[2026:RJ-JP:26865] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3205/1987 URN: CW / 219U / 1987 1. Vinod Kumar Sharma S/o Ramji Lal Sharma, 2. Ramji Lal Sharma S/o. Kanhaiya Lal Sharma, Both residents of Lalsot, Tehsil Lalsot, District Jaipur. ----Petitioners Versus 1. The State of Rajasthan through the Secrtetary to the Government, Agriculture (Group 2-B), Department, Rajasthan, Jaipur. 2. The Land Acquisition Officer, Dausa (the Sub-Divisional Officer, Dausa). 3. The Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Lalsot, through its Secretary. ----Respondents For Petitioners : Mr. Rajeev Surana Senior Advocate assisted by Ms. Muskan Verma Advocate, Ms. Palak Sinha Advocate and Mr. Anuj Rohila Advocate. For Respondents : Mr. S.S. Naruka Additional Advocate General with Mr. Jitendra Kumar Takar Advocate, Ms. Manju Joshi Advocate and Ms. Ritika Naruka Advocate. HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA Judgment REPORTABLE Date of conclusion of arguments :: 09.07.2026 Date on which judgment was reserved :: 09.07.2026 Whether the full judgment or only the operative part is pronounced :: Full Judgment Date of pronouncement :: 17.07.2026 1. The petitioners have approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India laying challenge to the acquisition proceedings initiated in respect of land bearing Khasra No. 1352 measuring 15 Biswas situated at Lalsot, Tehsil Lalsot, District Dausa [2026:RJ-JP:26865] (2 of 28) [CW-3205/1987] (formerly Jaipur) [hereinafter be referred as ‘the land in question’], seeking quashing of the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the Act of 1953’) and the subsequent notification issued under Section 17(4) read with Section 6 of the Act of 1953 and further praying for release/de-acquisition of the land in question by maintaining Notification dated 14.06.1990. 2. The case set up by the petitioners is that they are carrying on business of petrol pump, workshop, garage and allied activities over Khasra No.1352 total measuring 15 Biswas and have been earning their livelihood therefrom since the year 1969. It has been pleaded that although a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1953 was issued by the State Government on 30.01.1985 for acquisition of land for establishment of Krishi Upaj Mandi Yard, Lalsot, whereby 6 Biswas land out of total 15 Biswas of Khasra No. 1352 was sought to be acquired. Aggrieved by the notification, the petitioners filed objections and the Land Acquisition Officer, after site inspection and due enquiry, recommended for release of the said land from acquisition vide report dated 01.08.1986. However, land of the petitioner was not released from acquisition. It has further been pleaded that certain neighbouring lands were excluded from acquisition and, therefore, acquisition of the petitioners' land amounts to hostile discrimination. The petitioners have also challenged Notification dated 17.06.1986 for invocation of urgency provisions under Section 17(4) of the Act of 1953 on the ground that there existed no real urgency warranting dispensation of enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act of 1953. It is further pleaded that the land was neither waste, nor arable land and, therefore, Section 17 of the Act of 1953 could not have been invoked. By way of making [2026:RJ-JP:26865] (3 of 28) [CW-3205/1987] amendment in the writ petition, the petitioners have additionally relied upon notification dated 14.06.1990, whereby according to them, a part of the acquired land was sought to be de-acquired under Section 48 of the Act, and have contended that subsequent notification dated 26.12.1990 issued by the respondent-Government for withdrawing the earlier notification dated 14.06.1990 is illegal. It has also been averred that neither possession of land in question was taken by the respondents, nor award was passed pursuant to above acquisition proceedings and consequently, the acquisition proceedings have lapsed. 3. Shri Rajeev Surana, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners vehemently argued that the proceedings have been conducted by the respondents in utter disregard of the mandatory provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. He submitted that the urgency provisions were invoked in malicious manner in order to avoid the recommendations of Land Acquisition Officer suggesting that the land in question was not fit for acquisition. While indicating the time-gap between the date of issuance of Notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1953 and the Notification under Section 17 of the Act of 1953, learned Senior Counsel submitted that during such long gap of around one and a half years, the respondents could have easily completed the acquisition proceedings while resorting to the normal procedure and there was no requirement to adopt urgency provisions. 4. Shri Surana, learned Senior Counsel further submitted that when once power to de-acquire petitioners’ land was exercised by the State Government under Section 48 of the Act vide notification dated 14.06.1990, there is no statutory provision whatsoever to confer any power upon the respondent-Government to [2026:RJ-JP:26865] (4 of 28) [CW-3205/1987] withdraw the earlier notification under Section 48 of the Act. Hence, the subsequent notification dated 26.12.1990 issued by the State Government to withdraw the earlier notification dated 14.06.1990 was without authority of law and devoid of any competence. 5. Learned Senior Counsel vociferously argued that no award whatsoever was passed by the respondents in the above acquisition proceedings and it was only when this Court issued various directions during the course of writ petition, calling upon the respondents to produce copy of the award, a forged and fabricated document narrating the same to be award dated 29.02.1988 was produced before the Court. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the certified copy of the same document, which has also been placed on record, does not bear the same signatures of the Land Acquisition Officer, therefore, the very fact that the signatures on the alleged award dated 29.02.1988 differs from the signatures drawn on its certified copy, puts reasonable doubt over veracity and genuineness of the document. Further, it was submitted that the said document dated 29.02.1988 does not bear any file or dispatch number, which in itself is sufficient to create reasonable suspicion with regard to its existence. In addition to above, it was submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that the award has never been published in the official Gazette, hence, even otherwise it cannot be said to be a legal award. 6. Furthermore, it was submitted by learned Senior Counsel that physical possession of the land in question is still with the petitioners, hence, there cannot be any presumption of vesting of the land in question with the respondents. 7. While pressing the plea of hostile discrimination, learned Senior Counsel submitted that vide the same notification issued [2026:RJ-JP:26865] (5 of 28) [CW-3205/1987] under Section 4 of the Act of 1953, land of Allah Bux and others was also sought to be acquired and later on, their land was also de- acquired vide notification dated 14.06.1990, and such de-acquisition notification was further withdrawn by the State Government, in the similar manner alike the petitioners, vide notification dated 26.12.1990. Thereupon, Allah Bux and others filed S.B.Civil Writ Petition No. 261/1991 (Allah Bux & Others vs. State of Rajasthan & Others), before this Court, which has been partly allowed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide judgment dated 28.10.1996 and consequently, land of Allah Bux and others has been finally de-acquired. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that since case of the petitioners is exactly similar qua Allah Bux and others, hence, they are also entitled for the similar relief. 8. Per contra, Shri S.S. Naruka, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents opposed the writ petition and submitted that the acquisition proceedings were undertaken for establishment of Krishi Upaj Mandi Yard, which is undeniably a public purpose. It has been contended that after due survey, preparation of lay out plan and approval by the competent authorities, the State Government invoked urgency provisions under Section 17(4) of the Act of 1953. The respondents have specifically pleaded that possession of the acquired land, including 6 Biswas of Khasra No.1352, was taken on 24.07.1986 and mutation was also entered in favour of Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti. It has further been asserted that the petitioners are actually running the petrol pump only over about 9 biswas of land and the remaining 6 biswas was vacant land, over which no construction whatsoever was there. Hence, after issuance of Notification under Section 17(4) of the Act of 1953, possession thereof was taken vide memo of possession dated 24.07.1986 and [2026:RJ-JP:26865] (6 of 28) [CW-3205/1987] since then it remained in possession of the Mandi Samiti. There is no element of malafides in invocation of urgency provisions and notification under Section 17(4) has been validly issued. It has also been contended that once possession was taken and award was subsequently passed on 29.02.1988, the land vested absolutely in the State free from all encumbrances and no question of withdrawal from acquisition or de-acquisition survived. It is stated that after vesting of land upon taking possession, withdrawal from acquisition was legally impermissible. 