppellantInsurance Company has assailed the award mainly, on the ground that the learned Tribunal has wrongly decided issue No.1, in favour of the petitioners, as it has been proved on record that after the investigation, the police has filed the cancellation report, before the Court of learned Judicial 7 2026:HHC:20653 Magistrate First Class, Karsog, District Mandi, H.P., which was accepted vide documents RW1/F and RW1/G. 9.1. On the basis of the above facts, it has been impressed upon this Court to hold that the sine qua non for seeking of the compensation, under the provisions of Section 166 of M.V. Act, i.e. rashness and negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle, is lacking in the present case. According to the appellant, when, the very base of the case i.e. rash and negligent driving of respondent No.1, has not been proved, then, the petitioners are not entitled for any compensation. 9.2. The award has been assailed on the ground that as per Ex.RW1/A, the driver of the offending vehicle was having the license to drive only Light Motor Vehicles and not Transport Vehicles, as such, he was not authorized to drive the vehicle in question, as per Section 14(2)(a)(i) of the M.V. Act. 9.3. The award has also been assailed, on the ground that the learned Tribunal has wrongly taken the income of deceased as Rs.15,000/ per month, by considering him as mason, whereas, according to appellant, there is no documentary proof to the said effect, as such, the income of deceased Manoj Kumar should have been assessed, on the basis of the minimum wages, prevalent at the relevant time, i.e., in the 8 2026:HHC:20653 year 2015. In this regard, the appellant has relied upon the fact that at the relevant time, wages of the skilled workers were Rs.274/per day, or Rs.7,220/ per month. 9.4. Similarly, the amount, which has been deducted, on account of personal expenses of deceased Manoj Kumar, is also stated to be wrong. According to the appellant, the same is ought to have been 1/3rd, as there were only 3 persons, who were dependent upon the deceased. 9.5. Lastly, the award has been assailed on the ground that the learned Tribunal has wrongly awarded the interest @ 9%, wheres, according to the appellant, the same should have been @ 6% per annum. 9.6. On the basis of the above facts, Mr. Jagdish Thakur, Advocate, appearing for the appellant (Insurance Company) has prayed that the appeal may kindly be allowed, by setting aside the award or to reduce the amount of compensation. Contentions of learned Counsel for the respondents (petitioners before the Tribunal) 10. Per contra, Mr. Sumit Sharma, Advocate, appearing for respondents No.1 to 4 (petitioners), has supported the award and prayed that in order to achieve the legislative 9 2026:HHC:20653 intent, the awarded amount is liable to be enhanced, so that the same could fall within the definition of ‘just compensation’. 10.1. To buttress his contention, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has argued that the learned Tribunal has not awarded ‘just compensation’ under the heads ‘loss of consortium’, ‘funeral expenses’ and ‘loss of estate’. 10.2. Heavily relying upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in National Insurance Company Limited versus Pranay Sethi and others, reported in (2017), 16 Supreme Court Case 680 and in Magma General Insurance Company Limited vs. Nanu Ram @ Chuhru Ram and others, reported in (2018) 18 SCC 130, it has been prayed that the awarded amount may kindly be enhanced. Contentions of learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4 (driver cum owner) 11. The learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4, has supported the award passed by the learned Tribunal and it has been prayed that the appeal may kindly be dismissed. Discussion and Analysis 12. In the present case, Reliance General Insurance Company has assailed the award, on the ground that the driver was not having valid and effective license to drive the offending 10 2026:HHC:20653 vehicle. Perusal of the record shows that as per the document Ex.RW/A, which is the copy of registration certificate, the vehicle is Bolero LX2WD seven seater. As per the driving license Ex.RW1/E, respondent No.1, was authorized to drive Light Motor Vehicle. 13. Learned Tribunal has rightly relied upon the decision of this Court in United India Insurance Company Limited versus Madan Lal and others, 2015 (2) T.A.C. 243 (H.P.), as well as, the decision of this Court in Manohar Lal versus Sukh Bahadur and others, 2015(3) Him. L.R. 1338. As such the learned Tribunal has rightly held that the Insurance Company has failed to point out any fundamental breach of the policy. 