JUDGMENT : MRIDUL KUMAR KALITA, J. [1] Heard Mr. J. Deka, learned counsel for the appellants. Also heard Mr. M.K. Choudhury, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 as well as Mr. K.K. Bhattacharyya, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 2,3,4 and 6. Also heard Mr. C. Baruah, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 5. [2] This appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, has been filed by the appellants/defendant No. 1 impugning the judgment and decree dated 24.01.2014, passed by the court of the learned District Judge, Morigaon in Title Appeal No. 02/2013, whereby the judgment and decree dated 28.05.2013, passed by the trial court, i.e. the court of the learned Civil Judge, Morigaon in Title Suit No. 07/2009 was upheld. [3] The brief facts relevant for consideration of the instant second appeal are that the respondent No. 1 Rajia Begum, as plaintiff, had filed a suit for declaration of right, title and interest, recovery of arrear rent and eviction of the defendant No. 1 (present appellant) and recovery of compensation in respect of the land acquired by the State respondent, before the court of the learned Civil Judge, Morigaon. The said suit was registered as Title Suit No. 07/2009. The present appellants as well as other defendants appeared before the trial court and filed their written statement. After considering the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed following issues:- i. “Whether there is cause of action for the suit? ii. Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form? iii. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? iv. Whether the defendant No.1 is tenant under the plaintiff in respect of the suit premises? v. Whether the defendant is to pay Rs. 12,000/-being the rent of Rs. 500/- per month from 30.8.07 to 31.8.09 to the plaintiff and whether the defendant is liable to evicted therefrom? vi. Whether the plaintiff has right, title and interest over the suit land? vii. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover Rs. 28,500/- as compensation and Rs. 1,74,290/- for the pucca house on the suit land from the defendant No. 4? viii. Whether the defendant is entitled to counter claim made in respect of suit land? ix. To what relief(s) the parties are entitled to? vii. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover Rs. 28,500/- as compensation and Rs. 1,74,290/- for the pucca house on the suit land from the defendant No. 4? viii. Whether the defendant is entitled to counter claim made in respect of suit land? ix. To what relief(s) the parties are entitled to? [4] In support of her case the plaintiff (present respondent No. 1) examined 3(three) witnesses, including herself, however, as two of the witnesses apart from the plaintiff herself expired before they could be cross-examined, their evidence was expunged. [5] On the other hand, the defendant’s side did not examine anyone. It is pertinent to mention herein that in the aforesaid case, the present appellants (defendant No. 1) also filed a counter-claim along with her written statement claiming the declaration of her right, title and interest over scheduled-A land and also for a decree of confirmation of her possession over the said land. Apart from that the defendant No. 1 also claimed compensation for acquisition of the land and for the standing houses over the acquired land as well as for permanent injunction. [6] The trial court, by its judgment dated 7 th May, 2013, decreed the suit of the plaintiff granting the relief claimed by the plaintiff in her plaint except the relief of recovery of arrear rent. The trial court though, while deciding issue No. 8, had observed that the defendant No. 1 failed to adduce any evidence in support of her pleading made in the counter-claim, however, nothing was mentioned in the operative part of the judgment as regards the fate of the counter-claim. [7] Being aggrieved by the judgment of the trial court the present appellants (defendant No. 1) preferred an appeal before the court of the learned District Judge, Morigaon. The said appeal was registered as Title Appeal No. 02/2013. However, by impugned judgment and decree dated 24.01.2015, the First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellants and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The said appeal was registered as Title Appeal No. 02/2013. However, by impugned judgment and decree dated 24.01.2015, the First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellants and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. [8] Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of the First Appellate Court, the instant Regular Second Appeal has been filed by the appellant (defendant No. 1).This court after considering the memo of appeal and the documents annexed therewith as well as after hearing learned counsel for both sides, had formulated following substantial questions of law by its order dated 03.09.2018: - i. “Whether the judgment passed by the learned First Appellate Court complies with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 on the face of the counter-claim made by the appellants/defendants?” ii. “Whether the learned First Appellate Court has exceeded its jurisdiction as circumscribed under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908by giving a declaration of the scheduled-A land which includes a portion of the land acquired by the Government under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and/or the National Highway Act, 1956”? [9] Mr. J. Deka, the learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the judgment of the first appellate court is hit by provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in as much as the First Appellate Court while passing the impugned judgment did not formulate any points for determination as required under Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. [10] He further submits that the first appellate