9. Learned Additional Advocate General further submitted that award dated 29.02.1988 has been issued in consonance with the procedure contemplated under law and a genuine copy thereof has been placed on record. 10. Learned Additional Advocate General sought to clarify that case of the petitioners and that of Allah Bux and others is distinguishable on account of site position and construction, and hence, the petitioners cannot claim the same benefits as granted to Allah Bux and others. 11. Learned Additional Advocate General submitted that the writ petition filed by the petitioners is totally misconceived. Land acquisition proceedings in the present case have been carried out by the respondents strictly in accordance with law, which warrants no interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 12. Having considered the rival submissions and perused the material available on record, this Court finds the principal questions which arise for consideration are that as to whether the acquisition proceedings suffer from any illegality on account of invocation of urgency provisions under Section 17(4) of the Act of 1953 and [2026:RJ-JP:26865] (7 of 28) [CW-3205/1987] whether the petitioners can successfully challenge the acquisition after passing of the award and taking of possession and whether notification dated 14.06.1990 creates any enforceable right in favour of the petitioners? 13. At the outset, it is not disputed that the acquisition proceedings were undertaken for establishment of Krishi Upaj Mandi Yard, Lalsot. Establishment of a regulated agricultural market yard is undoubtedly a public purpose. The challenge raised by the petitioners that acquisition for construction of a Mandi Yard does not constitute public purpose deserves outright rejection. The concept of public purpose has consistently received liberal interpretation from the Courts and acquisition for development of market infrastructure facilitating agricultural trade has repeatedly been recognised as a public purpose. 14. The principal challenge of the petitioners is directed against invocation of Section 17(4) of the Act of 1953. However, mere time gap between the notification under Section 4 and Section 17 of the Act of 1953, would not in itself decisive to assume that the invocation of urgency clause was either arbitrary or malicious. Such challenge has become wholly irrelevant in view of the events which have attained finality decades ago. The record reveals that possession of the acquired land was taken by the acquiring authority vide possession memo dated 24.07.1986. Significantly, the petitioners have merely made a bald assertion that possession was not taken. The respondents, on the other hand, have specifically pleaded taking of possession of the land in question and mutation thereof in favour of Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti. The petitioners have failed to place any cogent material demonstrating continued lawful possession of the petitioners after 24.07.1986. Mere raising of [2026:RJ-JP:26865] (8 of 28) [CW-3205/1987] unauthorised construction on part of boundary wall after preparation of memo of possession, does not negate legal possession having been taken by the acquiring authority, nor does it create any presumption of possession in favour of the petitioners. It would be relevant to refer that in the case of Banda Development Authority, Banda vs Moti Lal Agarwal & Others, (2011) 5 SCC 394, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has given guidelines with regard to mode of taking possession in land acquisition proceedings. The Apex Court, in no uncertain terms, has laid down that if the acquired land is vacant, preparing a panchnama at the spot will ordinarily be sufficient to constitute valid mode of taking possession. This Court finds that in the light of above, in the present case, since the land in question was a vacant land, therefore, preparation of memo of possession in the presence of witnesses can be said to be a correct and legitimate mode of taking possession. 15. The respondents have further brought on record that the award came to be passed on 29.02.1988. Allegations levelled by the petitioners with regard to veracity and genuineness of the award are totally misconceived and unfounded. Merely on the ground that the signatures of the authority passing award over the certified copy do not match with the photocopy of the original award, no suspicion can be raised by the petitioners. This court also perused the two documents, which prima facie reflected that while issuing certified copy of the award, signatures existed over the original document might have been hidden and certified copy has been issued while putting a mark having resemblance of “sd/-” at the place of signatures in original document. Except such difference, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf the petitioners has utterly failed to point out any iota of difference in the photocopy of original and [2026:RJ-JP:26865] (9 of 28) [CW-3205/1987] certified copy of the award. The submission that the award does not bear any file or dispatch number also stands negated, as the last page of the award not only bears letter number and date of sending the award to the State Government for approval, but also has the letter number and date of letter, whereby the award was approved by the Government. Hence, it becomes clear that the allegations have been levelled by the petitioners merely on the basis of fake and unfounded assumptions. Argument raised on behalf of the petitioners that non-publication of award in official gazette is fatal, is equally unfounded and misconceived, as there exists no statutory provision for requiring land acquisition award to be published in official gazette. 16. It is settled preposition of law that once an award is made under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and possession of the acquired land is taken by the acquiring authority, the land stands vested in the State absolutely and free from all encumbrances. Such vesting is not conditional, tentative or defeasible in nature; rather, it is complete, absolute and irrevocable. The consequence of vesting is that the title, interest and all proprietary rights of the erstwhile landholder stand extinguished by operation of law and are simultaneously transferred to and absorbed in the State. The legal effect of such vesting is that the acquired land becomes the property of the State free from all encumbrances and the acquisition proceedings attain finality upon passing of the award and taking of possession and the rights of the landowner thereafter stand confined to the remedies available in relation to compensation alone. 17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Satendra Prasad Jain & Others vs. State of U.P. & Others, (1993) 4 SCC 369, while examining the aforesaid preposition has held as under: [2026:RJ-JP:26865] (10 of 28) [CW-3205/1987] “14. There are two judgments of this Court which we must note. In Rajasthan Housing Board v. Shri Kishan (1993) 2 SCC 84 it was held that Government could not withdraw from acquisition under Section 48 once it had taken possession of the land. In Lt. Governor of H.P. v. Avinash Sharma (1970) 2 SCC 149 it was held that : (SCC p. 152, para 8) “… after possession has been taken pursuant to a notification under Section 17(1) the land is vested in the Government, and the notification cannot be cancelled under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, nor can the notification be withdrawn in exercise of the powers under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. Any other view would enable the State Government to circumvent the specific provision by relying upon a general power. When possession of the land is taken under Section 17(1), the land vests in the Government. There is no provision by which land statutorily vested in the Government reverts to the original owner by mere cancellation of the notification.” 