14. Moreover, as per the documentary evidence adduced on the file, copy of RC of the offending vehicle as Ex.RW1/A. As per this document, the offending vehicle is Bolero LX 2WD 7 Seater and its seating capacity is 9 and the said vehicle was having the contract carriage permit from 27.1.2012 to 31.08.2015. The accident in question had taken place on 28.5.2015. Meaning thereby, at the relevant time the vehicle was having the valid contract carriage permit. Fitness certificate was also valid and the driver was holding a valid and 11 2026:HHC:20653 effective driving licence, copy of which is Ex.RW1/E. As per Ex.RW1/E, the holder of the driving licence was authorized to drive LMV w.e.f. 8.9.2003. 15. In view of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Cout in Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Company Ltd. Versus Rambha Devi & Others, (2025) 3 Supreme Court Cases 95, the arguments of the learned counsel appearing for the Insurance Company are devoid of any merit, as the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the above case has held that the driver, who is having driving licence to drive LMV can legally drive transport vehicle gross weight of which is below 7500 kg. Relevant paragraphs 175 to 181 of the judgment are reproduced as under: 175. The licensing regime under the MV Act and the MV Rules, when read as a whole, does not provide for a separate endorsement for operating a ‘Transport Vehicle’, if a driver already holds a LMV license. We must however clarify that the exceptions carved out by the legislature for special vehicles like ecarts and erickshaws, or vehicles carrying hazardous goods, will remain unaffected by the decision of this Court. 176. As discussed earlier in this judgment, the definition of LMV under Section 2(21) of the MV Act explicitly provides what a ‘Transport Vehicle’ ‘means’. This Court must ensure that neither provision i.e. the definition under Section 2(21) or the second part of Section 3(1) which concerns the necessity for a driving license for a ‘Transport Vehicle’ is reduced to a 12 2026:HHC:20653 dead letter of law. Therefore, the emphasis on ‘Transport Vehicle’ in the licensing scheme has to be understood only in the context of the ‘medium’ See Rule 8A of MV Rules,’Minimum training required for driving E rickshaw or E cart’ See Rule 9 of MV Rules, ’Educational Qualification for drivers of goods carriages carrying dangerous or hazardous goods’ and ‘heavy’ vehicles. This harmonious reading also aligns with the objective of the 1994 amendment in Section 10(2) to simplify the licensing procedure. 177. The above interpretation also does not defeat the broader twin objectives of the MV Act i.e. road safety and ensuring timely compensation and relief for victims of road accidents. The aspect of road safety is earlier discussed at length. An authoritative pronouncement by this Court would prevent insurance companies from taking a technical plea to defeat a legitimate claim for compensation involving an insured vehicle weighing below 7,500 kgs driven by a person holding a driving license of a ‘Light Motor Vehicle’ class. 178. In an era where autonomous or driver less vehicles are no longer tales of science fiction and appbased passenger platforms are a modern reality, the licensing regime cannot remain static. The amendments that have been carried out by the Indian legislature may not have dealt with all possible concerns. As we were informed by the Learned Attorney General that a legislative exercise is underway, we hope that a comprehensive amendment. The classes medium goods vehicle[(10(2)(e)], medium passenger vehicle[10(2) (f)],heavy goods vehicle[10(2)(g)] and heavy passenger vehicle [10(2)(h)] were deleted and a new class ‘Transport Vehicle’ was introduced in Section 10(2)(e) to address the statutory lacunae will be made with necessary corrective measures. 179. Just to flag one concern, the legislature through the 1994 amendment in Section 10(2)(e) 13 2026:HHC:20653 in order to introduce ‘transport vehicle’ as a separate class could not have intended to merge light motor vehicle (which continued as a distinct class) along with medium, and heavy vehicles into a single class. Else, it would give rise to a situation in which Sri (our hypothetical character), wanting to participate in the cycling sport, is put through the rigorous training relevant only for a multisport like Triathlon, which requires a much higher degree of endurance and athleticism. The effort therefore should be to ensure that the statute remains practical and workable. 