court has only dealt with two issues framed by the trial court namely, the issue No. vi as well as issue No. iv and have categorically mentioned paragraph 11 of the impugned judgment that since the issue No. iv and vi are the issues touching upon the vitality of the suit and since same are decided in favour of the plaintiff, it does not find necessary to make any discussion on other issues. [11] The learned counsel for the appellants submits that as apparent from the judgment of the first appellate court, that apart from the two issues mentioned herein above (issue No. iv and issue No. vi), the Appellate Court did not consider any other issues formulated by the trial court neither it itself framed any point for determination and therefore, he submits that there was not even the substantial compliance of the mandate as provided under Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.He, therefore, submits that as the first appellate court is the last Court on the question of facts, it is expected to apply its mind and record finding on all issues arising along with the contention put forth and pressed by the parties. [12] He further submits that the first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and they have a right to be heard on questions of law as well as questions of facts, however, in the impugned judgment, the first appellate court has not dealt with or made any observations as regards the questions of maintainability of the suit raised by the appellants in his written statement/counter-claim. He, therefore, submits that the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside on that count only and the first substantial question of law should be decided in favour of the appellants. [13] The learned counsel for the appellants further submits that as regards the second substantial question of law is concerned, though, the plaintiff (respondent No. 1) had claimed relief as regards compensation against acquisition of his land; he had not approached the appropriate court/forum under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which he ought to have done. [14] He further submits that as regards the relief claimed for eviction of the present appellants from the tenanted premises the plaintiff ought to have filed suit under the provisions of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 however, instead of doing so, he has clubbed all the relief by filing an ordinary civil suit which is impliedly barred under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. [15] The learned counsel for the appellants submits that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 would have been sufficient for the plaintiff to agitate his grievance regarding apportionment of compensation against the land acquisition. [15] The learned counsel for the appellants submits that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 would have been sufficient for the plaintiff to agitate his grievance regarding apportionment of compensation against the land acquisition. He further submits that the Apex Court has in a catena of its decisions had categorically held that a civil suit is not maintainable to challenge the acquisition proceedings as the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is a complete code in itself, therefore, by necessary implications under Section 9 of the CPC, a civil court has no jurisdiction to go into the questions of validity or otherwise of the land acquisition proceedings. In support of his submissions, he has cited following rulings of the Apex Court:- i. “The Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority & Anr. Vs. K.S. Narayan ” reported in “( 2006) 8 SCC 336; ii. “The State of Punjab Vs. Amarji t Singh & Ors.” reported in “( 2011)14 SCC 713; [16] The learned counsel for the appellants further submits that it is a fundamental principle which is well established that a decree passed by court without jurisdiction is a nullity and that its invalidity may be agitated whenever and wherever it is intended to be enforced or relied upon, i.e. even at the stage of execution and even at the collateral proceedings. In support of his submissions, he has cited a ruling of the Apex Court in the case of “ Sushil Kumar Mehta Vs. Gobind Ram Bohra (Dead) Through his LR s.” reported in “ (1990) 1 SCC 193. [17] The learned counsel for the appellants has thus submitted that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by the respondent No. 1 and as such he submits that the second substantial question of law may also be decided in affirmative in favour of the present appellants and this instant second appeal be allowed. [18] He further submits that in the event of allowing this instant appeal this court need not to remand back the matter to the first appellate court to decide the appeal afresh. [18] He further submits that in the event of allowing this instant appeal this court need not to remand back the matter to the first appellate court to decide the appeal afresh. He submits that as the evidence is available on record, this court may decide the suit on the basis of available materials and prays for dismissing the suit of the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 and decreeing the counter-claim of the appellants/defendant No. 1.The learned counsel for the appellants has cited following rulings of the Apex Court in support of his submissions: - i. “K. Karuppuraj Vs. M. Ganesan ” reported in “ 2021 (10) SCC 777; ii. “MalluruMallappa Vs. Kuruvathappa “ reported in “ (2020) 4 SCC 313 ;” iii. “Manjula And Others. Vs. Shyamsundar And Others” reported in “ (2022) 3 SCC 90 ;” iv. “ Mrugendra Indravadan Mehta Vs. Ahmedabad reported in Municipal Corporation” “2024 SCC OnLine SC 849.” [19] On the other hand, Mr. M.K. Choudhury, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has submitted, in respect of first substantial question of law, that though the first appellate court had not specifically formulated any point