15. Ordinarily, the Government can take possession of the land proposed to be acquired only after an award of compensation in respect thereof has been made under Section 11. Upon the taking of possession the land vests in the Government, that is to say, the owner of the land loses to the Government the title to it. This is what Section 16 states. The provisions of Section 11-A are intended to benefit the landowner and ensure that the award is made within a period of two years from the date of the Section 6 declaration. In the ordinary case, therefore, when Government fails to make an award within two years of the declaration under Section 6, the land has still not vested in the Government and its title remains with the owner, the acquisition proceedings are still pending and, by virtue of the provisions of Section 11-A, lapse. When Section 17(1) is applied by reason of urgency, Government takes possession of the land prior to the making of the award under Section 11 and thereupon the owner is divested of the title to the land which is vested in the Government. Section 17(1) states so in unmistakable terms. Clearly, Section 11-A can have no application to cases of acquisitions under Section 17 because the lands have already vested in the Government and there is no provision in the said Act by which land statutorily vested in the Government can revert to the owner.” 18. Similarly in the case of Rajasthan Housing Board & Others vs. Shri Kishan & Others, (1993) 2 SCC 84, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under: “26. We are of the further opinion that in any event the Government could not have withdrawn from the acquisition under Section 48 of the Act inasmuch as the Government had taken possession of the land. Once the possession of the land is taken it is not open to the Government to withdraw from the acquisition. The very letter dated February 24, 1990 relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner recites that “before restoring the possession to the society the amount of development charges will have to be returned back …”. This shows clearly that possession was taken over by the Housing Board. Indeed the very tenor of the letter is, asking the Housing Board as to what development work they had carried out on the land and how much expenditure they had incurred thereon, which could not have been done unless the Board was [2026:RJ-JP:26865] (11 of 28) [CW-3205/1987] in possession of the land. The Housing Board was asked to send the full particulars of the expenditure and not to carry on any further development works on that land. Reading the letter as a whole, it cannot but be said that the possession of the land was taken by the Government and was also delivered to the Housing Board. Since the possession of the land was taken, there could be no question of withdrawing from the acquisition under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.” 19. Further in the matter of U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow through its Chairman & Another vs. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., Lucknow & Others, (1996) 3 SCC 124, the Apex court has held as under: “3. xxxxxxxx In this case, notification under Section 4(1) was published on 24-3-1973, possession of the land admittedly was taken on 5-7-1973 and pumping station house was constructed. No doubt, declaration under Section 6 was published later on 8-7-1973. Admittedly power under Section 17(4) was exercised dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A and on service of the notice under Section 9 possession was taken, since urgency was acute, viz., pumping station house was to be constructed to drain out flood water. Consequently, the land stood vested in the State under Section 17(2) free from all encumbrances. xxxxxxxx” 20. Way back in Lt. Governor of Himachal Pradesh & Another vs. Sri Avinash Sharma, 1970 (2) SCC 149, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down as under: “6. Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act by the first sub- section provides: “Except in the case provided for in Section 36, the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken.” Power to cancel a notification for compulsory acquisition is, it is true, not affected by Section 48 of the Act; by a notification under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, the Government may cancel or rescind the notification issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. But the power under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act cannot be exercised after the land statutorily vests in the State Government.” 21. While deciding the case of State of Kerala & Others vs. M. Bhaskaran Pillai & Another, (1997) 5 SCC 432, following observations were made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court: “4. In view of the admitted position that the land in question was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by operation of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, it stood vested in the State free from all encumbrances. The question emerges whether the Government can assign the land to the erstwhile owners? It is settled law that if the land is acquired for a public purpose, after the public purpose was achieved, the rest of the land could be used for any other public purpose. In case there [2026:RJ-JP:26865] (12 of 28) [CW-3205/1987] is no other public purpose for which the land is needed, then instead of disposal by way of sale to the erstwhile owner, the land should be put to public auction and the amount fetched in the public auction can be better utilised for the public purpose envisaged in the Directive Principles of the Constitution. In the present case, what we find is that the executive order is not in consonance with the provision of the Act and is, therefore, invalid. Under these circumstances, the Division Bench is well justified in declaring the executive order as invalid. Whatever assignment is made, should be for a public purpose. Otherwise, the land of the Government should be sold only through the public auctions so that the public also gets benefited by getting a higher value.” 22. Furthermore, in the case of Bangalore Development Authority & Others vs. R. Hanumaiah & Others, (2005) 12 SCC 508, Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “43. In our considered view, the Division Bench has erred in holding that the State Government could release the lands in exercise of its power under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 from the acquisition. 44. This Court in Lt. Governor of H.P. v. Avinash Sharma has held in para 6 as under: (SCC p. 151) “Power to cancel a notification for compulsory acquisition is, it is true, not affected by Section 48 of the Act; by a notification under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, the Government may cancel or rescind the notification issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. But the power under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act cannot be exercised after the land statutorily vests in the State Government.” It was concluded in para 8 that: (SCC p. 152) “It is clearly implicit in the observations that after possession has been taken pursuant to a notification under Section 17(1) the land is vested in the Government, and the notification cannot be cancelled under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, nor can the notification be withdrawn in exercise of the powers under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. Any other view would enable the State Government to circumvent the specific provision by relying upon a general power. When possession of the land is taken under Section 17(1), the land vests in the Government. There is no provision by which land statutorily vested in the Government reverts to the original owner by mere cancellation of the notification.” 45. Again in Pratap v. State of Rajasthan (1996) 3 SCC 1 it was reiterated that once the possession is taken and the land vests in the Government then the Government cannot withdraw from acquisition under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. Same view was reiterated by this Court in Mohan Singh v. International Airports Authority of India (1997) 9 SCC 132 and in Printers (Mysore) Ltd. v. M.A. Rasheed (2004) 4 SCC 460. 46. The possession of the land in question was taken in the year 1966 after the passing of the award by the Land Acquisition Officer. Thereafter, the land vested in the Government which was then transferred to CITB, predecessor- [2026:RJ-JP:26865] (13 of 28) [CW-3205/1987] in-interest of the appellant. After the vesting of the land and taking possession thereof, the notification for acquiring the land could not be withdrawn or cancelled in exercise of powers under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. Power under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act cannot be exercised after vesting of the land statutorily in the State Government.” 23. In addition to above, in the case of V. Chandrasekaran & Another vs. Administrative Officer & Others, (2012) 12 SCC 133, Hon’ble Supreme Court has emphasised on following preposition: “25. It is a settled legal proposition, that once the land is vested in the State, free from all encumbrances, it cannot be divested and proceedings under the Act would not lapse, even if an award is not made within the statutorily stipulated period. [Vide Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar (1995) 6 SCC 31, U.P. Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. (1996) 3 SCC 124, Allahabad Development Authority v. Nasiruzzaman (1996) 6 SCC 424, M. Ramalinga Thevar v. State of T.N. (2000) 4 SCC 322 and Govt. of A.P. v. Syed Akbar (2005) 1 SCC 558.] 26. The said land, once acquired, cannot be restored to the tenure-holders/persons interested, even if it is not used for the purpose for which it was so acquired, or for any other purpose either. The proceedings cannot be withdrawn/abandoned under the provisions of Section 48 of the Act, or under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, once the possession of the land has been taken and the land vests in the State, free from all encumbrances. (Vide State of M.P. v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma AIR 1966 SC 1593, Lt. Governor of H.P. v. Avinash Sharma (1970) 2 SCC 149, Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P. (1993) 4 SCC 369, Rajasthan Housing Board v. Shri Kishan (1993) 2 SCC 84 and Dedicated Freight Corridor Corpn. of India v. Subodh Singh (2011) 11 SCC 100.) 27. The meaning of the word “vesting” has been considered by this Court time and again. In Fruit and Vegetable Merchants Union v. Delhi Improvement Trust AIR 1957 SC 344 this Court held that the meaning of the word “vesting” varies as per the context of the statute, under which the property vests. So far as the vesting under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act is concerned, the Court held as under : (AIR p. 353, para 19) “19.… In the cases contemplated by Sections 16 and 17 the property acquired becomes the property of the Government without any condition or limitations either as to title or possession. The legislature has made it clear that the vesting of the property is not for any limited purpose or limited duration.” 28. In Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra (1976) 1 SCC 800 in a similar situation, this Court held as under : (SCC p. 802, para 5) “5..… once the original acquisition is valid and title has vested in the Municipality, how it uses the excess land is no concern of the original owner and cannot be the basis for invalidating the acquisition. There is no principle of law by which a valid compulsory acquisition stands voided because long later the requiring authority diverts it to a public purpose other than the one stated in … declaration.” [2026:RJ-JP:26865] (14 of 28) [CW-3205/1987] 29. Similarly, in State of Kerala v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai (1997) 5 SCC 432 this Court held as under : (SCC p. 433, para 4) “4..… It is settled law that if the land is acquired for a public purpose, after the public purpose was achieved, the rest of the land could be used for any other public purpose. In case there is no other public purpose for which the land is needed, then instead of disposal by way of sale to the erstwhile owner, the land should be put to public auction and the amount fetched in the public auction can be better utilised for the public purpose envisaged in the Directive Principles of the Constitution.” (emphasis supplied) See also C. Padma v. Govt. of T.N. (1997) 2 SCC 627, Bhagat Singh v. State of U.P. (1999) 2 SCC 384, Niladri Narayan Chandradhurja v. State of W.B. (2002) 9 SCC 682, Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh (2003) 1 SCC 335 and Leelawanti v. State of Haryana (2012) 1 SCC 66. 30. In Govt. of A.P. v. Syed Akbar (2005) 1 SCC 558, this Court considered this very issue and held that, once the land has vested in the State, it can neither be divested, by virtue of Section 48 of the Act, nor can it be reconveyed to the persons interested/tenure-holders, and that therefore, the question of restitution of possession to the tenure-holder, does not arise. [See also Pratap v. State of Rajasthan (1996) 3 SCC 1, Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil v. State of Maharashtra (1996) 6 SCC 405, State of Kerala v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai (1997) 5 SCC 432, Printers (Mysore) Ltd. v. M.A. Rasheed (2004) 4 SCC 460, Bangalore Development Authority v. R. Hanumaiah (2005) 12 SCC 508 and Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. (2011) 9 SCC 354]” 24. In a case arising out of the acquisition proceedings under the provisions of the Urban Improvement Act, in the case of Pratap & Another vs. State of Rajasthan & Others, (1996) 3 SCC 1, following observation has been given by the Hon’ble Supreme Court:- “11. From the facts narrated hereinabove it is clear that the Central Act was extended to the State of Rajasthan only after the land in question had vested in the State Government with the publication of the notification under Section 52(1) on 10- 10-1984. Once the vesting of the land in the State Government, free from all encumbrances, was completed the subsequent extension of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to the State of Rajasthan and the amendments made by the Amending Acts to the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act becomes wholly irrelevant and of no consequence. Neither the amendments nor the extension of the Central Act can have the effect, in law or otherwise, of divesting the State of ownership of the land which had already been vested in it.” 25. Constitutional Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court while examining the various facets of land acquisition proceedings, in the case of Indore Development Authority vs Manoharlal & Others, [2026:RJ-JP:26865] (15 of 28) [CW-3205/1987] (2020) 8 SCC 129, after considering several earlier judgments as well as meaning of the word ‘vest’, has laid down as under: “136. In Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P., (1993) 4 SCC 369], the concept of vesting under the 1894 Act had been taken into consideration. The Government cannot withdraw from acquisition under Section 48, once it has taken the possession. This Court has observed that once possession has been taken under Section 17(1), prior to the making of the award, the owner is divested of the title to the land, which is vested in the Government and there is no provision by which land can be reverted to the owner. This Court has observed thus : (SCC pp. 373-74, paras 14-15) “14. There are two judgments of this Court, which we must note. In Rajasthan Housing Board v. Shri Kishan [Rajasthan Housing Board v. Shri Kishan, (1993) 2 SCC 84] it was held that the Government could not withdraw from acquisition under Section 48 once it had taken possession of the land. In Lt. Governor of H.P. v. Avinash Sharma [Lt. Governor of H.P. v. Avinash Sharma, (1970) 2 SCC 149] it was held that : (SCC p. 152, para 8) ‘8. … after possession has been taken pursuant to a notification under Section 17(1) the land is vested in the Government, and the notification cannot be cancelled under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, nor can the notification be withdrawn in exercise of the powers under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. Any other view would enable the State Government to circumvent the specific provision by relying upon a general power. When possession of the land is taken under Section 17(1), the land vests in the Government. There is no provision by which land statutorily vested in the Government reverts to the original owner by mere cancellation of the notification.’ 15. Ordinarily, the Government can take possession of the land proposed to be acquired only after an award of compensation in respect thereof has been made under Section 11. Upon the taking of possession the land vests in the Government, that is to say, the owner of the land loses to the Government the title to it. This is what Section 16 states. The provisions of Section 11-A are intended to benefit the landowner and ensure that the award is made within a period of two years from the date of the Section 6 declaration. In the ordinary case, therefore, when the Government fails to make an award within two years of the declaration under Section 6, the land has still not vested in the Government and its title remains with the owner, the acquisition proceedings are still pending and, by virtue of the provisions of Section 11-A, lapse. When Section 17(1) is applied by reason of urgency, the Government takes possession of the land prior to the making of the award under Section 11 and thereupon the owner is divested of the title to the land which is vested in the Government. Section 17(1) states so in unmistakable terms. Clearly, Section 11-A can have no application to cases of acquisitions under Section 17 because the lands have already vested in the Government and there is no provision in the said Act by which land statutorily vested in the Government can revert to the owner.” (emphasis supplied) [2026:RJ-JP:26865] (16 of 28) [CW-3205/1987] This Court further observed in Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P., (1993) 4 SCC 369 that even if compensation was not paid to the appellant under Section 17(3-A), it could not be said that possession was taken illegally. Vesting is absolute. This Court has observed thus : (SCC p. 375, para 17) “17. In the instant case, even that 80% of the estimated compensation was not paid to the appellants although Section 17(3-A) required that it should have been paid before possession of the said land was taken but that does not mean that the possession was taken illegally or that the said land did not thereupon vest in the first respondent. It is, at any rate, not open to the third respondent, who, as the letter of the Special Land Acquisition Officer dated 27-6- 1990 shows, failed to make the necessary monies available and who has been in occupation of the said land ever since its possession was taken, to urge that the possession was taken illegally and that, therefore, the said land has not vested in the first respondent and the first respondent is under no obligation to make an award.” (emphasis supplied) 137. In Tika Ram v. State of U.P. (2009) 10 SCC 689, the question considered was in case possession is taken, and compensation is not paid, what is the effect? This Court has held that there is no lapse of acquisition and observed thus : (SCC pp. 736-37, paras 91-93 & 95) “91. However, the question is as to what happens when such payment is not made and the possession is taken. Can the whole acquisition be set at naught? 