180. Now harking back to the primary issue and noticing that the core driving skills (as enunciated in the earlier paragraphs), expected to be mastered by all drivers are universal – regardless of whether the vehicle falls into “Transport” or “NonTransport” category, it is the considered opinion of this Court that if the gross vehicle weight is within 7,500 kg the quintessential common man’s driver Sri, with LMV license, can also drive a “Transport Vehicle”. We are able to reach such a conclusion as none of the parties in this case has produced any empirical data to demonstrate that the LMV driving licence holder, driving a ‘Transport Vehicle’, is a significant cause for road accidents in India. The additional eligibility criteria as specified in MV Act and MV Rules as discussed in this judgment will apply only to such vehicle (‘medium goods vehicle’, ‘medium passenger vehicle’, ‘heavy goods vehicle’ and ‘heavy passenger vehicle’), whose gross weight exceeds 7,500 Kg. Our present interpretation on how the licensing regime is to operate for drivers under the statutory scheme is unlikely to compromise the road safety concerns. This will also effectively address the livelihood issues for drivers operating Transport Vehicles (who clock maximum hours behind the wheels), in legally operating “Transport vehicles” (below 7,500 Kg), with their LMV driving license. Perforce Sri must drive responsibly and should have no occasion to be called either a maniac or an idiot (as mentioned in the first paragraph), while he is behind the wheels. Such harmonious 14 2026:HHC:20653 interpretation will substantially address the vexed question of law before this Court. 181. Our conclusions following the above discussion are as under: (I) A driver holding a license for Light Motor Vehicle (LMV) class, under Section 10(2)(d) for vehicles with a gross vehicle weight under 7,500 kg, is permitted to operate a ‘Transport Vehicle’ without needing additional authorization under Section 10(2)(e) of the MV Act specifically for the ‘Transport Vehicle’ class. For licensing purposes, LMVs and Transport Vehicles are not entirely separate classes. An overlap exists between the two. The special eligibility requirements will however continue to apply for, inter alia, ecarts, erickshaws, and vehicles carrying hazardous goods. (II) The second part of Section 3(1), which emphasizes the necessity of a specific requirement to drive a ‘Transport Vehicle,’ does not supersede the definition of LMV provided in Section 2(21) of the MV Act. (III) The additional eligibility criteria specified in the MV Act and MV Rules generally for driving ‘transport vehicles’ would apply only to those intending to operate vehicles with gross vehicle weight exceeding 7,500 kg i.e. ‘medium goods vehicle’, ‘medium passenger vehicle’, ‘heavy goods vehicle’ and ‘heavy passenger vehicle’. (IV) The decision in Mukund Dewangan (2017) is upheld but for reasons as explained by us in this judgment. In the absence of any obtrusive omission, the decision is not per incuriam, even if certain provisions of the MV Act and MV Rules were not considered in the said judgment.” (self emphasis supplied) 16. If the facts and circumstances of the present case are seen in the light of the above decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, as per the registration certificate gross weight of 15 2026:HHC:20653 the vehicle does not exceed 7500 kgs, as such, respondent No.1, was having a valid and effective driving license. 17. It is the case of the Insurance Company that the basic ingredients for seeking the compensation, under the provisions of M.V. Act, that too, under Section 166 of the M.V. Act, are rashness and negligence on the part of the driver and it was for the petitioners to plead and prove that the accident in question had taken place due to rash and negligent driving of the respondent No.1, while, driving the offending vehicle. According to Shri Jagdish Thakur, learned counsel appearing for the Insurance Company, such evidence is lacking, in the present case. 18. In order to buttress his contention, it has been pointed out that the police, after the investigation, has submitted the cancellation report. The respondents have also examined RW3, Keshva Nand, mechanic HRTC Karsog, who has mechanically inspected the offending vehicle and submitted the report Ex.RW3/A. In the cross examination, this witness has admitted that if brake pipe is broken or braking system is not working properly, in that eventuality, driver can observe the defect at the time of driving the vehicle. He has also admitted that wall joint cannot brake suddenly and it brakes, all of 16 2026:HHC:20653 sudden, only, in case, when there were already cracks on it. When the Court question was put to this witness, he has replied that the vehicle could be stopped by applying the brakes, if the vehicle was moving in normal speed. 