for determination in the impugned judgment. However, he submits that it has discussed all the relevant issues and all the evidence which was relevant for deciding the appeal preferred by the present appellants before the first appellate court. [20] He submits that since there has been a substantial compliance of mandate of Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 by the first appellate court, it is not hit by the said provision. He submits that the Apex Court in the case of “ Nafees Ahmed and Anr. Vs. Soinuddin and Ors. ” reported in “ 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 458 ” has observed that the non-compliance of the provisions contained in Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in itself may not vitiate the judgment and make it wholly void if there has been substantial compliance with it. [21] He submits that as in the instant case, the learned first appellate court has considered all the relevant factors which were necessary for deciding the appeal filed by the present defendants, the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants does not warrant favourable consideration. [21] He submits that as in the instant case, the learned first appellate court has considered all the relevant factors which were necessary for deciding the appeal filed by the present defendants, the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants does not warrant favourable consideration. He submits that the first substantial question of law formulated by this court should therefore be decided in favour of the present respondent No. 1. [22] As regards the second substantial question of law which has been formulated by this court, he submits that though the jurisdiction of civil court is ousted if in the case where there has been any challenge to any acquisition proceedings, however, in the instant case, the acquisition proceeding has not been challenged either by the plaintiff or by the defendant. [23] He submits that the dispute in this case was over the right, title and interest over a plot of land a portion of which has been acquired by the State respondent. He submits that since the right, title and interest of the respondent No. 1, was clouded by the appellants, who was her tenant only and has also defaulted in payment of rent the plaintiff had no other option but to approach a civil court under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. [24] The learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 further submits that since the right, title and interest of the respondent No. 1 was clouded by the acts of the present appellants, he approached the civil court seeking declaration of his right, title and interest and the other reliefs sought for were only consequential in nature. He also submits that the State respondent has already paid the compensation to which she was entitled after the judgment of the First Appellate Court. He, therefore, prays for dismissal of the instant regular second appeal and to uphold the decree and judgment passed by the First Appellate Court. [25] On the other hand, Mr. K.K. Bhattacharyya, the learned Government Advocate has submitted that the State has no other interest in the suit except with regard to payment of compensation to the party who is entitled to get the same for acquisition of the land. [26] He submits that out of 18 and a half lechas of land only 3 lechas of land was acquired by the State respondent. [26] He submits that out of 18 and a half lechas of land only 3 lechas of land was acquired by the State respondent. He submits that though as per Land Acquisition Act, 1894 the party who is in possession is also entitled to get compensation, however, in the instant case, since it was found that the appellants were tenant of respondent No. 1 and he was defaulter in rent, therefore, the State after passing of the judgment by the First Appellate Court has disbursed the compensation to the respondent No. 1. [27] I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for both the sides and have gone through the materials on record. I have also gone through the rulings cited by the learned counsel for the parties in support of their respective submissions. [28] It is a settled proposition of law that unless a substantial question is involved in the second appeal, the High Court would not interfere in the judgment of the first appellate court. It is also a settled proposition of law that if the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd, the question would not be a substantial question of law. Further, if the question of law, termed as a substantial question of law, stands already decided by a larger bench of High Court concerned or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or by the Supreme Court, its mere wrong application in facts of a case would not be termed as a substantial question of law[as held by the Apex Court in the case of “ Kondiba Dagadu Kadam Vs. Savitribai Sopan Gujar ” reported in “( 1999) 3 SCC 722 ” ]. [29] The question as to whether the judgment of the first appellate court (impugned judgment) is hit by non-compliance of the provisions of Order 41, Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is concerned, has already been settled by the Apex Court in a few of its judgments, namely, “ Mrugendra Indravadan Mehta Vs. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation ” (supra) and “ Nafees Ahmad & Anr. Vs. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation ” (supra) and “ Nafees Ahmad & Anr. Vs. Soinuddin & Ors .” reported in 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 458 wherein, the Apex Court has held that non-compliance with the provisions of Order 41, Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, by itself, may not vitiate the judgment and make it wholly void and may be ignored if there has been a substantial compliance with it, and the second appellate court is in a position to ascertain the findings of the lower appellate court. The Apex Court has held in the case of Mrugendra Indravadan Mehta Vs. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation ” (supra) that it is no doubt desirable that the appellate court should comply with all the requirements of Order 41, Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. But if it is possible to make out from the judgment that there is substantial compliance with the said requirements and that justice has not thereby suffered, that would be sufficient. Where the appellate court has considered the entire evidence on record and discussed the same in detail to come to any conclusion, and its findings are supported by reasons, even though the point has not been framed by the appellate court, there is substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41, Rule 31, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the judgment is not in any manner vitiated by absence of a point for determination. [30] In the light of above observation of the Apex Court, if we consider the impugned judgment of the first appellate court, it appears that the first appellate court has discussed the facts of the plaintiff's case in paragraph No. 2 of the said judgment, whereas the facts of the defendant's case has been discussed in paragraph Nos. 3 and 4 of the said judgment. Thereafter, in paragraph No. 7 of the impugned judgment, the first appellate court has reiterated the issues framed by the trial court. Though, no specific points for determination were framed by the appellate court in the impugned judgment, however, in paragraph No. 9 of the impugned judgment, it has categorically stated that the issues Nos. Thereafter, in paragraph No. 7 of the impugned judgment, the first appellate court has reiterated the issues framed by the trial court. Though, no specific points for determination were framed by the appellate court in the impugned judgment, however, in paragraph No. 9 of the impugned judgment, it has categorically stated that the issues Nos. 4 and 6 framed by the trial court are considered to be the vital issues for determining the fate of the case, and as such, in the succeeding paragraphs of the impugned judgment, the appellate court goes further to analyze the evidence on record, and after considering the same, it came to the finding that the plaintiff has been able to establish her right, title, and interest over the suit land, whereas it also came to the finding that the defendant No. 1 failed to adduce any evidence in support of her contention. [31] After going through the judgment of the first appellate court, it appears that though the said court has not framed any specific point for determination, however it has discussed the evidence on record in detail and come to the conclusion regarding the right, title and interest of the plaintiff over the suit land, as well as the absence of same in favour of the defendants. Hence, this court is of considered opinion that there has been a substantial compliance with the mandate of Order 41, Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,by the first appellate court and thus, on that count the judgment of the first appellate court, is not vitiated due to non- compliance of the requirement of Order 41, Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The first substantial question of law is, accordingly, decided. The first substantial question of law is, accordingly, decided. [32] As regards the second substantial question formulated in this second appeal as to whether the first appellate court has exceeded its jurisdiction as circumscribed by Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, by giving a declaration of Schedule-A land, which includes a portion of the land acquired by the Government under Land Acquisition Act, 1894, this court is of considered opinion that on perusal of the materials available on record, it appears that in the suit filed by the plaintiff, the main dispute was regarding the title over land described in Schedule-A of the plaint out of which the land described in Schedule-B of the plaint has already been acquired by the State Government. [33] It is important to note that in the suit filed by the plaintiff, no challenge has been made to the process of land acquisition. The main dispute in the suit is in respect of the title over the Schedule-A land between the plaintiff and the defendants. It is pertinent to note that in the suit the acquisition process by the State or the validity of award in itself has not been challenged. The suit was basically for deciding the question in between the plaintiff and the defendants as to who holds the title over Schedule-A land, a portion of which has already been acquired by the State. [34] As regards the title of the Schedule-A land, both the courts have come to the concurrent finding that it is the plaintiff, who held the title over the Schedule-A land, which implies that prior to acquisition of the portion of the said land the title was with the plaintiff. Under the facts and circumstances peculiar to this case, the jurisdiction of the civil court to decide the title in respect of the suit land, of disputing parties, where no challenge has been made to the acquisition proceedings is there under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. As the defendants/present appellants failed to adduce any evidence before the trial court or the first appellate court, this court is of the considered opinion that it is not a case where the concurrent finding of facts is liable to be interfered with, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The second substantial question of law is, accordingly, decided. The second substantial question of law is, accordingly, decided. [35] This regular second appeal, thus, lacks merit and, accordingly, dismissed. [36] Prepare decree accordingly. [37] Let the records of the trial court as well as first appellate court be sent back, along with a copy of this judgment.