92. In our opinion, this contention on the part of the appellants is also incorrect. If we find fault with the whole acquisition process on account of the non-payment of 80% of the compensation, then the further question would be as to whether the estimation of 80% of compensation is correct or not. A further controversy can then be raised by the landlords that what was paid was not 80% and was short of 80% and therefore, the acquisition should be set at naught. Such extreme interpretation cannot be afforded because indeed under Section 17 itself, the basic idea of avoiding the enquiry under Section 5-A is in view of the urgent need on the part of the State Government for the land to be acquired for any eventuality discovered by either sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act. 93. The only question that would remain is that of the estimation of the compensation. In our considered view, even if the compensation is not paid or is short of 80%, the acquisition would not suffer. One could imagine the unreasonableness of the situation. Now suppose, there is state of emergency as contemplated in Section 17(2) of the Act and the compensation is not given, could the whole acquisition come to a naught? It would entail serious consequences. 95. Further, in a judgment of this Court in Pratap v. State of Rajasthan [Pratap v. State of Rajasthan, (1996) 3 SCC 1] a similar view was reported. That was a case under the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1987, under which the acquisition was made using Section 17 of the Act. The Court took the view that once the possession was taken under Section 17 of the Act, the Government could not withdraw from that position under Section 18 and even the provisions [2026:RJ-JP:26865] (17 of 28) [CW-3205/1987] of Section 11-A were not attracted. That was of course a case where the award was not passed under Section 11-A after taking of the possession. A clear-cut observation came to be made in that behalf in para 12, to the effect that the non-compliance with Section 17 of the Act, insofar as, payment of compensation is concerned, did not result in lapsing of the land acquisition proceedings. The law laid down by this Court in Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P. was approved. The Court also relied on the decision in P. Chinnanna v. State of A.P., (1994) 5 SCC 486 and Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1995) 6 SCC 31 where similar view was taken regarding the land acquisition proceedings not getting lapsed. The only result that may follow by the non-payment would be the payment of interest, as contemplated in Section 34 and the proviso added thereto by the 1984 Act. In that view, we do not wish to further refer the matter, as suggested by Shri Trivedi, learned Senior Counsel and Shri Qamar Ahmad, learned counsel for the appellants. Therefore, even on the sixth question, there is no necessity of any reference.” (emphasis supplied) It has further been observed that the only result that may follow by the non-payment would be the payment of interest as contemplated in Section 34 of the 1894 Act. 138. In Pratap v. State of Rajasthan, (1996) 3 SCC 1, this Court held that when the possession of land is taken under Section 17(1), the land vests absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances and the Government cannot withdraw from acquisition under Section 48 and the provisions of Section 11-A of passing the award within two years were not attracted. The proceedings would not lapse on failure to make an award within the period prescribed under Section 11-A, once possession had been taken. The part-payment of compensation would also not render the possession illegal. This Court observed thus : (SCC pp. 8-9, para 12) “12. The provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 52 are somewhat similar to Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Just as publication of a notification under Section 52(1) vests the land in the State, free from all encumbrances, as provided by Section 52(4), similarly when possession of land is taken under Section 17(1) the land vests absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. A question arose before this Court that if there is a non-compliance with the provisions of Section 5-A and an award is not made in respect to the land so acquired, would the acquisition proceedings lapse. In Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P., (1993) 4 SCC 369 this Court held that once possession had been taken under Section 17(1) and the land vested in the Government then the Government could not withdraw from acquisition under Section 48 and the provisions of Section 11-A were not attracted and, therefore, the acquisition proceedings would not lapse on failure to make an award within the period prescribed therein. It was further held that non-compliance with Section 17(3-A), regarding part payment of compensation before taking possession, would also not render the possession illegal and entitle the Government to withdraw from acquisition. The aforesaid principle has been reiterated by this Court in P. Chinnanna v. State of A.P., (1994) 5 SCC 486 and Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1995) 6 SCC 31. In view of the aforesaid ratio it follows that the provisions of Section 11-A are not attracted [2026:RJ-JP:26865] (18 of 28) [CW-3205/1987] in the present case and even if it be assumed that the award has not been passed within the stipulated period, the acquisition of land does not come to an end.” (emphasis supplied) 139. In Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1995) 6 SCC 31, question was raised with respect to the lapse of acquisition proceedings in view of the provisions contained in Section 11-A as award had not been made within 2 years from the date of commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act, 1984. Possession had been taken by the Government under Section 17(1). It was held that it was not open to the Government to withdraw from the acquisition. Provisions of Section 11-A was not attracted. Following is the relevant portion of the observations made by this Court : (SCC p. 37, para 8) “8. … It was contended that in view of Section 11-A of the Act the entire land acquisition proceedings lapsed as no award under Section 11 had been made within 2 years from the date of commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act, 1984. We are of the view that the above plea has no force. In this case, the Government had taken possession of the land in question under Section 17(1) of the Act. It is not open to the Government to withdraw from the acquisition (Section 48 of the Act). In such a case, Section 11-A of the Act is not attracted and the acquisition proceedings would not lapse, even if it is assumed that no award was made within the period prescribed by Section 11-A of the Act.” 140. In P. Chinnanna v. State of A.P., (1994) 5 SCC 486 question again arose with respect to possession taken under Section 17(1) invoking urgency clause, this Court has held that once possession is taken, there is absolute vesting and subsequent proceedings were void. This Court stated as follows : (SCC pp. 493-94, para 10) “10. The said provision enables the appropriate Government to take possession of the land concerned on the expiration of 15 days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9 sub-section (1) notwithstanding the fact that no award has been made in respect of it. When the possession of the land concerned is once taken as provided for thereunder such land is made to vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. It must be noted here that taking possession of the land concerned and its vesting absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances does not depend upon