19. From the above facts, the negligence of the driver is writ large, as in the proceedings under M.V. Act, the liability of the tort feasor is to be fixed on the touch stone of preponderance of the probability. The proceedings under the M.V. Act, are altogether different from the criminal proceedings, where the guilt of the accused is to be proved by the prosecution, beyond any reasonable doubt. 20. In the present case, respondent No.1 has taken the plea that the accident had taken place due to sudden mechanical defect, which occurred, in the vehicle. The driver of the vehicle Joginder Singh has not bothered to put appearance to say about the fact that he used to maintain the vehicle properly. Admittedly, the vehicle was under the exclusive control of Joginder Singh at the relevant time and it was for him to plead and prove as to how the accident had taken place, which has resulted into loss of valuable lives. 21. Merely, asserting the fact that the cancellation report has been filed on account of some mechanical defect, is 17 2026:HHC:20653 too short to exonerate respondent No.1 from the rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. In the cancellation report, although it has been mentioned that the accident had taken place due to breakage of wall joint, but, in view of the deposition of RW3, the offending vehicle can be stopped if the same was moving in normal speed. The statement on oath, made by RW3, is sufficient to hold that the accident in question had taken place due to rash and negligent driving of respondent No.1. 22. Since the award has also been assailed on the ground of quantum, as such, this Court would now proceed further to discuss the evidence, so adduced, by the parties to the present lis, to ascertain, as to whether the amount of compensation, which has been awarded by the learned Tribunal, falls within the definition of ‘just compensation’ or requires any interference by this Court. 23. In order to ascertain the fact whether ‘just compensation’, has been awarded to the petitioners or not, the first question, which arises for determination before this Court is as to what was the age of Manoj Kumar, at the time of his death. 18 2026:HHC:20653 24. As per the claim petition, deceased Manoj Kumar, at the time of his death was 38 years of age. Learned Tribunal has taken his age as 39 years. When, petitioner No.1 Rinka Devi, wife of deceased Manoj Kumar, appeared in the witness box as PW1, she has given the age of her husband as 38 years. Apart from this, in the matriculation certificate of deceased Manoj Kumar Ex.PW1/K, the date of birth of deceased has been mentioned as 14.12.1976. The accident, in question, had taken place on 28.05.2015. Meaning thereby, at the time of his death, the age of deceased Manoj Kumar was 38 years. The said findings do not require any interference, by this Court. 25. So far as the earnings of the deceased are concerned, as per the claim petition, he was earning Rs.50,000/ per month, by running a photo lab, following agriculture and horticulture pursuits. Petitioner No.1, while appearing in the witnessbox has also deposed on the same lines. According to her, her husband was running a photo lab M Productions at Kumarsain. 26. In addition to this, the petitioners have examined Suresh Kumar, who has also deposed that deceased was running a photography shop at Kumarsain. He was earning 19 2026:HHC:20653 good amount. However, in the crossexamination, this witness has deposed that Manoj, during his life time, was income tax payee and he used to file income tax return. The petitioners have placed on record the documents, which are bills/cash memos of M Productions, Kumarsain, as well as, bill Ex.PW1/R issued by Malhotra Paper Mart in favour of M Productions. 27. All these documents are too short to conclude that deceased Manoj Kumar was earning Rs.50,000/ per month, but, from the above two documents, it can be inferred that Shri Manoj Kumar was photographer by profession. 