an award to be made under Section 11, making of which award alone in the case of ordinary acquisition of land could have empowered the Collector to take possession of the land under Section 16 and the taking of which possession would have made the land vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. As seen from the judgment dated 23-8- 1982 of the High Court in WP No. 3416 of 1978, taking possession of the appellants' land along with land of others by the Collector on 10-7-1978 under Section 17(1) is, in fact, made the basis for its holding that invoking of urgency clause to dispense with Section 5-A enquiry was made by the Government mechanically. No doubt, when the High Court took the view that acquisition of the land concerned under Section 17 of the Act was made pursuant to an order of the Government without application of its mind in the matter of making Section 5-A not to apply, it was open to it to set aside or quash the subsequent acquisition proceedings except Section 4(1) notification which had [2026:RJ-JP:26865] (19 of 28) [CW-3205/1987] followed and restore the ownership of the land to the appellants' land if it had to order fresh enquiry on the basis of Section 4(1) notification. Such a setting aside or quashing was inevitable because the acquisition proceedings had been completed under Section 17 and the land had vested in the State Government, inasmuch as, without setting aside that vesting of the land in the State Government and restoring the land to the appellant owners, that land was unavailable for subsequent acquisition by following the procedure under Section 5-A, Section 6, Section 11 and Section 16. Thus, in the circumstances of the case in respect of the land of the appellants, when publication of Section 4(1) notification was made on 21-7- 1977, when declaration under Section 6 was published on 21-7-1977 and taking possession of that land under Section 17(1) by the Collector was made on 10-7-1978 and the vesting in the State Government of that land had occurred on that day, setting aside by the judgment of the High Court in WP No. 3416 of 1978 of merely the direction given by the Government relating to non-applicability of Section 5-A to the land, given on 7-7-1977, in our view, did not enable the Court to order the starting of fresh proceedings for acquisition of the land concerned under Section 5-A, inasmuch as, that land concerned on Section 4(1) notification had already become the land of the Government. In this state of facts, when the previous acquisition of the land of the appellants made under Section 17 of the Act did never stand affected. Section 5-A enquiry held and subsequent declaration made were superfluous proceedings which were inconsequential. Hence, we feel that there is no need to set aside the impugned declaration inasmuch as the earlier acquisition was complete and had resulted in vesting of the land in the State Government and there was no land available for acquisition in the subsequent proceedings which have been carried out pursuant to the judgment of the High Court made in WP No. 3416 of 1978. Therefore, in the stated facts, although we find that no need arises to declare the impugned declaration as void, we clarify that the earlier proceedings which had taken place in respect of the appellants' land, resulting in its vesting in the State Government free from encumbrances, has stood unaffected and any award made by the Collector or be made by him under the LA Act shall be regarded as that based on earlier acquisition proceedings.” 142. This Court in May George v. Tahsildar, (2010) 13 SCC 98 opined, therefore, that once the land vests in the State, it cannot be divested, even if there is some irregularity in the acquisition proceedings. There is nothing in the 1894 Act to show that non-compliance thereof will be fatal or will lead to any penalty. 143. Now, coming back to the main issue, the legal fiction of lapsing [under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act] cannot be extended to denude title which has already vested in the beneficiaries of the acquisition corporation/local bodies, etc. and who, in turn, have also conveyed title and transferred the land to some other persons after development. In CST v. Modi Sugar Mills Ltd., (1961) 2 SCR 189 the Court has held that “a legal fiction must be limited to the purpose for which it has been created and cannot be extended beyond its legitimate field.” Similarly, in Braithwaite & Co. (India) Ltd. v. ESI Corpn., (1968) 1 SCR 771, this Court held that a legal fiction is adopted in law for a limited and definite purpose only and there is no justification for extending it beyond the purpose for which the [2026:RJ-JP:26865] (20 of 28) [CW-3205/1987] legislature has adopted. Lapsing is provided only where possession has not been taken nor compensation has been paid, divesting of vested land is not intended nor specifically provided. 144.Black's Law Dictionary defines “vested” as follows: “vested, adj. (18c) Having become a completed, consummated right for present or future enjoyment; not contingent; unconditional; absolute <a vested interest in the estate>. ‘[U]nfortunately, the word “vested” is used in two senses. Firstly, an interest may be vested in possession, when there is a right to present enjoyment, e.g. when I own and occupy Blackacre. But an interest may be vested, even where it does not carry a right to immediate possession if it does confer a fixed right of taking possession in the future.’ George Whitecross Paton, A Textbook of Jurisprudence 305 (CW. Paton & David P. Derham eds., 4th Edn., 1972). ‘A future interest is vested if it meets two requirements : first, that there be no condition precedent to the interest's becoming a present estate other than the natural expiration of those estates that are prior to it in possession; and second, that it be theoretically possible to identify who would get the right to possession if the interest should become a present estate at any time.’ Thomas F. Bergin & Paul C. Haskell, Preface to Estates in Land and Future Interests 66-67 (2nd Edn., 1984).” (emphasis in original) 145. In Webster's Dictionary, “vested” is defined as: “vested adj. [pp. of vest] 1. Clothed; robed, especially in church vestments. 2. in law, fixed; settled; absolute; not contingent upon anything : as, a vested interest.” 146. In State of Punjab v. Sadhu Ram, (1997) 9 SCC 544, it has been observed that once possession is taken and the award has been passed, no title remains with the landowner and the land cannot be de-notified under Section 48(1) and observed thus : (SCC p. 545, para 3) “3. The learned Judge having noticed the procedure prescribed in disposal of the land acquired by the Government for public purposes, has held that the said procedure was not followed for surrendering the land to the erstwhile owners. The respondent having purchased the land had improved upon the land and is, therefore, entitled to be an equitable owner of the land. We wholly fail to appreciate the view taken by the High Court. The learned Judge had not referred to the relevant provisions of the Act and law. It is an undisputed fact that consequent upon the passing of the award under Section 11 and possession taken of the land, by operation of Section 16 of the Act, the right, title and interest of the erstwhile owner stood extinguished and the Government became absolute owner of the property free from all encumbrances. Thereby, no one has nor claimed any right, title and interest in respect of the acquired land. Before the possession could be taken, the Government have power under Section 48(1) of the Act to denotify the land. In that event, land is required to be surrendered to the erstwhile owners. That is not the case on [2026:RJ-JP:26865] (21 of 28) [CW-3205/1987] the facts of this case. Under these circumstances, the Government having become the absolute owner of the property free from all encumbrances, unless the title is conferred on any person in accordance with a procedure known to law, no one can claim any title much less equitable title by remaining in possession. The trial court as well as the appellate court negatived the plea of the respondent that he was inducted into possession as a lessee for a period of 20 years. On the other hand, the finding was that he was in possession as a lessee on yearly basis. Having lawfully come into possession as a lessee of the Government, Section 116 of the Evidence Act estops him from denying title of the Government and set it up in third party. By disclaiming government title, he forfeited even the annual lease. Under these circumstances, having come into possession as a lessee, after expiry and forfeiture of the lease, he has no right. Illegal and unlawful possession of the land entails payment of damages to the Government.” 147. In Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (1996) 11 SCC 698, it was observed that once the award has been passed and possession has been taken, the land vests in the State free from all encumbrances. This Court held thus : (SCC p. 699, para 2) “2. This special leave petition arises from the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court made on 25-4-1996 in Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana, LPA No. 437 of 1996, order dated 25-4-1996 (P&H)] . Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short “the Act”) was published on 1-6-1976. Declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published on 16-2-1977. The award was passed on 3-7-1981. Thereafter, the reference also became final. The petitioner has challenged the notification, the declaration, and the award as illegal. It contends that the award does not come in the way of the petitioner in filing the writ petition on 21-1-1994. The High Court has dismissed the writ petition on the grounds of laches.” 148. A similar view has been taken in Market Committee v. Krishan Murari, (1996) 1 SCC 311 and Puttu Lal v. State of U.P., (1996) 3 SCC 99. The concept of “vesting” was also considered in Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union v. Delhi Improvement Trust, AIR 1957 SC 344. Once vesting takes place, and is with possession, after which a person who remains in possession is only a trespasser, not in rightful possession and vesting contemplates absolute title, possession in the State. xxxxxxx. 256. This Court in V. Chandrasekaran v. Administrative Officer, (2012) 12 SCC 133 dealt with the concept of vesting under the 1894 Act. The facts of the said case indicated that the appellants and the officials of the State and Development Board connived with each other to enable the appellant to grab/encroach upon the public land, which was acquired and falsified the documents so as to construct flats thereon. Considering the gravamen of the fraud, the Chief Secretary of the State was directed to trace out such officials and to take suitable action against each of them. It was also held by this Court that alienation of land subsequent to notification under Section 4(1) is void and no title passes on the basis of such sale deed. This Court held that once land vested in the State free from all encumbrances, it cannot be divested. Once land [2026:RJ-JP:26865] (22 of 28) [CW-3205/1987] has been acquired, it cannot be restored to tenure-holders/persons interested, even if it is not used for the purpose for which it is so acquired. Once possession of land has been taken, it vests in the State free from all encumbrances. Under Sections 16 and 17, the acquired property becomes the property of the Government without any limitation or condition either as to title or possession. Reliance has been placed on Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union, AIR 1957 SC 344 : (AIR p. 353, para 19) “19. That the word “vest” is a word of variable import is shown by provisions of Indian statutes also. For example, Section 56 of the Provincial Insolvency Act (5 of 1920) empowers the court at the time of the making of the order of adjudication or thereafter to appoint a receiver for the property of the insolvent and further provides that “such property shall thereupon vest in such receiver”. The property vests in the receiver for the purpose of administering the estate of the insolvent for the payment of his debts after realising his assets. The property of the insolvent vests in the receiver not for all purposes but only for the purpose of the Insolvency Act and the receiver has no interest of his own in the property. On the other hand, Sections 16 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act (1 of 1894), provide that the property so acquired, upon the happening of certain events, shall “vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances”. In the cases contemplated by Sections 16 and 17 the property acquired becomes the property of Government without any conditions or limitations either as to title or possession. The legislature has made it clear that the vesting of the property is not for any limited purpose or limited duration. It would thus appear that the word “vest” has not got a fixed connotation, meaning in all cases that the property is owned by the person or the authority in whom it vests. It may vest in title, or it may vest in possession, or it may vest in a limited sense, as indicated in the context in which it may have been used in a particular piece of legislation. The provisions of the Improvement Act, particularly Sections 45 to 49 and 54 and 54-A when they speak of a certain building or street or square or other land vesting in a municipality or other local body or in a trust, do not necessarily mean that ownership has passed to any of them.” (emphasis supplied) 257. In National Textile Corpn. Ltd. v. Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad, (2011) 12 SCC 695, the concept of vesting was considered. This Court observed that vesting means an absolute and indefeasible right. Vesting, in general sense, means vesting in possession. Vesting may include vesting of interest too. This Court observed thus : (SCC pp. 710-11, para 38) “38. “Vesting” means having obtained an absolute and indefeasible right. It refers to and is used for transfer or conveyance. “Vesting” in the general sense, means vesting in possession. However, “vesting” does not necessarily and always means possession but includes vesting of interest as well. “Vesting” may mean vesting in title, vesting in possession or vesting in a limited sense, as indicated in the context in which it is used in a particular provision of the Act. The word “vest” has different shades, taking colour from the context in which it is used. It does not necessarily mean absolute vesting in every situation and is capable of bearing the meaning of a limited vesting, being limited, in [2026:RJ-JP:26865] (23 of 28) [CW-3205/1987] title as well as duration. Thus, the word “vest” clothes varied colours from the context and situation in which the word came to be used in the statute. The expression “vest” is a word of ambiguous import since it has no fixed connotation and the same has to be understood in a different context under different sets of circumstances. [Vide Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union v. Delhi Improvement Trust, AIR 1957 SC 344, Maharaj Singh v. State of U.P., (1977) 1 SCC 155], Municipal Corpn. of Hyderabad v. P.N. Murthy, (1987) 1 SCC 568, Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat v. Nori Venkatarama Deekshithulu, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 228, M. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 360, SCC p. 404, para 41, State of A.P. v. Nizam, Hyderabad, (1996) 3 SCC 282, K.V. Shivakumar v. Appropriate Authority, (2000) 3 SCC 485, Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn., (2001) 8 SCC 143 and Sulochana Chandrakant Galande v. Pune Municipal Transport, (2010) 8 SCC 467.” (emphasis supplied) 258. Thus, it is apparent that vesting is with possession and the statute has provided under Sections 16 and 17 of the 1894 Act that once possession is taken, absolute vesting occurred. It is an indefeasible right and vesting is with possession thereafter. The vesting specified under Section 16, takes place after various steps, such as, notification under Section 4, declaration under Section 6, notice under Section 9, award under Section 11 and then possession. The statutory provision of vesting of property absolutely free from all encumbrances has to be accorded full effect. Not only the possession vests in the State but all other encumbrances are also removed forthwith. The title of the landholder ceases and the State becomes the absolute owner and in possession of the property. Thereafter there is no control of the landowner over the property. He cannot have any animus to take the property and to control it. Even if he has retained the possession or otherwise trespassed upon it after possession has been taken by the State, he is a trespasser and such possession of trespasser enures for his benefit and on behalf of the owner. 259. After the land has vested in the State, the total control is of the State. Only the State has a right to deal with the same. In Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn., (2001) 8 SCC 143, this Court discussed the concept of vesting in the context of Section 220 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act. It has referred to various decisions including that of Richardson v. Robertson, (1862) 6 LT 75] thus : (SCC pp. 147 & 149, paras 8 & 15) “8. It is no doubt true that Section 220 provides that any drain which vests in the Corporation is a municipal drain and shall be under the control of the Corporation. In this context, the question arises as to what meaning is required to assign to the word “vest” occurring in Section 220 of the Act? In Richardson v. Robertson LT p. 78, it was observed by Lord Cranworth as under : (LT p. 78) ‘The word “vest” is a word, at least, of ambiguous import. Prima facie “vesting” in possession is the more natural meaning. The expressions “investiture” — “clothing” — and whatever else be the explanation as to the origin of the word, point prima facie rather to the enjoyment than to the obtaining of a right. But I am willing to accede to the argument that was pressed at the Bar, that by long usage “vesting” originally means the having obtained an absolute and indefeasible right, [2026:RJ-JP:26865] (24 of 28) [CW-3205/1987] as contradistinguished from the not having so obtained it. But it cannot be disputed that the word “vesting” may mean, and often does mean, that which is its primary etymological signification, namely, vesting in possession.’ 