28. Learned Tribunal has taken the income of deceased Manoj Kumar as Rs.15,000/, however, this Court is of the view that merely, on the basis of the Certificate and Diploma courses, his income cannot be said to be Rs.15,000/ per month and in order to achieve the goal of granting ‘just compensation’, some guess work has to be done by this court. 29. The amount of compensation neither should be too meagre, nor should it be excessive, it should be just compensation. In order to achieve the said goal, income of Shri Manoj Kumar can be said to be Rs.10,000/ per month. 30. In view of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Pranay Sethi’s case (supra) some addition is required 20 2026:HHC:20653 to be made on the monthly income of the deceased, on account of his future prospects, in order to ascertain his established income. Manoj Kumar was working in unorganized sector and as per the decision in Pranay Sethi’s case (supra), 40% amount is liable to be added, on account of future prospects. Relevant paragraphs 59 to 59.8 are reproduced, as under: “59. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we proceed to record our conclusions: 59.1. The twoJudge Bench in Santosh Devi should have been well advised to refer the matter to a larger Bench as it was taking a different view than what has been stated in Sarla Verma, a judgment by a coordinate Bench. It is because a coordinate Bench of the same strength cannot take a contrary view than what has been held by another coordinate Bench. 59.2. As Rajesh has not taken note of the decision in Reshma Kumari, which was delivered at earlier point of time, the decision in Rajesh is not a binding precedent. 59.3 While determining the income, an addition of 50% of actual salary to the income of the deceased towards future prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was below the age of 40 years, should be made. The addition should be 30%, if the age of the deceased was between 40 to 50 years. In case the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years, the addition should be 15%. Actual salary should be read as actual salary less tax. 59.4. In case the deceased was selfemployed or on a fixed salary, an addition of 40% of the established income should be the warrant where the deceased was below the age of 40 years. An addition of 25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years and 10% where the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years 21 2026:HHC:20653 should be regarded as the necessary method of computation. The established income means the income minus the tax component. 59.5. For determination of the multiplicand, the deduction for personal and living expenses, the tribunals and the courts shall be guided by paragraphs 30 to 32 of Sarla Verma which we have reproduced hereinbefore. 59.6. The selection of multiplier shall be as indicated in the Table in Sarla Verma read with paragraph 42 of that judgment. 59.7 The age of the deceased should be the basis for applying the multiplier. 59.8. Reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs. 15,000/, Rs. 40,000/ and Rs.15,000/, respectively. The aforesaid amounts should be enhanced at the rate of 10% in every three years.” 31. The age of deceased Manoj Kumar was held to be 38 years, at the time of his death and he was working in unorganized sector, as such, the amount of 40% is required to be added to ascertain the established income. Thus his income comes to Rs.10,000/+Rs.4000/ =14,000/. 32. The petitioners are widow, minor children and mother of the deceased Manoj Kumar. As such, learned Tribunal; has rightly deducted ¼th amount. Deducting the ¼th amount, on account of personal expenses, had deceased Manoj Kumar been alive, his monthly contribution towards his family 22 2026:HHC:20653 comes to Rs.14,000/ minus Rs.3500/ (¼th of Rs.14,000/) 10,500/. 33. Learned tribunal has applied the multiplier of ‘15’ and in view of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sarla Verma versus Delhi Transport Corporation and Another, (2009) 6 Supreme Court Cases 121, the same does not require any interference. 34. As such, the amount of compensation awarded to the petitioners on account of loss of dependency, comes to Rs.10,500/ x 12 x15 = Rs.18,90,000/. 35. In view of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Magma General Insurance Company Limited versus Nanu Ram @ Chuhru Ram and others, (2018) 18 SCC 130, all the petitioners are held entitled for the amount under the head ‘loss of consortium’. Relevant paragraphs 21 to 24, are reproduced, as under: 21. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Pranay Sethi (supra) dealt with the various heads under which compensation is to be awarded in a death case. One of these heads is Loss of Consortium. In legal parlance,“consortium” is a compendious term which encompasses ‘spousal consortium’, ‘parental consortium’, and ‘filial consortium’.The right to consortium would include the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family. With respect to a spouse, it would 23 2026:HHC:20653 include sexual relations with the deceased spouse. 21.1. Spousal consortium is generally defined as rights pertaining to the relationship of a husbandwife which allows compensation to the surviving spouse for loss of “company society, corporation, affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation. 21.2. Parental consortium is granted to the child upon the premature death of a parent, for loss of “parental aid, protection, affection, society, discipline guidance and training. 21.3. Filial consortium is the right of the parents to compensation in the case of an accidental death of a child. An accident leading to the death of a child causes great shock and agony to the parents and family of the deceased. The greatest agony for a parent is to lose their child during their lifetime. Children are valued for their love, affection, companionship and their role in the family unit. 22. Consortium is a special prism reflecting changing norms about the status and worth of actual relationships. Modern jurisdictions world over have recognized that the value of a child’s consortium far exceeds the economic value of the compensation awarded in the case of the death of a child. Most jurisdictions therefore permit parents to be awarded compensation under loss of consortium on the death of a child. The amount awarded to the parents is a compensation for loss of the love, affection, care and companionship of the deceased child. 23. The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation aimed at providing relief to the victims or their families, in cases of genuine claims. In case where a parents has lost their minor child, or unmarried son of daughter, the parents are entitled to be awarded loss of consortium under the head of filial consortium. Parental consortium is awarded to children who lose their parents in motor vehicle accidents under the Act. A fe High Courts have awarded 24 2026:HHC:20653 compensation on this count. However, there was no clarity with respect to the principles on which compensation could be awarded on loss of filial consortium. 24. The amount of compensation to be awarded as consortium will be governed by the principles of awarding compensation under “ loss of consortium”. As laid down in Pranay Sethi. In the preset case, we deem it appropriate to award the father and sister of the deceased, as amount of Rs.40,000/ each for loss of filial consortium. 36. In addition to this, petitioners are also entitled for the enhanced amount of compensation under conventional heads i.e. loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses. The entitlement of the petitioners, thus, is ascertained as under: 1.Loss of contribution=Rs.18,90,000/ 2.Loss of estate = Rs.19,500/(Rs.15,000/+Rs.4500) 3.Funeral expenses = Rs.19,500/(Rs.15,000/+Rs.4500/) 4.Loss of consortium= Rs.2,08,000/ (Rs.40,000/ x 4 =1,60,000/+48,000/) Total= Rs.21,37,000/ 37. Thus, the petitioners are held entitled for a sum of Rs.21,37,000/, as compensation. 25 2026:HHC:20653 38. In view of the above, the amount of compensation is ordered to be reduced from 29,30,000/ to Rs.21,37,000/. 39. The learned Tribunal has awarded interest at the rate of 9% per annum, which is liable to be reduced to 7.5% per annum, in view of the prevailing rate of interest of the nationalized banks. 40. Consequently, the present appeal is allowed. The awarded amount is reduced, in the above terms. The petitioners are held entitled for the amount of Rs.21,37,000/, along with interest @ 7.5%, from the date of filing of the petition. 41. The amount of compensation is ordered to be apportioned amongst the petitioners, as under: Petitioner No.1 (widow) = 50% Petitioners No.2 & 3 (minor son and daughter) = 20% each Petitioner No.4 (mother) = 10% 42. The award passed by the learned Tribunal is modified in the above terms. The amount awarded to petitioners No.2 and 3 shall remain invested in the shape of FDRs in their names till they attain the age of majority. 43. Memo of costs be prepared. 26 2026:HHC:20653 44. Pending application(s), if any, are also disposed of. Record be sent back. (Virender Singh) Judge May 30, 2026 (ps/subhash)

RELIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD v. RINKA DEVI AND OTHERS

Judgment text