15. We are, therefore, of the view that the word “vest” means vesting in title, vesting in possession or vesting in a limited sense, as indicated in the context in which it is used in a particular provision of the Act.” (emphasis supplied) 260. The word “vest” has to be construed in the context in which it is used in a particular provision of the Act. Vesting is absolute and free from all encumbrances that includes possession. Once there is vesting of land, once possession has been taken, Section 24(2) does not contemplate divesting of the property from the State as mentioned above.” 26. It is by now well settled through above catena of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that once land vests in the State upon taking possession, such vesting cannot ordinarily be undone and the land cannot be divested except by an express statutory provision authorizing such divestment. In the absence of any such statutory authority, neither executive action, nor any subsequent administrative decision can revest the land in the original owner. Consequently, a challenge to the acquisition proceedings after the stage of award and possession is viewed by the Courts with great circumspection, as interference at such a stage would not only unsettle vested rights but would also adversely affect the public purpose for which the acquisition was undertaken. Therefore, after vesting has taken place, the original landholder ceases to have any proprietary interest in the acquired land and, save in exceptional cases involving patent lack of jurisdiction or fraud going to the root of the matter, the acquisition cannot ordinarily be reopened or invalidated. 27. The argument founded upon the report dated 01.08.1986 of the Land Acquisition Officer also does not advance the petitioners' case. A report made by the Land Acquisition Officer is merely [2026:RJ-JP:26865] (25 of 28) [CW-3205/1987] recommendatory in nature and does not create any vested or enforceable right in favour of a landholder. Even otherwise in the present case, admittedly, notification under Section 17(4) of the Act to dispense with enquiry was issued on 07.06.1986 and thereafter, possession was also taken on 24.07.1986, hence, any report of enquiry submitted thereafter by the Land Acquisition Officer on 01.08.1986 is meaningless and has got no enforceable legal effect, being against the scheme of the Act. Merely because the Land Acquisition Officer, after publication of Notification under Section 17(4) and after taking possession, expressed an opinion that the land may be released from acquisition, the petitioners cannot claim any legal entitlement to de-acquisition. 28. The petitioners have also heavily relied upon the notification dated 14.06.1990. However, the respondents have specifically pleaded that the said notification was issued by mistake and was subsequently withdrawn by notification dated 26.12.1990. More importantly, by the time the notification dated 14.06.1990 was issued, possession had already been taken on 24.07.1986 and the award had also been passed on 29.02.1988. Therefore, the land had already vested in the State. Once vesting has occurred, there remains no authority in law to withdraw from acquisition. Consequently, even if any tentative or erroneous notification proposing de-acquisition was issued, the same could not confer any legal right upon the petitioners. 29. It is equally well settled that the power of the Government to withdraw from acquisition or to de-acquire land can be exercised only so long as the acquired land has not vested in the State. Once possession of the land is taken in pursuance of acquisition proceedings and vesting takes place by operation of law, the State [2026:RJ-JP:26865] (26 of 28) [CW-3205/1987] itself becomes divested of any authority to withdraw from the acquisition in the absence of a specific statutory provision enabling such action. The rationale behind the aforesaid principle is that vesting of acquired land is not a mere administrative consequence but a statutory consequence flowing from the acquisition proceedings. Once such vesting takes place, neither the Government, nor any of its authorities can, by an executive order or administrative decision, nullify the legal effect of vesting. Any contrary view would create uncertainty in public projects and defeat the very object of compulsory acquisition undertaken for a public purpose. 30. Therefore, notification dated 14.06.1990, having been issued after possession had already been taken and vesting had already occurred, was clearly dehors the provisions of law and incapable of conferring any legal, vested or enforceable right upon the petitioners. The petitioners, therefore, cannot claim any benefit on the basis of the said notification nor can they assert any legitimate expectation founded thereupon. In fact, the subsequent notification dated 26.12.1990, whereby the earlier notification dated 14.06.1990 was withdrawn, was only a corrective measure undertaken to rectify an action which was otherwise unsustainable in law. 31. The above view of this Court is well supported by the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajasthan Housing Board & Others vs. Shri Kishan & Others (supra), Satendra Prasad Jain & Others (supra) and Bangalore Development Authority & Others (supra) and Indore Development Authority (supra), as well as judgment of this Court in the case of Allah Bux & Others (supra), wherein it was held that once statutory vesting has taken [2026:RJ-JP:26865] (27 of 28) [CW-3205/1987] place, there exists no mechanism under the law by which the land can revert to the original owner merely on the basis of a subsequent executive decision. 32. Thus, viewed from any angle, the petitioners cannot derive any advantage from the notification dated 14.06.1990, and the challenge to the subsequent notification dated 26.12.1990 is wholly misconceived and devoid of merit. The withdrawal of the earlier notification dated 14.06.1990 was legally justified, as the respondents could not have permitted an action which was itself contrary to the statutory consequences flowing from the acquisition proceedings and the vesting of land in the State. 33. The plea of discrimination based upon exclusion of neighbouring land of Allah Bux and others also deserves rejection. It reveals from the judgment of Allah Bux & Others (supra) that the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court directed to release the land of Allah Bux and others only on account of the fact that construction was existing on his land and it was not a vacant land. Whereas in the present case, the respondents have come out with a specific case that out of total measurement of 15 Biswas of Petitioners’ land, Petrol pump and other construction were existing only over 9 Biswas, hence, other part measuring 6 Biswas, which was a vacant land was acquired by the respondents. The petitioners have not produced any material demonstrating that the allegedly excluded land was identically situated in all respects. Mere exclusion of some parcels of land does not ipso facto establish hostile discrimination. Hence, the reliance placed by the petitioners upon the decision in the case of Allah Bux & Others (supra) is also misconceived, in which relief was granted by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court upon its own facts and circumstances. Moreover, a claim founded on parity cannot [2026:RJ-JP:26865] (28 of 28) [CW-3205/1987] override statutory consequences flowing from vesting of land after award and possession. 34. For all the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the considered opinion that the acquisition proceedings have long since attained finality. The award dated 29.02.1988 and possession memo dated 24.07.1986 conclusively establish that the acquired land vested in the State free from all encumbrances. The alleged recommendation of the Land Acquisition Officer given after notification under Section 17(4) and after taking possession of the land in question and the subsequently withdrawn notification dated 14.06.1990 do not confer any enforceable right upon the petitioners. No arbitrariness, mala fides, violation of constitutional provisions or jurisdictional error has been established warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 35. Consequently, the writ petition being devoid of merit, deserves dismissal and the same is accordingly dismissed. 36. All pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. (ANAND SHARMA),J MANOJ NARWANI/